State v. M.T. , 2020 Ohio 5256 ( 2020 )

[Cite as State v. M.T., 2020-Ohio-5256.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 109079
v. :
M.T., :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 12, 2020
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-17-617211-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Brandon Piteo and Christopher D.
Schroeder, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
Mark A. Stanton, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
Francis Cavallo, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:
Defendant-appellant M.T. appeals from a judgment of the Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas denying his application to seal the official record.
We reverse.
Relevant Factual and Procedural Background
In 2009, J.S., the alleged victim in the underlying case, claimed that
M.T. sexually assaulted her in his home in Maple Heights, Ohio. Shortly thereafter,
and with the victim’s cooperation, police investigated the alleged crime.
Although police knew who he was, where he was and what he
purportedly did in 2009, it was not until 2017, more than eight years later, that M.T.
was indicted, charged with rape, gross sexual imposition and kidnapping.
M.T. denied the charges and the case proceeded to trial on
October 10, 2017, but was terminated by mistrial the following day. We know not
whether a jury was impaneled or whether there was a waiver of jury trial, since the
trial court docket fails to indicate as such and we have no transcript of those
proceedings before us. Although the court rescheduled the trial for six different
dates between January and November 2018 for myriad reasons, a new trial never
did commence and the case was ultimately dismissed, without prejudice, on
November 26, 2018.
In 2019, M.T. filed an application to seal the official record in the case
for reasons including the negative impact of the ready availability of the records on
his securing employment. The state objected, arguing that the court should deny
the application because the case was dismissed without prejudice and the relevant
statutes of limitations had not expired. The state claimed that sealing the official
record in the case would “substantially inhibit, if not effectively prevent” any attempt
to reprosecute M.T. for this alleged crime. The prosecutor did, however, admit, “I
can’t represent to the Court that [reprosecuting M.T.] has any degree of likelihood
or probability given that this alleged incident occurred in 2009 and the case was
dismissed ten months ago * * *.”
There was no meaningful hearing on this motion. No testimony was
taken and counsel merely reiterated the content of their written briefs. The court
issued a journal entry containing its findings, concluding that it did not find that
“[M.T.’s] interests outweigh the state’s legitimate needs to maintain the records.”
This appeal follows.
Assignment of Error
M.T. asserts the following assignment of error:
The trial court abused its discretion in denying M.T.’s motion for
expungement as it failed to properly weigh the competing interests in
the sealing of M.T.’s record.[1]
Law and Analysis
R.C. 2953.52(A)(1) permits a person named as a defendant in a
dismissed complaint, indictment or information to apply for a court order to seal his
or her official records in the case. When determining whether such an applicant is
eligible for sealing, R.C. 2953.52(B) requires the court to make specific
determinations. Here, the court determined that the case was dismissed without
1 We note that although M.T. uses the word “expungement,” in his brief, he filed a
“motion to seal court records” with the trial court pursuant to R.C. 2953.52. But see State
v. Pariag, 137 Ohio St.3d 81, 2013-Ohio-4010, 998 N.E.2d 401, ¶ 11 (despite amendment
to R.C. 2953.32 changing the word “expungement” to “sealing,” “‘expungement’ remains
a common colloquialism used to describe the process.”).
prejudice,2 that none of the applicable statutes of limitations had expired and that
M.T. had no pending criminal proceedings. See R.C. 2953.52(B)(2)(a) and (b).
None of these determinations are at issue in this appeal. Moreover, we note that the
state did not dispute that M.T. was eligible to apply for sealing.
If a trial court finds an applicant eligible for sealing pursuant to R.C.
2953.52, it must then use its discretion to consider any objections raised by the
prosecutor, and it must weigh the applicant’s interest in sealing the records against
the government’s legitimate need to maintain those records. R.C. 2953.52(B)(2)(c)
and (d).
The applicant bears the burden of demonstrating that he or she has a
legitimate interest in having the records sealed beyond a general privacy interest.
State v. G. F. A., 2019-Ohio-4978, 149 N.E.3d 1071, ¶ 10, 14 (8th Dist.). That person
must demonstrate that his or her interest in having the records sealed is “‘equal to
or greater than the government’s interest in maintaining those records.’” State v.
Andrasek, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81398, 2003-Ohio-32, ¶ 12, quoting State v.
Newton, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 01AP-1443 and 01AP-1444, 2002-Ohio-5008, ¶ 9.
If the court determines, after complying with [R.C. 2953.52(B)(2)],
* * * that the complaint, indictment, or information in the case was
dismissed * * *; that no criminal proceedings are pending against the
person; and the interests of the person in having the records pertaining
to the case sealed are not outweighed by any legitimate governmental
needs to maintain such records * * *, the court shall issue an order
directing that all official records pertaining to the case be sealed * * *.
2 R.C. 2953.52(B)(2)(a) refers to “the complaint, indictment, or information in the
case” being dismissed.
R.C. 2953.52(B)(4).
We review a trial court’s determination of whether an applicant’s
interest outweighs the state’s legitimate needs for abuse of discretion. State v. C.A.,
10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 14AP-738 and 14AP-746, 2015-Ohio-3437, ¶ 10. “‘Abuse of
discretion’ has been described as including a ruling that lacks a ‘sound reasoning
process.’” State v. Morris, 132 Ohio St.3d 337, 2012-Ohio-2407, 972 N.E.2d 528,
¶ 14, quoting AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment
Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990).
