State v. Roberts , 2023 Ohio 1025 ( 2023 )

[Cite as State v. Roberts, 2023-Ohio-1025.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 30143
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
AMANDA ROBERTS AKRON MUNICIPAL COURT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 21TRC03879
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: March 29, 2023
FLAGG LANZINGER, Judge.
{¶1} Amanda Roberts appeals from the judgment of the Akron Municipal Court that
denied her motion to dismiss based upon an alleged violation of her speedy-trial rights. For the
following reasons, this Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} On January 18, 2021, Ms. Roberts was charged in case number 21TR00755 (“First
Case”) with violations of: (1) R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) (OVI); (2) R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(f) (OVI with
prohibited blood alcohol content); (3) R.C. 4549.02 (failure to stop after an accident); (4) R.C.
4511.202 (failure to control); and (5) R.C. 4511.36 (improper turn).1 All of the charges stemmed
from events that occurred on December 30, 2020. On January 20, 2021, counsel for Ms. Roberts
1
As the State points out, on January 18, 2021, Ms. Roberts was also charged in case number
21CR00487 with a violation of R.C. 4301.62 (open container), but that case is not relevant this
appeal.
2
entered an appearance and “waive[d] all statutory time requirements.” On March 15, 2021, the
trial court dismissed the case without prejudice.
{¶3} On June 2, 2021, the State re-filed the same charges against Ms. Roberts in case
number 21TR06879 (“Second Case”), with the exception that the State replaced the previous
charge of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(f) (OVI with prohibited blood alcohol content) with a charge under
R.C. 4511.19(A) for a prohibited “breath alcohol content[.]”2 There is no indication that Ms.
Roberts waived her speedy-trial rights in the Second Case.
{¶4} According to the stipulated documents the parties filed with this Court under
App.R. 9(E), the trial court set the matter for a suppression hearing on July 1, 2021. As the State
points out in its merit brief, Ms. Roberts had yet to file a motion to suppress in the Second Case,
but the trial court scheduled a suppression hearing, presumably because Ms. Roberts filed a motion
to suppress in the First Case. Regardless, on June 25, 2021, the parties agreed to continue the
suppression hearing until July 13, 2021. On July 12, 2021, Ms. Roberts filed her motion to
suppress, which she then withdrew at the suppression hearing the following day.
{¶5} After Ms. Roberts’s trial counsel withdrew her motion to suppress at the
suppression hearing, the parties discussed a proposed trial date on the record. The transcript
indicates that the parties and court agreed upon a trial date in late August 2021.
{¶6} On August 26, 2021, prior to the trial date, Ms. Roberts moved to dismiss the
Second Case based upon an alleged violation of her speedy-trial rights, which the trial court
summarily denied. Ms. Roberts now appeals that decision to this Court, raising one assignment of
error for this Court’s review.
2
The Akron Municipal Court’s docket reflects that Ms. Roberts was charged with an OVI under
“4511.19A4” for a prohibited “breath alcohol content[.]” This appears to be a typographical error
since R.C. 4511.19(A) does not contain a subsection (4).
3
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MS. ROBERTS’[S] MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR SPEEDY TRIAL WHEN THE STATE DISMISSED AND
REFILED SIMILAR CHARGES OUTSIDE OF THE 90-DAY SPEEDY TRIAL
TIMETABLE, MINUS TIME TOLLED BY THE DEFENSE.
{¶7} In her sole assignment of error, Ms. Roberts argues that the trial court erred when
it denied her motion to dismiss. For the following reasons, this Court disagrees.
{¶8} As an initial matter, this Court notes that Ms. Roberts has based her assignment of
error solely on her statutory right to a speedy trial, and this Court will limit its analysis accordingly.
See State v. Detamore, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 15AP0026, 2016-Ohio-4682, ¶ 6 (declining to address
the defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial when the defendant did not develop a
constitutional argument on appeal).
{¶9} A trial court’s determination of speedy trial issues presents a mixed question of law
and fact. State v. Fields, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 12CA0045, 2013-Ohio-4970, ¶ 8. “When reviewing
an appellant’s claim that [s]he was denied h[er] right to a speedy trial, this Court applies the de
novo standard of review to questions of law and the clearly erroneous standard of review to
questions of fact.” Id., quoting State v. Downing, 9th Dist. Summit No. 22012, 2004-Ohio-5952,
¶ 36.
{¶10} “The right of an accused to a speedy trial is recognized by the Constitutions of both
the United States and the State of Ohio.” State v. Pachay, 64 Ohio St.2d 218, 219 (1980). Ohio’s
statutory speedy trial provisions, R.C. 2945.71 et seq., “constitute a rational effort to enforce the
constitutional right to a public speedy trial of an accused charged with the commission of a felony
or a misdemeanor * * *.” Pachay at syllabus. Thus, “for purposes of bringing an accused to trial,
the statutory speedy trial provisions of R.C. 2945.71 et seq. and the constitutional guarantees found
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in the United States and Ohio Constitutions are coextensive.” State v. O’Brien, 34 Ohio St.3d 7, 9
(1987).
{¶11} R.C. 4511.19(G)(1)(a) provides that a violation of R.C. 4511.19(A), under which
Ms. Roberts was charged, is a first-degree misdemeanor. Under the speedy-trial statute, a person
charged with a first-degree misdemeanor must be brought to trial within 90 days after the person’s
arrest or the service of summons. R.C. 2945.71(B)(2); see R.C. 2945.71(D) (providing that a
person, like Ms. Roberts, charged with offenses of different degrees that arose out of the same act
or transaction shall be tried within the time period required for the highest degree of offense
charged). Certain conditions, however, operate to “toll” the time within which an accused must be
brought to trial. State v. Dalton, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 09CA009589, 2009-Ohio-6910, ¶ 21. R.C.
