State v. Bailey , 2023 Ohio 1594 ( 2023 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Bailey, 
    2023-Ohio-1594
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    WOOD COUNTY
    State of Ohio/City of Bowling Green               Court of Appeals No. WD-22-052
    Appellee                                  Trial Court No. 22TRC01164
    v.
    Dakotah Lee Bailey                                DECISION AND JUDGMENT
    Appellant                                 Decided: May 12, 2023
    *****
    Alyssa M. Blackburn, City of Bowling Green Prosecutor, and
    Nicholas P. Wainwright, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
    Sophia M. Eufracio, for appellant.
    *****
    SULEK, J.
    {¶ 1} Appellant, Dakotah Lee Bailey, appeals from the September 13, 2022
    judgment of the Bowling Green Municipal Court, denying his motion to vacate
    administrative license suspension (“ALS”), denying his motion to suppress evidence, and
    convicting him of operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. For the
    reasons that follow, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
    I.     Facts and Procedural History
    {¶ 2} During the early morning hours of March 18, 2022, city of Bowling Green
    Police officers effected a traffic stop of Bailey’s vehicle, which led to on-site sobriety
    testing and Bailey’s arrest. Immediately following the arrest, Bailey was taken to the
    police station, where he was asked to take a breath test. When he refused, the requesting
    officer placed him under an ALS pursuant to R.C. 4511.191(B)(1). That same day, the
    City charged Bailey with operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or
    drugs, in violation Bowling Green Ordinance § 73.01(A)(1), a first-degree misdemeanor.
    {¶ 3} Bailey filed two motions that are relevant to this appeal. First, he filed a
    Motion to Vacate ALS, arguing that there were no reasonable grounds to support the
    suspension, as he never expressly refused to take a breath test, but instead requested to
    have his attorney present. At a hearing on the motion, Bailey additionally claimed that
    the officer who requested the breath test “did not actually see [Bailey] in the car or
    driving.” After hearing the evidence and the arguments of counsel, the trial court
    concluded that Bailey failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the ALS
    was improper or unfounded, and, thus, denied Bailey’s appeal of the suspension.
    {¶ 4} On April 21, 2022, Bailey filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained as a
    result of the stop and arrest. He argued that the traffic stop, the sobriety testing, and the
    arrest were all unlawful. During the hearing on the motion, the state presented the
    2.
    testimony of Sergeant Andy Mulinix, Patrolman Caleb Kusmierek, and Patrolman Kris
    Garman.
    Sgt. Andy Mulinix
    {¶ 5} Sergeant Andy Mulinix of the city of Bowling Green Police Department
    testified that on March 18, 2022, the morning after St. Patrick’s Day, at around 2:26 a.m.,
    he observed Bailey’s vehicle commit a marked lanes violation by driving over a curb.
    Moments later, Mulinix observed Bailey’s vehicle brush the curb, at which point Mulinix
    radioed to officers who were riding in a car in front of him.
    {¶ 6} Mulinix initiated a traffic stop of Bailey’s vehicle. In response to Mulinix’s
    signal to pull over, Bailey drove up onto another curb and stopped with his front two tires
    fully on the sidewalk. Upon stopping, Bailey immediately exited the vehicle with his
    hands up. Mulinix yelled at him to get back in the vehicle. Although Bailey did not
    immediately respond to Mulinix’s orders, eventually he returned to his car.
    {¶ 7} Mulinix approached the driver’s side of the vehicle and saw beer cans, some
    of which were empty, on the passenger’s side seat and floor, together with a case of beer
    that contained several unopened cans. In addition, Mulinix noticed that Bailey was
    wearing a St. Patrick’s Day themed beaded necklace that had a “shot glass” or a “little
    mug” hanging from it. Mulinix asked Bailey if he had been drinking, and Bailey
    answered no. When Mulinix asked him why he had empty beer cans on the seat, Bailey
    answered that there were none.
    3.
    {¶ 8} Mulinix stated that he could smell alcohol and that Bailey exhibited
    bloodshot, glassy eyes, and mumbled and slurred speech. He explained that these
    physical indicators of intoxication, Bailey’s erratic driving, the presence of open
    containers in the vehicle, and Bailey’s denial about beer cans on the seat, led him to order
    Bailey out of the vehicle for field sobriety testing.
    {¶ 9} Once Bailey exited the vehicle, Mulinix stated he could smell alcohol on
    Bailey’s breath. He also noted that Bailey ignored his commands. According to Mulinix,
    Bailey’s delay in following instructions was an indication that Bailey was “probably
    under the influence of something.” Mulinix patted Bailey down, and then asked
    Patrolman Kris Garman to conduct field sobriety testing.