Here, as noted, there is no dispute that M.T. was eligible for sealing
under R.C. 2953.52. As to his interest in having the records sealed, M.T. argued that
even though he had never been found guilty, the mere allegations against him were
a “stain,” so readily accessible that it has effectively branded him with a “scarlet
letter,” which operates as a bar to obtaining employment.
A person’s arrest history is so readily available and accessible that
potential (and current) employment, family and interpersonal relationships,
licenses and even military enlistment could be substantially and adversely affected.
Common sense dictates that a criminal record of any kind, let alone charges of this
magnitude, i.e. rape, gross sexual imposition and kidnapping, have a tremendously
adverse effect on an individual’s life and future.
The state objected to sealing, noting that it could still reindict the case,
since it was dismissed without prejudice and the statutes of limitations had not yet
expired. At the hearing the prosecutor articulated that this was primarily the reason
for objection. The state claimed that sealing the official record in the case would
“substantially inhibit, if not effectively prevent, the possibility of any future
prosecution.”
As noted, at the hearing on the application, the parties merely
reiterated the content of their written briefs and the prosecutor admitted that “I
can’t represent to the Court that [reprosecuting M.T.] has any degree of likelihood
or probability given that this alleged incident occurred in 2009 and the case was
dismissed ten months ago * * *.”
The court denied M.T.’s application, finding that the state’s assertion,
that “the investigation remains open and a sealing of all pertinent records would
prevent law enforcement from accessing said records to conduct any further
investigation,” outweighed M.T.’s interest in having the records sealed.
The state of Ohio had eight years to investigate these allegations prior
to indictment and another 18 months before they dismissed the case. “Any further
investigation” seems to be an incredulous statement.
The state’s argument against sealing was that it should be denied
because it could still potentially prosecute M.T. for this offense in the future. The
same is true in any case that is dismissed without prejudice where the statute of
limitations has not expired. Taken to its logical conclusion, adopting the state’s
position would require the court to deny any sealing application in any case
dismissed without prejudice where the statute of limitations has not expired,
essentially excluding any such case from sealing eligibility.
This cannot be. R.C. 2953.52, by its own terms extends eligibility for
sealing to applicants named in cases dismissed without prejudice where the statute
of limitations has not expired. See also State v. Dye, 152 Ohio St.3d 11, 2017-Ohio-
7823, 92 N.E.3d 818, ¶ 12 (“R.C. 2953.52(B)(2)(a)(ii) requires only that a court
determine whether the relevant statute of limitations in a case dismissed without
prejudice has expired, but this determination is not dispositive of whether the court
can grant an application to seal records pursuant to R.C. 2953.52(B)(4).”).
Nevertheless, the trial court adopted the state’s argument as its
rationale for denying M.T.’s application. By basing its denial on an argument that
contravened R.C. 2953.52, the court thereby abused its discretion.
We reverse the trial court’s decision denying M.T.’s R.C. 2953.52
application to seal his official records. We remand the case to the trial court for an
order sealing M.T.’s official records in CR-17-617211-A.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment
into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
________________________
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCURS;
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J., CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY IN PART
AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE OPINION
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, P.J., CONCURRING IN JUDGMENT ONLY IN PART
AND DISSENTING IN PART WITH SEPARATE OPINION:
I concur in judgment only with the majority opinion reversing the
trial court’s decision. However, I dissent in granting M.T.’s application at this time.
I would remand the matter for further consideration on whether M.T.’s interests are
outweighed by the state’s legitimate needs to maintain the records.
I agree with the majority opinion that denying M.T.’s application on
the basis that the statute of limitations has not expired contravenes R.C. 2953.52
because whether the statute of limitations expired is just one factor to consider.
Accordingly, because it is not dispositive, I find that the trial court should have
discussed and evaluated the state’s other justification for denying M.T.’s application
— that sealing the official record would “substantially inhibit, if not effectively
prevent, the possibility of any future prosecution.”
The trial court noted that the state objected to M.T.’s application
because “the investigation remains open and a sealing of all pertinent records would
prevent law enforcement from accessing said records to conduct any further
investigation.” I find this justification and reasoning entirely vague. Without any
additional findings or conclusions, the state’s objections in such a speculative
manner do not, in my opinion, demonstrate a legitimate need.
My reading of R.C. 2953.51 and 2953.53 does not reveal that all
records would be completely unavailable or inaccessible to law enforcement officers
or agencies. In fact, the statutes only applies to “official records” and expressly
provides an exception regarding certain records that do not qualify as official
records such as investigatory work product. See also R.C. 2953.54 and 2953.55.
However, I do not believe that the state should be entirely foreclosed
from presenting this argument if the sealing of the records would actually inhibit
further prosecution. For example, if a victim or witness was incapacitated or
unavailable due to possible nefarious actions by the defendant, then the state may
have a legitimate need to maintain the records in order to prosecute the case prior
to the statute of limitations expiring.
In my opinion the record is just not developed enough to decide
whether M.T.’s interests are outweighed by the state’s legitimate needs to maintain
the records. I would remand the case for further consideration of M.T.’s stated
interests and what, if any, records would be unavailable to the state if it decided to
pursue to the charges against M.T. in the future. Additionally, I would further
request the state to make a record of why the investigation is still ongoing and what
obstacles it faces in the prosecution of this matter, considering that M.T. appeared
for trial six times. This additional information would allow the trial court to make
an informed decision on whether M.T.’s application should be granted.