State v. Eaddie , 2018 Ohio 961 ( 2018 )

[Cite as State v. Eaddie, 2018-Ohio-961.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 106019
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
THOMAS EADDIE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case Nos. CR-16-605555-A and CR-16-607340-A
BEFORE: Blackmon, P.J., Laster Mays, J., and Jones, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 15, 2018
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Michael Goldberg
The Goldberg Law Firm
323 Lakeside Avenue, West, Suite 450
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael C. O’Malley
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Katherine Mullin
Assistant County Prosecutor
The Justice Center, 9th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Thomas Eaddie (“Eaddie”) appeals from the
consecutive sentences imposed following his convictions in Case Nos. CR-16-605555-A
and CR-16-607340-A. Eaddie assigns the following error for our review:
The sentence imposed by the trial court was unreasonable and contrary to
law.
{¶2} Having reviewed the record and pertinent law, we affirm the trial court’s
sentence. The apposite facts follow.
{¶3} On May 9, 2016, Eaddie was indicted in CR-16-605555-A. He was
charged with having a weapon while under disability, improperly handling firearms in a
motor vehicle, carrying a concealed weapon, two counts of drug trafficking, two counts of
drug possession, and possessing criminal tools. The counts also contained various
forfeiture specifications and the drug charges contained one-year firearm specifications.
{¶4} On June 29, 2016, Eaddie was indicted in CR-16-607340-A. He was
charged with aggravated burglary, misdemeanor assault, domestic violence, criminal
damaging, burglary, three counts of menacing by stalking, and possessing criminal tools.
{¶5} Eaddie pled not guilty in both cases, and the trial court ordered Eaddie to
undergo inpatient competency and sanity evaluations. The court also appointed an
expert for an independent psychological evaluation.
{¶6} Eaddie subsequently reached plea agreements with the state in both matters.
In CR-16-605555-A, Eaddie pled guilty to having a weapon while under disability, and to
one amended count of drug trafficking following the deletion of the firearm specification.
The remaining counts were nolled. In CR-16-607340-A, Eaddie pled guilty to
domestic violence, burglary, and menacing by stalking, and the remaining counts were
nolled.
{¶7} On June 21, 2017, Eaddie was sentenced to thirty months in
CR-16-605555-A, to run consecutive with a seven-year term sentence in
CR-16-607340-A.
Consecutive Sentences
{¶8} In his sole assigned error, Eaddie argues that the trial court erred in
imposing consecutive sentences because the record does not support the court’s findings
under R.C. 2929.14(C), and because the court expressed hostility and bias against Eaddie
during sentencing.
{¶9} In reviewing felony sentences, appellate courts must apply the standard of
review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), rather than an abuse of discretion standard. See
State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 9. Under
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may increase, reduce, or modify a sentence, or it
may vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing, only if it clearly and convincingly
finds either (1) the record does not support certain specified findings, or (2) the sentence
imposed is contrary to law. An appellate court does not review a trial court’s sentence
for an abuse of discretion. Marcum at ¶ 10. Rather, an appellate court may vacate or
modify any sentence that is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law only if the
appellate court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support
the sentence. Id. at ¶ 23. In accordance with R.C. 2953.08(A)(1), Eaddie may appeal
as of right the imposition of consecutive sentences.
{¶10} Before a trial court may impose consecutive sentences, the court must first
make specific findings mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) and incorporate those findings in
the sentencing entry. State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d
659, ¶ 37. Under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), the court must find that consecutive sentences
are: (1) necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender; and
(2) are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger
the offender posses to the public. R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). In addition to making those
findings, the court must also find one of the following:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while
the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed
pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or
was under postrelease control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or
more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the
multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single
prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses
of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct.
(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime
by the offender.
Id.{¶11} Although the requisite findings must be made, the trial court “has no
obligation to state reasons to support its findings,” so long as “the necessary findings can
be found in the record and are incorporated into the sentencing entry.” Bonnell at ¶ 37.
{¶12} At the sentencing hearing in this matter, the trial court stated as follows:
You have a terrible record, okay? Which began as far back as 2003 with
aggravated rioting as a juvenile, failure to comply with a signal or order of a
police officer as an adult. Obviously open container, driving under the
influence, drug trafficking * * * Anyway, you have had drug trafficking
cases previously, aggravated menacing [in 2011 and 2016]. It’s obvious
from your record and the answers to my questions that it is necessary to run
them consecutive to protect the public from future crime from you, and I
don’t believe it’s disproportionate to the seriousness of your conduct and
the danger to the public. You are a drug dealer. You continue to sell
drugs. You continue to carry weapons. You continue to act in a manner
close to menacing, your third time, and at least your history of criminal
conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect
the public from future crime by you.
{¶13} These statements demonstrate that the trial court considered Eaddie’s
extensive criminal history and the nature of his conduct in the instant matters. The court
found that the consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime
in light of Eaddie’s criminal history, and that the court determined that consecutive
sentences were necessary to punish him due to his continued involvement in criminal
activity. Additionally, based upon Eaddie’s record and conduct, the court clearly found
that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of Eaddie’s
conduct and to the danger he presents to the public. Additionally, the court found and
the record shows, that Eaddie’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive
sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime. Further, the sentencing
journal entries set forth all of the findings required under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court made all of the required R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)
findings before imposing consecutive sentences in this matter.
