State v. Rister , 2023 Ohio 1284 ( 2023 )

[Cite as State v. Rister, 2023-Ohio-1284.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAWRENCE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, : Case No. 21CA17
:
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
: DECISION AND JUDGMENT
v. : ENTRY
:
ELVIS RISTER, :
: RELEASED: 04/18/2023
Defendant-Appellant. :
APPEARANCES:
Max Hersch, Assistant State Public Defender, Office of the Ohio Public Defender,
Columbus, Ohio for Appellant.
Brigham M. Anderson, Lawrence County Prosecuting Attorney, and Andrea M.
Kratzenberg, Assistant Lawrence County Prosecuting Attorney, Ironton, Ohio for
Appellee.
Wilkin, J.
{¶1} Elvis Rister (“Rister”) appeals the Lawrence County Court of
Common Pleas judgment entry that sentenced him for felonious assault, and
ordered him to pay court costs. Rister asserts two assignments of error: (1) “The
trial court committed plain error when it sentenced Mr. Rister to an indefinite
sentence under the unconstitutional Reagan Tokes Law” and (2) “Trial counsel
for Mr. Rister rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request a waiver of
court costs.”
{¶2} In response, the state maintains: (1) that the Reagan Tokes Act is not
unconstitutional and (2) Mr. Rister’s trial counsel was not ineffective by failing to
request the trial court waive court costs.
Lawrence App. No. 21CA17 2
{¶3} Having reviewed the parties’ arguments, the record, and the
applicable law, we overrule both of Rister’s assignments of error, and affirm the
trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
{¶4} On February 24, 2021, the state indicted Rister on a felonious assault
charge in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a second-degree felony. The case was
tried to a jury, which found Rister guilty.
{¶5} On October 18, 2021, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The
court indicated that it considered the “purposes and principals of sentencing in
Revised Code 2929.11, the seriousness and recidivism factors in 2929.12, and
following the guidance of R.C. 2929.13,” the court sentenced Rister to an
indefinite prison term of 8 to 12 years, post-release control, and ordered him to
pay court costs. It is this judgment that Rister appeals.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR WHEN IT
SENTENCED MR. RISTER TO AN INDEFINITE SENTENCE
UNDER THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL REAGAN TOKES LAW. THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION,
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION;
ARTICLE I, SECTION 5 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION; CRIM.R.
52(B); STATE EX REL. BRAY V. RUSSEL, 89 OHIO ST.3D 132,
2000-OHIO-116, 2000-OHIO-117, 2000-OHIO-119, 729 N.E.2D
359; SWARTHOUT V. COOKE, 562 U.S. 216, 131 S.CT. 859, 178
L.ED.2D 732 (2011); APPRENDI V. NEW JERSEY, 530 U.S. 466,
120 S.CT. 2348, 147 L.ED.2D 435 (2000); OCT. 6, 2021
SENTENCING TR. AT 5-7
II. TRIAL COUNSEL FOR MR. RISTER RENDERED INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO REQUEST A
WAIVER OF COURT COSTS. R.C. 2947.23(C); STATE V. DAVIS,
159 OHIO ST.3D 31, 2020-OHIO-309, 146 N.E.3D 560;
Lawrence App. No. 21CA17 3
STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.CT. 2052,
80 L.ED.2D 674 (1984).
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶6} Rister claims that the trial court committed plain error in sentencing
him to an indefinite prison sentence under the Reagan Tokes Act (“RTA”). In
support, he maintains that the RTA is unconstitutional because it violates the
separation of powers doctrine, a defendant’s right to a jury trial, and a
defendant’s due process.
{¶7} Rister claims that the RTA violates the separation of powers doctrine
because it permits the executive branch of the government, the Ohio Department
of Rehabilitation and Corrections (“ODRC”), to unilaterally extend an inmate’s
prison term, which is a function for the judicial branch of government.
