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 (1976); State ex rel. Cody v. Toner,

8 Ohio St.3d 22

456 N.E.2d 813

 (1983).
VINTON, 16CA701                                                                                                                        3
On August 16, 2016, the court denied his motion. This appeal followed.2
I
{¶ 4} Initially, we observe that appellant’s thoroughly researched and well-written brief
unfortunately does not designate proper assignments of error. His “assignments of error” do not
assign any error to the trial court’s ruling. See Painter and Dennis, Ohio Appellate Practice
(2007 Ed.), Section 1.45 (stating that “the assignments of error * * * set forth the rulings of the
trial court * * * contended to be erroneous”); see also App. R. Rule 16 (1992 staff notes) (setting
forth an example of a proper assignment of error as, “The trial court erred in overruling
defendant-appellant’s motion for directed verdict. (Tr. ____)”). Instead, appellant framed his
assignments of error as propositions of law. While a proposition of law is appropriate in an
appellate brief to the Ohio Supreme Court, an “assignment of error” is appropriate in an appellate
brief to an Ohio appellate court. See State v. Noling,

136 Ohio St.3d 163

2013-Ohio-1764

992 N.E.2d 1095

, ¶63 (O’Donnell, J., dissenting) (noting that “appellate courts consider assignments
of error, while [the supreme] court considers propositions of law). The two are materially and
substantively different”); App.R. 16(A)(3); S.Ct. R.P. 6(B)(1). Because appellant does not raise
appropriate assignments of error, we would be within our discretion to simply disregard his
arguments.         Headings v. Ranco, Inc., 3rd Dist. Union No. 14–04–33, 2005–Ohio–1095, ¶6
(explaining that appellate court may disregard argument improperly presented as proposition of
law); State v. Maxson,

66 Ohio App.3d 32

, 36,

583 N.E.2d 402

 (1st Dist. 1990) (declining to
address an appellant’s alleged error “[b]ecause the assignment is advanced as a proposition of
2
In In re J.B.B., 4th Dist. Scioto No. 09CA3335 (Mar. 2, 2010), we entered an order concluding that a trial court’s decision to
deny a parent’s request to appoint counsel in an adoption proceeding constitutes a final, appealable order.
VINTON, 16CA701                                                                                 4
law rather than as an assignment of error, [and] it does not comply with the Appellate Rules”);
see also Eberhard Architects, L.L.C. v. Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn Co., L.P.A., 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 102088,

2015-Ohio-2519

2015 WL 3899367

, ¶16 (stating that appellate court
need not address argument if appellant fails to present it as an assignment of error in accordance
with appellate rules). An appellate court may, however, “reach the merits of an argument if the
assignments of error [are] ‘readily discernable’ from the propositions of law, and where the
opposing party ha[s] responded as if the propositions were assignments of error.” Eberhard
Architects at ¶16, citing JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Allton, 10th Dist. Franklin No.
14AP–228, 2014–Ohio–3742, ¶6–7; Carter–Jones Lumber Co v. Denune,

132 Ohio App.3d 430

,
432,

725 N.W.2d 330

(10th Dist. 1999).
{¶ 5} In the case at bar, we readily discern that appellant’s improperly-framed
assignments of error challenge the trial court’s decision to deny his request for appointed
counsel. Furthermore, appellee has responded to appellant’s challenge as if he presented
properly-framed assignments of error. We will, therefore, consider the “assignments of error” to
the extent that they relate to the trial court’s alleged error in denying appellant’s request for
appointed counsel.
II
{¶ 6} Appellant’s “assignments of error” essentially assert that the trial court erred as a
matter of law by denying his request for appointed counsel. Appellant claims that the court’s
failure to appoint counsel to represent him in the adoption proceeding involving his biological
child violates both the equal protection and due process clauses of the United States and Ohio
constitutions.
VINTON, 16CA701 5
A
{¶ 7} We first point out that during the trial court proceedings, appellant did not
specifically raise any of the arguments he now raises on appeal. Instead, his motion generally
alleged that he is indigent and that the trial court must appoint counsel in order to protect his
constitutional right to maintain the parent-child relationship. While we recognize that appellant
attached as exhibits to his motion a Franklin County probate court decision and an appellate brief
filed in a different case that both touch on the constitutional issues, appellant did not expressly
argue the constitutional issues in his motion. Thus, although appellant generally referenced the
constitutional arguments that might be made, he did not argue them and explain how they apply
to his case. Under these circumstances, we believe appellant forfeited the right to raise the
arguments he now raises for the first time on appeal. Independence v. Office of the Cuyahoga
Cty. Executive,

142 Ohio St.3d 125

2014-Ohio-4650

28 N.E.3d 1182

, ¶30 (stating that “an
appellant generally may not raise an argument on appeal that the appellant has not raised in the
lower courts”); State v. Quarterman,

140 Ohio St.3d 464

2014-Ohio-4034

19 N.E.3d 900

, ¶21
(explaining that defendant forfeited his constitutional challenge by failing to raise it during trial
court proceedings); Gibson v. Meadow Gold Dairy,

88 Ohio St.3d 201

, 204,

724 N.E.2d 787

(2000) (concluding that party waived constitutional arguments for purposes of appeal when party
failed to raise those arguments during trial court proceedings); State ex rel. Gutierrez v. Trumbull
Cty. Bd. of Elections,

65 Ohio St.3d 175

, 177,

602 N.E.2d 622

 (1992) (explaining that an
appellant cannot “present * * * new arguments for the first time on appeal”); accord State ex rel.
Jeffers v. Athens Cty. Commrs., 4th Dist. Athens No. 15CA27,

