State v. Gray ( 2021 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Gray, 
    2021-Ohio-2446
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    STATE OF OHIO,                                   :
    Plaintiff-Appellee,             :
    No. 110099
    v.                              :
    RICARDO GRAY,                                    :
    Defendant-Appellant.            :
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 15, 2021
    Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-98-369837-ZA
    Appearances:
    Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
    Attorney, and Janna R. Lifford, Assistant Prosecuting
    Attorney, for appellee.
    Ricardo Gray, pro se.
    KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:
    Defendant-appellant, Ricardo Gray, appeals the trial court’s decision
    denying his petition for postconviction relief. Finding no merit to the appeal, we
    affirm.
    In 1999, Gray was sentenced to 23 years to life in prison for murder,
    felonious assault, and a firearm specification. In Gray’s direct appeal, this court
    upheld his convictions and sentence. State v. Gray, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96170,
    
    2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3371
     (July 27, 2000) (“Gray I”). Gray has since filed a litany
    of motions, appeals, and original actions, each alleging that his convictions should
    be overturned because trial witnesses have since recanted, the state withheld
    evidence, and his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.1
    In 2010, this court considered Gray’s eighth appeal seeking to overturn
    his convictions. State v. Gray, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92646, 
    2010-Ohio-11
     (“Gray
    VIII”). In that case, this court affirmed the trial court’s denial of a motion for new
    trial, which was based on affidavits from Mixon, Michael Steele, and Kenneth Bell,
    who each averred that Bennie Kern shot and killed the victim.
    In 2016, Gray filed another petition for postconviction relief. He
    supported his petition with purported newly discovered evidence obtained from a
    1 State v. Gray, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 76170, 
    2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 4234
     (Sept.
    17, 2001) (“Gray II”) (application to reopen granted because appellate counsel failed to
    raise issue regarding consecutive sentences); State v. Gray, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    76170, 
    2002-Ohio-1093
     (“Gray III”) (sentence reversed and remanded because trial court
    failed to make the requisite findings prior to imposing consecutive sentences); State v.
    Gray, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81474, 
    2003-Ohio-436
     (“Gray IV”) (sentence reversed
    because trial court failed to conduct a new sentencing hearing as ordered); State v. Gray,
    8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82841, 
    2003-Ohio-6643
     (“Gray V”) (affirmed trial court’s denial
    of motion for new trial and postconviction relief based on the trial court’s failure to hold
    a hearing, affidavits from Anthony Mixon and Arthur Jackson recanting their trial
    testimony, and merger of felonious assault and attempted murder); State v. Gray, 8th
    Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83926, 
    2004-Ohio-5861
    (“Gray VI”) (affirmed imposition of
    consecutive sentences); State v. Gray, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84677, 
    2004-Ohio-7030
    (“Gray VII”) (affirmed trial court’s denial of motion for new trial based on affidavits from
    Mixon and Jackson recanting their trial testimony).
    2015 public records request by the Ohio Innocence Project. Specifically, he attached
    a page of a police report that contained Edward McDowell’s police interview
    summary, and Detective Michael Cipo’s “Original Investigation” report wherein he
    described and sketched the crime scene. According to Gray, the state suppressed
    this evidence, which contained exculpatory information that supported his trial
    defense that the gunshots were fired during the fight, not after the fight dispersed as
    argued by the state at trial. The trial court summarily denied the petition. Gray did
    not appeal.
    In April 2020, Gray filed yet another petition for postconviction relief,
    contending that he obtained exculpatory evidence from a 2015 public records
    request by the Ohio Innocence Project, and an affidavit in the mail. The evidence
    Gray relied on was Detective Cipo’s police report and crime scene sketch, Edward
    McDowell’s police interview summary, Gary Blanchard’s police interview summary,
    and an affidavit from Derrick James. According to Gray, the state suppressed this
    evidence, which contained exculpatory information that supported his trial defense
    that the gunshots were fired during the fight, and that Bennie Kern shot and killed
    the victim. He further maintained that this new evidence revealed that he did not
    receive effective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court denied Gray’s petition as
    untimely.
    Gray now appeals, raising the following three assignments of error:
    I.    The trial court abused its discretion when it denied [Gray’s]
    untimely postconviction petition without making a
    determination as to whether [he] met the criteria under [R.C.]
    2953.23 in violation of [his rights under the] 5th, 6th, and 14th
    Amendment[s] to the United States and Ohio Constitution[s].
    II.   [Gray] was denied his 5th, 6th, and 14th due process rights, and
    the right to a fair trial when the state suppressed evidence
    favorable to [Gray] and allowed false testimony to go
    uncorrected to obtain a conviction thereby render [his]
    conviction and sentence void.