{¶8} Rister also asserts that the RTA violates a defendant’s constitutional
right to a trial by jury because it allows the ODRC to impose a sentence beyond
the minimum stated term or presumptive earned early release date, a role that is
reserved for fact finders.
{¶9} Finally, Rister maintains that the RTA violates an inmate’s right to
due process. Rister claims that the RTA infringes upon an inmate’s protected
liberty interest “[b]y vesting the authority to extend one’s sentence in the
executive branch and failing to guarantee a fair hearing[.]” Rister asserts that the
ODRC, the very entity that keeps an individual in prison, cannot also make the
decision to restrict their freedom.
Lawrence App. No. 21CA17 4
{¶10} In response, the state first maintains that the RTA does not violate
the separation of powers doctrine because it does not permit the ODRC to
lengthen an inmate’s sentence.
{¶11} The state further argues that the RTA does not violate a defendant’s
right to a jury trial. The state maintains that under the RTA an inmate will be
released on a presumptive early release date or on the expiration of their
minimum prison term if certain factors apply. Alternatively, if the presumption is
rebutted and the inmate remains imprisoned beyond those dates, then they are
never kept beyond their maximum sentence.
{¶12} Finally, the state claims that the RTA does not violate due process.
It asserts that the hearings conducted by the ODRC are akin to parole/probation
revocation or post-release control violation hearings, which do not require judicial
involvement.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
{¶13} To give some context, we first provide a brief overview of the RTA:
The Reagan Tokes Law encompasses four newly enacted
statutes and amendments to 50 existing statutes. R.C. 2901.011.
Relevant here, the Reagan Tokes Law requires that a court
imposing a prison term under R.C. 2929.14(A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) for a
first or second degree felony committed on or after March 22,
2019, impose a minimum prison term under that provision and a
maximum prison term determined under R.C. 2929.144(B). R.C.
2929.144(A) and (C). There is a presumption that the offender
“shall be released from service of the sentence on the expiration
of the offender's minimum prison term or on the offender's
presumptive earned early release date, whichever is earlier.” R.C.
2967.271(B). A presumptive earned early release date is a date
determined under procedures described in R.C. 2967.271(F)
which allow the sentencing court to reduce the minimum prison
term under certain circumstances. R.C. 2967.271(A)(2).
Lawrence App. No. 21CA17 5
R.C. 2967.271(C) states that the Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”) may rebut the
presumption in R.C. 2967.271(B) if it
determines, at a hearing, that one or more of the following applies:
(1) Regardless of the security level in which the offender is
classified at the time of the hearing, both of the following apply:
(a) During the offender's incarceration, the offender committed
institutional rule infractions that involved compromising the
security of a state correctional institution, compromising the safety
of the staff of a state correctional institution or its inmates, or
physical harm or the threat of physical harm to the staff of a state
correctional institution or its inmates, or committed a violation of
law that was not prosecuted, and the infractions or violations
demonstrate that the offender has not been rehabilitated.
(b) The offender's behavior while incarcerated, including, but not
limited to the infractions and violations specified in division
(C)(1)(a) of this section, demonstrate that the offender continues
to pose a threat to society.
(2) Regardless of the security level in which the offender is
classified at the time of the hearing, the offender has been placed
by the department in extended restrictive housing at any time
within the year preceding the date of the hearing.
(3) At the time of the hearing, the offender is classified by the
department as a security level three, four, or five, or at a higher
security level.
If ODRC rebuts the presumption, it “may maintain the offender's
incarceration” after the expiration of the minimum prison term or
presumptive earned early release date for a reasonable period of
time, determined and specified by ODRC, which “shall not exceed
the offender's maximum prison term.” R.C. 2967.271(D)(1).
State v. Bontrager, 2022-Ohio-1367, 188 N.E.3d 607, ¶ 35-36 (4th Dist.).
