Siegel v. Bridewell ( 2012 )


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  • [Cite as Siegel v. Bridewell, 
    2012-Ohio-797
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    ROSS COUNTY
    KIMBERLY LEE SIEGEL,           :
    :
    Plaintiff-Appellee,       : Case No. 11CA3255
    :
    vs.                       : Released: February 24, 2012
    :
    GEORGE W. BRIDEWELL,           : DECISION AND JUDGMENT
    : ENTRY
    Defendant-Appellant.       :
    _____________________________________________________________
    APPEARANCES:
    George W. Bridewell, Chillicothe, Ohio, Appellant, pro se.
    Matthew S. Schmidt, Ross County Prosecuting Attorney, and Judith Heimerl
    Brown, Ross County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Chillicothe, Ohio, for
    Appellee, Kimberly Lee Siegel.
    _____________________________________________________________
    McFarland, J.:
    {¶1} This is an appeal from a Ross County Court of Common Pleas
    judgment entry establishing a parent-child relationship between Appellant
    and his minor child, and ordering child support. On appeal, Appellant
    contends that 1) the trial court abused its discretion and went against the
    sufficiency of the evidence when calculating his income for child support
    purposes; 2) he was denied due process of law when the trial court held a
    hearing to set a child support obligation without giving proper notice to all
    parties; 3) the trial court abused its discretion by setting a retroactive support
    Ross App. No. 11CA3255                                                           2
    order; and 4) the trial court committed plain error and abused its discretion
    in failing to designate which party was eligible to claim the allocation for the
    dependency exemption for all tax years.
    {¶2} We have determined under Appellant’s second assignment of
    error that Appellant did not receive proper notice of the hearing on child
    support. As such, we sustain Appellant’s second assignment of error and
    remand this matter to the trial court to provide proper notice and a re-hearing
    on that issue. In light of our disposition of Appellant’s second assignment of
    error, Appellant’s remaining assignments of error, all of which are based
    upon the child support order, have been rendered moot. Accordingly, the
    decision of the trial court, as to the issue of child support, is reversed and
    this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    “I.          THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND WENT
    AGAINST THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE WHEN
    CALCULATING THE DEFENDANT’S INCOME FOR CHILD
    SUPPORT PURPOSES.
    II.          THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW,
    WHEN THE COURT HELD A HEARING TO SET CHILD
    SUPPORT OBLIGATION [SIC] WITHOUT GIVING PROPER
    NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES.
    III.     THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
    SETTING A RETROACTIVE SUPPORT ORDER.
    Ross App. No. 11CA3255                                                          3
    IV.    THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR AND
    ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, IN FAILING TO DESIGNATE
    WHICH PARTY WAS ELIGIBLE TO CLAIM THE
    ALLOCATION FOR THE DEPENDENCY EXEMPTION FOR
    ALL TAX YEARS.
    LEGAL ANALYSIS
    {¶3} For ease of analysis, we address Appellant’s assignments of error
    out of order. In his second assignment of error, Appellant contends that he
    was denied due process of law when the trial court held a hearing to set child
    support without giving him proper notice. Specifically, Appellant contends
    that he was only provided with notice of the May 12, 2011, hearing to the
    extent that it was to be a hearing on the genetic test results, an issue to which
    he did not plan to object. However, he claims he received no notice that the
    hearing would also address the issue of child support, an issue to which he
    planned to object, as he was and still is serving a prison term. Appellee
    concedes the notice of hearing provided by the trial court did not state the
    matter would cover the establishment of child support. As such, Appellee
    does not object to a remand of the matter to the trial court in order to provide
    Appellant an opportunity to be heard on the issue of the establishment of
    child support.
    {¶4} A review of the record indicates that this matter originated with
    the filing of a child support enforcement transmittal pursuant to the Uniform
    Ross App. No. 11CA3255                                                          4
    Interstate Family Support Act (“UIFSA”) seeking to establish paternity and
    child support. Chapter 3115 of the Revised Code deals with UIFSA and in
    3115.55(A) provides that “[a]ny action or proceeding brought pursuant to
    sections 3115.01 to 3115.59 of the Revised Code is a civil action and shall
    be governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure * * *.” R.C. 3115.55(B)
    further provides that an action under section 3115.31 of the Revised Code to
    establish support “is an original action and shall be governed by the Rules of
    Civil Procedure.” Thus, we look to the Rules of Civil Procedure to
    determine whether Appellant received proper notice of the hearing on the
