Printz v. Printz , 2013 Ohio 5344 ( 2013 )

[Cite as Printz v. Printz, 2013-Ohio-5344.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DARKE COUNTY
KAREN E. PRINTZ :
: Appellate Case No. 2013-CA-2
Plaintiff-Appellee :
: Trial Court Case No. 86-DIV-48917
v. :
:
TODD A. PRINTZ and JOHN C. : (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas
PRINTZ, Co-Executors of the Estate : (Court, Domestic Relations)
of ANTHONY L. PRINTZ, Deceased :
(In substitution for Anthony L. Printz) :
:
Defendants-Appellants :
:
...........
OPINION
Rendered on the 6th day of December, 2013.
...........
SCOTT D. RUDNICK, Atty. Reg. #0000853, Law Office of Scott D. Rudnick, Ltd., 121 West
Third Street, Greenville, Ohio 45331
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
JON PAUL RION, Atty. Reg. #0067020, and NICOLE RUTTER-HIRTH, Atty. Reg. #0081004,
Rion, Rion & Rion, L.P.A., Inc., 130 West Second Street, Suite 2150, Dayton, Ohio 45402
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant, Anthony L. Printz, Deceased
.............
HALL, J.,
{¶ 1} Anthony Printz appeals the trial court’s order that he sign a Qualified Domestic
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Relations Order (QDRO) that gives his former wife, Karen Printz, a joint interest in his pension
benefits. Anthony contends that their decree of divorce gives her only a survivorship interest. In
light of the evidence, the court’s interpretation of the decree’s language is reasonable. We
affirm.1
FACTS
{¶ 2} In 1986, Karen filed a complaint for divorce. A referee was appointed who filed
a report and recommendation. In the report, the referee found that Anthony and Karen were
married in 1965, that Anthony has worked for 22 years as an assembler at Sheller-Globe
Corporation, and that Karen has worked for 13 years as a “secretary-teacher’s aide” in a school.
The referee found that Anthony and Karen entered into a separation agreement as to several
matters, including Anthony’s pension benefits:
(5) The Plaintiff shall receive a joint and survivorship benefit from the
Defendant’s pension at Sheller-Globe, with the benefits to be determined at the
date of the Defendant’s retirement. The benefit shall be determined by the
following formula:
21/no. Years the Defendant works at Sheller-Globe X 1/2.
The Defendant shall be responsible to provide and execute all documents
necessary for the Plaintiff to receive that benefit.
(Emphasis added.) (July 20, 1987 Report and Recommendation, 1). The referee recommended
that the separation agreement be found fair and equitable and made an order of the court. The
1
On September 6, 2013, this Court was notified of the death of Appellant, Anthony L. Printz. Todd A. Printz and John C. Printz,
co-executors of the Estate of Anthony L. Printz, were substituted as Appellants in this matter on October 25, 2013 pursuant to App.R. 29(A).
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referee also recommended that Anthony pay alimony. Anthony objected to the alimony
recommendation, but he did not object to the referee’s recital of the separation agreement. While
the trial court sustained Anthony’s objection and reduced the length of Anthony’s alimony
obligation, the court “affirmed and approved” the rest of the referee’s report. (Aug. 19, 1987
Judgment Entry, 2).
{¶ 3} In September 1987, the trial court entered a final decree of divorce. Alimony, the
decree says, was the only unresolved issue between the parties. “[T]he parties have entered into
certain oral agreements regarding property division, which are hereinafter set forth in writing.”
(Sept. 28, 1987 Judgment Entry-Final Decree of Divorce, 1). The court stated their agreement
regarding Anthony’s pension benefits this way:
5. Defendant shall designate Plaintiff as survivorship beneficiary on
Defendant’s existing Pension Plan through his employer, Sheller-Globe
Corporation, for an amount equal to one-half of a fraction in which the numerator
is twenty-one (21) years, and the denominator is the number of years Defendant is
vested in his Pension Plan, as of the date of his retirement, death, or other
qualifying act, by which Defendant is entitled to receive his Pension Plan benefits.
