Kapadia v. Kapadia , 2012 Ohio 808 ( 2012 )

[Cite as Kapadia v. Kapadia, 2012-Ohio-808.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 96910
DARSHAN DILRANJAN KAPADIA
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
SALLY SAAD KAPADIA
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Domestic Relations Division
Case No. D-306907
BEFORE: Rocco, P.J., E. Gallagher, J., and Kilbane, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 1, 2012
2
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
L. Bryan Carr
Leonard F. Carr
The Carr Law Firm
1392 S.O.M. Center Road
Mayfield Heights, Ohio 44124
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Joseph G. Stafford
Gregory J. Moore
Stafford & Stafford Co., L.P.A.
55 Erieview Plaza, 5th Floor
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
3
KENNETH A. ROCCO, P.J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Sally Saad Kapadia appeals from a domestic relations
(“DR”) court order finding her in contempt for failing to pay plaintiff-appellee Darshan
Dilranjan Kapadia 1 $204,990.13 toward a court-ordered division of property, and
sentencing her to 30 days in jail for the contempt; the DR court stated Sally could purge
her contempt by (1) paying appellee $39,990.13 within 14 days of the court’s order, and
(2) paying appellee $8,700 toward his attorney fees within 14 days of the court’s order.
{¶2} The first issue this court must consider is Darshan’s motion to dismiss this
appeal. Darshan argues the contempt order should not be reviewed on two grounds.
{¶3} Darshan initially contends that the DR court’s order is not final and
appealable because the court did not impose sentence. However, the DR court did
impose a sentence, viz., 30 days in jail. The DR court ordered Sally to serve this
sentence if she did not purge her contempt by making the required payments.
Although some other districts might hold that such an order is not final because the
appellant was not yet actually required to serve the sentence, this district has found
otherwise. Abernethy v. Abernethy, 8th Dist. No. 92708, 2010-Ohio-435, ¶ 36.2
1Hereinafter, the parties are referred to by their first names.
2Some other districts have held that a contempt order is not appealable until the sentence of
imprisonment is actually imposed. In those districts, a contempt order is appealable only after the
appellant fails to comply with the purge order and the court actually imposes sentence. See, e.g., In
re Estate of Sheehan, 11th Dist. No. 2007-G-2774, 2007-Ohio-2571.
4
{¶4} The instant case is distinguishable from the cases Darshan cites precisely
because the contempt order herein includes a sentence. Cf., Cooper v. Cooper, 14 Ohio
App.3d 327, 471 N.E.2d 525 (8th Dist.1984); Chain Bike v. Spoke ‘n Wheel, Inc., 64
Ohio App.2d 62, 410 N.E.2d 802 (8th Dist.1979). Similarly, Darshan’s citation to this
court’s summary dismissal of the appeal in Bawab v. Bawab, 8th Dist. No. 92787 (May
19, 2009), has no precedential weight because neither the facts of that case nor the basis
for the panel’s decision can be discerned from its order.
{¶5} Pursuant to R.C. 2705.09, “[t]he judgment or order of a court or officer made
in cases of contempt may be reviewed on appeal.” A “final order in contempt of court
proceedings” requires “both a finding of contempt and the imposition of a sentence or
penalty. The mere adjudication of contempt of court is not a final appealable order until
a sanction or penalty is also imposed.” Abernethy v. Abernethy, 8th Dist. No. 92708,
2010-Ohio-435, ¶ 36. In this case, the DR court’s order sentences Sally to a jail term
unless she purges her contempt by making certain payments; therefore, it constitutes an
appealable order under the statute.
{¶6} Darshan also contends that this appeal is moot because appellant has paid the
amounts the court required to purge the contempt. “Exhibit B” attached to Darshan’s
motion indicates that Sally made one of the two ordered purge payments before the
contempt judgment was entered.
5
{¶7} The docket of this case, however, shows that Sally did not make the second
payment until after she filed this appeal and after both the domestic relations court and
this court denied her motion for a stay pending appeal. Under these circumstances,
Sally’s payment cannot be considered voluntary and, therefore, does not waive her right
to appeal the DR order. Janosek v. Janosek, 8th Dist. Nos. 86771 and 86777,
2007-Ohio-68, ¶ 124; see also Cleveland Hts. v. Lewis, 129 Ohio St.3d 389,
2011-Ohio-2673, 953 N.E.2d 278.
{¶8} Based upon the foregoing, Darshan’s motion to dismiss this appeal is denied,
and this court will proceed to the merits of the case.