{¶14} This court undertakes a de novo review of a constitutional challenge
to a statute, and, in this case, it would have been necessary to employ a plain
error analysis because Rister did not challenge the constitutionality of the RTA
until he filed this appeal. See State v. Drennen, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 21CA10,
2022-Ohio-3413, ¶ 16-17. However, our disposition of Rister’s first assignment
of error is resolved by applying our prior decisions that have upheld the
constitutionality of the RTA where appellants unsuccessfully alleged the RTA
Lawrence App. No. 21CA17 6
suffers from the same constitutional defects, i.e., it violates the separation of
powers doctrine, the right to a trial by jury, and the right to due process. See
State v. Holsinger, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 21CA20, 2022-Ohio-4092, ¶ 39-40,
45--54; Drennen, at ¶ 22-25. See also State v. Chapman, 4th Dist. Ross No.
21CA3742, 2022-Ohio-2853, ¶ 77 (“[T[he Reagan Tokes Law does not violate
the constitutional right to a jury trial.”); State v. Alexander, 4th Dist. Adams No.
21CA1144, 2022-Ohio-1812, ¶ 57 (The RTA does not violate the separation of
powers doctrine.).
{¶15} The arguments that Rister makes in his first assignment of error
regarding how the RTA violates the separation of powers doctrine, right to a trial
by jury, and due process do not differ in any material way from the arguments
that we rejected in the aforementioned cases. Therefore, we overrule Rister’s
first assignment of error that the RTA is unconstitutional on the authority of
Holsinger, Drennen, Chapman, and Alexander.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶16} In his second assignment of error, Rister contends that his counsel
was ineffective for failing to request the trial court waive its imposition of court
costs at his sentencing hearing. Rister claims that he is indigent. “[E]ven so, [he
states] his counsel did not request a waiver of court costs during his sentencing;
nor was there any discussion surrounding Mr. Rister’s ability to pay costs.”
Rister argues that there was insufficient information to determine whether his
costs would have been waived had his counsel so requested. Therefore, Rister
maintains that we should remand the case for the trial court to reconsider
Lawrence App. No. 21CA17 7
whether he has the ability to pay his costs consistent with our decision in State v.
Bowling, 4th Dist. Jackson No. 19CA2, 2020-Ohio-813.
{¶17} The state argues that Rister’s counsel was not ineffective by failing
to move the court to waive costs. The state claims that even though Rister was
determined to be indigent at the time of his arraignment, he was able to post a
$25,000 cash or surety bond through a bondsman, which continued throughout
the pendency of his case. The state maintains that Rister’s posting of this bond
indicates that the trial court would not have waived Rister’s costs even if his
counsel had made such a request because the bond showed that he would be
able to pay the costs. Additionally, the state argued that Rister had 12 years of
school and he would have the present or future ability to pay his court costs upon
his release from prison because of his age.
{¶18} In response, Rister argues that “the record does not reflect whether
[he] personally paid the bondsman or whether he received help from family or
friends.” “Nor does the record reflect what portion of the $25,000 he paid before
the bondsman covered the rest.” He further maintains that the record is devoid
of “his work history, previous sources of income or savings when arrested.”
LAW
1. Court Costs
{¶19} R.C. 2947.23(A)(1)(a) states: “In all criminal cases, including
violations of ordinances, the judge or magistrate shall include in the sentence the
costs of prosecution, including any costs under section 2947.231 of the Revised
Code, and render a judgment against the defendant for such costs.” Thus, the
Lawrence App. No. 21CA17 8
imposition of court costs on all convicted defendants is mandatory, whether
“indigent or not.” State v. Taylor, 161 Ohio St. 3d 319, 2020-Ohio-3514, 163
N.E.3d 486, ¶ 6. However, “R.C. 2947.23(C) gives a trial court continuing
jurisdiction to ‘waive, suspend, or modify the payment of the costs of prosecution
* * * at the time of sentencing or at any time thereafter.’ So, while the court must
impose costs, it may also waive, suspend, or modify them.” Id. at ¶ 7, quoting
R.C. 2947.23(C).
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{¶20} In Ohio, every properly licensed attorney is presumed to be competent
so the defendant bears the burden of proving counsel’s ineffectiveness. State v.