2016-Ohio-8119

2016 WL 7230928

, fn.3 (stating that “[i]t is well-settled that failure to raise an argument in the trial court
VINTON, 16CA701                                                                                        6
results in waiver of the argument for purposes of appeal”); State v. Anderson, 4th Dist.
Washington No. 15CA28,

2016-Ohio-2704

2016 WL 1643247

, ¶24 (explaining that
“constitutional arguments not presented in the trial court are deemed to be waived and may not
be raised for the first time on appeal”). We may, however, consider appellant’s arguments using
a plain-error analysis. See Risner v. Ohio Dept. of Nat. Resources, Ohio Div. of Wildlife,

144 Ohio St.3d 278

42 N.E.3d 718

, 2015–Ohio–3731,

42 N.E.3d 718

, ¶27 (stating that reviewing
court has discretion to consider forfeited constitutional challenges); see also Hill v. Urbana,

79 Ohio St.3d 130

, 133–34,

679 N.E.2d 1109

 (1997), citing In re M.D.,

38 Ohio St.3d 149

527 N.E.2d 286

 (1988), syllabus (stating that “[e]ven where [forfeiture] is clear, [appellate] court[s]
reserve[] the right to consider constitutional challenges to the application of statutes in specific
cases of plain error or where the rights and interests involved may warrant it’”); State v. Pyles,
7th Dist. Mahoning No. 13–MA–22, 2015–Ohio–5594, ¶82, quoting State v. Jones, 7th Dist. No.
06–MA–109, 2008–Ohio–1541, ¶65 (explaining that the plain error doctrine “‘is a wholly
discretionary doctrine’”); DeVan v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
102945, 2015–Ohio–4279, ¶9 (noting that appellate court retains discretion to consider forfeited
argument).
{¶ 8} For the plain error doctrine to apply, the party claiming error must establish (1)
that “‘an error, i.e., a deviation from a legal rule’” occurred, (2) that the error was “‘an “obvious”
defect in the trial proceedings,’” and (3) that this obvious error affected substantial rights, i.e., the
error “‘must have affected the outcome of the trial.’” State v. Rogers,

143 Ohio St.3d 385

,
2015–Ohio–2459,

38 N.E.3d 860

, ¶22, quoting State v. Barnes,

94 Ohio St.3d 21

, 27,

759 N.E.2d 1240

 (2002); Schade v. Carnegie Body Co.,

70 Ohio St.2d 207

, 209,

436 N.E.2d 1001

,
VINTON, 16CA701                                                                                 7
1003 (1982) (“A ‘plain error’ is obvious and prejudicial although neither objected to nor
affirmatively waived which, if permitted, would have a material adverse affect on the character
and public confidence in judicial proceedings.”). For an error to be “plain” or “obvious,” the
error must be plain “under current law” “at the time of appellate consideration.” Johnson v.
United States,

520 U.S. 461

, 467, 468,

117 S.Ct. 1544

137 L.Ed.2d 718

 (1997); accord Barnes,
94 Ohio St.3d at 27; State v. G.C., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-536,

2016-Ohio-717

, ¶14.
{¶ 9} The plain error doctrine is not, however, readily invoked in civil cases. Instead,
an appellate court “must proceed with the utmost caution” when applying the plain error doctrine
in civil cases. Goldfuss v. Davidson,

79 Ohio St.3d 116

, 121,

679 N.E.2d 1099

 (1997). The
Ohio Supreme Court has set a “very high standard” for invoking the plain error doctrine in a civil
case. Perez v. Falls Financial, Inc.,

87 Ohio St.3d 371

721 N.E.2d 47

 (2000). Thus, “the
doctrine is sharply limited to the extremely rare case involving exceptional circumstances where
error, to which no objection was made at the trial court, seriously affects the basic fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the
underlying judicial process itself.” Goldfuss, 79 Ohio St.3d at 122; accord Gable v. Gates Mills,

103 Ohio St.3d 449

, 2004–Ohio–5719,

816 N.E.2d 1049

, ¶43. Moreover, appellate courts
“‘should be hesitant to decide [forfeited errors] for the reason that justice is far better served
when it has the benefit of briefing, arguing, and lower court consideration before making a final
determination.’” Risner at ¶28, quoting Sizemore v. Smith,

6 Ohio St.3d 330

, 332,

453 N.E.2d 632

 (1983), fn. 2; accord Mark v. Mellott Mfg. Co., Inc.,

106 Ohio App.3d 571

, 589,

666 N.E.2d 631

 (4th Dist.1995) (“Litigants must not be permitted to hold their arguments in reserve for
appeal, thus evading the trial court process.”).
VINTON, 16CA701                                                                                    8
{¶ 10} In the case sub judice, we do not believe that the trial court plainly erred by failing
to appoint counsel for appellant. Most pertinently, as we explain below, we do not believe that
any error that the court may have arguably made by failing to appoint counsel constitutes a
“plain” or “obvious” error under current law.
B
{¶ 11} “The right of a natural parent to the care and custody of his children is one of the
most precious and fundamental in law.” In re Adoption of Masa,

