State v. Gazaway , 2019 Ohio 5164 ( 2019 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Gazaway, 
    2019-Ohio-5164
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
    BUTLER COUNTY
    STATE OF OHIO,                                     :
    Appellee,                                   :      CASE NO. CA2018-12-236
    :           OPINION
    - vs -                                                      12/16/2019
    :
    DONALD T. GAZAWAY,                                 :
    Appellant.                                  :
    CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
    Case No. CR2018-01-0105
    Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, John C. Heinkel, Government
    Services Center, 315 High Street, 11th Floor, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for appellee
    Engel & Martin, LLC, Mary K. Martin, 4660 Duke Drive, Suite 101, Mason, Ohio 45040, for
    appellant
    PIPER, J.
    {¶ 1} Appellant, Donald Gazaway, appeals his convictions in the Butler County Court
    of Common Pleas for felonious assault, aggravated burglary, kidnapping, having weapons
    under disability, and inducing panic, as well as the accompanying firearm specifications.
    {¶ 2} The victim and her son lived in an apartment complex, along with the family's
    dog. On the evening of the incident in question, the child was in his mother's bedroom
    Butler CA2018-12-236
    playing video games when he heard yelling from the living room. The child ran from his
    mother's bedroom into the living room and saw Gazaway, a man with whom he was familiar,
    pointing a gun at his mother's head and demanding $10,000. When the child tried to call
    police from a phone in the apartment, Gazaway ran after the child and threw the phone on
    the floor breaking it. During this time, the child's mother ran from her home.
    {¶ 3} After Gazaway searched the apartment for the woman but could not find her,
    Gazaway took the child and hid in a closet. Police soon arrived at the apartment complex
    and the child's mother informed them that Gazaway was inside with her son. The responding
    officers called the victim's cell phone, which was in the apartment, but Gazaway
    disconnected the calls and began firing his gun through the closet wall and door.
    {¶ 4} Soon thereafter, a SWAT team arrived on scene, including an armored vehicle
    and multiple officers. Officers then evacuated the other inhabitants of the surrounding
    apartments. Although no one was shot, bullets pierced the apartment's exterior windows, the
    SWAT vehicle where officers were located, as well as various parts of the apartment's
    interior.
    {¶ 5} The standoff lasted approximately 30 hours before Gazaway surrendered.
    Police located three firearms and a multitude of spent and live ammunition in the home.
    Gazaway was arrested and pled not guilty to the charges, claiming instead, that someone
    else fired the bullets that pierced the home and SWAT vehicle.
    {¶ 6} After a jury trial, Gazaway was convicted of felonious assault, aggravated
    burglary, kidnapping, having weapons under disability, inducing panic, and multiple
    accompanying firearm specifications. The trial court sentenced Gazaway to an aggregate
    term of 41 and one-half years in prison.1 Gazaway now appeals his convictions and
    1. The trial court filed a nunc pro tunc sentencing entry reflecting the 41.5 year sentence imposed at the
    sentencing hearing.
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    sentence, raising multiple assignments of error, some of which we will combine or discuss
    out of order for ease of discussion.
    {¶ 7} Assignment of Error No. 3:
    {¶ 8} THE CONVICTIONS IN THIS MATTER WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY
    SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.
    {¶ 9} Assignment of Error No. 4:
    {¶ 10} THE CONVICTIONS IN THIS MATTER WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST
    WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
    {¶ 11} Gazaway argues that his convictions for felonious assault, kidnapping, and
    aggravated burglary are not supported by sufficient evidence and were against the manifest
    weight of the evidence.
    {¶ 12} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a criminal conviction,
    an appellate court examines the evidence in order to determine whether such evidence, if
    believed, would support a conviction. State v. Workman, 12th Dist. Clermont Nos. CA2016-
    12-082 and CA2016-12-083, 
    2017-Ohio-8638
    , ¶ 20. The relevant inquiry is "whether, after
    viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
    could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt."
    State v. Watson, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2014-08-110, 
    2015-Ohio-2321
    , ¶ 22.