    III.      [Gray] was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance
    of trial counsel thereby rendering his conviction and sentence
    void.
    Finding that all three assignments of error raise arguments that are intertwined, we
    will address them together.
    I.   Standard of Review
    R.C. 2953.21 provides:
    Any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense * * * and who
    claims that there was such a denial or infringement of the person's
    rights as to render the judgment void or voidable under the Ohio
    Constitution or the Constitution of the United States * * * may file a
    petition in the court that imposed sentence, stating the grounds for
    relief relied upon, and asking the court to vacate or set aside the
    judgment or sentence or to grant other appropriate relief. The
    petitioner may file a supporting affidavit and other documentary
    evidence in support of the claims for relief.
    A petition for postconviction relief is a collateral civil attack on a
    criminal judgment, not an appeal of the judgment. State v. Bell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
    No. 105000, 
    2017-Ohio-7168
    , ¶ 10. It is a means to resolve constitutional claims
    that cannot be addressed on direct appeal because the evidence supporting the
    claims is outside the record. State v. Milanovich, 
    42 Ohio St.2d 46
    , 
    325 N.E.2d 540
    (1975).
    A trial court’s decision denying a postconviction petition should be
    upheld absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Gondor, 
    112 Ohio St.3d 377
    , 2006-
    Ohio-6679, 
    860 N.E.2d 77
    , ¶ 58. The trial court does not abuse its discretion in
    dismissing a petition without a hearing if (1) the petitioner fails to set out sufficient
    operative facts to establish substantive grounds for relief, or (2) the operation of res
    judicata prohibits the claims made in the petition. State v. Abdussatar, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 92439, 
    2009-Ohio-5232
    , ¶ 15.
    II. Untimely and Successive Petition
    Gray filed this petition for postconviction relief approximately 20
    years after the trial transcript in his direct appeal was filed in the court of appeals;
    his petition is therefore obviously untimely — a fact that Gray does not dispute. See
    R.C. 2953.21(A)(2). Moreover, Gray has previously filed multiple petitions for
    postconviction relief in this case. R.C. 2953.23(A) precludes the trial court from
    entertaining an untimely or successive petition for postconviction relief unless it
    meets two conditions.       First, the petitioner must show either that he was
    unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts upon which he relies in the
    petition, or that the United States Supreme Court has, since his last petition,
    recognized a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to the petitioner.
    Second, the petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence that a reasonable
    factfinder would not have found him guilty but for constitutional error at trial. See
    R.C. 2953.23(A)(1). A person is unavoidably prevented from discovering facts when
    he is unaware of those facts and was unable to discover them through reasonable
    diligence. State v. Short, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84524, 
    2004-Ohio-7024
    , ¶ 15.
    In this case, Gray contends that he was unavoidably prevented from
    discovering the evidence supporting his petition because it was either suppressed by
    the state in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
    , 
    83 S.Ct. 1194
    , 
    10 L.Ed.2d 215
     (1963), or his trial counsel failed to investigate known witnesses or sufficiently
    review the state’s discovery prior to trial. Specifically, he claims that he did not
    discover that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance until December 2015,
    when he received documentary evidence obtained by the Ohio Innocence Project’s
    investigation and public records request, and in 2019, when he received an affidavit
    from Derrick James in the mail.        According to Gray, the discovery of these
    documents reveals that his constitutional rights were violated and no reasonable
    factfinder would have found him guilty. Gray’s arguments are without merit.
    In support of his petition, Gray relies on Detective Cipo’s police report
    and crime scene sketch, McDowell’s police interview summary, Blanchard’s police
    interview summary, and an affidavit from James. According to Gray, Detective
    Cipo’s report and McDowell’s summary support his trial defense that the gunshots
    were fired during the fight, not after, as the state maintained at trial. He further
    contends that Blanchard’s description of the potential shooter in his 1998 police
    interview summary corroborated another trial witness’s testimony describing
    Bennie as the shooter. He contends that his counsel failed to review this report, if
    actually provided in discovery, because Blanchard’s description was contrary to his
    testimony that he did not see who shot the victim. Finally, Gray contends that his
    trial counsel failed to investigate the state’s evidence and contact James as a witness
    for trial. James provided an affidavit stating that counsel never contacted him and
    that Bennie Kern shot and killed the victim.
