State v. Harrison , 2023 Ohio 1618 ( 2023 )

[Cite as State v. Harrison, 2023-Ohio-1618.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
LOGAN COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 8-22-34
v.
KANDALE L. HARRISON, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Logan County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. CR 18 03 0091
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: May 15, 2023
APPEARANCES:
William T. Cramer for Appellant
Eric C. Stewart for Appellee
Case No. 8-22-34
ZIMMERMAN, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Kandale L. Harrison (“Harrison”), appeals the
August 25, 2022 judgment of the Logan County Court of Common Pleas denying
his motion to suppress. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} On April 18, 2018, Harrison was indicted by the Logan County Grand
Jury in a multi-count indictment on the following criminal charges: Count One for
trafficking in cocaine under R.C. 2925.03(A)(1), (C)(4)(a), a fifth-degree felony;
Count Two for having weapons under disability under R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), (B), a
third-degree felony, with a forfeiture specification; Count Three for improper
handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle under R.C. 2923.16(B), (I), a fourth-degree
felony, with firearm and forfeiture specifications; Count Four for carrying a
concealed weapon under R.C. 2923.12(A)(2), (F)(1), a fourth-degree felony, with
firearm and forfeiture specifications; Count Five for having weapons under
disability under R.C. 2923.13(A)(3), (B), a third-degree felony, with firearm and
forfeiture specifications; Count Six for possession of cocaine under R.C.
2925.11(A), (C)(4)(b), a fourth-degree felony, with firearm and forfeiture
specifications; Count Seven for trafficking in cocaine under R.C. 2925.03(A)(2),
(C)(4)(c), a fourth-degree felony, with firearm and forfeiture specifications; Count
Eight for receiving stolen property, under R.C. 2913.51(A), (C), a fourth-degree
felony, with a firearm specification; and Count Nine for engaging in a pattern of
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corrupt activity under R.C. 2923.32(A)(1), (B)(1), a first-degree felony, with
forfeiture specifications. Harrison tendered not-guilty pleas to all of the criminal
charges.1
{¶3} On April 4, 2019, Harrison filed a motion to suppress evidence
challenging law enforcement’s execution of the arrest warrant on March 5, 2018.
(Doc. No. 178). Harrison argued that the arrest warrant was facially invalid since it
did not bear the signature of the judge who issued the warrant, and thus he argued
that it did not comport with Crim.R. 4(A). The trial court held motion hearings on
April 17 and September 10, 2019. On October 16, 2019, the trial court granted
Harrison’s motion and suppressed all evidence obtained from his person and vehicle
on March 5, 2018.2
{¶4} We reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the matter for
further proceedings consistent with our opinion after concluding that we did not
need to determine whether the unsigned-arrest warrant was valid since we
concluded that the good-faith exception applied.
1
This court recited much of the factual and procedural background of this case in a previous appeal, State v.
Harrison, 3d Dist. Logan No. 8-19-48, 2020-Ohio-3920, ¶ 2-11, and the Supreme Court of Ohio also recited
that same factual and procedural background in State v. Harrison, 166 Ohio St.3d 479, 2021-Ohio-4465, ¶
2-10. Consequently, we will not duplicate those efforts here.
2
The trial court determined in an “Opinion and Findings” that the arrest warrant was defective since it was
unsigned at the time of execution under Crim.R. 4(A). (Doc. No. 254). The trial court further found that the
good-faith exception did not apply since the arrest warrant was so facially defective that it was not objectively
reasonable for a law-enforcement officer to rely upon the legitimacy of the warrant.
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{¶5} Harrison then filed a memorandum in support of jurisdiction in the
Supreme Court of Ohio raising two propositions of law for review. Ultimately, the
Supreme Court of Ohio accepted jurisdiction over Harrison’s discretionary appeal
as to both propositions of law. The Supreme Court affirmed our judgment, albeit
for a different reason than was expressed in our opinion and the cause was remanded
to the trial court for further proceeding.3
{¶6} After remand, Harrison (through counsel) filed a motion captioned as
“Motion for Reconsideration to Suppress Evidence; Motion In Limine” on May 31,
2022. (Doc. No. 283). This motion requested that the trial court consider whether
there was probable cause to issue the GPS tracking-device warrant placed on the
vehicle that Harrison was driving. (Id.). On August 24, 2022, the State filed its
response to the Harrison’s motion. Thereafter, the trial court denied Harrison’s
motion to suppress on the merits.
{¶7} On September 21, 2022, Harrison pleaded no contest to Counts One,
Five, Seven, and the forfeiture specifications under Count Seven. (Doc. No. 328).
In exchange for his change of pleas, the State agreed to dismiss Counts Two, Three
Four, Six, and Eight as well as all other specifications. (Id.). Then, the trial court
found Harrison guilty of the charges against him and dismissed the remaining counts
3
The Supreme Court determined that the arrest warrant was facially valid and thus expressed no opinion
regarding whether the good-faith exception applies under the circumstances of the appeal since they were not
confronted with an invalid-arrest warrant. Harrison, 166 Ohio St.3d 479, 2021-Ohio-4465, at ¶ 45.
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and specifications in the indictment. (Sept. 21, 2022 Tr. at 32); (Id.). The parties’
plea agreement also contained a joint-sentencing recommendation. (Sept. 21, 2022
Tr. at 16, 32). The trial court adopted the joint-sentencing recommendation in its
entirety without deviation, and thus, Harrison was sentenced to 12 months under
Count One, 36 months under Count Three, and 18 months under Count Seven. (Id.
at 33-35). Those sentences were ordered to be served concurrently to one another
with an aggregate sentence of 36 months in prison. (Id. at 36). However, that 36-
month aggregate sentence was ordered to be served consecutively to the sentence
imposed in Logan County Common Pleas Court in case number CR20-12-0290.
{¶8} Harrison filed a timely appeal and raises one assignment of error for our
review.
Assignment of Error
Appellant’s Federal and State constitutional rights to be free of
unreasonable searches and seizures was violated when the trial
court refused to suppress evidence arising from a search warrant
that was not supported by probable cause.
{¶9} In his sole assignment of error, Harrison argues that the trial court erred
by denying his motion to suppress. Specifically, Harrison asserts that the tracking-
device warrant was not supported by probable cause.
Standard of Review
{¶10} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question
of law and fact. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the
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role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions
and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152,
2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. “Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial
court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Id.“Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently
determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts
satisfy the applicable legal standard.” Id.Analysis
{¶11} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “when police attach a GPS
tracking device to a suspect’s vehicle, it is a search implicating the protections of
the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Johnson, 141 Ohio St.3d 136, 2014-Ohio-5021,
¶ 39, citing U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949.
{¶12} “Ohio Law vests only judges with the authority to issue [tracking-
device] warrants.” State v. Harrison, 2021-Ohio-4465, at ¶ 30, citing Crim.R.
41(A). Crim.R. 41 governs the issuance of tracking-device warrants and provides
in its pertinent parts:
(A) Authority to issue warrant. Upon the request of * * * a law
enforcement officer:
* * *.
(2) A tracking device warrant authorized by this rule may be issued
by a judge of a court of record to install a tracking device within the
court’s territorial jurisdiction. The warrant may authorize use of the
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device to track the movement of a person or property within or outside
of the court’s territorial jurisdiction, or both.
* * *.
(B) Issuance and contents.
(1) A warrant shall issue on either an affidavit or affidavits sworn to
before a judge of a court of record or an affidavit or affidavits
communicated to the judge by reliable electronic means establishing
the grounds for issuing the warrant. * * *. In the case of a tracking
device warrant, the affidavit shall name or describe the person to be
tracked or particularly describe the property to be tracked, and state
substantially the offense in relation thereto, state the factual basis for
the affiant’s belief that the tracking will yield evidence of the offense.
If the affidavit is provided by reliable electronic means, the applicant
communicating the affidavit shall be placed under oath and shall
swear to or affirm the affidavit communicated.
(2) If the judge is satisfied that probable cause exists, the judge shall
issue a warrant identifying * * * the person or property to be tracked.
The warrant may be issued to the requesting * * * law enforcement
officer through reliable electronic means. The finding of probable
cause may be based upon hearsay in whole or in part, provided there
is a substantial basis for believing the source of the hearsay to be
credible and for believing that there is a factual basis for the
information furnished. * * *.
(Emphasis added.) Crim.R. 41(A)-(C).
{¶13} Here, Harrison challenges the trial court’s determination of probable
cause. Specifically, he argues that the affidavit of Brent Joseph (“Det. Joseph”), a
detective with the Logan County Joint Drug Task Force, was insufficient to support
the issuance of a tracking-device warrant since it did not contain information
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regarding the reliability of the confidential informant (“CI”), thus, rendering the
affidavit invalid.
{¶14} Significantly, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.” See also Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution
(containing the identical language). “Probable cause ‘means less than evidence
which would justify condemnation,’ so that only the ‘probability, and not a prima
facie showing of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause.’” State v.
Gonzales, 3d Dist. Seneca Nos. 13-13-31 and 13-13-32, 2014-Ohio-557, ¶ 18,
quoting State v. George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325, 329 (1989).
In determining the sufficiency of probable cause in an affidavit
submitted in support of a search warrant, “[t]he task of the issuing
magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before
him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”
George at paragraph one of the syllabus, quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
238-239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983). Generally, “neither a trial court nor an
appellate court should substitute its judgment for that of the magistrate by
conducting a de novo determination as to whether the affidavit contains sufficient
probable cause.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus, citing Gates. “In conducting
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any after-the-fact scrutiny of an affidavit submitted in support of a search warrant,
* * * appellate courts should accord great deference to the magistrate’s
determination of probable cause, and doubtful or marginal cases in this area should
be resolved in favor of upholding the warrant.” Id., citing Gates.
{¶15} Here, the trial court first noted the presumption of validity afforded
the probable-cause affidavit supporting a tracking-device warrant. Then, the trial
court concluded that there was probable cause to issue the warrant based upon Det.
Joseph’s personal observations of Harrison alone. Specifically, Det. Joseph
observed Harrison engage in a controlled-drug buy with the CI. Further, the
probable-cause affidavit herein also identified the name of the person to be tracked
and described with particularity the property to be tracked. Moreover, the probable-
cause affidavit stated substantially the offense and the factual basis for Det. Joseph’s
belief that the tracking device would yield evidence of the offense based upon his
personal observations.
{¶16} Consequently, considering the totality of the circumstances, we
conclude that the information regarding the reliability of the CI is immaterial to the
trial court’s determination of probable cause since the trial court determined that
there was probable cause based upon Det. Joseph’s observations and not based upon
information provided by the CI.
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{¶17} Since we have concluded that the trial court did not err in its probable-
cause determination and thus issued a valid tracking-device warrant, we leave
questions of whether it implicates the exclusionary rule and whether the good-faith
exception applies for another day. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did
not err by denying Harrison’s motion to suppress.
{¶18} Therefore, Harrison’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶19} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
MILLER, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.
/jlr
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