(Emphasis added.) (Id. at 2)
{¶ 4} In 1990, Karen filed a motion asking the trial court to order Anthony to give her
information about his pension–specifically, “what date he can withdraw and when he plans to
withdraw it.” (Oct. 11, 1990 Motion). Karen states in the motion that she is asking “that the
Court make such order to protect her pension rights.” (Id.). The court entered an agreed order that
requires Anthony to notify Karen “of any application of withdrawal of retirement monies from
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his retirement pay.” (Nov. 21, 1990 Agreed Order). The agreed order also states that Anthony
“understands his obligation to the Plaintiff for that part of his pension plan as stated in paragraph
5 of the Final Decree and Judgment of Divorce.” (Id.).
{¶ 5} Anthony retired in November 1990 and in 2008 began receiving pension benefits.
In 2012, Karen had a QDRO drafted, but Anthony refused to sign it. He said that the divorce
decree’s pension provision gives her only a survivorship right–a right to benefits after he dies.
Karen filed a motion to enforce the pension provision, asking the trial court to order Anthony to
sign the QDRO or to appoint a special commissioner to sign it. The matter was referred to a
magistrate. In February 2013, after a hearing at which Karen and Anthony testified, the
magistrate issued a decision sustaining Karen’s motion. Based largely on the referee’s report, the
magistrate found that the parties had intended that Karen also have a joint right to Anthony’s
pension benefits. After quoting the divorce decree’s pension provision, the magistrate continued:
To date, a QDRO has not been filed. Counsel for the Plaintiff recently
caused a QDRO to be prepared, pursuant to which the Plaintiff would begin to get
her share of the pension immediately, as the Defendant has retired and is currently
receiving all of the pension benefits. The Defendant has not signed it, on the
advice of counsel, because it is their belief that she is not entitled to any benefits
until after the Defendant’s death, citing the language in the Decree that says he is
to designate her as survivorship beneficiary.
Testimony was given at this hearing by both parties. It was the Defendant’s
memory that the Plaintiff was not to get any benefits until after his death, and that
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all he had to do was to name her as beneficiary. He did not, however do that, and
he testified that he has been receiving benefits since 2008.
It was the Plaintiff’s understanding that she was to begin to get benefits
when the Defendant retired, then to continue to do so after his death.
The Magistrate finds that neither party’s testimony is reliable as to their
intent and what may or may not have been put on the record, given the fact that
neither party even remembers having been in court with the other’s lawyer that
day or having given any testimony.
As the case is so old, the Magistrate did not have the complete file on the
day of the hearing on the current motion. Counsel for the parties agreed that the
Magistrate would check to see whether a recording of the original divorce hearing
still exists, as well as whether there is anything in the original file which would
shed light on the parties’ intent. As indicated above, following the original hearing
a Report and Recommendation of the Referee was filed. The report reflects that
the parties were both in court. The Report specifically enumerated the parties’
agreement. Section 5 indicated that the Plaintiff was to receive a joint and
survivorship benefit from the Defendant’s pension, based on the formula
designated in the Decree. The parties also agreed that the Defendant was to be
responsible to provide and execute all documents necessary for the Plaintiff to
receive the benefit. It was recommended that the agreement be adopted as an order
of the court. Although the Defendant objected, the only issue about which he
objected was alimony. The court modified the alimony award, but affirmed and
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approved the balance of the report.
The Magistrate finds that the Plaintiff’s motion for an order appointing a
commissioner to sign the QDRO which has been prepared is well taken. While the
Decree itself may be somewhat ambiguous, it is clear from the Report and
Recommendation of the Referee that the Plaintiff’s benefits were not intended to
be limited to taking place only after the Defendant’s death.
(Feb. 21, 2013 Magistrate’s Decision and Order). The magistrate recommended that if Anthony
had not signed the QDRO by a certain date, a special commissioner be appointed to sign it.
Anthony filed objections to the magistrate’s decision, but the trial court overruled them and
adopted the magistrate’s decision and recommended order.
{¶ 6} Anthony appealed.
ANALYSIS
{¶ 7} The sole assignment of error alleges that the trial court erred in awarding Karen a
joint interest in the pension benefits. Anthony argues that by doing so the court disregarded the
divorce decree.
{¶ 8} “Domestic relations courts may not modify property divisions ordered in a prior
decree of divorce. Nevertheless, ‘If there is good faith confusion over the interpretation to be
given to a particular clause of a divorce decree, the trial court in enforcing that decree has the
power to hear the matter, clarify the confusion, and resolve the dispute.’” (Citation omitted.)
