State v. Renode , 2020 Ohio 5430 ( 2020 )

[Cite as State v. Renode, 2020-Ohio-5430.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 109171
v. :
JACQUE RENODE, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 25, 2020
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-17-617731-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, Maxwell Martin and Kevin Bringman, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.
John F. Corrigan, for appellant.
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J.:
Defendant-appellant, Jacque Renode, appeals from his convictions
for murder, felonious assault, aggravated menacing, and intimidation of a witness.
He assigns the following errors for our review:
I. The trial court erred in denying [Renode] the right of
confrontation.
II. The trial court erred in overruling [Renode’s] motion for a
mistrial.
III. [Renode’s] convictions were not supported by legally sufficient
evidence as required by state and federal due process.
IV. [Renode’s] convictions were against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
Having reviewed the record and the pertinent law, we affirm.
Renode was indicted for aggravated murder, murder, felonious
assault, and aggravated menacing in connection with the death of 14-year-old J.D.
Together with his girlfriend, Navi Sanders (“Sanders”), Renode was also indicted for
attempted murder, felonious assault, discharge of a weapon near prohibited
premises, improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle, and intimidation of
crime witness A.B. in connection with a drive-by shooting that occurred four days
after J.D.’s death.1 The cases against Renode were consolidated and proceeded to a
jury trial in September 2019.
Jenna Davis (“Davis”), mother of J.D., testified that she met Sanders
in about 2014. Over the course of their friendship, Sanders periodically stayed with
Davis when Sanders did not have housing. By 2016, Davis, J.D., and Davis’s younger
son were living in a single family home on West 105th Street in Cleveland. Later
1A.B. testified during Sanders’s trial. See State v. Sanders, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
106744, 2018-Ohio-4603. However, prior to Renode’s trial, A.B. was shot and killed in
an unrelated incident.
that year, Davis’s boyfriend of eight years, Damien Sellers (“Sellers”) also moved into
the home.
Davis established that in November 2016, she learned that Sanders
and Renode needed a place to stay after a fire in their apartment. Davis agreed to
let them stay with her and they moved in a short time later. However, friction
quickly developed between Sanders and J.D. after they argued over Davis’s cell
phone. Renode also fought with J.D. and accused him of looking at Sanders
“inappropriately.” Due to their ongoing issues with J.D., Davis told Sanders and
Renode that they had to move out. At that point, Sanders and Davis had a physical
altercation. Davis subsequently packed their belongings and left them on the porch
where Renode’s mother picked them up.
On November 27, 2016, Renode and Sanders returned to Davis’s
home. According to Davis, they were beating on the door, pounding on windows,
and Renode threatened that if Davis did not let him in, he would “com[e] back [to]
kill all you guys.” Davis’s neighbor, Dena Simones (“Simones”), called the police,
but Renode and Sanders fled before police arrived. Several days later, however, they
returned. Sanders told Davis that they had secured housing, but it would not be
available until Monday, December 5, 2016. Davis testified that her younger son
persuaded her to let them in, and she agreed because it was for a short duration.
Several days later, Simones’s electricity was disconnected, and Davis invited her and
her three boys to also stay at the West 105th Street house.
On the afternoon of December 3, 2016, Davis, Sellers, and Simones
left for several hours to buy groceries. During this time, Sanders and Renode were
home with J.D., Davis’s younger son, Simones’s 14-year-old son A.B. A.B.’s
girlfriend A.F., and Simones’s two younger children. According to A.F., as the group
sat together, Renode improvised a song, singing that he was “going to body
this n----.”
By the time that Davis, Simones, and Sellers returned from shopping,
J.D. was intoxicated. Davis stated that she was upset with Renode, and Sanders,
and she sent J.D. to his room. J.D. remained in his room for the remainder of the
night, and was lying on the floor of his room, watching television.
The group remained in the house that evening. J.D. remained in his
room on the floor, with Davis checking on him periodically and bringing him food.
Simones’s children were in another bedroom. The third bedroom was unoccupied
and contained only dirty clothes and an uninflated air mattress. Simones and
Davis’s younger son were in the dining room, watching a movie. Davis and Sellers
were sleeping on a sectional sofa, in the living room. Renode and Sanders were also
in the living room, sharing a chair. Davis thought that Renode and Sanders would
be more comfortable in a bed, so she told them that they could sleep on the bed in
J.D.’s room.