2945.72 outlines the various statutory tolling events, including periods of delay necessitated by a
motion “made or instituted by the accused[.]” R.C. 2945.72(E).
{¶12} Here, Ms. Roberts’s trial counsel “waive[d] all statutory time requirements” in the
First Case. That waiver did not mention a specific time period and, therefore, was unlimited in
duration. State v. Bray, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 03CA008241, 2004-Ohio-1067, ¶ 8, quoting State v.
Kovacek, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 00CA007713, 2001 WL 577664, *4 (May 30, 2001) (“[A] waiver
that expressly waives the accused’s right to a speedy trial under the statute without mentioning a
specific time period is unlimited in duration.”). Additionally, because the waiver did not include a
specific date as the starting point for the tolling of time, “the waiver is deemed to be effective from
the date of arrest.” State v. Buck, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27597, 2017-Ohio-273, ¶ 11, quoting State
v. Matland, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 09-MA-115, 2010-Ohio-6585, ¶ 47. As a result, the waiver
from the First Case was effective from the date of the arrest and continued through the date of the
dismissal (i.e., March 15, 2021). The speedy-trial clock did not begin to run again until the State
5
re-filed its charges against Ms. Roberts. See State v. Davis, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 08CA009412,
2008-Ohio-6741, ¶ 12 (“When charges are dismissed, the time between the dismissal and a
subsequent indictment on the same conduct does not count toward the speedy trial deadline.”);
State v. Broughton, 62 Ohio St.3d 253, 259-60 (1991).
{¶13} As previously noted, the State re-filed its charges against Ms. Roberts on June 2,
2021. The earliest the speedy-trial clock could have started in the Second Case was on June 3,
2021 (i.e., the day after the service of summons), and the earliest it could have expired—absent
any tolling events—was August 31, 2021 (i.e., 90 days later). See R.C. 2945.71(B)(2); Akron v.
Cody, 9th Dist. Summit No. 19986, 2000 WL 1257807, *1 (Sept. 6, 2000) (“[S]peedy trial time
begins to run the day after the date of arrest or service of summons.”).
{¶14} On August 26, 2021, Ms. Roberts filed her motion to dismiss based upon an alleged
violation of her speedy-trial rights. By that point, however, less than 90 days had elapsed. Thus,
regardless of any tolling events that occurred between June 3, 2021 and August 26, 2021, which
would further undermine Ms. Roberts’s argument, the trial court did not err by denying Ms.
Roberts’s motion to dismiss because 90 days had not elapsed by the time she filed her motion. See
State v. Howard, 7th Dist. Belmont No. 08 BE 6, 2009-Ohio-3251, ¶ 21 (holding that the trial court
did not err by denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds because, at the
time the defendant filed his motion to dismiss, less than 90 days had passed); State v. Squillace,
10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-958, 2016-Ohio-1038, ¶ 21 (same); see also State v. Coleman, 9th
Dist. Summit No. 30060, 2022-Ohio-3807, ¶ 17 (reversing the trial court’s judgment that granted
the defendant’s motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds when, at the time the defendant filed his
motion to dismiss, the speedy-trial time had not expired).
6
{¶15} Even considering the events that occurred after Ms. Roberts filed her motion to
dismiss, Ms. Roberts has not established a violation of her speedy-trial rights. Ms. Roberts’s
motion to dismiss (filed August 26, 2021) tolled the speedy-trial clock. See R.C. 2945.72(E); State
v. Szorady, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 02CA008159, 2003-Ohio-2716, ¶ 14 (acknowledging that a
defendant’s motion to dismiss based upon an alleged speedy-trial violation tolls the speedy-trial
clock). While the trial court’s denial of Ms. Roberts’s motion to dismiss does not contain a time-
and-date stamp, according to Ms. Roberts’s merit brief, the trial court denied her motion to dismiss
on August 31, 2021. The speedy-trial clock, therefore, remained tolled until that time. Id.{¶16} The following day, on September 1, 2021, Ms. Roberts moved the trial court to
reconsider its decision denying her motion to dismiss, which again tolled the speedy-trial clock.
See R.C. 2945.72(E); State v. Lewis, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28962, 2021-Ohio-1895, ¶ 62 (“If
a motion to dismiss tolls the [speedy-trial] statute, logic dictates that a motion to reconsider a
decision on dismissal would also have a tolling effect.”). That motion remained pending until
September 8, 2021, when Ms. Roberts pleaded no contest, the trial court entered a judgment of
conviction, and any pending motions not ruled upon were deemed denied. See State ex rel. Pedraza
v. Kimbler, 9th Dist. Medina No. 20CA0055-M, 2021-Ohio-993, ¶ 6, quoting State ex rel. Nash v.
Fuerst, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99027, 2013-Ohio-592, ¶ 8 (“To the extent that there were motions
that the trial judge did not explicitly resolve, they are deemed denied.”). Thus, even considering
the events that occurred after Ms. Roberts filed her motion to dismiss, she has not established a
violation of her statutory speedy-trial rights.
{¶17} In light of the foregoing, Ms. Roberts’s assignment of error is overruled.
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III.
{¶18} Ms. Roberts’s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Akron
Municipal Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Akron Municipal
Court, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
JILL FLAGG LANZINGER
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, P. J.
STEVENSON, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
JONATHAN T. SINN, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
EVE V. BELFANCE, Director of Law, and KIRSTEN L. SMITH, Assistant Director of Law, for
Appellee.