    We find that Gray was not unavoidably prevented from discovering
    Detective Cipo’s original investigation crime scene report and sketch and the police
    summaries of their interviews with McDowell and Blanchard because these
    documents were available to Gray in 2015 and he relied on Detective Cipo’s report
    and McDowell’s summary in his 2016 petition to vacate his conviction. Moreover,
    we note that Blanchard testified at trial and was subject to cross examination. Any
    defect in trial counsel’s performance in cross-examining Blanchard could have been
    raised on direct appeal or, perhaps, in Gray’s 2016 petition to vacate his conviction.
    Regarding James’s 2019 affidavit, Gray again fails to establish that he
    was unavoidably prevented from discovering James’s statement. He admits that he
    identified James as a potential witness for trial but that counsel advised him that
    James did not wish to testify. Accordingly, he knew of James at the time of trial and,
    thus, on direct appeal. He now contends that his counsel was ineffective based on
    James’s affidavit, which avers that Gray’s trial counsel never contacted him to testify
    and that he saw Bennie Kern shoot the victim in the back. James’s refusal to
    cooperate at the time of trial does not demonstrate that Gray was unavoidably
    prevented from obtaining his statement earlier or that counsel was ineffective.
    Gray cannot now seek to overturn his conviction based solely on trial
    counsel’s failure to call certain witnesses or ask certain questions on cross-
    examination. Trial counsel called three witnesses who all testified that “Bennie” was
    the shooter. See generally Gray II. Bennie’s last name was purportedly discovered
    in 2008, and the allegation that Bennie shot the victim has been raised repeatedly
    in Gray’s petitions for postconviction relief. See Gray VIII at ¶ 7-8. His presentation
    of additional witnesses who merely confirm Bennie’s identity or belief that he was
    the shooter is cumulative and not sufficient to constitute newly discovered evidence.
    Finally, even if Gray was unavoidably prevented from discovering this
    documentary evidence, we find no constitutional violation based on the information
    contained in the documents. Accordingly, Gray has failed to show by clear and
    convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty
    based on the information contained in the documents.
    In light of on the foregoing, Gray has failed to satisfy both criteria of
    R.C. 2953.23 that would have allowed the trial court to entertain his untimely and
    successive petition for postconviction relief. And Gray’s challenge that the trial court
    failed to make a threshold determination whether he satisfied the criteria under R.C.
    2953.23 is without merit. A trial court is not required to issue findings of fact and
    conclusions of law when it dismisses an untimely or successive petition for
    postconviction relief. See State ex rel. Kimbrough v. Greene, 
    98 Ohio St.3d 116
    ,
    
    2002-Ohio-7042
    , 
    781 N.E.2d 155
    , ¶ 6; State ex rel. Carroll v. Corrigan, 
    84 Ohio St.3d 529
    , 530, 
    705 N.E.2d 1226
     (1999). Accordingly, the assignments of error are
    overruled.
    III. Res Judicata
    Moreover, res judicata bars the arguments Gray raises because the
    claims and documentary evidence upon which he relies have been raised or could
    have been raised in his direct appeal or in his prior petitions. State v. Davis, 
    119 Ohio St.3d 422
    , 
    2008-Ohio-4608
    , 
    894 N.E.2d 1221
     (the doctrine of res judicata bars
    the further litigation of issues that were or could have been raised previously in a
    direct appeal). The doctrine of res judicata can also bar successive petitions for
    postconviction relief. State v. Apanovitch, 
    107 Ohio App.3d 82
    , 
    667 N.E.2d 1041
    (8th Dist.1995). “While Ohio law may permit the filing of multiple petitions, a
    petitioner does not have carte blanche to file successive petitions endlessly.” State
    v. Cotton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 71234 and 71235, 
    1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 1882
    , 8
    (May 8, 1997), citing State v. Steffen, 
    70 Ohio St.3d 399
    , 410, 
    639 N.E.2d 67
     (1994).
    “‘Trial courts are not required to entertain successive petitions which alleged the
    same grounds as an earlier petition. * * * [A] [d]efendant should generally be
    prepared, after thorough investigation, to present all relevant evidence to support
    the particular grounds before broaching the subject.’” Cotton at 8, quoting State v.
    Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 68613, 
    1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 100
    , 3 (Jan. 18,
    1996).
    In this case, Gray supports his petition with the same claims that he
    has been raising for 20 years — shots were fired during the fight, and Bennie Kern
    shot and killed the victim. And he primarily supports his petition with the same
    documentary evidence and claims as those that he raised in his unsuccessful 2016
    petition. Accordingly, res judicata would also bar Gray’s petition for relief, and we
    find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying the petition.
    Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
    common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
    27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
    SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
    EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 110099

Judges: Keough

Filed Date: 7/15/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/16/2021