23 Ohio St.3d 163

, 164,

492 N.E.2d 140

 (1986), citing Santosky v. Kramer,

455 U.S. 745

, 753,

102 S.Ct. 1388

71 L.Ed.2d 599

 (1982); accord Lassiter v. Durham Cty. Dept. of Social Servs.,

452 U.S. 18

, 27,

101 S.Ct. 2153

68 L.Ed.2d 640

 (1981), quoting Stanley v. Illinois,

405 U.S. 645

, 651,

92 S.Ct. 1208

, 1212,

31 L.Ed.2d 551

 (1972) (explaining that “a parent’s desire for and right to ‘the companionship,
care, custody, and management of his or her children’ is an important interest”); In re C.F.,

113 Ohio St.3d 73

2007-Ohio-1104

862 N.E.2d 816

, ¶28 (stating that “[t]he right to parent one’s
children is a fundamental right”).      Indeed, “the upbringing of children [is] among [the]
associational rights th[e United States Supreme] Court has ranked as ‘of basic importance in our
society.’” M.L.B. v. S.L.J.,

519 U.S. 102

, 116–17,

117 S.Ct. 555

136 L.Ed.2d 473

 (1996),
quoting Boddie v. Connecticut,

401 U.S. 371

, 376,

91 S.Ct. 780

28 L.Ed.2d 113

 (1971)
(citations omitted); accord In re B.C.,

141 Ohio St.3d 55

2014-Ohio-4558

21 N.E.3d 308

2014 WL 5285371

, ¶17, citing M.L.B.,

519 U.S. at 116

 (“A parent’s relationship with his or her child
is among the ‘associational rights’ sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution against unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect by the state.”); Lehr v.
Robertson,

463 U.S. 248

, 257–58,

103 S.Ct. 2985

77 L.Ed.2d 614

 (1983), quoting Prince v.
VINTON, 16CA701                                                                                                                              9
Massachusetts,

321 U.S. 158

, 166,

64 S.Ct. 438

88 L.Ed.2d 645

 (1944) (“‘[T]he custody, care
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.’”). “‘[T]he interest of parents
in their relationship with their children is sufficiently fundamental to come within the finite class
of liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.’” M.L.B.,

519 U.S. at 119

, quoting
Santosky,

455 U.S. at 774

 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).                                         Consequently, the parent-child
relationship “‘undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest,
protection.’” Lassiter,

452 U.S. at 27

, quoting Stanley v. Illinois,

405 U.S. 645

, 651,

92 S.Ct. 1208

31 L.Ed.2d 551

 (1972); M.L.B.,

519 U.S. at 116

 (stating that the parent-child relationship
deserves “shelter[] * * * against the State’s unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect”).3
{¶ 12} “‘[F]ew consequences of judicial action are so grave as the severance of natural
family ties.’” M.L.B.,

519 U.S. at 119

, quoting Santosky,

455 U.S. at 787

 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).          “[P]arental status termination is ‘irretrievabl[y] destructi[ve]’ of the most
fundamental family relationship” and permanently destroys “‘all legal recognition of the parental
relationship.’”          Id. at 121, 127–28 quoting Santosky,

455 U.S. at 753

, and Rivera, 483 U.S. at
580 107 S.Ct., at 3005. Thus, “‘state intervention to terminate [a parent-child] relationship * * *
3
For purposes of this appeal only, we assume, without deciding, that a private adoption proceeding in probate court constitutes
state action. See M.L.B.,

519 U.S. at

116 and fn.8 (considering case as “involving the State’s authority to sever permanently a parent-child
bond” and noting that “[a]lthough the termination proceeding in this case was initiated by private parties as a prelude to an adoption
petition, rather than by a state agency, the challenged state action remains essentially the same: M.L.B. resists the imposition of an official
decree extinguishing, as no power other than the State can, her parent-child relationships”); State ex rel. Portage Cty. Welfare Dept. v.
Summers,

38 Ohio St.2d 144

, 151,

311 N.E.2d 6

 (1974) (holding “that adoption is a function which requires the exercise of the judicial power
which is constitutionally vested in the courts of this state”); see also State ex rel. Howard v. Ferreri,

70 Ohio St.3d 587

, 591-592,

639 N.E.2d 1189

 (1994) (concluding that state-action requirement satisfied in case involving private placement adoption agency, which performed
“traditional governmental function”).
VINTON, 16CA701                                                                                10
must be accomplished by procedures meeting the requisites of the Due Process Clause.’” Lehr,

463 U.S. at 258

, quoting Santosky,

455 U.S. at 752

; accord In re Adoption of Zschach,

75 Ohio St.3d 648

, 653,

665 N.E.2d 1070

 (1996) (recognizing that adoption procedures, which terminate
a parent’s fundamental right, must comply with due process); In re Adoption of Greer,

70 Ohio St.3d 293

, 298,

638 N.E.2d 999

 (1994) (determining that parent facing loss of parental rights
through adoption entitled to adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard). Additionally,
“decrees forever terminating parental rights [fall] in the category of cases in which the State may
not ‘bolt the door to equal justice.’” M.L.B.,

519 U.S. at 124

, quoting Griffin v. Illinois,

351 U.S. 12

, 24,

76 S.Ct. 585

100 L.Ed.2d 891

 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment).
{¶ 13} Cases involving the permanent termination of an “undeniably important”
parent-child bond “demand[] * * * close consideration.”