{¶14} Having determined that the trial court made the required findings under
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), we next consider whether the record supported those findings. State
v. Moore, 2014-Ohio-5135, 24 N.E.3d 1197 (8th Dist.). Here, Eaddie’s record contains
other drug offenses, aggravated vehicular assault, failure to comply, and menacing. His
record, and the circumstances of the instant offenses, support the trial court’s conclusion
that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime or to
punish the offender, and are not disproportionate to the seriousness of his conduct and to
the danger he presents to the public. Additionally, the record demonstrates that Eaddie’s
history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to
protect the public from future crime.
Judicial Bias
{¶15} Eaddie next argues that during sentencing, the trial court exhibited bias and
hostility against him because it “badgered,” “mocked,” and demeaned him while
“feigning concern” about his medical condition prior to his plea and during sentencing.
{¶16} R.C. 2701.03 provides the exclusive means by which a litigant may claim
that a common pleas court judge is biased and prejudiced. State v. Bacon, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 85475, 2005-Ohio-6238, ¶ 66; State v. Casada, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
103362, 2016-Ohio-2633, ¶ 25, citing State ex rel. Pratt v. Weygandt, 164 Ohio St. 463,
132 N.E.2d 191 (1956), paragraph three of the syllabus; Jones v. Billingham, 105 Ohio
App.3d 8, 663 N.E.2d 657 (2d Dist.1995). A court of appeals has “no authority to
determine a claim that a trial judge is biased or prejudiced against a defendant and no
authority to void a trial court’s judgment based on a claim that the trial judge is biased or
prejudiced.” State v. Frazier, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104264, 2017-Ohio-8307, ¶ 16,
citing State v. Williamson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104294, 2016-Ohio-7053, ¶ 27. A
litigant who believes that the trial judge should be disqualified must file an affidavit of
bias or prejudice with the clerk of the supreme court pursuant to R.C. 2701.03. Id.{¶17} However, in State v. Dean, 127 Ohio St.3d 140, 2010-Ohio-5070, 937
N.E.2d 97, the court recognized that “trial before a biased judge is fundamentally unfair
and denies a defendant due process of law.” Id. at ¶ 48, quoting State v. LaMar,
95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002 -Ohio -2128, 767 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 34. However,
“opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the
course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a
bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that
would make fair judgment impossible.” Dean at ¶ 49, quoting Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994).
{¶18} This court applied the foregoing principles to sentencing challenges in
Frazier, and in State v. Filous, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104287, 2016-Ohio-8312, to
determine whether purported judicial bias rendered the sentence unlawful. The Filous
court explained:
[t]he law presumes that a judge is unbiased and unprejudiced in the matters
over which he or she presides, and the appearance of bias or prejudice must
be compelling in order to overcome the presumption. State v. Power, 7th
Dist. Columbiana No. 12 CO 14, 2013-Ohio-4254, ¶ 23, citing In re
Disqualification of Olivito, 74 Ohio St.3d 1261, 1262, 657 N.E.2d 1361(1994).
Filous at ¶ 14.
{¶19} In this matter, the record demonstrates that when the competency and
sanity reports were stipulated into evidence, the trial court made the following remark:
And the [competency and sanity report] findings are that he does not have a
present mental condition that is within reasonable medical certainty, and
that he is presently malingering his psychiatric symptoms and cognitive
deficits.
{¶20} We have reviewed the record and conclude that the trial court was
restating the conclusions reached in the sanity and competency report. The statement
contained a term of art used in the report that was a fair comment upon facts introduced
or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings. The statement does not
constitute a basis for a bias or partiality.
{¶21} Additionally, the court stated during pretrial proceedings:
So I’m asking you, do you want me to order that they stabilize your head so
it doesn’t move? They can do that. People who are in accidents that
have those problems, they screw a frame like onto your head — it’s call a
halo — into your shoulders and into your head. And then your head will
never move, you just — your body can move, but your head is immobilized.
Is that what you need? And you thinking about that bullet in your head can
make your day bad. So try to think about other things. Try to think about
good things. * * *
I guess I would look at it this way. You were lucky that you got shot in the
head and you didn’t die, you know? So every day that that bullet doesn’t
shift is a day that you might not have had; do you know what I mean? * *
*
Well, I said I’m going to get your medical records, I’ll give them to my
experts, and they’ll tell me if you’re getting the right treatment or not, okay?
{¶22} We have reviewed the comments and find absolutely no evidence to
overcome the presumption that the trial court was not biased or prejudiced against Eaddie.
The comments were part of repeated inquiries to determine whether Eaddie needed
additional medical treatment to stabilize his head and prevent movement of the bullet.
The comments were neither demeaning nor mocking. To the contrary, the record
indicates that the court shared one of its own experiences with Eaddie and offered
strategies to him. The court expressed empathy for Eaddie and stated that it would make
further inquiries about his condition and medical needs. In no way do the comments
display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism and they do not undermine the lawful
sentence that the court imposed.
{¶23} The assigned error is without merit.
{¶24} Judgment is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having
been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court
for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, PRESIDING JUDGE
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., and
LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., CONCUR