    issue of child support. Civ. R. 5 governs service and filing of pleadings and
    other papers subsequent to the original complaint. Civ.R. 5(A) provides that
    “every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, and similar
    paper shall be served upon each of the parties.”
    {¶5} On September 9, 2010, an order to show cause under the
    Uniform Interstate Family Support Act was filed ordering Appellant to
    appear on November 18, 2010, and show cause why an order should not be
    made directing him to pay, under UIFSA, such sums as the court may
    determine for support the minor child. Appellant received notice of this
    hearing but did not appear. It was determined at the November 18, 2010,
    hearing that the proof necessary to adjudicate paternity was not available and
    Ross App. No. 11CA3255                                                                             5
    as such, the parties were ordered to submit to genetic testing. The
    “Judgment Entry for Genetic Testing” was filed on January 7, 2011, and
    provided that “[t]his matter will be set for further hearing upon the filing of
    the results of the genetic testing.”
    {¶6} The DNA test results were made a part of the record via a notice
    of filing on March 22, 2011. Subsequently, the trial court scheduled “a
    hearing on the D.N.A. test results” on May 12, 2011, and this notice of
    hearing was provided to Appellant, though he did not appear at that hearing.
    At the May 12, 2011, hearing the magistrate established a parent-child
    relationship between Appellant and the minor child at issue and also
    established a minimum child support order of $50.00 per month. Appellant
    subsequently filed objections to the magistrate’s decision on June 13, 2011.1
    Therein, Appellant specifically raised the issue of notice with respect to the
    establishment of child support. However, on June 14, 2011, the trial court
    issued a judgment entry which was essentially identical to the magistrate’s
    earlier decision.
    {¶7} “Due process of law requires that every party to an action be
    afforded ‘a reasonable opportunity to be heard after a reasonable notice of
    such hearing.’ Ohio Valley Radiology Assoc., Inc. v. Ohio Valley Hosp.
    1
    Appellant’s objections to the magistrate’s decision were titled “Motion to Set Aside Order.”
    Ross App. No. 11CA3255                                                              6
    Assn. (1986), 
    28 Ohio St.3d 118
    , 125, 
    502 N.E.2d 599
    .” Neace v. Neace,
    Scioto App. No. 02CA2824, 2003-Ohio- 276 at ¶ 15. “ ‘The issue of what
    constitutes reasonable notice is left for a case-by-case analysis.’ ” Id.; citing
    Zashin, Rich, Sutula & Monastra Co., L.P.A. v. Offenberg (1993), 
    90 Ohio App.3d 436
    , 443, 
    629 N.E.2d 1057
    . Generally, the notice satisfies due
    process requirements as long as it is “ ‘reasonably calculated to give actual
    notice.’ ” Id.; citing Mitchell v. Mitchell (1980), 
    64 Ohio St.2d 49
    , 
    413 N.E.2d 1182
    , paragraph two of the syllabus.
    {¶8} As stated, Appellant did receive notice in accordance with the
    Civil Rules of Procedure of the May 12, 2011, hearing. However, the
    hearing notice represented that it was a hearing on the D.N.A. test results.
    There was no indication from the notice that the issue of child support would
    be addressed at the hearing. Thus, we find a substantive problem with the
    notice that was provided to Appellant. As such, we conclude that the
    hearing notice at issue was not reasonably calculated to give actual notice of
    the fact that child support would be determined at the hearing and therefore
    did not afford Appellant due process of law.
    {¶9} In light of the foregoing, as well as Appellee’s candid concession
    related to this error, we reverse the decision of the trial court as to the issue
    of child support and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent
    Ross App. No. 11CA3255                                                      7
    with this opinion. Further, as Appellant’s remaining assignments of error all
    stem from the child support order, they have been rendered moot.
    JUDGMENT REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
    Ross App. No. 11CA3255                                                          8
    JUDGMENT ENTRY
    It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE REVERSED IN PART AND
    REMANDED and that the Appellant recover of Appellee costs herein taxed.
    The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing
    the Ross County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
    Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of
    the date of this entry.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
    Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    Exceptions.
    Abele, P.J. and Harsha, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion.
    For the Court,
    BY: _________________________
    Matthew W. McFarland, Judge
    NOTICE TO COUNSEL
    Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
    judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from
    the date of filing with the clerk.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11CA3255

Judges: McFarland

Filed Date: 2/24/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021