Id. at 116-117

. Court thus should
approach parental rights termination cases, which include adoption cases, “‘mindful of the
gravity’ of the circumstances and the long-term impact on all the concerned parties.” In re
Adoption of P.A.C.,

126 Ohio St.3d 236

2010-Ohio-3351

933 N.E.2d 236

, ¶6, quoting M.L.B.,

519 U.S. at 117

; see In re Adoption of Greer,

70 Ohio St.3d 293

, 298,

638 N.E.2d 999

 (1994)
(recognizing that adoption “terminates all parental rights of a natural parent”).
{¶ 14} With these considerations in mind, we proceed to consider appellant’s argument
that he has a constitutional right to appointed counsel in the adoption proceeding involving his
biological child.
C
{¶ 15} Appellant first asserts that denying him the right to appointed counsel in this
adoption proceeding deprives him of the equal protection of the law. Appellant notes that R.C.
VINTON, 16CA701                                                                                11
2151.352 affords appointed counsel to an indigent parent in an abuse, neglect, and dependency
proceeding who faces parental rights termination, but that no similar provision affords appointed
counsel to an indigent parent in an adoption proceeding, who also faces parental rights
termination. Appellant claims that the differing treatment of similarly-situated indigent parents
in cases involving the fundamental right to parent a child violates the Equal Protection Clauses of
the United States and Ohio Constitutions. However, because appellant did not specifically
request the trial court to consider the equal-protection implications of his request for appointed
counsel, we must review appellant’s equal-protection argument for plain error.
{¶ 16} The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution states: “No State shall * * * deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” Ohio’s Equal Protection Clause, Article I, Section 2 of the Ohio
Constitution, provides: “All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted
for their equal protection and benefit * * *.”      “These two equal-protection provisions are
functionally equivalent and require the same analysis.”          State v. Aalim, Slip Opinion,

2017-Ohio-2956

2017 WL 2274997

, ¶29, citing Eppley v. Tri–Valley Local School Dist. Bd. of
Edn.,

122 Ohio St.3d 56

2009-Ohio-1970

908 N.E.2d 401

, ¶11.
{¶ 17} The basic meaning of “equal protection of the laws” is that “all persons similarly
situated should be treated alike.” Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,

473 U.S. 432

, 439,

105 S.Ct. 3249

87 L.Ed.2d 313

 (1985); Lehr,

463 U.S. at 265

 (“The concept of equal justice under law
requires the State to govern impartially.”). “Simply stated, the Equal Protection Clauses require
that individuals be treated in a manner similar to others in like circumstances.” McCrone v.
Bank One Corp.,

107 Ohio St.3d 272

2005-Ohio-6505

839 N.E.2d 1

, ¶6. The equal-protection
VINTON, 16CA701                                                                                 12
provisions do not, however, “‘deny to [the] State the power to treat different classes of persons in
different ways.’” Eisenstadt v. Baird,

405 U.S. 438

, 446–447,

92 S.Ct. 1029

31 L.Ed.2d 349

(1972), quoting Reed v. Reed,

404 U.S. 71

, 75,

92 S.Ct. 251

30 L.Ed.2d 225

 (1971); accord
State v. Noling,

149 Ohio St.3d 327

2016-Ohio-8252

, ¶12.            Instead, the equal-protection
provisions prohibit legislation that treats “similar groups differently based on criteria that are
unrelated to the purpose of the law.” Noling at ¶13, citing Johnson v. Robison,

415 U.S. 361

,
374,

94 S.Ct. 1160

39 L.Ed.2d 389

 (1974); Lehr,

463 U.S. at 265

 (“The sovereign may not draw
distinctions between individuals based solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective.”).
{¶ 18} “The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained
if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”
Cleburne,

473 U.S. at 440

; accord Noling at ¶14. If, however, the classification involves either
a suspect class or a fundamental right, it will be upheld only if the challenged classification is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. State v. Thompson,

95 Ohio St.3d 264

2002-Ohio-2124

767 N.E.2d 251

, ¶13; e.g., Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke,

438 U.S. 265

, 357,

98 S.Ct. 2733

, 2782,

57 L.Ed.2d 750

 (1978); see Aalim at ¶31; Harrold v. Collier,

107 Ohio St.3d 44

2005-Ohio-5334

836 N.E.2d 1165

, ¶40 (recognizing parental rights as
fundamental and employing strict scrutiny in substantive due process analysis).
This standard of review places a heavy burden on the government to show that
there is a compelling state interest for the regulation. Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Assn., 564 U.S. [786],

131 S.Ct. 2729

, 2738,

180 L.Ed.2d 708

 (2011).
The rule must also be shown to be “the least restrictive means among available,
effective alternatives” of furthering that interest. Reno v. Am. Civ. Liberties
Union,

521 U.S. 844

, 874,

117 S.Ct. 2329

138 L.Ed.2d 874

 (1997); United States
v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.,

529 U.S. 803

, 813,

120 S.Ct. 1878

, 146
VINTON, 16CA701

13 L.Ed.2d 865

 (2000).
In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against O’Toole,

141 Ohio St.3d 355

2014-Ohio-4046

24 N.E.3d 1114

, ¶20.
{¶ 19} In the case sub judice, we are unable to conclude that the trial court plainly erred
by failing to determine that denying appellant appointed counsel in this adoption proceeding
deprives appellant of the equal protection of the law. While we assume, arguendo, that the strict
scrutiny standard applies, we do not find it plain or obvious that denying an indigent parent
appointed counsel in an adoption proceeding deprives the parent of the equal protection of the
law. Appellant has not cited any decisions from this court, the Ohio Supreme Court, or the
United States Supreme Court holding that the different treatment among indigent parents in
private adoption proceedings and in state-initiated parental rights termination proceedings
violates equal protection principles. Any error that the trial court might have made, therefore, is
not a plain or obvious error under current law.4
{¶ 20} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we find appellant’s equal
protection argument without merit.
D
{¶ 21} Appellant next asserts that the trial court’s decision to deny him the right to
4
Although the state need not be made a party to the proceedings, we find it difficult to evaluate whether the state has a
compelling state interest without allowing the state an opportunity to address the issue. See Ruble v. Ream, 4th Dist. Washington No.
03CA14,