    Patrolman Caleb Kusmierek
    {¶ 10} Patrolman Caleb Kusmierek testified that on March 18, 2022, he and
    another officer were driving down the road at 2:26 a.m., in a marked patrol car, when
    they saw Bailey drive his vehicle off the right-hand side of the road. Kusmierek testified
    that he had been slow to activate the camera in his cruiser; however, once the camera
    turned on, it caught Bailey’s vehicle shaking as Bailey brushed the curb.
    {¶ 11} Like Mulinix, Kusmierek observed Bailey pull off to the side of the road
    and on to the sidewalk when the traffic stop was initiated. Kusmierek approached the
    vehicle and, looking in the window, observed multiple cans of beer, some of which were
    opened. When he started securing the cans, he noticed that a few still had liquid inside.
    4.
    {¶ 12} Kusmierek described Bailey’s speech—which he heard only after Bailey
    had exited the vehicle—as slow and slurred. And although he did not get close enough to
    Bailey to detect any odor or to see Bailey’s eyes, he noticed that Bailey was unsteady on
    his feet.
    Patrolman Kris Garman
    {¶ 13} Patrolman Kris Garman testified that immediately following the initial stop
    by Mulinix, he performed on-scene field sobriety testing of Bailey. This testing included
    a horizontal gaze nystagmus test (“HGN”), a “walk and turn” test, a “one-leg stand” test,
    and an alphabet test.
    {¶ 14} During his encounter with Bailey, Garman noticed that Bailey’s speech was
    “pretty consistent[ly]” slurred. He also testified that Bailey stumbled when asked to walk
    in a straight line and that he swayed back and forth when standing up.
    {¶ 15} Garman stated that Bailey exhibited six out of six clues on the HGN test.
    He further stated that Bailey failed the walk and turn test and the one-leg test, and that he
    could not successfully recite the alphabet. As a result of Bailey’s performance, Garman
    concluded that Bailey was possibly under the influence of alcohol.
    {¶ 16} Next, Garman took Bailey to the police station and requested that he take a
    breath test. Bailey refused, and Garman marked Bailey’s refusal time as 2:57 a.m.
    {¶ 17} Garman then placed Bailey under an ALS. He completed a BMV 2255
    form, on which he marked that “the driver refused to submit to tests,” and that there were
    5.
    “reasonable grounds for an arrest,” including: “Defendant was observed driving up on to
    the curb in the 200 block of Pearl Street;” “slurred speech;” “unsteady on feet;” “odor;”
    “HGN;” and “SFST’s.” Garman read the BMV 2255 form out loud to Bailey and made
    sure that he understood it.
    Trial Court’s Decision
    {¶ 18} At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court found that
    Bailey’s erratic driving at 2:30 in the morning, after St. Patrick’s Day, gave officers a
    reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of his vehicle.
    {¶ 19} Next, the trial court determined that Bailey’s actions in getting out of—and,
    eventually, back into—the vehicle, together with Mulinix’s observation of beer
    containers, the odor of alcoholic beverages, and Bailey’s slurred speech, gave officers
    reasonable, articulable suspicion to request that Bailey participate in field sobriety tests.
    {¶ 20} The court further found that the results of the field sobriety tests would lead
    a reasonable officer to believe that Bailey was impaired while he was driving his vehicle.
    {¶ 21} Based on the totality of the circumstances—including the sobriety test
    results, the fact that there were open containers in the vehicle, some of which still had
    liquid in them, and Bailey’s bloodshot, glassy eyes and slurred speech—the trial court
    concluded that there was probable cause to arrest. As a result, the trial court denied
    Bailey’s motion to suppress.
    6.
    {¶ 22} On August 1, 2022, Bailey pleaded no contest to an amended charge of
    OVI under the codified ordinances of Bowling Green, Section 73.01(A)(1). In a
    judgment entry dated September 13, 2022, the trial court accepted the plea, found Bailey
    guilty, and sentenced him as follows: (1) by imposing a $1,075.00 fine, with $475.00
    suspended; (2) by imposing a 33 day jail sentence, with 30 days suspended and with the
    three remaining days “to likely be served in a DIP;” (3) by suspending Bailey’s license
    for one year from March 18, 2022 to March 18, 2023; and (4) by placing Bailey on
    community control through August 1, 2024. It is from this decision that Bailey now
    appeals.
    II.      Assignments of Error
    {¶ 23} Appellant raises the following assignment of error on appeal:
    I. The trial court erred when it failed to grant defendant’s motion to
    suppress.
    III.    Law and Analysis
    {¶ 24} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law
    and fact.” State v. Burnside, 
    100 Ohio St.3d 152
    , 
    2003-Ohio-5372
    , 
    797 N.E.2d 71
    , ¶ 8.