Browne v. Browne, 2d Dist. Greene No. 02CA117, 2003-Ohio-2853, ¶ 12, quoting Quisenberry
v. Quisenberry, 91 Ohio App. 3d 341, 348, 632 N.E.2d 916 (2d Dist.1993). For a reviewing court,
the issue is whether the trial court, in clarifying the confusion, abused its discretion–that is,
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whether the trial court made the decision with an “‘unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable’”
attitude. Browne at ¶ 13, quoting Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St. 3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d
1140 (1983).
{¶ 9} The referee’s report plainly shows that Anthony and Karen intended Karen to
have not only a survivorship right but also a joint right. Anthony never objected to the referee’s
recital of their pension-benefits agreement, and the trial court expressly “affirmed and approved”
it. The 1990 agreed order also suggests a joint-right intent. If Karen thought that she had no right
to the benefits until Anthony died, why would she want to know when he can and will begin
receiving them while alive? That the trial court thought that Karen also had a right to joint
benefits is suggested by the fact that it entered the agreed order at all. Otherwise, why would it
bother ordering Anthony to give Karen this information? Given this evidence, the magistrate’s
interpretation, adopted by the trial court, is reasonable.2
{¶ 10} We recognize that because “[a] separation agreement is a contract * * * a court
can only consider parol evidence if there are ambiguous terms in the contract.” (Citation
omitted.) Robinson v. Robinson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 17562, 1999 WL 1082656, *6 (Dec.
3, 1999). But in this case, we do not consider whether the pension provision is ambiguous.
Anthony did not object to the magistrate’s using extrinsic evidence to determine the meaning of
the pension provision. Indeed, he agreed to let the magistrate use anything in the original case file
to clarify how the parties intended to divide his pension benefits. Anthony therefore waived any
error concerning the magistrate’s use of the referee’s report or anything else in the original case
2
It may well be that because Anthony failed to elect a survivorship benefit, as he admits he was required to do, and because has
been receiving benefits for several years, the pension administrator may resist modification by court order. That may entail subsequent
alteration of the court’s order. That issue is not now before us.
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file. See Miller v. Miller, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2001CA00189, 2002 WL 138498, *4 (Jan. 28,
2002) (concluding that because appellant did not object at trial to the admission of a
memorandum written by appellee’s trial counsel, which the magistrate relied on to interpret the
parties’ separation agreement, appellant waived any error concerning its admission); Evid.R.
103(A)(1).
{¶ 11} Anthony also argues that the magistrate’s decision is not equitable. He contends
that awarding Karen a right to joint pension benefits is inequitable because her retirement
benefits were never divided. Karen has a pension in the State Teachers’ Retirement System
(STRS), and neither the referee’s report nor the divorce decree mentions it. Anthony says that the
court here should have considered her pension. But the trial court here awarded Karen nothing; it
merely enforced Anthony and Karen’s own agreement, which they presumably believed was
equitable. Anthony contends also that because Karen waited to pursue her right to joint benefits
until five years after he began to receive them she is barred from doing so by the doctrine of
laches. 3 He says that Karen’s delay hurts him because he will have to pay her five years of
retroactive benefits. And he says that he now has health issues and relies on the amount he
currently receives each month, an amount that would be reduced if Karen is allowed to claim her
share. Anthony did not raise the laches issue before the trial court, so we will not address it here.
{¶ 12} The sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 13} The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
3
“‘The affirmative defense of laches is an equitable doctrine barring an action because of an unexcused delay that prejudices an
adversary.’” (Citation omitted.) Baker v. Chrysler, 179 Ohio App. 3d 351, 2008-Ohio-6032, 901 N.E.2d 875, ¶ 31 (2d Dist.), quoting
Dayspring of Miami Valley v. Carmean, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2007 CA 28, 2007-Ohio-7159, ¶ 29.
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.............
WELBAUM and YARBROUGH, JJ., concur.
(Hon. Steve A. Yarbrough, Sixth District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio).
Copies mailed to:
Scott D. Rudnick
Jon Paul Rion
Nicole Rutter-Hirth
Hon. Jonathan P. Hein