2003-Ohio-5969

, ¶15 (noting that Attorney General need not be notified of proceedings involving constitutionality of state law
unless action originates as a declaratory judgment action under R.C. 2721.12, and thus, court has jurisdiction to consider constitutionality of
state law initiated in ordinary civil action).
VINTON, 16CA701                                                                                                                     14
appointed counsel deprives him of due process of law.5
{¶ 22} The Due Process Clause contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution states: “No State shall * * * deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law * * *.” The Due Course of Law Clause in Article I, Section 16 of the
Ohio Constitution provides: “All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him
in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have
justice administered without denial or delay.” The two clauses provide equivalent due process
protections. State v. Aalim, Slip Opinion,

2017-Ohio-2956

2017 WL 2274997

, ¶15; State v.
Hand,

149 Ohio St.3d 94

2016-Ohio-5504

73 N.E.3d 448

, ¶11; Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v.
Dayton,

138 Ohio St. 540

, 544–545,

38 N.E.2d 70

 (1941).
{¶ 23} “Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which
deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.” Mathews v. Eldridge,

424 U.S. 319

, 332,

 (1976). “‘[D]ue process’ has never been, and perhaps can never be,
precisely defined.” Lassiter,

452 U.S. at 24

. Instead, due process is “a flexible concept that
varies depending on the importance attached to the interest at stake and the particular
circumstances under which the deprivation may occur.” Aalim at ¶22, citing Walters v. Natl.
5
Appellant does not raise a substantive due process argument. See, e.g., State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Craig,

132 Ohio St.3d 68

2012-Ohio-1999

969 N.E.2d 243

2012 WL 1648905

, ¶ 14 (2012), quoting Kallstrom v. Columbus,

136 F.3d 1055

, 1064 (6th
Cir.1998) (explaining that “[w]here state action infringes upon a fundamental right, such action will be upheld under the substantive due
process component of the Fourteenth Amendment only where the governmental action furthers a compelling state interest, and is narrowly
drawn to further that state interest.”).
VINTON, 16CA701                                                                                15
Assn. of Radiation Survivors,

473 U.S. 305

, 320,

105 S.Ct. 3180

87 L.Ed.2d 220

 (1985).
“Applying the Due Process Clause is therefore an uncertain enterprise which must discover what
‘fundamental fairness’ consists of in a particular situation by first considering any relevant
precedents and then by assessing the several interests that are at stake.” Lassiter,

452 U.S. at

24–25; accord Aalim at ¶22; In re B.C.,

141 Ohio St.3d 55

2014-Ohio-4558

21 N.E.3d 308

,
¶17, citing Santosky,

455 U.S. at

753–754 (“In the context of termination of parental rights, due
process requires that the state’s procedural safeguards ensure that the termination proceeding is
fundamentally fair.”). “The fundamental requirement[s] of due process [are notice and] the
opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Eldridge,

424 U.S. at 333

, quoting Armstrong v. Manzo,

380 U.S. 545

, 552,

85 S.Ct. 1187

14 L.Ed.2d 62

 (1965);
B.C. at ¶17.
{¶ 24} Determining what process is due and whether a parental rights termination
proceeding is fundamentally fair generally requires courts to consider three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.
Eldridge,

424 U.S. at 335

; accord Lassiter,

452 U.S. at 27

; B.C. at ¶18.
{¶ 25} An indigent person ordinarily does not have a due process right to appointed
counsel in a civil case. M.L.B.,

519 U.S. at 119

; State ex rel. McQueen v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court
VINTON, 16CA701                                                                                 16
of Common Pleas, Probate Division,

135 Ohio St.3d 291

2013-Ohio-65

986 N.E.2d 925

, ¶9;
State ex rel. Burnes v. Athens Cty. Clerk of Courts,

83 Ohio St.3d 523

, 524,

700 N.E.2d 1260

(1998) (stating that “unlike criminal litigation, there is no general right of counsel in civil
litigation”); State ex rel. Jenkins v. Stern,

33 Ohio St.3d 108

, 110,

515 N.E.2d 928

, 930–31
(1987). Instead, an indigent Ohio citizen is entitled to appointed counsel in a civil case when
counsel is statutorily- or constitutionally-mandated.      State v. Bode,

144 Ohio St.3d 155

2015-Ohio-1519

41 N.E.3d 1156

, ¶13-15 and 19 (noting that juveniles have constitutional, due
process right to counsel in delinquency proceedings–which are civil proceedings–as well as
statutory right); State ex rel. McQueen at ¶9 and 19 (concluding that plain language of statute
required appointed counsel), citing State ex rel. Asberry v. Payne,

82 Ohio St.3d 44

693 N.E.2d 794

 (1998); see Liming v. Damos,

133 Ohio St.3d 509

2012-Ohio-4783

979 N.E.2d 297

, 28
(evaluating claimed due process right to counsel during purge hearing of contempt proceeding
using Eldridge test).
{¶ 26} The United States Supreme Court has not recognized a federal due process right
to appointed counsel for indigent parents in all parental rights termination proceedings.
Lassiter,

452 U.S. at

31–32 (explaining that the United States Constitution does not require “the
appointment of counsel in every parental termination proceeding”).          In Lassiter, the Court
initially noted that it generally recognized “an indigent’s right to appointed counsel * * * only
where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation.”