Smith, 17 Ohio St.3d 98, 100, 477 N.E.2d 1128 (1985).
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
criminal defendant must establish (1) deficient performance by
counsel, i.e., performance falling below an objective standard of
reasonable representation, and (2) prejudice, i.e., a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.
State v. Cremeans, 4th Dist. Ross No. 21CA3744, 2022-Ohio-4832, ¶ 20, citing
State v. Wilson, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 18CA15, 2019-Ohio-2754, ¶ 25.
“Failure to satisfy either part of the test is fatal to the claim.” State v. Trout, 4th
Dist. Scioto No. 19CA3866, 2020-Ohio-3940, ¶ 31, citing Wilson at ¶ 25.
{¶21} In assessing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “ ‘we must
indulge in “a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action
‘might be considered sound trial strategy.” ’ ” Cremeans at ¶ 20, quoting
Lawrence App. No. 21CA17 9
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674(1984), quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.Ed. 83(1955). A “strategy, even if debatable, does not establish deficient performance
or serve as the basis for an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.” State v.
Watts, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2021-04-042, 2021-Ohio-4548, ¶ 10, citing State
v. Holt, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-19-1101, 2020-Ohio-6650, ¶ 8-9; State v. Cepec,
149 Ohio St. 3d 438, 2016-Ohio-8076, 75 N.E.3d 1185, ¶ 111.
{¶22} “Prior to [the] adoption [of R.C. 2947.23(C)], a failure to request of
(Emphasis sic.) waiver of costs at sentencing resulted in a final judgment and a
prohibition of any further consideration of that issue.” State v. Eblin, 5th Dist.
Muskingum No. CT2019-0036, 2020-Ohio-1216, ¶ 16, citing State v. Threatt, 108
Ohio St.3d 277, 2006-Ohio-905, 843 N.E.2d 164, ¶ 23. But now R.C. 2947.23(C)
states that a “trial court ‘retains jurisdiction’ to waive court costs ‘at the time of
sentencing or at any time thereafter.’ To that end, the statute specifically
provides an exception to res judicata when a defendant did not request waiver at
sentencing or challenge his court costs on direct appeal.” State v. Braden, 158
Ohio St. 3d 462, 2019-Ohio-4204, 145 N.E.3d 235, ¶ 23. “Thus, the timing of a
motion to seek waiver of costs is a matter of trial strategy.” State v. Phillips, 4th
Dist. Scioto No. 20CA3905, 2022-Ohio-478, ¶ 15, fn. 2; State v. Farnese, 4th
Dist. Washington No. 15CA11, 2015-Ohio-3533, ¶ 15-16; State v. Purifoy, 2d
Dist. Montgomery No. 28042, 2019-Ohio-2942, ¶ 28; Eblin at ¶ 16; State v. Pultz,
6th Dist. Wood No. WD-14-083, 2016-Ohio-329, ¶ 61; State v. Mihalis, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 104308, 2016-Ohio-8056, ¶ 33.
Lawrence App. No. 21CA17 10
{¶23} More recently, the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed a conflict-of-
law question between the Fifth and Eighth District Courts of Appeals, which
asked “whether trial counsel's failure to file a motion to waive court costs at a
defendant's sentencing hearing constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel
when the defendant has previously been found indigent.” State v. Davis, 159
Ohio St. 3d 31, 2020-Ohio-309, 146 N.E.3d 560, ¶ 1. The court did not alter the
basic two-part-ineffective-assistance-of-counsel test, we set out supra, which
originated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed.