Davis testified that in the middle of the night, Sellers left to buy
cigarettes at a nearby store. After that, she went upstairs to check on the children.
Davis immediately observed that the door to J.D.’s room, which had been off of its
hinges was now placed in the doorway of J.D.’s room. Davis went inside and saw
J.D. wrapped in a blanket and blood everywhere. Davis yelled for Simones to call
the police then sent A.B. to the store to get Sellers. According to Davis, Renode
subsequently ran into the house, up the steps, then ran from the scene. Sellers
arrived a few minutes later and was still wearing the same white hooded sweatshirt
that he was wearing earlier that night. Sellers was crying, distraught, and upset
when he learned that J.D. was hurt, and he spoke with police on the scene and
afterward.
Sellers testified that he thought of J.D. as a son and denied all
involvement in the murder. He testified that he could not sleep so he decided to
walk to a nearby store for cigarettes. As he went upstairs to get his shoes, he saw
Renode coming downstairs, and Renode said that he would join him. When they
arrived at the store, Renode asked Sellers to get lighter fluid. The clerk passed the
lighter fluid to them, and Renode put it in his pocket and passed Sellers a debit card.
When the card was declined, Renode ran out of the store with the lighter fluid.
Sellers chased after Renode and brought the lighter fluid back to the store.
According to Simones, Renode was wearing basketball shorts when
he returned from the store. He sat on the steps of the house, then abruptly said, “I
gotta get the f--- outta here,” and ran from the scene. Sanders also left before the
police arrived.
Paramedics determined that J.D. was dead at the scene. The police
recovered a bloody knife from J.D.’s room along with clothing and other pieces of
evidence during their initial investigation of the home.
Deputy Medical Examiner Todd Barr, M.D. (“Dr. Barr”) testified that
J.D.’s death was a homicide that was the result of two separate events: compression
asphyxiation that caused bleeding in his brain; and a deep stab wound to his neck.
Following J.D.’s death, Davis, Sellers, and Davis’s younger child
stayed with Simones. A day or two later, Sellers, together with A.B. and A.F., went
into Davis’s house to get clothing and food. Sellers testified that he noticed a pair of
blood-stained tan pants in a pile of dirty clothing in the unused bedroom. He asked
A.B. for a stick or pencil to handle the pants and called the police to return to the
home. The police retrieved the pants and also removed a pair of stained blue jeans
that were located in the living room. According to Cleveland Police Detective Mark
Peoples (“Det. Peoples”), when the police were on the scene immediately after the
homicide, clothing was “all over the floor” of this bedroom and they took only a
“cursory glance” at it.
Curtiss Jones (“Jones”), Cuyahoga County Medical Examiner’s Office
trace evidence supervisor, testified that the blue jeans recovered from the house had
staining that was negative for blood. The tan pants recovered from the house had
multiple blood stains, including spatter stains, drip stains, saturation stains, and
blood transfer stains. According to Jones, a spatter stain is created from the impact
of force into liquid blood, where the impact causes a sort of splash of blood droplets
through the air that are projected into the general area of impact. A saturation stain
occurs when blood accumulates and soaks into an item. A transfer stain occurs
when a bloody object comes into contact with another object and deposits an imprint
stain. A drip stain is a stain pattern, caused either from the injury or a bloody object
that leaves a series of drops.
According to DNA analyst Lisa Moore (“Moore”) of the Cuyahoga
County Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, DNA evidence of the knife recovered
from the scene contained J.D.’s blood. The blade and handle contained such a
tremendous amount of blood that J.D.’s DNA would have masked any other DNA
contributor to this item of evidence. The blood on the tan pants located by Sellers
in the unoccupied bedroom also contained J.D.’s blood. However, DNA recovered
from the inner waistband had a mixture of DNA. Renode was determined to be the
major contributor by a likelihood of one in 109 quintillion unrelated African-
American individuals. Sanders was the minor contributor by a likelihood of one in
206 trillion unrelated African-American individuals. No evidence linked Sellers or
A.B. to the tan pants.
Approximately four days after J.D.’s death, while Davis, Sellers, and
Davis’s other child were still staying with Simones, and A.F. was visiting, Simones
noticed a car stopped in front of her house. The car backed up then pulled forward.
A.B. and A.F. headed outside, and Simones turned her attention inside the house. A
few moments later, Simones heard multiple gunshots. A car parked in her driveway
was struck by a bullet. According to Simones, as she looked back outside, she got a
“glimpse” of Renode and heard Sanders shout, “Go, go!” Simones immediately
called the police. Simones admitted that during the initial portion of the 911 call she
stated that she did not know who the assailant was, but three minutes into the call
she told the dispatcher that the shooting was committed by the same individuals
connected to J.D.’s murder.