Id. at 25

. Thus, “as a
litigant’s interest in personal liberty diminishes, so does [the litigant’s] right to appointed
counsel.”

Id. at 26

. The Lassiter court concluded an indigent litigant has a presumed “right to
appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his physical liberty.”

 at
VINTON, 16CA701                                                                                   17
26–27.
{¶ 27} The court declined to impose a constitutional requirement that requires appointed
counsel for an indigent parent in a parental rights termination proceeding and, instead, stated that
trial courts must evaluate the facts and circumstances of each case in light of the three factors
identified in Eldridge: “the private interests at stake, the government’s interest, and the risk that
the procedures used will lead to erroneous decisions.”

Id. at 27

id.

 at 31–32; accord M.L.B.,

519 U.S. at 117

 (recognizing that Lassiter adopted a “case-by-case” approach that a trial court
should evaluate in the first instance). Once the trial court balances the Eldridge factors, it then
must weigh the net effect of those factors “against the presumption that there is a right to
appointed counsel only where the indigent, if he is unsuccessful, may lose his personal freedom.”
Lassiter at 27.
{¶ 28} The Lassiter court examined how the Eldridge factors generally applied to
parental rights termination proceedings. In examining the private interest at stake, the court
observed that “[a] parent’s interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or
her parental status is * * * a commanding one.”

 The court determined that the state, which
“has an urgent interest in the welfare of the child, * * * shares the parent’s interest in an accurate
and just decision.”

 The court thus found that “the State may share the indigent parent’s
interest in the availability of appointed counsel.”

 The court explained that “the State’s
interest in the child’s welfare may perhaps best be served by a hearing in which both the parent
and the State acting for the child are represented by counsel, without whom the contest of
interests may become unwholesomely unequal.” Id. at 28.
{¶ 29} The court concluded, however, that “[t]he State’s interests * * * clearly diverge
VINTON, 16CA701                                                                                      18
from the parent’s insofar as the State wishes the termination decision to be made as economically
as possible and thus wants to avoid both the expense of appointed counsel and the costs of the
lengthened proceedings his presence may cause.” Id. The court nevertheless did not believe
that the State’s economic interest is “significant enough to overcome” the parent’s private
interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship.
{¶ 30} The court next examined “the risk that a parent will be erroneously deprived of his
or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel.” Id. The court reviewed the
parental rights termination procedures involved in the matter and further noted that “the ultimate
issues with which a termination hearing deals are not always simple, however commonplace they
may be.” Id. at 30. The court found that “the complexity of the proceeding and the incapacity
of the uncounseled parent could be, but would not always be, great enough to make the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of the parent’s rights insupportably high.” Id. at 31.
{¶ 31} The Lassiter court did not, however, conclude that the balancing of the factors,
weighed against the presumption that there is not a right to appointed counsel, shows that an
indigent parent always has a due process right to counsel in all parental rights termination
proceedings. Rather, the court explained:
If, in a given case, the parent’s interests were at their strongest, the State’s
interests were at their weakest, and the risks of error were at their peak, it could
not be said that the [Mathews v.] Eldridge[,

424 U.S. 319

, 335,

 (1976)] factors did not overcome the presumption against the right to
appointed counsel, and that due process did not therefore require the appointment
of counsel. But since the Eldridge factors will not always be so distributed, and
VINTON, 16CA701                                                                                19
since “due process is not so rigid as to require that the significant interests in
informality, flexibility and economy must always be sacrificed,” Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S., at 788, 93 S.Ct., at 1762, neither can we say that the
Constitution requires the appointment of counsel in every parental termination
proceeding. We therefore adopt the standard found appropriate in Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, and leave the decision whether due process calls for the appointment of
counsel for indigent parents in termination proceedings to be answered in the first
instance by the trial court, subject, of course, to appellate review. See, e. g.,
Wood v. Georgia,

 at 31–32.
{¶ 32} The court further explained that because “‘[t]he facts and circumstances * * * are
susceptible of almost infinite variation,’” “‘[i]t is neither possible nor prudent to attempt to
formulate a precise and detailed set of guidelines to be followed in determining when the
providing of counsel is necessary to meet the applicable due process requirements.’” Id. at 32,
quoting Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 790. The court stated, however, that “[a] wise public policy” may
be to provide indigent parents with appointed counsel in parental termination, as well as neglect
and dependency, proceedings. Id. at 33-34.
{¶ 33} The Lassiter court ultimately held that the underlying facts and circumstances
showed that the mother was not entitled to counsel in the proceeding to terminate her parental
rights. The court observed that the mother showed little interest in rekindling a relationship with
her child and that the presence of counsel would not have made a difference to the outcome of
the proceedings. Id. at 32-33.
VINTON, 16CA701                                                                                 20
{¶ 34} A year prior to Lassiter, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the United States and
Ohio Constitutions’ due process and equal protection provisions require appointed counsel for
indigent parents in state-initiated parental rights termination cases.     State ex rel. Heller v.
Miller,

61 Ohio St.2d 6

399 N.E.2d 66

 (1980), paragraph two of the syllabus (“[i]n actions
instituted by the state to force the permanent, involuntary termination of parental rights, the
United States and Ohio Constitutions’ guarantees of due process and equal protection of the law
require that indigent parents be provided with counsel and a transcript at public expense for
appeals as of right.”); In re Baby Girl Baxter,

