State v. Gilmer , 2022 Ohio 821 ( 2022 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Gilmer, 
    2022-Ohio-821
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    STATE OF OHIO,                                    :
    Plaintiff-Appellee,              :
    No. 110649
    v.                               :
    MICHAEL S. GILMER,                                :
    Defendant-Appellant.             :
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 17, 2022
    Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-20-648045-A
    Appearances:
    Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
    Attorney, and Eric Collins, Assistant Prosecuting
    Attorney, for appellee.
    Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
    Aaron T. Baker, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
    ANITA LASTER MAYS, P.J.:
    Defendant-appellant Michael S. Gilmer (“Gilmer”) appeals his
    sentence and the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Act (“Reagan Tokes”).
    Gilmer asks this court to remand to the trial court for resentencing and hold Reagan
    Tokes unconstitutional. We affirm Gilmer’s sentence and further hold Reagan
    Tokes to be constitutional.
    Gilmer pleaded guilty to one count of burglary, a second-degree
    felony, in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(1), along with a one-year firearms
    specification; one count of robbery, a second-degree felony, in violation of
    R.C. 2911.02(A)(1), along with a one-year firearms specification; one count of
    abduction, a second-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2905.02(A)(2); and one
    count of theft, a fifth-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2913.02(A)(1). The trial
    court sentenced Gilmer to a total of six years’ imprisonment. The trial court also
    imposed a sentence of up to 30 months under Reagan Tokes.
    Gilmer’s trial counsel did not object to the sentencing at the hearing,
    and Gilmer filed this timely appeal assigning two assignments of error for our
    review:
    I.     The indefinite sentencing scheme set forth in the Reagan Tokes
    Law and imposed by the trial court in this case violates the
    federal and state constitutions; and
    II.    Gilmer was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel as
    protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
    United States Constitution and by Article I, Section 10 of the
    Ohio Constitution when his attorney did not object to the
    application of the unconstitutional Reagan Tokes Law.
    I.    The Constitutionality of Reagan Tokes
    Gilmer argues that the indefinite sentencing scheme set forth in
    Reagan Tokes violates the right to trial by jury, separation-of-powers doctrine, and
    his due process rights for failure of sufficient notice. Gilmer did not raise these
    issues before the trial court. “‘It is well established that ‘the question of the
    constitutionality of a statute must generally be raised at the first opportunity and, in
    a criminal prosecution, this means in the trial court.’’” State v. Alexander, 12th Dist.
    Butler No. CA2019-12-204, 
    2020-Ohio-3838
    , ¶ 8, citing State v. Buttery, 
    162 Ohio St.3d 10
    , 
    2020-Ohio-2998
    , 
    164 N.E.3d 294
    , ¶ 7, quoting State v. Awan, 
    22 Ohio St.3d 120
    , 122, 
    489 N.E.2d 277
     (1986).
    By not first raising the issue with the trial court, Gilmer’s arguments
    challenging the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Act are forfeited and will not
    be heard for the first time on appeal. State v. Ponyard, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
    No. 101266, 
    2015-Ohio-311
    , ¶ 7. See also State v. Quarterman, 
    140 Ohio St.3d 464
    ,
    
    2014-Ohio-4034
    , 
    19 N.E.3d 900
    , ¶ 2 (“The failure to challenge the constitutionality
    of a statute in the trial court forfeits all but plain error on appeal, and the burden of
    demonstrating plain error is on the party asserting it.”). Ponyard at ¶ 7. See, e.g.,
    State v. Jenkins, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109323, 
    2021-Ohio-123
    , ¶ 23.
    “This court has recently declined to address constitutional challenges
    to the Reagan Tokes Act when defendants did not object to their sentences or
    otherwise raise the constitutionality of the act at their sentencing hearing.” Jenkins
    at ¶ 22. See State v. Dames, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109090, 
    2020-Ohio-4991
    , ¶ 12-
    19; State v. Hollis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109092, 
    2020-Ohio-5258
    , ¶ 47-54;
    State v. White, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109652, 
    2021-Ohio-126
    , ¶ 9, and State v.
    Stone, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109322, 
    2020-Ohio-5263
    , ¶ 6-10.