    {¶ 13} To determine whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the
    evidence, the reviewing court must look at the entire record, weigh the evidence and all
    reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether in
    resolving the conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a
    manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.
    State v. Bradbury, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-06-111, 
    2016-Ohio-5091
    , ¶ 17. An appellate
    court will overturn a conviction due to the manifest weight of the evidence only in
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    extraordinary circumstances when the evidence presented at trial weighs heavily in favor of
    acquittal. Id. at ¶ 18. A determination that a conviction is supported by the manifest weight
    of the evidence will also be dispositive of the issue of sufficiency. State v. Peyton, 12th Dist.
    Butler No. CA2015-06-112, 
    2017-Ohio-243
    , ¶ 48.
    {¶ 14} Gazaway was convicted of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2),
    which provides, that no person shall "cause or attempt to cause physical harm to another or
    to another's unborn by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance." Gazaway was
    also convicted of aggravated burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.11(A)(2), which provides,
    No person, by force, stealth, or deception, shall trespass in an
    occupied structure or in a separately secured or separately
    occupied portion of an occupied structure, when another person
    other than an accomplice of the offender is present, with purpose
    to commit in the structure or in the separately secured or
    separately occupied portion of the structure any criminal offense,
    if * * * the offender has a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance
    on or about the offender's person or under the offender's control.
    {¶ 15} Gazaway was also convicted of kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(B)(2),
    which provides,
    No person, by force, threat, or deception, or, in the case of a
    victim under the age of thirteen or mentally incompetent, by any
    means, shall knowingly do any of the following, under
    circumstances that create a substantial risk of serious physical
    harm to the victim or, in the case of a minor victim, under
    circumstances that either create a substantial risk of serious
    physical harm to the victim or cause physical harm to the victim:
    * * * Restrain another of the other person's liberty.
    After reviewing the record, we find that each of Gazaway's convictions are supported by
    sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
    {¶ 16} During trial, the state offered testimony from the child Gazaway took as a
    hostage during his standoff with police. The child, who was familiar with Gazaway before the
    night in question, testified that he saw Gazaway pointing a gun at his mother's head and
    demanding $10,000 from her. The child also testified that Gazaway followed him when he
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    ran to call the police and that Gazaway forced him into the closet and began firing his gun
    once police arrived at the apartment complex. Gazaway then took the child to another closet
    where he continued to fire different weapons, including an AK-47. Gazaway also took the
    child into his mother's bathroom and fired the weapon several more times, breaking the toilet
    and causing bullet holes in the bathroom walls.
    {¶ 17} The child also testified that police sent a robot into the apartment to deliver a
    phone to Gazaway and that Gazaway told him the phone could be an explosive or meant to
    electrocute them. Gazaway then took the child into the garage out of fear that the robot was
    going to "rush" them. The child testified that he and Gazaway saw police officers near the
    door to the garage.
    {¶ 18} The child testified that he did not want to stay with Gazaway during the police
    standoff but did so because he was afraid Gazaway would shoot him. The child explained
    that Gazaway would carry him on his back through the apartment and stand behind him
    when police officers were nearby. The child further testified that Gazaway had a gun with
    him the entire time he was in the apartment, that Gazaway pointed a gun at him, and that he
    observed Gazaway fire the gun at police officers. The child also testified that he was afraid
    during the standoff, was scared of being shot if he did not obey Gazaway's commands, and
    that Gazaway did not let him go despite his asking to be let go. The child testified that the
    standoff eventually ended when he and Gazaway exited the garage and a SWAT member
    carried him to safety.
    {¶ 19} The state then called a deputy with the Butler County Sheriff's Department who
    was involved in the incident when he received a dispatch that a female was running through
    the apartment complex screaming for help. The deputy testified that he and three other
    deputies responded to the scene and that he made contact with the child's mother. The
    deputy testified that when he tried to make contact with Gazaway inside the apartment, the
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    phone calls were disconnected three times and that shots were fired from inside the
    apartment between the second and third phone calls.
    {¶ 20} During the phone calls, the deputy identified himself as a police officer and
    verified that the child had not been shot. The deputy testified that he and the other deputies
    immediately called for backup and that a SWAT team arrived.
    {¶ 21} The deputy further testified that when he first encountered the child's mother,
    she was frantic and that she told him "D" was in the apartment with her son. The deputy
    testified that the woman was wearing a tank top and sweatpants, but no shoes, which
    alarmed the deputy because there was snow on the ground.2 During the 13 hours the deputy
    was on the scene, he did not observe anyone enter or exit the apartment.
    {¶ 22} The state next presented testimony from another deputy who was on the scene,
    and who had positioned himself near the front of the apartment. The deputy testified that
    when he moved toward the side of the apartment, a shot was fired from inside the apartment.
    He also heard other gunshots and heard the bullets ricochet in front of his police cruiser.
    During the time the deputy was on the scene, he did not observe anyone enter or exit the
    apartment.
    {¶ 23} The state also presented testimony from a police captain who was the critical
    incident manager of the SWAT team deployed to the apartment. The captain testified that he
    observed gunshot holes through the window of the apartment, and also that he observed a
    man standing behind the child when the door to the apartment opened for a short time. The
    captain described the child as being "very scared," and that the child expressed a desire to
    leave the apartment.
    {¶ 24} The captain also testified that when he was sitting in the front driver side of the
    2. Other witnesses testified that the standoff occurred in January and that the weather was especially frigid
    during the 30-hour standoff.
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    armored SWAT vehicle, bullets fired from inside the apartment hit the vehicle, including one
    that struck the windshield. During the time the captain was in charge of the scene, he did not
    see anyone enter or exit the apartment.
    {¶ 25} The state next called the negotiator who was present on the night of the
    incident and testified that his goal was to reach a peaceful conclusion to the standoff. In
    order to do so, he contacted Gazaway multiple times, often ending with Gazaway hanging up
    the phone. The negotiator testified that at one point during the incident, he was sitting in the
    SWAT armored vehicle when it was hit by a bullet fired from the apartment. The negotiator
    testified that the bullet struck the windshield "directly in front of" his face. The negotiator
    further testified that the SWAT team was eventually able to confine Gazaway and the child to
    the garage and that he was able to hear the child screaming and speaking frantically.
    {¶ 26} The state next called a member of the SWAT team who testified that he
    observed shots fired from the apartment while he was in position in the garage. The SWAT
    officer also testified that his team observed Gazaway take the child from the apartment to the
    garage and that his team was eventually able to contain Gazaway and the child in the garage
    by wedging the door from the garage to the apartment shut so that Gazaway could not gain
    reentry.
    {¶ 27} The state also called another SWAT team member who testified that he was
    positioned in the garage when he observed the door open and the child emerge with his
    small dog. The child, who was surprised to see the SWAT team members, dropped the dog
    and tried to recapture him before the door to the apartment opened and the child was pulled
    back inside.
    {¶ 28} The SWAT team member also testified that he later observed the child when
    the team was trying to deliver a phone into the apartment. The team member testified that
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    the child "looked scared to death," and that when the child looked toward the ground, the
    SWAT team could see that Gazaway was holding a gun to the back of the child's neck.
    {¶ 29} Another SWAT team member also testified for the state that he observed the
    child and Gazaway sitting in one of the vehicles once the two were in the garage, that the
    child was crying and scared, and that Gazaway held a gun to the child the majority of the
    time. The SWAT team member also testified that he made an identification of Gazaway at
    the scene by comparing the man he saw in the car holding the child at gunpoint with
    Gazaway's photographs taken by the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles. The team member
    then made an in-court identification of Gazaway and later testified that he observed
    Gazaway's face multiple times during the standoff and that he was able to "tell it was
    [Gazaway]."
    {¶ 30} The SWAT team member testified that eventually, the standoff came to an end
    when Gazaway exited the garage with his hands in the air and his pants around his ankles.
    The team was able to secure the child's safety and then placed Gazaway in custody.
    {¶ 31} The state also presented testimony from a DNA expert who analyzed evidence
    removed from the apartment after the standoff ended. The expert testified that Gazaway's
    DNA matched DNA samples taken from evidence retrieved from the apartment.
    {¶ 32} When viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence
    demonstrates that Gazaway committed felonious assault, aggravated burglary, and
    kidnapping during the standoff with police through his use of a firearm to trespass in the
    apartment, restrain the child's liberty, and fire weapons multiple times that could have
    resulted in death or serious harm to the multitude of officers and bystanders. While it is true
    that no one was injured during the standoff, the jury could infer from Gazaway
    indiscriminately firing multiple weapons toward officers in an area where he knew they were
    located, as well as the surrounding circumstances of the standoff itself, that he possessed an
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    intent to cause serious physical harm to others and took substantial steps toward that end.
    See State v. Sizemore, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2019-01-006, 
    2019-Ohio-4400
    , ¶ 27. ("A
    criminal attempt occurs when a defendant purposely does or omits to do something which is
    an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate
    in the commission of a crime. To constitute a substantial step, the conduct must be strongly
    corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose").     As such, Gazaway's convictions are
    supported by sufficient evidence and are not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
    Gazaway's third and fourth assignments of error are overruled.
    {¶ 33} Assignment of Error No. 1:
    {¶ 34} APPELLANT'S        MAXIMUM        SENTENCES         ARE     CLEARLY        AND
    CONVINCINGLY CONTRARY TO LAW.
    {¶ 35} Assignment of Error No. 2:
    {¶ 36} APPELLANT'S       CONSECUTIVE        SENTENCES        ARE    CLEARLY       AND
    CONVINCINGLY CONTRARY TO LAW.
    {¶ 37} In his first two assignments of error, Gazaway challenges his sentence.
    {¶ 38} As with all felony sentences, we review the trial court's sentencing decision in
    this case under the standard of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State v. Grimm, 12th
    Dist. Clermont No. CA2018-10-071, 
    2019-Ohio-2961
    , ¶ 43. Pursuant to that statute, this
    court may modify or vacate a sentence only if, by clear and convincing evidence, the record
    does not support the trial court's findings under relevant statutes or that the sentence is
    otherwise contrary to law. State v. Cyrek, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2019-02-037, 2019-Ohio-
    4515. A sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial court
    "considers the principles and purposes of R.C. 2929.11, as well as the factors listed in R.C.
    2929.12, properly imposes postrelease control, and sentences the defendant within the
    permissible statutory range." State v. Ahlers, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-06-100, 2016-
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    Butler CA2018-12-236
    Ohio-2890, ¶ 8. This court may therefore "increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence
    only when it clearly and convincingly finds that the sentence is (1) contrary to law or (2)
    unsupported by the record." State v. Brandenburg, 
    146 Ohio St.3d 221
    , 
    2016-Ohio-2970
    , ¶ 1.
    {¶ 39} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), a trial court must engage in a three-step
    analysis and make certain findings before imposing consecutive sentences. The trial court
    must find that (1) the consecutive sentence is necessary to protect the public from future
    crime or to punish the offender, (2) consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the
    seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and
    (3) one of the following applies:
    (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses
    while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a
    sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2919.17, or
    2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control
    for a prior offense.
    (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part
    of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two
    or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or
    unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses
    committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately
    reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.
    (c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
    consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from
    future crime by the offender.
    To impose consecutive terms of imprisonment, the trial court must make findings pursuant to
    R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporate the findings in its sentencing
    entry. State v. Bonnell, 
    140 Ohio St.3d 209
    , 
    2014-Ohio-3177
    , ¶ 37.
    {¶ 40} Gazaway essentially argues that his sentence is contrary to law because he did
    not cause any harm to anyone and he never intended to harm anyone during the standoff.
    However, and after reviewing the record, we find that the trial court properly sentenced
    Gazaway.
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    {¶ 41} Gazaway does not argue that the trial court failed to properly impose
    postrelease control or that his sentences were not within the permissible statutory range.
    Instead, Gazaway asserts that the trial court failed to properly consider the purposes and
    principles of sentencing. However, the trial court noted its express consideration of the
    statutory requirements of R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 in its sentencing entry and at the
    sentencing hearing.
    {¶ 42} Furthermore, we find that the trial court's sentence is supported by the record.
    Gazaway, who has an extensive criminal history, held a ten-year-old boy for 30 hours, many
    times at gunpoint, and used him as a human shield to protect himself from officers trying to
    end the standoff. During this time, the child cried, screamed, spoke frantically, was afraid,
    and asked to be let go. However, Gazaway refused to release the child and subjected him
    instead to repeated close-range gunfire.
    {¶ 43} Gazaway used three firearms, one of which was an AK-47, during his standoff.
    Gazaway's erratic and prolific gunfire could have easily resulted in serious injury or death to
    the child, as well officers and bystanders. For example, had the SWAT vehicle not been
    protected with bulletproof glass, one SWAT team member would have been shot in the head.
    The trial court made specific note of the "terror" Gazaway caused during the standoff, a terror
    that impacted the child, his mother, residents of the apartment complex, as well as multiple
    law enforcement officers. The record fully supports the trial court's sentence.
    {¶ 44} The trial court also made the proper consecutive sentence findings, as required
    by statute. Specifically, the court determined that the consecutive nature of the sentences
    was necessary to protect the public from future crime and to punish the offender and that the
    sentences were not disproportionate to the seriousness of Gazaway's conduct and the
    danger it posed to the public. The court also made a finding that Gazaway committed the
    crimes while on postrelease control from a prior felonious assault conviction and that the
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    harm from Gazaway's conduct was so great or unusual that a single term did not adequately
    reflect its seriousness.
    {¶ 45} After reviewing the record, we find that the trial court's sentence was not
    contrary to law, was supported by the record, and that the court made the requisite
    consecutive sentence findings. As such, Gazaway's sentence is valid and his first and
    second assignments of error are overruled.
    {¶ 46} Assignment of Error No. 5:
    {¶ 47} APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
    {¶ 48} Gazaway argues in his final assignment of error that he was denied effective
    assistance of counsel.
    {¶ 49} To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an appellant must
    show his trial counsel's performance was deficient, and that he was prejudiced as a result.
    Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687-688, 
    104 S.Ct. 2052
     (1984). Trial counsel's
    performance will not be deemed deficient unless it fell below an objective standard of
    reasonableness. 
    Id. at 688
    . To show prejudice, appellant must establish that, but for his trial
    counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been
    different. 
    Id. at 694
    .
    {¶ 50} Gazaway asserts that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because
    counsel did not call the child's mother as a witness and because he did not testify in his own
    defense. However, decisions specific to calling witnesses is within trial counsel's strategy
    and will not provide basis for reversal. State v. Casey, 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA2017-08-
    013, 
    2018-Ohio-2084
    . There is no indication that had the child's mother testified, she would
    have exculpated Gazaway in any way or supported his contention that someone else fired
    the gun from the apartment during the standoff. Nor is there an indication that Gazaway's
    own testimony would have resulted in a reasonable probability of a different result at trial
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    particularly where there was overwhelming evidence of his guilt. There was significant
    testimony from the child, testimony from the officers that no one entered or exited the
    apartment during the standoff, in-court identification by SWAT team members identifying
    Gazaway as the person creating the standoff, as well as DNA evidence from the apartment
    implicating Gazaway.
    {¶ 51} Gazaway's arguments that his counsel's representation was deficient and
    prejudicial is based on speculation as to what testimony might have disclosed. However, this
    testimony could have, just as easily, aided the prosecution in proving its case and there is no
    indication that the jury would have discounted the testimony from the state's witnesses and
    believed Gazaway's account of the standoff. Mere speculation and unsupported suggestions
    of what might have been established does not demonstrate counsel's deficient performance
    nor the prejudice required to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. As such,
    Gazaway's final assignment of error is overruled.
    {¶ 52} Judgment affirmed.
    RINGLAND, P.J., and M. POWELL, J., concur.
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