17 Ohio St.3d 229

, 232,

479 N.E.2d 257

 (1985),
citing Heller (recognizing earlier holding “that the state must appoint counsel for indigent parents
at parental termination proceedings”). The court has not, however, specifically incorporated the
same requirement in private adoption cases. In In re Adoption of Zschach,

75 Ohio St.3d 648

,
653–54,

665 N.E.2d 1070

 (1996), the court held that Ohio’s adoption procedures requiring notice
and an opportunity to be heard “adequately protect a [parent’s] constitutionally protected right.”
The Zschach court did not mention that appointed counsel in an adoption proceeding involving
an indigent parent is constitutionally required.
{¶ 35} This court previously rejected the notion that a constitutional right to counsel
exists in private adoption proceedings. In re Adoption of M.C., 4th Dist. Jackson Nos. 11CA5
and 11CA6,

2011-Ohio-6527

2011 WL 6372834

, ¶8-12. Other Ohio appellate courts have
concluded likewise.      In re Adoption of I.M.M., 5th Dist. Ashland No.

16 COA 018

,
2016–Ohio–5891, ¶17; Angus v. Angus, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 14AP-22 and 14AP-159,

2014-Ohio-4225

2014 WL 4748485

, ¶19 (stating that right to appointed counsel generally
provided in juvenile and domestic court proceedings “when the state is the initiating and primary
VINTON, 16CA701                                                                                                                  21
actor in a proceeding that will result in a termination of parental rights” and that “[t]here is no
authority in Ohio for a right to counsel in a proceeding where the state is not the initiating entity
and the parentage dispute merely reflects proceedings between individual parties”); In re
Adoption of Drake, 12th Dist. No. CA2002–08–067, 2003–Ohio–510; see In re Adoption of
J.L.M-L.,       5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT-2016-0030,

2017-Ohio-61

2017 WL 90636

, ¶12,
appeal not allowed,

148 Ohio St.3d 1446

2017-Ohio-1427

72 N.E.3d 658

 (refusing to recognize
ineffective assistance of counsel claim in adoption context when no constitutional right to
counsel in adoption proceedings).
{¶ 36} Additionally, appellant has not cited, and we are unaware of any, governing
statute or rule that provides indigent parents with the right to appointed counsel in adoption
proceedings between private parties.                      We recognize that R.C. 2151.352 allows for the
appointment of counsel in most juvenile court proceedings.                                  However, no similar statute
authorizes the appointment of counsel in probate court proceedings, in general, or in adoption
proceedings, in particular.6
{¶ 37} Therefore, based upon the current state of the law, we do not find it obvious that
an indigent parent possesses a constitutional due process or statutory right to appointed counsel
in every adoption proceeding. While application of the Lassiter factors might support a right to
appointed counsel in some adoption proceedings, Lassiter made clear that trial courts should
6
According to long-standing law, “[e]xclusive jurisdiction over adoption proceedings is vested in the Probate Court.” In re
Adoption of Biddle,

168 Ohio St. 209

152 N.E.2d 105

 (1958); accord State ex rel. Allen Cty. Children Servs. Bd. v. Mercer Cty. Common
Pleas Court, Prob. Div., Slip Opinion,

2016-Ohio-7382

2016 WL 6123595

, ¶24; In re Adoption of Pushcar,

110 Ohio St.3d 332

2006-Ohio-4572

853 N.E.2d 647

, ¶9; State ex rel. Portage Cty. Welfare Dept. v. Summers,

38 Ohio St.2d 144

, 149,

311 N.E.2d 6

 (1974).
VINTON, 16CA701                                                                                 22
answer the question in the first instance based upon all of the facts and circumstances in the case.
Lassiter,

452 U.S. at

31–32 (stating that “the decision whether due process calls for the
appointment of counsel for indigent parents in termination proceedings [should] be answered in
the first instance by the trial court, subject, of course, to appellate review”); accord M.L.B.,

519 U.S. at 117

 (recognizing that Lassiter adopted a “case-by-case” approach that a trial court should
evaluate in the first instance).
{¶ 38} In the case at bar, appellant did not request the trial court to analyze appellant’s
right to counsel using the Eldridge balancing factors and did not present any argument how those
factors apply to his situation. We therefore are limited to reviewing whether the trial court
plainly erred by not concluding that the Eldridge factors support a finding that due process
requires appointed counsel in this case. After our review, we are unable to state that the trial
court obviously erred by failing to conclude that the Eldridge factors support appellant’s claim
that he is entitled to appointed counsel. We again point out that in Zschach, the Ohio Supreme
Court considered a parent’s due process argument in the adoption context and did not find that
appointed counsel was necessary to satisfy due process. Admittedly, the court did not explicitly
discuss the right to appointed counsel, but the court did find that Ohio’s existing adoption
procedures comply with due process.
{¶ 39} Moreover, applying the Eldridge factors to this case does not obviously lead to a
conclusion that due process requires appellant to have appointed counsel in this adoption
proceeding. While we find it obvious that appellant has a strong fundamental interest at stake in
the adoption proceeding, we do not find it obvious that appellant’s interest outweighs the
remaining factors so as to balance in favor of a right to appointed counsel. For example, it is not
VINTON, 16CA701                                                                                                                     23
clear whether this adoption proceeding carries a high risk of error if appellant is not provided
counsel. Unlike permanent custody cases, which the court considered in Lassiter, adoption
cases may not be exceedingly complex, nor do they always involve expert medical or psychiatric
testimony.         See Lassiter,

452 U.S. at 30

.                       Furthermore, parents involved in adoption
proceedings may not be individuals “with little education, who have had uncommon difficulty in
dealing with life,” and who are in the same type of distressed situations as parents involved in
state-initiated termination proceedings.