2d 674 (1984). Id. at ¶ 10. However, it imparted instruction regarding the
second prong of the test, i.e., whether counsel’s conduct in failing to request a
court to waive costs prejudiced the defendant. Specifically, the Court stated:
To evaluate whether a defendant has been prejudiced, as part
of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a court does not
assess whether the defendant was simply harmed by counsel's
alleged deficient performance. More specifically, the court does
not analyze whether the defendant has been required to pay court
costs at a given moment, or even whether the defendant has the
ability to have court costs waived in the future. Furthermore, a
determination of indigency alone does not rise to the level of
creating a reasonable probability that the trial court would have
waived costs had defense counsel moved the court to do so[.] * *
* The court of appeals, instead, must look at all the circumstances
that the defendant sets forth in attempting to demonstrate
prejudice and determine whether there is a reasonable probability
that the trial court would have granted a motion to waive costs had
one been made.”
Id. (Internal citations omitted.)
{¶24} In State v. Smith, we found, “[f]or example, if a court finds that a
defendant has the ability to work and pay court costs in the future, the court may
decide to not waive court costs.” (Emphasis added.) 4th Dist. Pickaway No.
Lawrence App. No. 21CA17 11
19CA33, 2021-Ohio-2866, ¶ 80. Also relevant to the determination of whether a
court might waive costs is whether “the record contains no indication that
appellant ‘would be unemployable upon his release, such as a health or medical
condition that would preclude him from future employment.’ ” State v. Malone,
4th Dist. Lawrence No. 21CA9, 2022-Ohio-1409, quoting State v. Freeman, 1st
Dist. Hamilton No. C-180090, 2018-Ohio-4973, ¶ 13.
ANALYSIS
1. Counsel’s Performance
{¶25} As we established above, there are numerous appellate districts,
including ours, that recognize a counsel’s decision not to seek waiver of costs at
sentencing as strategic because it may be more advantageous to seek a waiver
at a different time. However, we find the case of Holt, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-19-
1101, 2020-Ohio-6650, particularly instructive on the issue of strategy and
waiving costs in our case. In Holt, the appellant “was convicted of attempted
felonious assault and vandalism, sentenced to serve 24 months in prison, and
ordered to pay all costs * * *. On appeal, Holt argue[d] that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to request that the trial court waive his court costs.” Id. at ¶
1.
{¶26} In evaluating appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the
court of appeals found that “the decision not to request a waiver at sentencing
and instead to postpone it until later has been found to be a matter of trial
strategy.” Id. at ¶ 8. The court continued:
Given that Holt's claim of deficient performance is based
entirely upon counsel's failure to seek a waiver at sentencing, we
Lawrence App. No. 21CA17 12
cannot find that Holt has overcome the presumption that trial
counsel's inaction was anything other than trial strategy. Indeed,
a review of the sentencing transcript reveals that counsel's priority
was persuading the court that Holt “would make an excellent
candidate” for probation. To that end, counsel stressed that,
before this case, Holt had “never been a problem to society,” and
since committing the offenses, he had “not had any contact with *
* * the legal system.” Trial counsel also stressed that, while Holt
suffered from past alcohol abuse and psychological problems, he
had quit drinking and was “taking care of” his emotional health.
Id. at ¶ 8.
{¶27} In sum, as a matter of trial strategy, counsel may decline to seek a
waiver of costs at sentencing upon a belief that raising it at a later time would be
more advantageous, or because counsel focuses priority on another issue such
as mitigating punishment, or both.
{¶28} Similar to Holt, counsel herein did not seek a waiver of Rister’s
costs at sentencing, but instead focused on mitigating his sentence:
In the realm of things, this is not one of worst forms of felonious
assault that we’ve ever seen. It basically amounted to a broken
wrist. Those happen. This Court remembers from jury selection,
a lot of us had broke wrists at times. Uh, we’d ask the Court to
sentence this case on the minimum side on the two * * * two to
three side, and uh, take into consideration the factors that we’ve
talked about with Mr. Rister.