{¶9} Sally presents three assignments of error in challenging the DR court’s order
that found her in contempt. She argues that the DR court should not have adopted the
magistrate’s decision because the evidence presented at the hearing did not support a
finding that Sally was in contempt of court. Sally also argues an $8,700.00 award to
Darshan in attorney fees was neither based upon the evidence nor proper as a “purge”
condition.
{¶10} Having reviewed the record with Sally’s arguments in mind, this court finds
that none has merit. Consequently, Sally’s assignments of error are overruled. The
DR court’s order is affirmed.
{¶11} This is the second time this court has addressed issues arising from the
parties’ divorce. In Kapadia v. Kapadia, 8th Dist. No. 94456, 2011-Ohio-22556
(“Kapadia I”), Sally challenged aspects of the DR court’s divorce decree with respect to
the valuation and division of property and her payment schedule. This court considered
Sally’s arguments, but affirmed the DR court’s decree. The relevant portions of
Kapadia I are set forth as follows.
Darshan and Sally were married on June 5, 1993 and have one child
born as issue of the marriage. From 1993 to 1995, the parties enjoyed a
modest lifestyle. Darshan worked for the Cleveland Metropolitan Housing
Authority and Sally worked at her parents’ convenient store. On April 1,
1995, the parties’ daughter, Anjani was born. That same year, Sally
became involved as an investor with Charley’s Grilled Subs * * * [,]
primarily owned by Charley M. Shin. Sally was a fifty percent owner with
her mother, Janette Saad in Anjani Inc., the entity that owned and operated
the Great Northern Mall store.
On October 30, 1996, Sally entered into an operating agreement
with Charley Shin and invested in Anjani II, Ltd., for a Charley’s Grilled
Subs store in Summit Mall. The agreement entitled Sally to a 40%
member interest, 50% of the cash flow and 40% of extraordinary items,
bringing her income to $11,000 per month. Sally worked as a consultant
and oversaw the general operations of all the franchise locations, the
numbers of which continued to grow over the years. By 2005, Sally was a
part owner of thirteen Charley’s Grilled Subs stores. * * * Darshan * * *
became employed by Satyam Technologies, where he continued to work
through trial. Darshan also worked part time at the Great Northern Mall
franchise whenever needed.
In 2005, the parties separated and Sally vacated the marital home.
Prior to the time of the parties’ separation, the couple maintained an upper
class standard of living. They lived in an affluent community in an
above-average priced home and enjoyed vacations in the United States,
Canada, India, Mexico, and Europe.
On September 20, 2005, Darshan filed a complaint for divorce * * *
The parties entered into a shared parenting plan on August 17, 2007
***.
***
In outlining the final division of property, the Magistrate found as
follows:
7
Asset/Debt Plaintiff
Defendant
Real estate $287,553.00
Anjani II
$1,020,600.00
Sales proceeds Anjani I
$81,839.00
Capital gains/income 2006–07
$665,035.00
Distributions 2008
$115,000.00
Defendant’s Cashier’s check
$14,000.00
Loan to Plaintiff’s brother $19,000.00
TOTAL $306,553.00
$1,896,474.00
GRAND TOTAL
$2,203,027.00
ONE HALF SHARE
$1,101,513.50
Plaintiff’s share to equalize $794,960.50
Distributive award to Plaintiff $75,000.00
TOTAL $869,960.50
Less property division funds held by Plaintiff’s attorney $50,000.00
DEFENDANT’S PAYMENT TO PLAINTIFF
$819,960.50
The trial court adopted the Magistrate’s findings and ordered Sally
to pay to Darshan “$819,960.50 in annual installments as follows: (a)
$204,990.13 on March 1, 2010 and March 1, 2011; and (b) $204,990.12 on
March 1, 2012 and March 1, 2013.”
***.
* * * [O]ur review of the trial court’s judgment entry leads us to
conclude that the trial court fashioned its order to protect the parties’
interests in the various assets, and to sever those interests in a proper
manner. We find that the payment schedule as set out by the trial court is
not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.
8
{¶12} In Kapadia I, this court thus affirmed Sally’s payment schedule. However,
due to a problem with the finality of the divorce decree, the decision in Kapadia I was
not issued until May 12, 2011.
{¶13} During the time the appeal in Kapadia I was pending, therefore, Sally’s first
installment of the property-division payment to Darshan under the divorce decree had
come due. Rather than paying the installment, Sally filed several motions in the DR
court. Darshan responded on April 8, 2010, by filing a motion to show cause; he sought
an order from the DR court finding Sally in contempt for failing to make the first
scheduled payment. Darshan requested an award of attorney fees in pursuing the matter.