     In the case at bar, it is not clear that the
circumstances of the present adoption proceeding “may combine to overwhelm” appellant.

Consequently, we are unable to conclude that the trial court plainly erred by failing to determine
that the Eldridge factors balance in favor of appointing counsel for appellant.7
{¶ 40} As a final note, even if we agree with the principle that affording appointed
counsel to an indigent parent in a private adoption proceeding is a “wise public policy,” see
Lassiter,

452 U.S. at 33

, we are not a policy-making body. Instead, the Ohio General Assembly
is the policy-making body in this state. Groch v. Gen. Motors Corp.,

117 Ohio St.3d 192

2008-Ohio-546

883 N.E.2d 377

, ¶212, quoting (“It is not this court’s role to establish legislative
policies”); Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson,

116 Ohio St.3d 468

2007-Ohio-6948

880 N.E.2d 420

,
¶21, quoting State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer,

98 Ohio St.3d 126

2002-Ohio-7041

781 N.E.2d 163

, ¶21 (explaining that “[a] fundamental principle of the constitutional separation of powers
among the three branches of government is that the legislative branch is ‘the ultimate arbiter of
public policy’”); see SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Products, LLC, 137
7
We point out that nothing appears to prohibit the trial court from reconsidering appellant’s request for appointed counsel at
some future point in the proceedings, if later factual developments show that the Eldridge factors tilt in favor of appointing counsel.
VINTON, 16CA701

24 S.Ct. 954

, 967,

197 L.Ed.2d 292

(2017) (stating that court “cannot overrule Congress’s judgment
based on [its] own policy views”). Thus, while we recognize appellant’s and amici curiae’s
policy arguments, we are not willing to create a policy when it is not obviously constitutionally
required under the Ohio or United States Constitutions. Arbino at ¶113 (stating that “the
General Assembly is responsible for * * * making policy decisions; [courts] are charged with
evaluating the constitutionality of their choices”).
{¶ 41} We also fully recognize that the Ohio Supreme Court is free to interpret the Ohio
constitution’s due process provision so as to provide a right to appointed counsel in private
adoption proceedings. We, however, do not believe that the current state of the law would
support our decision to interpret the Ohio constitution in this manner.
{¶ 42} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we do not believe that the trial
court erred by failing to conclude that appellant possesses a due process right to appointed
counsel.
{¶ 43} Consequently, we hereby overrule appellant’s four “assignments of error” and
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
VINTON, 16CA701 25
Harsha, J., dissenting:
{¶ 44} I respectfully dissent from the majority decision, which affirms the trial court’s
judgment denying the biological father’s right to counsel in this private adoption proceeding. I
conclude we should exercise our discretion and address the merits of J.C.J.’s assignment of error
without using the more restrictive plain-error standard of review. The Supreme Court of Ohio
recently held in the context of an adoption case that “ ‘[w]hen an issue of law that was not argued
below is implicit in another issue that was argued and is presented by an appeal, we may consider
and resolve that implicit issue.’ ” In re Adoption of P.L.H., __ Ohio St.3d __,

2017-Ohio-5824

,
__ N.E.3d __, ¶ 22, quoting Beveldere Condominium Unit Owners’ Assn. v. R.E. Roark Cos.,
Inc.,

67 Ohio St.3d 274

, 279,

617 N.E.2d 1075

 (1993). “Stated another way, ‘if we must resolve
a legal issue that was not raised below in order to reach a legal issue that was raised, we will do
so.’ ”

Id.,

 quoting Belvedere, 67 Ohio St.3d at 279.
{¶ 45} The issue of whether the trial court properly denied J.C.J.’s right to appointed
counsel necessarily encompasses his claims on appeal that the right is constitutionally protected.
J.C.J. raised his constitutional right to maintain his parent-child relationship in his motion for
appointed counsel and attached a probate court decision and appellate brief from another case
raising equal-protection and due-process issues. Under these circumstances he did not forfeit or
waive his right to raise these constitutional issues on appeal, so the merits are properly before us.
Consequently, we should not apply the stricter plain-error review here.
{¶ 46} J.C.J. raises constitutional equal-protection issues that are potentially meritorious.
For example, see generally 2 Haralambie, Handling Child Custody, Abuse and Adoption Cases,
Section 14:3 (2016), which states that “[b]ecause a contested adoption includes as a component a
VINTON, 16CA701                                                                                26
termination of parental rights, a parent generally has a right to appointed counsel in a contested
adoption where such a right is granted in termination cases in that state”; see also In re Adoption
of A.W.S.,

339 P.3d 414

, ¶ 27 (Mont.2014), and cases cited therein (“Courts that have considered
the right to counsel for private termination proceedings on equal protection grounds have found
that the right cannot be provided in state-initiated termination proceedings but denied in private
terminations”). Likewise, courts have held that due process warrants the appointment of counsel
in contested adoption cases. See, e.g., In re Adoption of J.E.V.,

141 A.3d 254

 (N.J.2016) (due
process requires the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in a contested adoption).
{¶ 47} Here the trial court did not engage in the requisite balancing of interests required
by Eldridge, 424 U.S.319,