In re S.P. , 2023 Ohio 1208 ( 2023 )

[Cite as In re S.P., 2023-Ohio-1208.]
COURT OF APPEALS
STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
IN THE MATTER OF S.P. : JUDGES:
: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
: Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
:
:
: Case No. 2022CA00139
:
: OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common
Pleas Family Court Division, Case
No. 2021JCV00408
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: April 11, 2023
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
BRANDON J. WALTENBAUGH PAUL M. GRANT
402 2nd Street SE 209 S. Main Street
Canton, OH 44708 8th Floor
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00139 2
Akron, OH 44038
King, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant Father appeals the September 29, 2022 judgment entry of the
Stark County Court of Common Pleas Family Court Division terminating his parental
rights and granting permanent custody of his child S.P. to the Stark County Department
of Job and Family Services (SCJFS).
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} J.P. is the father ("Father") of S.P. who was born December 16, 2020.
SCJFS became involved with the family shortly thereafter due to concerns involving drug
use by both parents, active warrants for both parents, Mother J.B.'s history with social
service agencies involving the removal of three other children from her custody, and
Mother's poorly-managed epilepsy.
{¶ 3} SCJFS initially attempted to put a safety plan in place which included using
maternal grandmother as a safety plan monitor. However, Mother, Father, and
Grandmother all tested positive for methamphetamines. As a result, an emergency
shelter care hearing was held on February 2, 2021 wherein the trial court found probable
cause for the involvement of SCJFS, that SCJFS had made reasonable efforts to prevent
the removal of S.P. from the home, and that S.P.'s continued residence with parents was
not within S.P.'s best interests. The trial court granted temporary custody of S.P. to the
SCJFS. Neither Mother nor Father attended the hearing.
{¶ 4} On April 30, 2021, Father appeared for the first time and requested counsel.
Due to statutory time constraints, the complaint was dismissed and refiled the same day.
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00139 3
The concerns outlined in the initial complaint were identical to those outlined in the refiled
complaint. S.P. remained in the temporary custody of SCJFS.
{¶ 5} On May 3, 2021, a second emergency shelter care hearing was held with
the same concerns and results as the first. The trial court found SCJFS had made
reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of S.P. from the home. S.P. was continued in
the temporary custody of SCJFS.
{¶ 6} On May 26, 2021, an adjudicatory hearing was held. The trial court set the
matter for evidence on July 8, 2021.
{¶ 7} On July 8, 2021, S.P. was adjudicated dependent. On the same day, a case
plan for parents was approved and adopted. The plan required both parents to complete
a parenting assessment, substance abuse treatment, and follow through with all
treatment recommendations. The trial court found SCJFS had made reasonable efforts
to finalize permanency planning and compelling reasons existed to preclude a filing for
permanent custody. The court further found both parents were using drugs, both had
active warrants for their arrest, and neither were cooperating with non-court services.
{¶ 8} Both Mother and Father completed their parenting assessments with Dr.
Aimee Thomas. Dr. Thomas' concerns for Father's ability to safely parent S.P. included
his criminal activity and substance abuse, both of which had been concerns for Father
since the age of 10 or 11. Thomas also found Father's "unstable and immature" lifestyle
concerning for safe parenting.
{¶ 9} Thomas recommended Father engage in weekly aftercare classes, twelve-
step meetings, maintain sobriety, find a sober sponsor, cooperate with random drug
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00139 4
screens, engage in individual counseling, and successfully complete home-based
parenting classes.
{¶ 10} Thomas recommended Mother also engage in weekly aftercare classes,
twelve-step meetings, maintain sobriety, cooperate with random drug screens, and
engage in individual counseling. Additionally, Mother was to engage with a neurologist to
stabilize her seizure disorder. Because Mother has a full-scale IQ of 77 she required a
structured approach to parenting-skill training with more repetition. For that reason, the
Goodwill Parenting program was specifically recommended for Mother.
{¶ 11} Both Mother and Father were required to demonstrate nine months of
sobriety before reunification with S.P.
{¶ 12} On July 22, 2021 the court reviewed the case plan, found SCJFS had made
reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of S.P. from the home, and ordered status quo.
{¶ 13} On November 30 2021, SCJFS filed a motion to extend temporary custody
for six months. Parents had moved to a different county and needed time to locate and
utilize providers relevant to their case plan.