{¶14} The record reflects Sally’s motions were subsequently resolved. In August
2010, Sally paid Darshan $60,000 on the outstanding amount. She made another
$25,000 payment in October 2010.
{¶15} Darshan’s motion to show cause proceeded to a hearing before a magistrate
that began on October 28, 2010 and concluded on January 21, 2011. In December 2010,
before the hearing concluded, Sally made a third payment of $80,000 to Darshan.
{¶16} The magistrate issued her report on April 4, 2011. While acknowledging
that Sally made three partial payments on the March 1, 2010 installment of the property
division payment due under the divorce decree, the magistrate nevertheless granted
Darshan’s motion to show cause, and held Sally in contempt of court.
9
{¶17} The magistrate found that Sally’s testimony, in which she claimed that she
did not have the financial ability to pay Darshan, was not credible. The magistrate based
this finding on several facts. First, Sally was able to make a lump sum tuition payment
of $25,000 in May 2010 to the parties’ child’s private school. Second, Sally appeared to
have the same partnership interest in the business that she had at the time of the divorce
decree. Third, Sally did not make any effort to corroborate her testimony with any tax
returns or financial statements.
{¶18} The magistrate also found that Darshan was entitled to an award of attorney
fees for prosecuting the motion to show cause. However, he was not entitled to an
award “of all attorney fees and expenses incurred since the divorce was finalized.”
Based upon a review of his attorneys’ fee statement, the magistrate determined Darshan
was entitled to $8,700.00.
{¶19} The magistrate sentenced Sally to 30 days in jail, but permitted Sally to
purge her contempt by: (1) paying Darshan the remaining amount due on the first
property division payment, viz., $39,990.13, and (2) paying Darshan $8,700.00 toward
his attorney fees; both were to be made within 14 days of the DR court’s journalization of
the contempt finding.
{¶20} Sally filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. A month later, the DR
court issued its decision, overruling Sally’s objections and adopting the magistrate’s
decision in its entirety.
10
{¶21} Sally’s appeal of the DR court’s order presents three assignments of error
for this court’s review.
“I. The trial court erred in finding Appellant in contempt of court.
“II. The trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to the Appellee in the
amount of $8,700.00.
“III. The trial court erred in making the payment of attorney fees on a
motion to show cause a ‘purge condition.”
{¶22} In her first assignment of error, Sally argues that the DR court acted
improperly in adopting the magistrate’s decision and finding her in contempt. 3 This
court disagrees.
{¶23} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d), a trial court “shall undertake an independent
review as to the objected matters to ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined
the factual issues and appropriately applied the law.” The trial court must conduct a de
novo review of the facts and an independent analysis of the issues to reach its own
conclusions about the issues in the case. Kapadia, 8th Dist. No. 94456,
2011-Ohio-2255, ¶ 9, citing Inman v. Inman, 101 Ohio App.3d 115, 655 N.E.2d 199 (2d
Dist.1995).
3Sally
makes several additional arguments in the “Statement of the Facts”
and the “Standard of Review” portions of her appellate brief, but because these
arguments are not made in compliance with App.R. 16(A), this court will not
address them. App.R. 12(A)(2).
11
{¶24} A trial court’s ruling on objections to a magistrate’s decision will not be
reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Gobel v. Rivers, 8th Dist. No. 94148,
2010-Ohio-4493, ¶ 16. An abuse of discretion implies that the court’s attitude was
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable, not merely an error of law or judgment.
Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). “Abuse of
discretion” is thus a term of art that describes a judgment comporting neither with the
record nor reason. See, e.g., State v. Ferranto, 112 Ohio St. 667, 676-678, 148 N.E. 362(1925).
{¶25} “A decision is unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning process that
would support that decision.” AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Comm. Redevelopment,
50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990). An abuse of discretion also may be
found when the trial court either “applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct
legal standard, or relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact.” Thomas v. Cleveland,
176 Ohio App.3d 401, 2008-Ohio-1720, 892 N.E.2d 454, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.).
{¶26} This court also reviews a contempt finding under an abuse of discretion
standard. In re Contempt of Modic, 8th Dist. No. 96598, 2011-Ohio-5396, at ¶ 7, citing
State ex rel. Celebrezze v. Gibbs, 60 Ohio St.3d 69, 573 N.E.2d 62 (1991). Contempt is
defined as a disregard of, or disobedience to, an order or command of judicial authority.