Over strenuous defense objection, Simones also testified to the
statements and mental state of A.B. who died prior to trial. According to this
testimony, A.B. was shaking and could hardly breathe, and stated that he observed
Renode produce a gun from the back window and start shooting.
A.F. testified that she was outside with A.B. when the shots were fired.
She observed three people in the car and saw a silver gun. According to A.F., after
the shots were fired, A.B. was scared and under an “adrenalin rush.”
Officer Justin Lawrence (“Officer Lawrence”) of the Indianapolis
Police Department testified that on May 23, 2017, he responded to a call regarding
an argument between Renode and Sanders near a McDonald’s in Indianapolis.
Officer Lawrence spoke with them and determined their identities. As he learned
that there was a warrant for Renode, Renode fled the scene. He was eventually
captured by SWAT officers on a nearby rooftop, then extradited to Ohio.
Renode was convicted of murder, felonious assault, aggravated
menacing, and intimidation of a crime witness.2 The trial court sentenced him to
life imprisonment with parole eligibility after 21 years.
Confrontation
In the first assigned error, Renode argues that the trial court deprived
him of his constitutional right of confrontation when it permitted Simones to testify
regarding a declaration from A.B. that Renode was the shooter in the December 8,
2016 drive-by shooting. Renode argues that A.B.’s statement does not constitute an
admissible excited utterance because it was not contemporaneous, was not made
under nervous excitement, and A.B. himself did “not have the opportunity to
observe personally the matters [he] asserted[.]” Renode also notes that during
Sanders’s trial (and prior to A.B.’s death), the court determined that some of
Simones’s testimony regarding A.B.’s declarations were inadmissible hearsay.
In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158
L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), the United States Supreme Court held that the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution permits
testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial where the declarant is
unavailable, only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.
2 On September 14, 2017, Sanders was convicted of felonious assault, discharging
a firearm near a prohibited premises, improper handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle,
and intimidation of a crime witness. This court affirmed. Sanders, 2018-Ohio-4603. An
en banc panel also affirmed, concluding that an underlying criminal or delinquent act is
not an essential element of intimidation of a witness. See State v. Sanders, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 106744, 2019-Ohio-2566 (en banc).
Testimonial statements include statements “that were made under circumstances
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement
would be available for use at a later trial.” Id. at 52. See also Davis v. Washington,
547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006). “Statements are
nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of interrogation is to
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.” Davis at 823. See also
State v. Eicholtz, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2012-CA-7, 2013-Ohio-302, ¶ 26.
“Typically, 911 calls made to report an ongoing emergency that
requires police assistance to resolve that emergency are not ‘testimonial’ in nature
and therefore the Confrontation Clause does not apply.” (Citations omitted.) State
v. McDaniel, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24423, 2011-Ohio-6326, ¶ 24. Moreover,
courts have “generally held that a 911 call made by a domestic assault victim is not
testimonial in nature and that, where the excited utterance exception to the hearsay
rule applies, the admission of such a statement does not violate the Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation of witnesses.” (Citations omitted.) State v.
Norris, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26147, 2015-Ohio-624 at ¶ 13. Accord State v.
Kerr, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26686, 2016-Ohio-965, ¶ 22.
The court in State v. Stahl, 111 Ohio St.3d 186, 2006-Ohio-5482, 855
N.E.2d 834, ¶ 23, the court recognized that “[i]n Davis, the court held that a 911
telephone call made to seek protection from immediate danger did not constitute a
testimonial statement for Sixth Amendment purposes.” The Stahl court further
explained as follows:
[The Davis court] reasoned that “the nature of what was asked and
answered [during the 911 call] * * * , again viewed objectively, was such
that the elicited statements were necessary to be able to resolve the
present emergency, rather than simply to learn (as in Crawford) what
had happened in the past.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at [547 U.S. 814], 126
S.Ct. at 2276, 165 L.Ed.2d 224. Moreover, the call “was plainly a call
for help against bona fide physical threat” and involved “frantic
answers” given “in an environment that was not tranquil, or even (as
far as any reasonable 911 operator could make out) safe.” Id. at [547
U.S. 814], 126 S.Ct. at 2276, 2277, 165 L.Ed.2d 224.
Finally, as to the controlling caselaw, we note that Evid.R. 803 sets
forth certain exceptions to the rule against hearsay, including the “excited utterance”
exception. Evid.R. 803(2). In order for a statement to be admissible as an excited
utterance, four prerequisites must be satisfied: (a) the occurrence of an event
startling enough to produce a nervous excitement in the declarant that stills his
reflexive faculties so that his declarations are spontaneous and the unreflective and
sincere expressions of his impressions and beliefs; (b) a statement made while still
under the stress of excitement caused by the event; (c) a statement related to the
startling event; and (d) the declarant had an opportunity to personally observe the
matters in his declaration. State v. Taylor, 66 Ohio St.3d 295, 300-301, 612 N.E.2d
316 (1993); State v. Jones, 135 Ohio St.3d 10, 2012-Ohio-5677, 984 N.E.2d
948, ¶ 166.
Beginning with determining whether the statement was testimonial
or nontestimonial, the record clearly establishes that A.B.’s statements during the
911 telephone call were made in order to obtain protection from immediate danger.
They were made in an effort to resolve an immediate physical threat and were not
made under circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to
believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. The statements
are not testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause analysis.
As to whether A.B.’s declarations constitute excited utterances,
Renode insists that the declaration was not contemporaneous. However, the
passage of time between the statement and the event is relevant but not dispositive
of the question. Taylor at 301. Rather, “‘[e]ach case must be decided on its own
circumstances, since it is patently futile to attempt to formulate an inelastic rule
delimiting the time limits within which an oral utterance must be made in order that
it be termed a spontaneous exclamation.’” Id., quoting State v. Duncan, 53 Ohio
St.2d 215, 219-220, 373 N.E.2d 1234 (1978).
In addition, as to Renode’s claim that the declaration was the product
of reflective thought,
Time is not necessarily the controlling factor in determining whether a
statement qualifies as an excited utterance. The controlling factor is
whether the declaration was made under such circumstances as would
reasonably show that it resulted from impulse rather than reason and
reflection. State v. Smith (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 180, 190, 517 N.E.2d
933, 944. “Spontaneity and the lack of an opportunity to engage in
reflective thought are the essential criteria in determining whether this
exception to the hearsay rule is applicable in a given cause.” State v.
Moorman (1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 251, 252, 7 OBR 330, 332, 455 N.E.2d
495, 497.
Id. at 598.
We conclude that the declaration identifying Renode was made
within minutes and was immediately reported to the 911 dispatcher. At this time,
according to Simones and A.F., A.B. was scared, breathing hard, and on “an
adrenaline rush.” From the record, the drive-by shooting dominated the events of
the home and there were no intervening circumstances that could have influenced
the declaration. The record does not support the claim that the declaration was the
product of reflective thought and was not a spontaneous declaration.
Finally, as to whether A.B. was properly positioned to identify the
assailant, the record reveals that A.B. and A.F. exited the house as the shooting
began and were directly in front of the home.
From all of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that A.B.’s declaration was admissible as an
excited utterance.
As to Renode’s additional argument regarding the trial court’s rulings
in Sanders’s trial, this court, in Sanders, stated as follows:
Sanders asks us to independently weigh the evidence and conclude that
testimony by [Simones] was completely fabricated because she
testified, in seeming contradiction to [A.B.’s testimony], that the [A.B.]
claimed to have seen Sanders and Renode in the car, with a gun in
Renode’s hand, claiming that he would “come back and kill you and
your family, your mother, as well as [the child’s] * * * family.”
Although [A.B.] testified and denied hearing any voices coming from
the car, that contradiction did not call the verdict into question. A.B.
plainly identified both Sanders and Renode, an identification that was
credible because of his familiarity with them and interaction with them
on the night [J.D.] died. This familiarity mitigated concerns about any
inconsistencies in portions of the witnesses’ testimony.
Id., 2018-Ohio-4603 at ¶ 19-20. Moreover, the court in Sanders dealt only with this
contradiction between Simones’s testimony and A.B.’s testimony during Sanders’s
trial; it did not rule on the issue of the admissibility of A.B.’s excited utterance.
This assigned error is without merit.
Mistrial
In the second assigned error, Renode argues that the trial court erred
in denying his motion for a mistrial after Simones’s testimony because, he claims,
she committed perjury in identifying Renode as the assailant in the drive-by
shooting. He complains that due to her position inside the house she could not see
the assailant, and she testified during Sanders’s trial that she did not see the shooter.
The granting or denial of a motion for mistrial rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court. State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 480, 2001-Ohio-4,
739 N.E.2d 749; State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 182, 510 N.E.2d 343 (1987). A
reviewing court will not disturb the exercise of that discretion absent a showing that
the accused has suffered material prejudice. Id.A prosecuting duty of assuring that a criminal defendant receives a
fair trial includes an obligation to (1) refrain from knowingly using perjured
testimony, (2) disclose evidence favorable to the accused, and (3) correct testimony
he knows to be false. State v. Iacona, 93 Ohio St.3d 83, 97, 2001-Ohio-1292, 752
N.E.2d 937, citing State v. Staten, 14 Ohio App.3d 78, 83, 470 N.E.2d 249 (2d
Dist.1984). The defendant has the burden to “show that (1) the statement was
actually false; (2) the statement was material; and (3) the prosecution knew it was
false.” Id. at 97; State v. Smith, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-170335, 2018-Ohio-4615,
¶ 22. However, the Smith court observed:
“Mere inconsistencies in testimony do not establish the knowing use of
false testimony by the prosecutor.” State v. Buck, 2017-Ohio-8242, 100
N.E.3d 118, ¶ 76 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Widmer, 12th Dist. Warren
No. CA2012-02-008, 2013-Ohio-62, ¶ 41. Additionally, the fact “that a
witness contradicts [herself] or changes [her] story also does not
establish perjury.” Id.Id. at ¶ 24.
In this matter, to be clear, the focus of Renode’s motion for a mistrial
was the introduction of A.B.’s excited utterance. (Tr. 755-759). The defense
primarily challenged A.B.’s demeanor and reflection on the incident, and it
challenged Simones insofar as her location when she heard A.B.’s statement. Thus,
Renode argued that Simones did not reliably convey the excited utterance offered
by the state. In evaluating this claim, we must acknowledge that A.B. did testify
during Sanders’s trial and “plainly identified both Sanders and Renode, an
identification that was credible because of his familiarity with them and interaction
with them on the night [J.D.] died.” Sanders, 2018-Ohio-4603 at ¶ 20. Moreover,
while Simones may have been unclear or confused as to her precise location when
she heard A.B.’s remarks, there is overwhelming evidence in this record that A.B.
was under an “adrenaline rush,” scared, and upset. Immediately after the shooting,
and within minutes of the shooting, Renode was named as a suspect. We
additionally note that during Sanders’s trial, the defense claimed that Simones’s
testimony was “completely fabricated because she testified, in seeming
contradiction to [A.B.], that claimed to have seen Sanders and Renode in the car,
with a gun in Renode’s hand, claiming that he would ‘come back and kill you and
your family, your mother, as well as [A.B.’s] * * * family.’” Id. at ¶ 19. This court
concluded that this inconsistency did not taint the verdict. Id. at ¶ 20.
As to the issue of the veracity of Simones’s own observations, we note
that she was cross-examined about her inability to identify Renode as the assailant
in Sander’s trial, and questioned as follows:
Q. [You were asked in Sanders’s trial,] [“]Did you notice anything
about the car? Windows up? Windows down?[”]
A. [“]The back windows were down.[”] [“]Did you see in?[”] Your
answer: “No.”
Q. [“]Why not?[”]
A. [“]When I hit the corner of the house, all I seen was the back windows. It
was dark outside.” Do you recall that testimony now?
A. Yeah, I remember talking to that detective.
Q. So, what’s the truth, ma’am? Then or now, which one do you want
the jury to believe? Which one?
A. But I’m being honest when I stepped outside, when that car was
pulling off as we [were] coming out the door, my driveway, I glanced at
his face and I heard her say go.
Q. Okay. Ma’am, you were asked directly by [the prosecuting attorney],
did you see in the windows, and your answer was no. Would you like
to take a look at the transcript page?
A. “No.”
Q. Would you like to take a look at the entire transcript and let this jury
know whether or not you said to that previous jury that you saw a
glimpse of Jacque Renode? Would you like to look at that entire
transcript?
A. No.
Q. If I tell you that it’s not in that transcript, that you never testified to
that, will you dispute that?
A. I mean, I don’t understand.
Q. Well, did you say it or not in the previous trial that you saw Jacque
Renode?
A. I believe I did.
After that, the prosecuting attorney questioned Simones as follows:
Q. That original line of questioning took place about ten months after
the fact, is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. At this point we’re close to three years away from the event, isn’t
that right?
A. Most definitely.
Q. I just want to ask you if there were answers you gave then that are
different from the answers you’ve given now, why is that?
A. My brain ain’t exactly on point. I don’t remember.
Q. You don’t remember what, testifying?
A. I don’t remember testifying. I don’t remember half of the things I’ve
talked to you guys about.
Q. Why?
A. It’s been so long and then me dealing with my own son’s [A.B.]
murder.
From the foregoing, we cannot say that the inconsistency establishes
perjury. Moreover, Simones was thoroughly cross-examined about the issue, so it
was for the jury to resolve the inconsistency. We additionally note that compelling
evidence supports the conviction, including the heavily blood stained pants with the
DNA evidence that was linked to Renode, and the nature of the blood evidence,
including blood spatter that is associated with the administration of a forcible
impact. Renode also attempted to obtain lighter fluid immediately after the
stabbing, fled the scene before police arrived, and continued to evade capture
months later in Indianapolis.
We find no abuse of discretion. This assigned error is without merit.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In the third assigned error, Renode argues that his convictions are not
supported by sufficient evidence. He asserts that there is no evidence linking him to
the knife recovered from the scene, and that although he was linked to the pants
recovered from the house, there is legally insufficient evidence that he was the
assailant. He also maintains that legally insufficient evidence established that he
was the assailant in the drive-by shooting.
A sufficiency challenge requires a court to determine whether the
state has met its burden of production at trial and to consider not the credibility of
the evidence but whether, if credible, the evidence presented would support a
conviction. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).
The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable
to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259,
574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). The state may use direct
evidence, circumstantial evidence, or both, in order to establish the elements of a
crime. See State v. Durr, 58 Ohio St.3d 86, 568 N.E.2d 674 (1991). Circumstantial
evidence is “proof of facts or circumstances by direct evidence from which the trier
of fact may reasonably infer other related or connected facts that naturally or
logically follow.” State v. Seals, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101081, 2015-Ohio-517,
¶ 32.
Further, as this court noted in Sanders,
the jury could rationally find that Sanders fled the jurisdiction with
Renode, an act that showed a consciousness of guilt. State v. Eaton, 19
Ohio St.2d 145, 249 N.E.2d 897 (1969), paragraph six of the syllabus
(“Flight from justice * * * may be indicative of a consciousness of
guilt.”). Testimony showed that warrants were issued for the arrest of
Sanders and Renode just days after the shooting. It is unclear when the
two left Ohio, but Renode was forcibly apprehended six months later in
Indiana.
2018-Ohio-4603 at ¶ 10.
The state’s evidence indicated that a few days after Davis permitted
Renode and Sanders to move in with her and her sons, she made them leave due to
their ongoing arguments with J.D. However, they returned on November 27, 2016,
Renode and Sanders began beating on the door, and Renode threatened that if she
did not let him in, he was “coming back [to] kill all you guys.” Renode and Sanders
fled before police arrived but returned again a few days later. At that point, Davis
agreed to let them stay until the following Monday. On December 3, 2016, Sanders
and Renode were home with the children, and Renode improvised a song, singing
that he was “going to body this n----.”
J.D. became intoxicated, and when Davis returned, she was upset
with Renode, Sanders, and J.D., and that she sent J.D. to his room where he
remained, lying on the floor of his room, for the rest of the night. Davis also
permitted Renode and Sanders to sleep in a bed in J.D.’s room. A few hours later,
Sellers saw Renode coming downstairs, and Renode joined him in walking to the
nearby store. It is undisputed that Renode fled the store with lighter fluid, before
being stopped by Sellers. While Sellers and Renode were gone, Davis noticed that
the door to J.D.’s room was propped in front of the doorway. She went inside to
investigate and saw J.D. motionless in the blood-stained room. He had been both
strangled by force and stabbed, and paramedics determined that he was dead on
arrival. Renode subsequently ran into the house, then returned to the steps, and
abruptly said, “I gotta get the f--- outta here,” before fleeing the scene. Pants with
Renode’s DNA were later recovered from the home. The pants had multiple blood
stains, including spatter stains indicative of an impact of force into blood that gets
projected into the area of impact. The pants also had drip stains, saturation stains,
and blood transfer stains.
In the days following J.D.’s death, Davis, Sellers, and Davis’s other
child were still staying with Simones. As A.B. and A.F. walked outside, a parked car
backed up and pulled forward as an occupant fired shots toward the house, striking
a car parked in the driveway. Simones testified that as she looked out, she got a
“glimpse” of Renode and heard Sanders shout, “Go, go!” Simones also testified that
A.B. excitedly declared that Renode was the assailant. Simones called the police and
within a few minutes, told police that the shooter was J.D.’s assailant. Renode was
eventually captured by SWAT officers in Indianapolis.
From the foregoing, we conclude that after viewing the evidence in a
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of murder, felonious assault, aggravated menacing, and
intimidation of a crime witness. The crimes were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
The record contains sufficient evidence to support Renode’s convictions.
This assigned error lacks merit.
Manifest Weight of the Evidence
In the fourth assigned error, Renode argues that his convictions are
against the manifest weight of the evidence. He asserts that it is extremely
suspicious that Sellers located the bloody pants inside the house after the police had
already searched it and that Simones was not credible when she stated that she saw
a “glimpse” of Renode during the drive-by shooting, and that A.B. excitedly
identified Renode as the shooter.
“[W]eight of the evidence involves the inclination of the greater
amount of credible evidence.” Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541(1997). Weight of the evidence concerns “the evidence’s effect of inducing belief.”
State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶ 25, citing
Thompkins at 386-387. The reviewing court must consider all the evidence in the
record, the reasonable inferences, and the credibility of the witnesses to determine
“‘whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and
created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed
and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio
App.3d 172, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).
Furthermore, “the weight to be given the evidence and the credibility
of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of the facts.” State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio
St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. When examining
witness credibility, “the choice between credible witnesses and their conflicting
testimony rests solely with the finder of fact and an appellate court may not
substitute its own judgment for that of the finder of fact.” State v. Awan, 22 Ohio
St.3d 120, 123, 489 N.E.2d 277 (1986). The factfinder “is free to believe all, some,
or none of the testimony of each witness appearing before it.” State v. Ellis, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 98538, 2013-Ohio-1184, ¶ 18.
Upon review, we cannot say that the jury lost its way and created a
manifest miscarriage of justice by convicting Renode of the offenses. Although
Sellers found the bloody pants after the police had searched the house, it is
undisputed that the police did not search the room where the pants were found
because this room was filled with dirty clothing and the uninflated mattress, and
appeared to have no connection to the bloody crime scene. Moreover, DNA evidence
linked Renode to the pants. Neither Sellers’s nor A.B.’s DNA was found on the pants.
Additionally, it is undisputed that Renode had made prior threats against the family,
sang about “body[ing] a n----,” and fled from the scene to Indianapolis. As to the
drive-by shooting, evidence indicated that Renode was the shooter and that Sanders
shouted, “Go, go!” The convictions are not against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
This assigned error is without merit.
Judgment is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending is terminated. Case remanded to
the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, PRESIDING JUDGE
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCURS;
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCURS
WITH SEPARATE OPINION ATTACHED
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCURRING:
I concur with the majority’s opinion and resolution of this matter. I
respectfully write separately, however, to express my disgust and horror at the facts
of this case. In this jurist’s twenty years of experience as an appellate judge, eight
years as a common pleas felony judge, and seven years as a civil trial attorney, I have
never seen a case as heinous as this brutal murder of a young boy in his mother’s
home.
The state noted at the sentencing hearing that appellant has never
accepted any responsibility for his actions, nor has he ever expressed remorse. I
agree wholeheartedly with the trial court’s characterization of this case as a
reprehensible act of violence and the “senseless, horrible, and violent” murder of a
child who was presumably sleeping in his bed who had no issue with appellant.
Sadly, appellant’s vile conduct and utter disregard for life did not end
there. Following the murder, appellant and his girlfriend attempted to intimidate
and potentially harm A.B. and A.F. by shooting at them as they stood in a driveway.
A.B. and A.F. were friends with J.D., and A.B. was present in the house the night of
the murder. Thankfully appellant and his girlfriend were unsuccessful, and neither
teenager was injured in the shooting. Later, though, as if the individuals involved in
this matter had not suffered enough, A.B. was subsequently murdered in another
shooting, which, at the time of appellant’s trial, remained unsolved.
The lengthy prison sentence imposed by the trial court, life
imprisonment with parole eligibility after 21 years, was undoubtedly warranted and
supported by the record in this case. I hope the families of the victims may find
closure.