State v. Haydon , 2016 Ohio 4683 ( 2016 )

[Cite as State v. Haydon, 2016-Ohio-4683.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 27737
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
ROBERT W. HAYDON COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. CR 2014 06 1658
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: June 30, 2016
WHITMORE, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Robert W. Haydon, appeals his trafficking in marijuana conviction from
the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.
I
{¶2} Following a traffic stop, police found eleven bags of marijuana in the center
console of a van driven by Mr. Haydon. Ten of the bags weighed 1.2 grams each and one
weighed 1.9 grams, for a total weight of 13.9 grams. Mr. Haydon admitted the marijuana was
his. Mr. Haydon was charged with, inter alia, trafficking in marijuana.
{¶3} The matter proceeded to a jury trial. Prior to voir dire, the State made an oral
motion in limine “to exclude any self-serving statements by the defendant through cross-
examination of the State’s witnesses.” The court ruled that those statements would not be
referenced during opening arguments or voir dire. The court, however, deferred ruling on the
extent of cross-examination finding that it would depend on the level of questioning by the State.
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{¶4} At trial, the State presented testimony from the officer who stopped Mr. Haydon
and a number of detectives. Mr. Haydon testified on his own behalf and presented testimony
from the van’s passenger, Brittany Roberts.
{¶5} Defense counsel moved for an acquittal under Crim.R. 29 at the close of the
State’s evidence and renewed that motion at the close of his case. The trial court denied the
motion both times. The jury found Mr. Haydon guilty, and the court sentenced him accordingly.
{¶6} Mr. Haydon appeals raising four assignments of error. For ease of analysis, we
rearrange his first two assignments of error.
II
Assignment of Error Number Two
THE COURT IMPROPERLY DEN[IED] THE MOTION TO DISMISS MADE
BY THE DEFENSE AT [THE] CLOSE OF STATE’S CASE AND DEFENSE
CASE.
{¶7} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Haydon argues that his motions to dismiss
pursuant to Crim.R. 29 should have been granted. We disagree.
{¶8} We review the denial of a Crim.R. 29 motion by assessing the sufficiency of the
evidence. State v. Seabeck, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25190, 2011-Ohio-3942, ¶ 6. Sufficiency tests
whether the prosecution presented adequate evidence for the case to go to the jury. State v.
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio
St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶9} Trafficking in drugs is prohibited by R.C. 2925.03. The statute provides, in
pertinent part:
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No person shall knowingly do any of the following * * * [p]repare for shipment,
ship, transport, deliver, prepare for distribution, or distribute a controlled
substance or a controlled substance analog, when the offender knows or has
reasonable cause to believe that the controlled substance or a controlled substance
analog is intended for sale or resale by the offender or another person.
R.C. 2925.03(A)(2). R.C. 2925.03(C)(3) specifies that, when the substance is marijuana, a
violation of division (A) is trafficking in marijuana.
{¶10} Mr. Haydon argues that the evidence was insufficient because “no cash,” “no
weapon,” “no multiple phones,” “no scales,” and “no customer records” were found. He further
argues that the evidence that was presented was circumstantial.
{¶11} “Circumstantial and direct evidence inherently possess the same probative value.”
Jenks at paragraph one of the syllabus. When reviewing the sufficiency of circumstantial
evidence, we review the record for evidence that lends support to reasonable factual inferences
about the elements of the crime to be proven. See State v. Rohr-George, 9th Dist. Summit No.
23019, 2007-Ohio-1264, ¶ 22-23.
{¶12} In the instant matter, Detectives Hoffman and Wallace each testified that they had
observed multiple pictures of marijuana posted on Mr. Haydon’s Facebook page. Detective
Wallace further testified that the police had received information that Mr. Haydon “possibly was
selling marijuana.” On the day of the stop, both detectives were conducting surveillance of Mr.
Haydon.
{¶13} Officer Lemonier testified that, after receiving a request for a uniformed officer, he
stopped the van driven by Mr. Haydon. The van was searched and eleven bags of marijuana
were found in the center console. Officer Lemonier testified that the marijuana was wrapped in
eleven individual bags with the marijuana shoved in the corner. Each bag was twisted and tied
off. He described this as “standard dope packaging.” He had “[j]ust short of 16 years” with the
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Akron Police Department and had made hundreds of arrests involving the sale of drugs. He had
previously observed drug transactions where the drugs were packaged in a similar manner.
Based on his experience and prior observations, he indicated that, when drugs are sold from a
vehicle, the drugs are usually hidden somewhere with easy access, such as the center console.
{¶14} On cross-examination, Officer Lemonier admitted that some drug traffickers have
scales or weapons, but he did not find any in this case. Further, he could not say how much
money Mr. Haydon had and Mr. Haydon had just one cell phone. He did not check the phone for
a customer list and did not find a physical customer list in the car. On redirect, Officer Lemonier
stated that some users also carry scales “to make sure they’re getting what they paid for.”
Officer Lemonier testified that Mr. Haydon admitted that the marijuana was his, but Mr. Haydon
did not say that he was going to sell it.
{¶15} Detective Jones testified that he had worked for the Akron Police Department for
23 years and had handled thousands of trafficking cases. In the present case, he tested and
weighed the contents of the bags that were found in the van. He further testified that ten of the
bags contained 1.2 grams of marijuana each and the eleventh bag contained 1.9 grams. In his
experience, bags weighing the same amount, such as these, have been “prepped for sale.” He
further indicated that a user would be unlikely to have multiple small bags, but someone who
was trafficking would have drugs packaged in this manner. Detective Jones testified that it was
common for both traffickers and users to hide drugs in the center console or the glove
compartment of a vehicle.
{¶16} When asked on cross-examination whether any scales were found, Detective Jones
explained that he was only asked to test the marijuana in the present case. He conceded that
some traffickers will have scales, weapons, or sale proceeds. On redirect, Detective Jones
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testified that he had previous trafficking cases where the offender had multiple bags of drugs, but
no scales, weapons, or money.
{¶17} While cash, weapons, multiple phones, scales, and customer records may be
associated with drug trafficking, none of them are required to prove a trafficking offense. See
R.C. 2925.03(A). Officer Lemonier and Detective Jones testified that these items are sometimes,
but not always, present when individuals are trafficking in drugs.
{¶18} According to Mr. Haydon, “the evidence suggests someone [who] smokes
marijuana daily.” To the extent that Mr. Haydon argues that his explanation was more probable
than that of the police, his argument challenges the weight of the evidence rather than
sufficiency. Moreover, the mere fact that an individual is a marijuana user does not rule out the
possibility that they might also be engaged in other illegal activities, such as trafficking in
marijuana. See State v. Berecz, 4th Dist. Washington No. 08CA48, 2010-Ohio-285, ¶ 43.
“When the [S]tate relies on circumstantial evidence * * * there is no need for such evidence to be
irreconcilable with any reasonable theory of innocence in order to support a conviction.” Jenks
at paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶19} Construing the evidence most favorably to the prosecution, a reasonable jury
could conclude that Mr. Haydon was trafficking in marijuana. See State v. Vactor, 9th Dist.
Lorain No. 02CA008068, 2003-Ohio-7195, ¶ 31-32 (concluding that there was sufficient
evidence to convict defendant of trafficking in marijuana where officer and detective testified
that multiple bags of marijuana were intended for resale based on how they were packaged and
the amount in each individual bag). Consequently, the trial court properly overruled Mr.
Haydon’s Crim.R. 29 motions.
{¶20} Mr. Haydon’s second assignment of error is overruled.
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Assignment of Error Number One
THE CONVICTION WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE.
{¶21} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Haydon argues that his trafficking conviction
was against the manifest weight of the evidence. As with his sufficiency challenge, Mr. Haydon
argues that his trafficking conviction should be reversed because the State’s evidence was
circumstantial and the van did not contain certain items that are sometimes associated with
trafficking in drugs. We disagree.
{¶22} While sufficiency of the evidence deals with the burden of production, manifest
weight deals with the burden of persuasion. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 390 (Cook, J.,
concurring). When a defendant challenges the manifest weight of the evidence,
an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all
reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether
in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and
created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed
and a new trial ordered.
State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist.1986). “Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the
inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of
the issue rather than the other.’” (Emphasis sic.) Thompkins at 387, quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990). The power to grant a new trial is reserved for exceptional cases
in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. Otten at 340.
{¶23} In addition to the State’s evidence, which was summarized under the second
assignment of error, the jury was presented with testimony from Mr. Haydon and Brittany
Roberts.
{¶24} Ms. Roberts testified that she was the passenger in the van on the day of the stop.
She further testified that she is Mr. Haydon’s fiancé and they have a two-year old child together.
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She testified that, on the day in question, they got “a half” and then stopped by Mr. Haydon’s
brother’s house. She further testified that, in the three years that she knew Mr. Haydon, she had
never witnessed him dealing drugs. When asked on cross-examination whether Mr. Haydon had
a job, she stated that he “works underneath the table.”
{¶25} Mr. Haydon admitted that the marijuana in the van was his, but he denied that he
was going to sell it. According to Mr. Haydon, on the day in question, he woke up and called
around until he found someone who could sell him “a half.” He explained that “a half” is 14
grams as there are 28 grams in an ounce. Mr. Haydon continued, “All the dude had was nicks,
so I got a half worth of nicks [and] put them in the console.” He stated that, after he bought the
marijuana, he drove to a friend’s house where “we was gonna smoke,” but he later decided not to
smoke the marijuana there.
{¶26} Mr. Haydon further testified that he did not weigh the marijuana or observe anyone
else weighing it. Rather than weigh it, Mr. Haydon explained that he had “smoked marijuana
enough to be able to eyeball” the amount and “each five sack weighs a gram.”1 Mr. Haydon
testified that he smokes marijuana daily and indicated that he prefers to buy in bulk when he has
the money because he can get a better price.
{¶27} Mr. Haydon admitted that selling marijuana could be a way to make money to
support habitual marijuana use, but denied ever selling it himself. Mr. Haydon testified that he
remodels houses, paints, does carpet, siding, windows, and other “side jobs.” Mr. Haydon stated
1
No explanation was offered as to why there were eleven bags, and not fourteen, if each bag
equals a gram and he bought “a half” which is fourteen grams.
8
that marijuana is “the number one thing” he talks about on Facebook. He testified that he is a
member of “Dads for Ohio Marijuana” and the “Ohio Rights Group” and they petition for the
legalization of marijuana.
{¶28} “[T]he weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are
primarily for the trier of the facts.” State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one of
the syllabus. When presented with conflicting evidence, the jury is free to believe or disbelieve
any, or all, of the testimony from each witness. State v. Peasley, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25062,
2010-Ohio-4333, ¶ 18.
{¶29} Officer Lemonier and Detective Jones testified that the marijuana found in the van
driven by Mr. Haydon was packaged in a manner intended for sale. Mr. Haydon and his fiancé
testified that he did not sell drugs. The jury was free to believe the State’s version and disbelieve
Mr. Haydon’s version of events. See id. This is not the exceptional case where the evidence
presented weighs heavily in favor of Mr. Haydon and against conviction.
{¶30} Mr. Haydon’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Assignment of Error Number Three
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY PROHIBITING APPELLANT
FROM TESTIFYING AT TRIAL THAT THE MARIJUANA WAS FOR
PERSONAL USE.
{¶31} In his third assignment of error, Mr. Haydon argues that the trial court “improperly
granted the State[’]s motion in limine to prohibit the defendant from testifying to marijuana
being for personal use.” We disagree.
{¶32} On the day of trial, the State made an oral motion in limine “to exclude any self-
serving statements by the defendant through cross-examination of the State’s witnesses.” The
court ruled that “there will be no reference to the defendant’s statement during opening or voir
9
dire, and then depending on the level of questioning by the State of [its] witnesses, [defense
counsel] may be entitled to cross-examination[,] but we’ll cross that bridge when we come to
it[.]”
{¶33} “The effect of the granting of a motion in limine in favor of the [S]tate in a
criminal proceeding is to temporarily prohibit the defendant from making reference to evidence
which is the subject of the motion.” State v. Grubb, 28 Ohio St.3d 199 (1986), paragraph one of
the syllabus. Contrary to Mr. Haydon’s assertions, the court’s ruling did not prevent him from
testifying at trial that the marijuana was for personal use. Rather, the State’s motion and the
court’s ruling pertained to cross-examination of the State’s witnesses. Moreover, Mr. Haydon
did in fact testify to his personal use of marijuana. He testified that he smokes marijuana daily
not “just to get high [but] for [his] bipolar, [his] depression, and [his] anxiety.” He stated that he
had bought “a half” of marijuana that morning to smoke. He further testified that he told the
police that he does not deal marijuana, but he smokes it himself.
{¶34} Within the body of this argument, Mr. Haydon also contends, “The [c]ourt
improperly prohibited the defense from using recross of officer at trial to review if the
[d]efendant indicated that marijuana was for personal use.” That contention, however, falls
outside the scope of his stated assignment of error. Mr. Haydon’s assigned error pertains to his
ability to testify, not to cross-examine the State’s witnesses. “[A]n appellant’s assignment of
error provides this Court with a roadmap to guide our review.” State v. Ross, 9th Dist. Summit
No. 26694, 2014-Ohio-2867, ¶ 68, quoting Taylor v. Hamlin-Scanlon, 9th Dist. Summit No.
23873, 2008-Ohio-1912, ¶ 12. In addition, Mr. Haydon fails to develop his argument and cites
no legal authority. See App.R. 16(A)(7). “We decline to chart our own course when, as in this
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case, an appellant has failed to provide any guidance.” Akron v. Johnson, 9th Dist. Summit No.
26047, 2012-Ohio-1387, ¶ 3, citing App.R. 12(A)(2).
{¶35} Mr. Haydon’s third assignment of error is overruled.
Assignment of Error Number Four
THE APPELLANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
AT TRIAL.
{¶36} In his fourth assignment of error, Mr. Haydon contends that his trial counsel was
ineffective based on (1) the evidence that was allowed in, (2) counsel’s failure to request a jury
instruction on personal use of marijuana, and (3) counsel’s failure to proffer evidence in response
to the State’s motion in limine.
{¶37} To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish: (1)
counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) prejudice, such that he was deprived of a fair trial
with a reliable result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
{¶38} Mr. Haydon’s argument consists of a listing of the alleged deficiencies followed by
the conclusory assertion that “[t]hese failures detrimentally effected the outcome of the case.”
He fails to cite any legal authority to demonstrate that trial counsel erred, much less caused him
prejudice so as to deprive him of a fair trial. See State v. Hutzler, 9th Dist. Summit No. 21343,
2003-Ohio-7193, ¶ 13.
{¶39} Mr. Haydon does not include any reasoning in support of his contentions that trial
counsel was ineffective. See App.R. 16(A)(7). He does not specify what evidence he believes
was improper, nor does he include any citations to the record. See id. Aside from mentioning
that ineffective assistance claims are reviewed under the standard enunciated in Strickland v.
Washington, he includes no citations to any legal authority. “If an argument exists that can
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support this assignment of error, it is not this [C]ourt's duty to root it out.” Cardone v. Cardone,
9th Dist. Summit No. 18349, 1998 WL 224934, *8 (May 6, 1998).
{¶40} Mr. Haydon’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
III
{¶41} Mr. Haydon’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
BETH WHITMORE
FOR THE COURT
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HENSAL, P. J.
CARR, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
WESLEY A. JOHNSTON, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and RICHARD S. KASAY, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.