State v. Flinn, 7 Ohio App.3d 294, 455 N.E.2d 691 (9th Dist.1982).
12
{¶27} This case does not meet the test for an abuse of discretion. Sally never
disputed the fact that she failed to comply with the divorce decree; rather, she asserted
that she had a defense for her failure. Sally was required to establish this defense by a
preponderance of the evidence. Jeffers v. Jeffers, 7th Dist. No. 07 BE 36,
2008-Ohio-3339, at ¶ 15, citing Rinehart v. Rinehart, 87 Ohio App.3d 325, 328, 622
N.E.2d 359 (3d Dist.1997).
{¶28} In her decision, the magistrate found Sally did not meet the burden of
demonstrating her defense. The magistrate outlined her basis for making this
determination, i.e., Sally had no good reason for failing to make the first installment of
the property division payment to Darshan, because Sally’s testimony was self-serving,
lacking in credibility, and uncorroborated by any evidentiary material.
{¶29} The record clearly and convincingly supports the magistrate’s finding.
Jeffers, 7th Dist. No. 07 BE 36, 2008-Ohio-3339, at ¶19-20; compare Dureiko v.
Dureiko, 8th Dist. No. 94393, 2010-Ohio-5599, 2010 WL 4684470 (no evidence of
wilful intent to disobey divorce decree provisions). Although Sally claimed her
financial condition made it impossible to meet the payment schedule set out in the
divorce decree, she made no effort to notify the DR court of such a claim before the first
installment payment came due.
{¶30} This court cannot substitute its judgment on matters of credibility.
Montgomery v. Montgomery, 4th Dist. Nos. 03CA2924 and 03CA2925, 2004-Ohio-6926,
13
¶ 25. Because the DR court’s contempt finding is supported by clear and convincing
evidence in the record, Sally’s first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶31} Sally argues in her second and third assignments of error that the DR court
improperly ordered her to pay the attorney fees Darshan incurred in pursuing his motion
to show cause as a condition for purging her contempt. Her argument is unpersuasive.
{¶32} R.C. 3105.73(B) provides:
In any post-decree motion or proceeding that arises out of an
action for divorce, dissolution, legal separation, or annulment
of marriage or an appeal of that motion or proceeding, the
court may award all or part of reasonable attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses to either party if the court finds the award
equitable. In determining whether an award is equitable, the
court may consider the parties’ income, the conduct of the
parties, and any other relevant factors the court deems
appropriate, but it may not consider the parties’ assets.
{¶33} In addition, a trial court may award reasonable attorney fees in post-divorce
proceedings upon a finding of contempt. McDaniel v. McDaniel, 74 Ohio App.3d 577,
599 N.E.2d 758 (8th Dist.1991), citing Planned Parenthood Assn. of Cincinnati, Inc. v.
Project Jericho, 52 Ohio St.3d 56, 67, 556 N.E.2d 157 (1990).
{¶34} Under either of the above principles, this court applies an abuse of
discretion standard of review on the issue of a DR court’s decision to grant attorney fees.
Dureiko, 8th Dist. No. 94393, 2010-Ohio-5599, 2010 WL 4684470, ¶ 26. No abuse
of discretion occurred in this case.
14
{¶35} The record reflects that Sally made no effort to pay any portion of the first
property division payment until six months after it was due. In the meantime, Darshan
had been required to engage his attorneys to file his motion to show cause, dispute
Sally’s request for a stay of the case until the decision in Kapadia I was issued, and
participate in a court conference.
{¶36} Moreover, because Sally did not pay the full amount, Darshan needed his
attorneys to seek discovery, prepare a motion in limine, and prepare for and participate in
the hearing on the motion. The record also supports the inference that Sally made
additional payments toward the first installment only because Darshan’s motion to show
cause had been scheduled for a full hearing and she wished to appear in a better light
when it commenced. Under these circumstances, this court cannot determine that the
DR court abused its discretion in ordering Sally to pay Darshan’s attorney fees as a
condition of her purge. Deacon v. Deacon, 8th Dist. No. 91609, 2009-Ohio-2491, ¶ 79;
Fisher v. Fisher, 5th Dist. No. 2008 CA 00049, 2009-Ohio-4739, ¶ 64.
{¶37} Accordingly, Sally’s second and third assignments of error also are
overruled.
{¶38} The DR court’s order is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
15
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into
execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
__________________________________________
KENNETH A. ROCCO, PRESIDING JUDGE
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., and
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR