State v. Meadows , 2023 Ohio 1572 ( 2023 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Meadows, 
    2023-Ohio-1572
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    STATE OF OHIO,                                      :
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                 :
    No. 111950
    v.                                  :
    REGINALD MEADOWS,                                   :
    Defendant-Appellant.                :
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 11, 2023
    Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-21-666153-A
    Appearances:
    Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
    Attorney, and Brittany Fletcher, Assistant Prosecuting
    Attorney, for appellee.
    John T. Forristal, for appellant.
    MARY J. BOYLE, J.:
    Defendant-appellant, Reginald Meadows (“Meadows”), was involved
    in a police chase following a traffic stop, which resulted in Meadows crashing into
    two vehicles. He appeals from his guilty plea to failure to comply, aggravated
    vehicular assault, carrying a concealed weapon, trafficking, drug possession, and
    possessing criminal tools, arguing that the trial court’s participation in his plea
    rendered his plea invalid.
    I. Facts and Procedural History
    In September 2021, the Independence Police stopped Meadows for
    failing to maintain his lane of travel. As the police officer was in his cruiser running
    Meadows’s identification, which revealed that Meadows had active warrants and a
    suspended driver’s license, Meadows took off in his vehicle at a high rate of speed
    and a pursuit ensued. Meadows was speeding, ran through red lights, and drove
    against traffic on SR 21 in Independence. Meadows crashed into a vehicle as he
    approached the intersection of SR 21 and Rockside Road, causing the vehicle to flip
    on its side. The driver of this vehicle had to be life-flighted from the scene to the
    hospital. The driver sustained several injuries including a dislocated shoulder, ten
    broken ribs, and a punctured lung. Meadows’s vehicle then crashed into another
    vehicle, which ended the pursuit. The driver of this vehicle suffered lower back
    spasms and soreness, and her 5-year-old grandson sustained no physical injury but
    was emotionally traumatized. The police search of Meadows’s vehicle revealed a
    loaded firearm, 1.34 grams of meth, and drug-related tools.1
    As a result of this incident, Meadows was charged in a nine-count
    indictment in December 2021. Counts 1-3 charged him with failure to comply, with
    1    The above facts were set forth by the state at Meadows’s August 2022 sentencing
    hearing.
    both a one-year firearm specification and a forfeiture of weapon clause attached to
    each count. These counts also carried furthermore clauses stating that the operation
    of the motor vehicle by the offender was a proximate cause of serious physical harm
    to persons or property (Counts 1 and 2) and the offender was fleeing immediately
    after the commission of a felony (Count 3). Count 4 charged him with aggravated
    vehicular assault, with both a one-year firearm specification and a forfeiture of
    weapon clause attached. Count 5 charged him with carrying a concealed weapon,
    with a forfeiture of weapon clause attached and a furthermore clause stating that the
    weapon involved was a firearm that was either loaded or for which the offender had
    ammunition ready at hand. Count 6 charged him with improperly handling firearms
    in a motor vehicle, with a forfeiture of weapon clause attached. Count 7 charged him
    with trafficking, with both a one-year firearm specification and three forfeiture
    clauses attached. Count 8 charged him with drug possession, with both a one-year
    firearm specification and three forfeiture clauses attached. Count 9 charged him
    with possessing criminal tools, with a furthermore clause and three forfeiture
    clauses attached.
    The matter was set for trial on July 6, 2022. The day before, Meadows
    was in court with his defense counsel and the prosecutor preparing for trial. The
    parties went on the record, and defense counsel explained to the court that there
    may be an opportunity to resolve the matter and Meadows was concerned with the
    mandatory nature of the penalties. During this discussion, the trial court advised
    Meadows that the aggravated vehicular assault count carried a mandatory prison
    term from 12 to 60 months, in 6-month increments. The court also stated to
    Meadows that “it’s a tough decision” to decide to plea and he should discuss his
    options with defense counsel, who was very experienced. (July 5, 2022, tr. 9.)
    It was the court’s understanding that there is film of the incident, and
    the court stated to Meadows that “that type of stuff weighs very heavily on a jury.”
    (July 5, 2022, tr. 9.) The court further stated that Meadows faced nine charges, some
    of which are mandatory consecutive so that could “add up to a lot of time.” (July 5,
    2022, tr. 6.) The court also stated to Meadows that the “jury’s not going to see it the
    same way you do. They just won’t” and, with all the charges, defense counsel “would
    have to throw a no hitter here for there not to be some possible prison time, possibly
    substantial time.” (July 5, 2022, tr. 6-7.) The court also advised Meadows, “I don’t
    know what the charges are. You know, I don’t get into the plea too much because
    that’s between you and the State, and I don’t want that to interfere with my
    judgment. We’ll put the plea on the record in a second here, and I’ll step out while
    it’s going on.” (July 5, 2022, tr. 8.)
    After defense counsel and the state discussed the plea, the trial judge
    then reentered the courtroom. Defense counsel advised the court that Meadows
    wanted to resolve the matter through the state’s plea offer. The trial court then had
    the following exchange with Meadows:
    [COURT]: You wish to plea?
    [MEADOWS]: Unfortunately.
    [COURT]: Pardon me?
    [MEADOWS]: Yes. Yes. Unfortunately, yes.
    [COURT]: Well, you know, like I said before, you know, I wouldn’t
    want to be in your situation. It’s a tough decision to make. I
    understand that. But, you know, a decision needs to be made.
    You can go to a jury, but, you know, they’re not going to see it your way.
    I can guarantee you that. All right? Do you want to proceed, or do you
    want to think about it?
    [MEADOWS]: It’s either go to trial tomorrow or plead out today?
    [COURT]: Uh-huh.
    [MEADOWS]: Plead out today.
    [COURT]: All right.
    (July 5, 2022, tr. 11-12.)
    The trial court then proceeded with the plea colloquy advising
    Meadows of his rights in accordance with Crim.R. 11. While discussing his rights,
    the court asked Meadows if he was satisfied with the services of his lawyer. Meadows
    responded:
    [MEADOWS]: I mean, I really didn’t * * * understand it all, to go
    through all those charges, but it is what it is now. I’m at the end of the
    road, so.
    ***
    Because I was told something else at the beginning, before this, before
    this case. I was told I wasn’t going to be pleading out to all these
    charges. But it is what it is now. It’s either that or trial, so it’s like —
    I’m not saying I’m forced to do it, but it’s basically like my [sic.] is to the
    wall now, so.
    [COURT]: Mr. Meadows, you know, there are no rabbits to be pulled
    out of a hat here. All right? Do you understand what I mean?
    [MEADOWS]: Yes, sir. Yes, Your Honor.
    [COURT]: I don’t know all the facts here. * * * And there are no
    miracles. * * * The plain reality is there are a lot of serious charges in
    this case. You know, in this incident people were hurt. And, you know,
    the police in the situation are driving this. This is a situation where you
    should have given up and nothing like this would have happened.
    Nothing like this would have happened. You would not have any of
    these mandatory charges. You wouldn’t have had any of these charges
    that were mandatory charges, if you would just given up.
    [MEADOWS]: These charges could be run consecutive?
    [COURT]: Yes. They could be. * * * I’m going to go through all that.
    Because my job right now is to give you the worst possible thing that
    can happen so that you know the worst possible thing that can happen
    to you. You know, so that you can make a knowing and intelligent
    decision. I don’t sugarcoat stuff. You know, I don’t just tell people the
    least possible plea. I tell them the worst possible plea so you can have
    a full understanding.
    ***
    All right? Do you want to keep going? * * * I’m going to ask you some
    questions again.
    ***
    [COURT]: So are you satisfied with the services of your lawyer[?]
    [MEADOWS]: Yes.
    (July 5, 2022, tr. 17-20.)
    Meadows pled guilty to six charges: an amended count of failure to
    comply with forfeiture specifications (Count 1), an amended count of aggravated
    vehicular assault with forfeiture specifications (Count 4), carrying a concealed
    weapon with forfeiture specifications (Count 5), an amended count of trafficking
    (Count 7), drug possession with a one-year firearm specification and forfeiture
    specifications (Count 8), and an amended count of possessing criminal tools with
    forfeiture specifications (Count 9). The remaining counts were nolled, and the
    remaining firearm specifications were dismissed. The court found that the plea was
    knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made and referred Meadows to the
    psychiatric clinic and the probation department for a presentence-investigation
    report.
    The matter resumed in August 2022 for the sentencing hearing. At
    the hearing, the state recited the facts surrounding the incident and played the
    officer’s dashcam video, over an objection by Meadows. The state also read letters
    from the three victims. Defense counsel spoke on Meadows’s behalf. Meadows also
    spoke to the court and apologized for his actions. The court then sentenced
    Meadows to
    a prison sentence at the Lorain Correctional Institution of 92 month(s).
    Count 1: F3, 36 month(s), consecutive with count 4; up to 2 years of
    PRC at the discretion of the parole board.
    Count 4: F3, 36 month(s), (this is mandatory time); a mandatory
    minimum 1 year, up to a maximum of 3 years.
    Counts 5, 7: F4, 12 month(s), Counts 5 and 7 to run concurrent with
    each other, but consecutive to Counts 1 and 4; up to 2 years of PRC at
    the discretion of the parole board.
    Count 7: F4, 12 month(s), Counts 5 and 7 to run concurrent with each
    other, but consecutive to Counts 1 and 4; up to 2 years of PRC at the
    discretion of the parole board.
    Counts 8, 9: F5, 8 month(s), Counts 8 and 9 are to run concurrent with
    each other but consecutive to Counts 1, 4, 5 and 7; up to 2 years of PRC
    at the discretion of the parole board.
    (Judgment Entry, Aug. 17, 2022.)
    It is from this order that Meadows now appeals, raising the following
    two assignments of error for review:
    Assignment of Error One: Mr. Meadows’ guilty pleas were not
    entered knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily because the trial court’s
    participation in the plea bargaining process undermined the
    voluntariness of the pleas.
    Assignment of Error Two: The trial court erred when it overruled
    defense counsel’s objection to the playing of the dashcam video at the
    sentencing hearing.
    II. Law and Analysis
    A. Guilty Plea
    In the first assignment of error, Meadows challenges his plea, arguing
    that it was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily made because trial court’s
    participation in the plea-bargaining process undermined his decision and led him
    to believe he would not have a fair trial. He argues that several of the court’s
    statements, made on the eve of his jury trial, were improper and coerced him to
    abandon his plan to take the case to trial.
    It is well-established that for a defendant’s plea to be valid, it must be
    knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. State v. Engle, 
    74 Ohio St.3d 525
    ,
    527, 
    660 N.E.2d 450
     (1996). Although strongly discouraged by the Ohio Supreme
    Court, a trial judge’s participation in plea negotiations does not render a defendant’s
    plea invalid per se under the Ohio and United States Constitutions. State v. Byrd,
    
    63 Ohio St.2d 288
    , 293, 
    407 N.E.2d 1384
     (1980).              Instead, “a trial judge’s
    participation in the plea bargaining process must be carefully scrutinized to
    determine if the judge’s intervention affected the voluntariness of the defendant’s
    guilty plea.” Id. at 293. A plea should be found involuntary and unconstitutional “if
    the judge’s active conduct could lead a defendant to believe he cannot get a fair trial
    because the judge thinks that a trial is a futile exercise or that the judge would be
    biased against him at trial.” Id. at 293-294.
    Meadows, relying on Byrd, directs us to the following statements
    made by the trial court, arguing that these statements indicated that the court would
    be biased against him and felt that going to trial was a “futile exercise”: (1) “a jury’s
    not going to see it the same way you do. They just won’t”; (2) “So your attorney
    would have to throw a no hitter here for there not to be some possible prison time,
    possibly substantial time”; (3) “they thought the jury would see it their way. And
    they didn’t”; and (4) “You can go to a jury, but, you know, they’re not going to see it
    your way. I can guarantee you that. All right?”
    The state argues that Meadows is mislabeling the court’s legal
    requirement to ensure that accurate information is conveyed so that he can fully
    understand the consequences of his decision and enter a valid plea as “coercion.” In
    support of its position, the state relies on State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    107561, 
    2019-Ohio-2571
    , which cites to State v. Jabbaar, 
    2013-Ohio-1655
    , 
    991 N.E.2d 290
     (8th Dist.). In Jones, the defendant argued that the trial court’s
    participation in the plea-bargaining process undermined his decision and led him
    to believe he would not obtain a fair trial. In Jones, the trial court stated that Jones
    may not leave prison, depending upon the length of his jail time, and the trial court
    assured Jones the victim would testify against him even though he could not say
    what her testimony would be. Id. at ¶ 21-22.
    We stated that while the trial court’s comments
    are disquieting and the trial court’s participation is similar to the trial
    court’s participation in the Jabbaar case in that such participation is
    not the “preferred practice,” we do not look at the trial court’s
    comments in isolation, but look at the record in its entirety to
    determine the voluntariness of the guilty plea. Id. In reviewing the trial
    court’s participation and the totality of the record, the trial court did
    not create and present the plea offer and the prosecutor had input in
    the plea offer.
    Id. at ¶ 23. We found that in looking at the record in its entirety, the trial court’s
    comments did not cause Jones to believe he would not receive a fair trial or a fair
    sentence after trial. Id.
    In Jabbaar, the defendant argued that the trial court’s discussion of
    the evidence and the penalties attached to the counts coupled with his direct
    recommendation that the defendant “should consider a plea” had a coercive effect
    that rendered his plea involuntary. Id., 
    2013-Ohio-1655
    , 
    991 N.E.2d 290
    , at ¶ 24.
    We recognized that the trial judge’s participation in Jabbaar was not the preferred
    practice and that, in some instances, the trial judge’s comments raised concern. Id.
    at ¶ 29. We found, however, that these comments must not be considered in
    isolation. Id. “‘Instead, we consider the record in its entirety to determine the
    voluntariness of the guilty plea.’” Id., quoting State v. Finroy, 10th Dist. Franklin
    No. 09AP-795, 
    2010-Ohio-2067
    , ¶ 7.
    The record in Jabbaar, 
    2013-Ohio-1655
    , 
    991 N.E.2d 290
    ,
    demonstrated that (1) the defendant was represented during all of the proceedings
    by counsel, who actively participated on the defendant’s behalf; (2) the trial court
    did not coerce or negotiate a plea agreement for the defendant; rather the trial court
    insisted on the defendant taking additional time to consider the plea offer even after
    the defendant expressed a possible change of heart in going to trial; and (3) telling
    the defendant that he “should consider” the plea is not the same as telling him “to
    take” the plea. Id. at ¶ 32-33. These factors, and the trial judge fully advising the
    defendant of his constitutional rights so as to comply with Crim.R. 11, led this court
    to determine the plea was not coerced. Id. at ¶ 35.
    In Jabbaar, we distinguished Byrd, 
    63 Ohio St.2d 288
    , 293, 
    407 N.E.2d 1384
    , noting that the trial judge in Byrd
    solicited private meetings with the defendant’s mother and sister and
    encouraged them to pressure Byrd to enter a guilty plea, indicating to
    them that Byrd would mostly likely get “the chair” if he went to trial.
    After speaking with his relatives, Byrd met with the judge in chambers,
    along with a sheriff’s deputy, a probation officer, and an assistant
    prosecutor, where Byrd was neither provided counsel nor advised to
    obtain counsel. The trial judge then negotiated a plea bargain with the
    prosecutor, and, thereafter, informed Byrd that it was a “pretty good
    deal.” Id. at 290. The trial judge also enlisted the aid of the deputy
    sheriff, a friend of Byrd’s family, in convincing Byrd to plead guilty.
    Id. at ¶ 30.
    We likewise find the situation in Byrd distinguishable and find that
    the instant case is analogous to Jabbaar and Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107561,
    
    2019-Ohio-2571
    . Although the above comments by the trial court that Meadows
    emphasizes are concerning, and the trial court’s participation is not the “preferred
    practice,” we do not look at these comments in isolation, but look at the record in its
    entirety to determine the voluntariness of the guilty plea.
    Here, all of the trial court’s statements, but for the last statement,
    were said while Meadows was discussing the mandatory nature of his sentence and
    before the trial judge left the courtroom so that Meadows could discuss the plea. The
    trial court did not coerce or negotiate a plea agreement; rather, the plea agreement
    was brought to the court’s attention and the court’s statements were direct responses
    to Meadows’s sentencing questions. The court acknowledged that “it’s a tough
    decision” to decide to plea and encouraged Meadows to discuss the matter with
    defense counsel, whom the court acknowledged was experienced. Prior to leaving
    the courtroom, the trial judge advised Meadows that he does not get too involved
    with the plea because that is between him and the state. The judge stated, “I don’t
    want that to interfere with my judgment.” (July 5, 2022, tr. 8.). The trial judge then
    left the courtroom while the terms of the plea were discussed by the parties.
    This is not a situation where the trial court exerted pressure and
    influence to induce a plea. Rather, the trial judge specifically told Meadows that “I
    don’t sugarcoat stuff” and it is his job to give Meadows the worst possible thing that
    can happen so that Meadows could make a knowing and intelligent decision. These
    factors, and the trial judge fully advising Meadows of his constitutional rights in
    compliance with Crim.R. 11, lead this court to determine Meadows’s plea was not
    coerced.
    Thus, after reviewing the trial court’s participation and considering
    the totality of the record, we cannot say that the trial court’s involvement coerced
    Meadows’s plea. The trial court’s comments taken in their entirety do not reveal a
    belief by the court that a trial would be futile or that the judge would be biased
    against Meadows at trial.
    Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.
    B. Dashcam Video at Sentencing
    In the second assignment of error, Meadows argues that the court
    erred when it allowed the state to play the dashcam video of the police chase at
    sentencing.   Meadows contends that, under Evid.R. 403, the dashcam video
    inflamed the passion of the trial court and impermissibly impacted his sentence.
    We note that the rules of evidence do not apply at sentencing
    hearings. State v. Echols, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104483, 
    2017-Ohio-1360
    , ¶ 9,
    citing State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98934, 
    2013-Ohio-2201
    . The trial
    court is permitted to consider any reliable evidence in the record when sentencing a
    defendant. Williams at ¶ 18, citing State v. Hinton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84582,
    
    2005-Ohio-3427
    ; see also State v. Wagner, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109678, 2023-
    Ohio-1215, ¶ 34.
    Here, we find that the officer’s dashcam video of Meadows fleeing
    from the police, crashing into two vehicles, and causing harm to three individuals is
    reliable evidence that a trial court can consider at the time of sentencing. There is
    no evidence in the record supporting Meadows’s contention that this video inflamed
    the trial court and impermissibly impacted his sentence. Rather, at the sentencing
    hearing, the court advised Meadows that it gave him 12 months in prison on the
    fourth-degree felonies, when Meadows could have received 18 months on each
    count, noting that “[w]hat [Meadows] did is extraordinarily serious.             Do you
    understand that?      Anybody, anybody would look at this and say this is an
    extraordinarily serious thing that you did.” (Aug. 12, 2022, tr. 63.) Thus, based on
    the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not err when it allowed the state to play
    the dashcam video.
    The second assignment of error is overruled.
    III. Conclusion
    Meadows’s guilty plea was not invalid. While some of the trial court’s
    comments are concerning and the trial court’s participation is not the “preferred
    practice,” we do not look at these comments in isolation, but look at the record in its
    entirety and find that Meadows’s guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and
    voluntarily made. We further find that the dashcam video of Meadows fleeing from
    the police, crashing into two vehicles, and causing harm to three individuals is
    reliable evidence that a trial court could consider at the time of sentencing.
    Accordingly, judgment is affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
    common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.              The defendant’s
    conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending is terminated. Case remanded to
    the trial court for execution of sentence.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
    of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE
    MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., and
    EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 111950

Citation Numbers: 2023 Ohio 1572

Judges: Boyle

Filed Date: 5/11/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/11/2023