    However, because Gilmer argues that the trial court’s sentence
    constitutes plain error,
    “[w]e may review the trial court decision for plain error, but we
    require a showing that but for a plain or obvious error, the outcome of
    the proceeding would have been otherwise, and reversal must be
    necessary to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice.” Quarterman,
    
    140 Ohio St.3d 464
    , 
    2014-Ohio-4034
    , 
    19 N.E.3d 900
    , at ¶ 16. “The
    burden of demonstrating plain error is on the party asserting it.” 
    Id.
    State v. Conant, 4th Dist. Adams No. 20CA1108, 
    2020-Ohio-4319
    , ¶ 39.
    Gilmer has not demonstrated that the trial court’s decision
    constitutes plain error because this court recently held in State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 109315, 
    2022-Ohio-470
    , ¶ 17, that “the Reagan Tokes Law, as defined
    under R.C. 2901.011, is not unconstitutional * * *.”
    With respect to the separation-of-powers doctrine,
    [t]he Reagan Tokes Law does not violate any separation-of-powers
    safeguard because the executive branch has always possessed the
    authority to determine parole, parole revocation, or sentencing-
    release matters under an indefinite sentencing scheme after the trial
    court imposes the minimum and maximum terms. See R.C. 2967.12
    and 2967.16 (executive branch authorized to grant final release of the
    offender following adherence to the terms of parole). R.C. 2929.144,
    2929.14(A)(1)(a) and (A)(2)(a), and R.C. 2967.271 do not stray from
    the sentencing structure already in place under Ohio law.
    Id. at ¶ 37. Additionally, this court also held that Reagan Tokes does not violate a
    defendant’s due process rights. See id. at ¶ 45-69.
    Therefore Gilmer’s first assignment of error is overruled.
    II.   Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    A.     Standard of Review
    “A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is judged using the
    standard announced in Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687, 
    104 S.Ct. 2052
    , 
    80 L.Ed.2d 674
     (1984). State v. Sims, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109335, 2021-
    Ohio-4009, ¶ 21, citing State v. Bradley, 
    42 Ohio St. 3d 136
    , 
    538 N.E.2d 373
     (1989).
    “‘Counsel’s performance will not be deemed ineffective unless and until counsel’s
    performance is proved to have fallen below an objective standard of reasonable
    representation and, in addition, prejudice arises from counsel’s performance.’” 
    Id.,
    quoting Bradley, at paragraph two of the syllabus.
    B.     Law and Argument
    Gilmer argues that his trial counsel’s assistance was ineffective
    because trial counsel failed to raise a constitutional challenge to Gilmer’s sentence
    at the sentencing hearing. However, because this court has held that Reagan Tokes
    is not unconstitutional, trial counsel’s objections would be moot. See, e.g., State v.
    Mathis, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107365, 
    2019-Ohio-3654
    , ¶ 48, quoting State v.
    Mitchell, 
    53 Ohio App.3d 117
    , 119, 
    559 N.E.2d 1370
     (8th Dist.1988) (“[A] trial
    attorney does not violate any substantial duty in failing to make futile objections.”).
    In addition to demonstrating that counsel’s performance fell below the objective
    standard of reasonable representation, Gilmer must demonstrate that he was
    prejudiced by the performance and the results of the sentencing hearing would have
    been different. See State v. Fisher, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108494, 
    2020-Ohio-670
    ,
    ¶ 21.
    Gilmer has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s
    performance or the results would have been different if his trial counsel objected to
    the sentencing, as the constitutionality of Reagan Tokes has been determined.
    Therefore, Gilmer’s second assignment of error is overruled.
    Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
    common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
    Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    __________________________________
    ANITA LASTER MAYS, PRESIDING JUDGE
    KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., and
    EMMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR
    N.B. Judge Anita Laster Mays is constrained to apply Delvallie’s en banc decision.
    For a full explanation of her analysis, see State v. Delvallie, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
    No. 109315, 
    2022-Ohio-470
     (Laster Mays, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting
    in part).
    Judge Emanuella D. Groves concurred with the opinions of Judge Lisa B. Forbes
    (dissenting) and Judge Anita Laster Mays (concurring in part and dissenting in part)
    in Delvallie and would have found the Reagan Tokes Law unconstitutional.