{¶ 14} On December 28, 2021 the trial court reviewed the matter, approved and
adopted the case plan, and found SCJFS had made reasonable efforts to finalize the
permanency planning, had made intensive efforts to identify and engage kinship
caregivers for S.P. and ordered status quo. The motion to extend temporary custody was
set for evidence on January 27, 2022. The court found Father had been discharged from
substance abuse treatment due to positive drug screens and non-compliance. The court
further found Mother was not engaged in substance abuse treatment and neither parent
was engaged in individual counseling.
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00139 5
{¶ 15} On January 27, 2022, Parents stipulated to the motion to extend temporary
custody and the trial court granted the same. The trial court that SCJFS had made
reasonable efforts, and ordered SCJFS to begin seeking permanency for S.P.
{¶ 16} On June 21, 2022, SCJFS filed a motion for permanent custody of S.P. The
motion alleged in part that S.P. could not be placed with Parents within a reasonable
amount of time, that S.P. had been in the continuous custody of SCJFS for 12 or more
months in a consecutive 22-month period, and that permanent custody was within S.P.'s
best interests.
{¶ 17} On June 28, 2022, the trial court reviewed the matter, found reasonable
efforts by SCJFS to finalize permanency planning, engage willing kinship caregivers for
S.P., ordered status quo, and found there were no compelling reasons to preclude a
request for permanent custody. The trial court specifically found Parents had failed to
follow through with mental health counseling, had not completed substance abuse
treatment, had refused drug testing since December 2021, and struggled with both stable
housing and consistency during visits with S.P. Parents were staying with family members
or in hotels. At the time of the review they were staying with Father's aunt in Pennsylvania.
{¶ 18} On September 19, 2022, the assigned Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) filed her
final report. In it the GAL noted her concerns surrounding Parents ability to safely parent
S.P. and recommended the trial court grant SCJFS's motion for permanent custody.
{¶ 19} The permanent custody hearing was held on September 28, 2022. SCJFS
caseworker Nicole Hadden was assigned to this case. She testified she became involved
in the matter nearly two years before the hearing due to concerns including drug use by
both parents, active warrants for both parents, Mother's extensive history of losing
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00139 6
custody of other children, and both parents failing to cooperate with non-court case plan
services. Hadden testified the initial complaint had been filed on February 2, 2021 and
that S.P. had been in the continuous temporary custody of the SCJFS since that date.
{¶ 20} Hadden described the case plan for Mother and Father. She stated while
Father was on probation, he initially complied with substance abuse treatment, but as
soon as he was released from probation he stopped participating. As of the date of the
hearing, Father had not participated in substance abuse treatment for nine months.
Father further failed to engage in twelve-step meetings, find a sober sponsor, or engage
in home-based parenting classes. Father had failed to comply with random drug testing
since December of 2021 when he tested positive for methamphetamine and
buprenorphine. He struggled with stable housing and employment throughout the case.
{¶ 21} Hadden testified that Parents moved to a different county and failed to
complete most of the requirements of their case plan. They did complete the Triple P
parenting program in Mahoning County. Hadden attempted to secure drug testing for
parents when they moved out of county, and offered screening on the multiple occasions
they came to Stark County to visit S.P. but parents still failed to comply. Mother failed to
comply with substance abuse counseling and refused multiple drug screens. She tested
positive for methamphetamines in November and December of 2021 and refused testing
thereafter. Mother further failed to complete Goodwill Parenting classes and made no
progress in individual counseling. Mother was incarcerated for a portion of the life of this
matter. She participated in the Triple P parenting programming while incarcerated.
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00139 7
{¶ 22} Hadden testified that despite reasonable efforts by SCJFS parents failed to
successfully complete their case plan services. She therefore believed there were
compelling reasons to grant SCJFS's motion for permanent custody.
{¶ 23} Father testified on his own behalf. As of the date of the hearing, Father had
been living in Pennsylvania with his aunt for six months and his relationship with Mother
was on and off. Father stated he has had long periods of sobriety but admitted he relapsed
in October or November of 2021. He blamed the relapse on the fact that SCJFS had
requested a six-month extension of temporary custody and claimed he never would have
relapsed if S.P. had been returned to him and Mother within six months. Father also
claimed the drug tests administered by SCJFS were inaccurate.
{¶ 24} Father also blamed his inconsistent employment on SCJFS stating he had
to decline employment since the agency scheduled visits with S.P. in the middle of the
week. He further stated SCJFS made no attempt to find services for him once he moved
out of county. He stated he therefore engaged in two parenting programs on his own
volition. Father testified that he felt no matter what he did, SCJFS planned to keep S.P.