{¶29} Therefore, we find that Rister’s counsel did not violate an “essential
duty” by declining to seek a waiver of court costs at sentencing because he may
have decided to prioritize sentence mitigation. Holt at ¶ 8-9. Alternatively, or in
addition, his counsel may have concluded that seeking a waiver of Rister’s costs
at a time other than sentencing was a better strategy. Phillips, 4th Dist. Scioto
No. 20CA3905, 2022-Ohio-478, ¶ 15, fn. 2 (A decision to not seek waiver of
costs at sentencing may be a strategy). Therefore, we find that counsel’s
Lawrence App. No. 21CA17 13
representation of Rister was not deficient, but could have been a strategic
decision.
2. Prejudice
{¶30} Even accepting that trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to waive
court costs amounted to deficient performance, Rister still could not prevail on his
ineffective assistance claim because he failed to establish prejudice.
{¶31} Even though Rister had previously been determined to be indigent,
we know from Davis that alone is not enough to support an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim. Rister claims there is not enough information in the record for
this court to determine whether it would have granted a request to waive costs;
thus, we should remand costs for reevaluation pursuant to Bowling, 4th Dist.
Jackson No. 19CA2, 2020-Ohio-813.
{¶32} In Bowling, the appellant pleaded guilty to unlawful sexual conduct
with a minor in violation of R.C. 2907.04(A) and the trial court sentenced him to
60 months in prison with 5 years of post-release control. Id. at ¶ 1. In his second
assignment of error on appeal he asserted that trial counsel's failure to request a
waiver of court costs constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at ¶ 11.
We reasoned:
In the case sub judice it is difficult for this court to fully and
objectively review all pertinent facts and evidence to determine
whether appellant has demonstrated that a reasonable probability
exists that, had his trial counsel moved the trial court to waive
court costs, the trial court would have granted the motion. Davis,
supra. We recognize, however, that the record on this particular
issue is somewhat sparse and should be further developed in
order to facilitate the full examination of all relevant facts and
evidence.
Lawrence App. No. 21CA17 14
Id. at ¶ 18.
Therefore, “we sustain appellant's second assignment of error and remand this
matter so that the parties and the trial court may consider anew the imposition of
court costs issue in light of Davis and all pertinent facts and evidence.” Id. at ¶
19. Because the record herein is sufficient to evaluate the prejudice prong of the
test, we find Bowling distinguishable.
{¶33} While the record may not be replete with evidence regarding
whether Rister could pay costs, it does show that he was 45 on March 24, 2021
and that he attended school through the 12th grade, which indicates that even if
he served the maximum sentence he would be released at a still-employable age
of 57 with a high school education. Smith, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 19CA33,
2021-Ohio-2866, ¶ 80. Further, Rister presented no evidence that he was in ill
health or otherwise was unemployable. Malone, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 21CA9,
2022-Ohio-1409, ¶ 24.
{¶34} Finally, Rister posted a $25,000 bond. He does not deny financing
all or part of the bond, but instead asserts that the “record does not reflect
whether Mr. Rister paid the bondsman or whether he received help from family
and friends.” It is Rister who has the burden of proof in an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim. Davis, 159 Ohio St.3d 31, 2020-Ohio—309, 146 N.E.2d 309 at
¶ 24. Yet, Rister does not actually deny paying all or part of that bond, let alone
submit any evidence to support his contention that family or friends paid that
bond.
Lawrence App. No. 21CA17 15
{¶35} Therefore, we find Rister has failed to demonstrate a “reasonable
probability” that he was prejudiced, i.e., had his counsel moved the trial court to
waive costs, it would have granted the motion.
{¶36} Even though failing to satisfy either prong would mean that Rister’s
counsel was not ineffective, we find he failed to show both prongs, i.e., his
counsel’s representation was not deficient and he was not prejudiced by his
counsel’s actions. Accordingly, we overrule Rister’s second assignment of error.
CONCLUSION
{¶37} Having overruled both of Rister’s assignments of error, we affirm the
trial court’s judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Lawrence App. No. 21CA17 16
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that appellant shall
pay the costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL
HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS
COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the
bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to
file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency
of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at
the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the Appellant to
file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal
period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court
of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to
expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Abele, J. and Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
BY: ________________________
Kristy Wilkin, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.