{¶ 25} As to best interests, Hadden testified that parents visited S.P. regularly and
the visits went well for the most part. She noted S.P. was bonded with her foster parents,
but not Mother and Father. On one occasion parents brought developmentally
inappropriate food to the visit. When the matter was discussed with them, parents became
defensive. Hadden explored two potential kinship placements, only one of which was a
possibility. S.P.'s foster family was willing to adopt S.P.
{¶ 26} Father testified he and Mother visited S.P. in Stark County at least 60 times
requiring two hours of driving round trip. Father believed S.P. was bonded with he and
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00139 8
Mother, was aware of who her parents are, and that her best interests were served by
being with he and Mother. Father added that if there was an issue with Mother's past that
he would assume full responsibility for S.P.
{¶ 27} The GAL testified that parents had a lot of time, support, and options to get
sober and to engage in counseling but have failed to take advantage of those
opportunities. The GAL added that while parents complain SCJFS did not find a drug
testing facility in Pennsylvania for them, parents had the opportunity to take a drug screen
each time they visited S.P. but failed to do so. The GAL also opined uprooting S.P. who
has special needs challenges and is non-verbal would be detrimental to her wellbeing.
The GAL therefore felt granting SCJFS's motion for permanent custody was in S.P.'s best
interests.
{¶ 28} After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court granted SCJFS's
motion for permanent custody.
{¶ 29} Father filed an appeal and the matter is now before this court for
consideration. He raises three assignments of error as follow:
I
{¶ 30} "THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
GRANTED PERMANENT CUSTODY TO SUMMIT [SIC] COUNTY CHILDREN
SERVICES AND DENIED FATHER’S MOTION FOR AN EXTENSION AS THE TRIAL
COURT’S DECISION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE AND WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE."
II
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00139 9
{¶ 31} "THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY NOT
CONDUCTING THE ADJUDICATORY HEARING WITH [SIC] THE MANDATORY SIXTY
DAYS."
III
{¶ 32} "THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION TO GRANT PERMANENT CUSTODY
OF THE CHILDREN TO STARK COUNTY JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES SHOULD BE
REVERSED, BECAUSE THE AGENCY FAILED TO USE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO
REUNIFY THE CHILDREN. [sic]"
I
{¶ 33} Under the first assignment of error, we must first note that despite its
caption, there was no issue raised or argued by Father involving the denial of a motion
for an extension of time.
{¶ 34} In his first assignment of error, father argues the trial court's decision to
grant permanent custody to SCJFS is not supported by clear and convincing evidence
and is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, Father argues the trial
court erred in granting SCJFS's motion for permanent custody because S.P. had not been
in SCJFS custody for 12 of the past 22 months. We disagree.
Manifest Weight
{¶ 35} On review for manifest weight, the standard in a civil case is identical to the
standard in a criminal case: a reviewing court is to examine the entire record, weigh the
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00139 10
evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and
determine "whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury [or finder of fact] clearly
lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction
[decision] must be reversed and a new trial ordered." State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d
172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). In State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387,
678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990), the Supreme
Court of Ohio explained the following:
Weight of the evidence concerns "the inclination of the greater
amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of
the issue rather than the other. It indicates clearly to the jury that the
party having the burden of proof will be entitled to their verdict, if, on
weighing the evidence in their minds, they shall find the greater
amount of credible evidence sustains the issue which is to be
established before them. Weight is not a question of mathematics,
but depends on its effect in inducing belief." (Emphasis sic.)
{¶ 36} In weighing the evidence however, we are always mindful of the
presumption in favor of the trial court's factual findings. Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio
St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517.
Permanent Custody Determination
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00139 11
{¶ 37} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) states in relevant part that permanent custody may be
granted if the trial court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best
interest of the child and:
(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned * * * and the child cannot
be placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time
or should not be placed with the child's parents.
***
(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public
children services agencies or private child placing agencies for
twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period * *
*.
{¶ 38} Clear and convincing evidence is that evidence "which will provide in the
mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established."
Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the
syllabus. See In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 481 N.E.2d 613 (1985).
"Where the degree of proof required to sustain an issue must be clear and convincing, a
reviewing court will examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had
sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof." Cross at 477.
{¶ 39} R.C. 2151.414(E) sets out the factors relevant to determining whether a
child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time or should not
be placed with the parents. The section states in relevant part:
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00139 12
(E) In determining at a hearing held pursuant to division (A) of this
section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of
the Revised Code whether a child cannot be placed with either
parent within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed
with the parents, the court shall consider all relevant evidence. If the
court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, at a hearing
held pursuant to division (A) of this section or for the purposes of
division (A)(4) of section 2151.353 of the Revised Code that one or
more of the following exist as to each of the child's parents, the court
shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent
within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent:
(1) Following the placement of the child outside the child's home and
notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the
agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially
caused the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed
continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions
causing the child to be placed outside the child's home. In
determining whether the parents have substantially remedied those
conditions, the court shall consider parental utilization of medical,
psychiatric, psychological, and other social and rehabilitative
services and material resources that were made available to the
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00139 13
parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to allow them
to resume and maintain parental duties.
***
(16) Any other factor the court considers relevant.
Best Interests
{¶ 40} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) sets forth the factors a trial court shall consider in
determining the best interest of a child:
(D)(1) In determining the best interest of a child at a hearing held
pursuant to division (A) of this section or for the purposes of division
(A)(4) or (5) of section 2151.353 or division (C) of section 2151.415
of the Revised Code, the court shall consider all relevant factors,
including, but not limited to, the following:
(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's
parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home
providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the
child;
(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or
through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity
of the child;
(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has
been in the temporary custody of one or more public children
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00139 14
services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or
more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period * * *;
(d) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and
whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of
permanent custody to the agency;
(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section
apply in relation to the parents and child.
Father's argument
{¶ 41} Father challenges only the trial court's finding that S.P. had been in the
temporary custody of SCJFS for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-
month period.
{¶ 42} For the purposes of the "twelve of twenty-two" determination contained in
R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), the section states: "a child shall be considered to have entered the
temporary custody of an agency on the earlier of the date the child is adjudicated pursuant
to section 2151.28 of the Revised Code or the date that is sixty days after the removal of
the child from home." Emphasis added.
{¶ 43} SCJFS filed its dependency/neglect complaint on February 2, 2021. An
emergency shelter care hearing took place and S.P. was placed into the temporary
custody of SCJFS the same day. Sixty days from February 2, 2021 was April 3, 2021.
SCJFS filed its motion requesting permanent custody on June 21, 2022, well in excess
of 12 months. Accordingly, the trial court correctly found that S.P. had been in the
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00139 15
temporary custody of SCJFS for over twelve months of a consecutive 22-month period.
See In the Matter of D.V. 5th Dist. Stark No. 2022CA00109, 2023-Ohio-238, ¶¶ 27-32.
{¶ 44} A finding that a child has been in the temporary custody of a public children-
services agency for twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period alone, in
conjunction with a best interest finding, is sufficient to support the grant of permanent
custody. In re Calhoun, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2008CA00118, 2008-Ohio-5458 ¶ 45. Father
does not challenge the trial court's best interests finding and in fact states there is no
reason to examine the best interests finding. Father's brief at 16. We therefore find the
trial court's decision is supported by clear and convincing evidence and is not against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 45} The first assignment of error is overruled.
II
{¶ 46} In his second assignment of error, Father argues his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to object to the trial court holding the adjudicatory hearing
outside of the 60-day time frame set forth in R.C. 2151.28. We disagree.
{¶ 47} The test for ineffective assistance of counsel used in criminal cases,
announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d
674 (1984), also applies in actions by the state to force the permanent, involuntary
termination of parental rights. Jones v. Lucas Cty. Children Services Bd., 46 Ohio App.3d
85, 86, 546 N.E.2d 471 (1988). A claim for ineffective assistance of counsel requires a
two-prong analysis. The first inquiry is whether counsel's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonable representation involving a substantial violation of any of
defense counsel's essential duties to appellant. The second prong is whether the
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00139 16
appellant was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness. Strickland, supra; State v. Bradley,
42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989).
{¶ 48} In determining whether counsel's representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly
deferential. Bradley at 142, 538 N.E.2d 373. Because of the difficulties inherent in
determining whether effective assistance of counsel was rendered in any give case, a
strong presumption exists counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. Id.{¶ 49} In order to warrant a reversal, the appellant must additionally show he was
prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness. "Prejudice from defective representation
sufficient to justify reversal of a conviction exists only where the result of the trial was
unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair because of the performance of trial
counsel." State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 558, 1995-Ohio-104, citing Lockhart v.
Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 370, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993).
{¶ 50} Father faults his counsel for failing to object to the adjudication hearing
being held on July 8, 2021 instead of on or before the deadline of June 29, 2021.
{¶ 51} We note Father did not appeal the adjudication of S.P. as a dependent child.
As the Eighth District has found:
"An adjudication by a juvenile court that a child is 'neglected' or
'dependent ' * * * followed by a disposition awarding temporary
custody to a public children services agency * * * constitutes a 'final
order' within the meaning of R.C. 2505.02 and is appealable to the
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00139 17
court of appeals * * *." In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 556 N.E.2d
1169 (1990), syllabus. Furthermore, "an appeal of an adjudication
order of abuse, dependency, or neglect of a child and the award of
temporary custody to a children services agency pursuant to R.C.
2151.353(A)(2) must be filed within 30 days of the judgment entry
pursuant to App.R. 4(A)." In re H.F., 120 Ohio St.3d 499, 2008-Ohio-
6810, 900 N.E.2d 607, ¶ 18. Although the parent still retains the right
to appeal any award of permanent custody to a children services
agency, that appeal is limited to issues that arose after the
adjudication order. Id.{¶ 52} In re S.C., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102611, 2015-Ohio-4766, ¶ 14,
emphasis added.
{¶ 53} Because Father failed to file a timely appeal, we are without jurisdiction to
consider the ineffective assistance of counsel issue he now raises. See In the Matter of
Blackburn, Butler App. No. CA92-09-174, 1994 WL 18163 (Jan. 24, 1994) at *1.
{¶ 54} The second assignment of error is overruled.
III
{¶ 55} In his final assignment of error, Father argues the trial court's decision to
grant permanent custody to SCJFS should be reversed because SCJFS failed to employ
reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of S.P. We find Father's reasonable efforts
argument inapplicable to the permanent custody hearing in this matter.
{¶ 56} In 2007, the Supreme Court of Ohio found:
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00139 18
[E]xcept for some narrowly defined statutory exceptions, the state must
make reasonable efforts to reunify the family before terminating parental
rights. If the agency has not already proven reasonable efforts, it must do
so at the hearing on a motion for permanent custody. However, the specific
requirement to make reasonable efforts that is set forth in R.C.
2151.419(A)(1) does not apply in an R.C. 2151.413 motion for permanent
custody.
{¶ 57} In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, 862 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 4.
{¶ 58} The Court in C.F. further stated "[i]f the agency has not established that
reasonable efforts have been made prior to the hearing on a motion for permanent
custody, then it must demonstrate such efforts at that time." Id. at ¶ 43.
{¶ 59} According to the record in this matter the magistrate made reasonable
efforts findings on six occasions prior to the permanent custody hearing, specifically, May
3, 2021, July 8, 2021, July 22, 2021, December 28, 2021, January 27, 2022, and June
28, 2022. The same finding was made on February 2, 2021 before the case was
dismissed and refiled. Father never objected to any of the magistrate's seven findings of
best efforts.
{¶ 60} Even if that were not true, at the permanent custody hearing, Hadden, the
assigned SCJFS caseworker, testified that when she received the case plans were
developed and approved with the goal of parents complying with the case plan to
demonstrate they could safely parent and provide stability for S.P. Transcript of
Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00139 19
permanent custody hearing (T.) 10-11. Among the biggest concerns was Father's drug
use. While Father complied with the requirement of drug counseling while he was on
probation, he failed to comply thereafter. T. 12. Instead of taking responsibility for his
continued drug use, Father blamed SCJFS for his relapse and stated the agency failed
to direct him to a facility where he could be drug screened in Pennsylvania. T. 87-88. But
Father refused to comply with requests by SCJFS for drug screens on the many
occasions he traveled to Stark County to visit S.P. T. 15-16, 86-87, 117. Father further
failed to attend twelve-step meetings, identify a sober sponsor, or maintain employment
and stable housing, all things Father could have accomplished no matter where he
decided to live, and without any further prodding from SCJFS. 15-16, 117. In short, Father
was provided with many opportunities and failed to take advantage of those opportunities.
{¶ 61} Because SCJFS was not required to make a reasonable efforts showing
during the permanent custody hearing, and because Father never objected to seven
previous findings by the court of reasonable efforts, the final assignment of error is
overruled.
{¶ 62} The judgment of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas Family Court
Division is affirmed.
By King, J.,
Gwin, P.J. and
Delaney, J. concur.
AJK/rw