    “When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact
    and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate the
    credibility of witnesses.” 
    Id.
     “Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial
    court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Id.
    7.
    “Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently determine,
    without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy the
    applicable legal standard.” Id.
    {¶ 25} Bailey’s assignment of error challenges the constitutionality of: (1) the
    initial traffic stop; (2) his continued detention for the purpose of field sobriety testing;
    and (3) his arrest. It also challenges the lawfulness of the trial court’s decision not to
    vacate Bailey’s ALS suspension.
    Sgt. Mulinix had reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop on
    Bailey’s vehicle.
    {¶ 26} Bailey maintains that the trial court erred in finding that he committed a
    marked lanes violation, because none of the officers’ dash cam videos observed the
    violations and because Officer Kusmierek testified that he did not turn on his dash cam at
    the earliest opportunity. Based on United States v. Younis, 
    890 F.Supp.2d 818
     (N.D.
    Ohio 2012), Bailey contends that the “negligence” of the officers should “weigh heavily
    against their credibility.”
    {¶ 27} In Younis, the trial court discounted officer testimony because the officer
    failed to record repeated lane violations. As previously mentioned, however, the trial
    court was in the best position to determine the officers’ credibility. This court’s role is
    not to second guess the credibility determinations of the trial court; rather, it is to
    determine whether there are sufficient facts in the record to support the trial court’s
    conclusion that officers had reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop, reasonable
    8.
    suspicion to request that Bailey participate in field sobriety tests, and probable cause to
    arrest Bailey for operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.
    {¶ 28} “[A] traffic stop is constitutionally valid if an officer has a reasonable and
    articulable suspicion that a motorist has committed a traffic violation.” State v.
    Martorana, 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-22-011, 
    2023-Ohio-662
    , ¶ 20, citing State v. Mays,
    
    119 Ohio St.3d 406
    , 
    2008-Ohio-4539
    , 
    894 N.E.2d 1204
    , ¶ 7-8.
    {¶ 29} R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) provides that “[a] vehicle * * * shall be driven, as
    nearly as is practicable, entirely within a single lane or line of traffic and shall not be
    moved from such lane or line until the driver has first ascertained that such movement
    can be made with safety.” The Supreme Court of Ohio has recognized that “[a] traffic
    stop is constitutionally valid when a law enforcement officer witnesses a motorist [drive]
    over the lane markings in violation of R.C. 4511.33, even without further evidence of
    erratic or unsafe driving.” Mays at syllabus.
    {¶ 30} In the instant case, Officers Mulinix and Kusmierek testified that they
    initially saw Bailey drive his vehicle off the side of the road and over a curb. Moments
    later – after Kusmierek activated the dashboard camera on his patrol car – the officers
    saw Bailey’s vehicle brush against a curb a second time. The dash cam video shows an
    unfocused, frontal image of Bailey’s vehicle’s headlights, as Bailey is driving toward the
    officers, who were themselves traveling toward Bailey. At one point, the headlights can
    be seen briefly shaking. Officer Kusmierek testified that it was at that point that Bailey’s
    9.
    vehicle brushed the curb. The officers’ observation of Bailey once driving up over a curb
    and then brushing the curb with his vehicle provided them with reasonable suspicion that
    Bailey violated R.C. 4511.33(A) and, therefore, provided a sufficient basis to initiate a
    traffic stop. The initial stop of Bailey’s vehicle was lawful.
    The Bowling Green police officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to request
    Bailey to submit to sobriety tests.
    {¶ 31} Next, Bailey challenges the officers’ request that he submit to field sobriety
    tests. He argues that, contrary to the trial court’s finding, the dash cam video does not
    demonstrate that he spoke in a slurred fashion. In the absence of slurred speech, Bailey
    contends the remaining evidence of impairment was insufficient to give the officers a
    reasonable, articulable suspicion to request that he submit to field sobriety tests.
    {¶ 32} “‘[A]n officer may request a motorist to perform field sobriety tests after a
    traffic stop for a minor traffic violation where the officer has articulable facts that give
    rise to a reasonable suspicion that the motorist is intoxicated.’” State v. Colby, 2021-
    Ohio-4405, 
    181 N.E.3d 610
    , ¶ 17 (6th Dist.), citing Cleveland v. Hyppolite, 2016-Ohio-
    7399, 
    76 N.E.3d 539
    , ¶ 24 (8th Dist.). Courts determining whether the officer had
    reasonable suspicion look at the totality of the circumstances, rather than at any single
    factor. Id. at ¶ 17, citing State v. Dye, 
    2021-Ohio-3513
    , 
    178 N.E.3d 584
    , ¶ 65 (6th Dist.).
    {¶ 33} The factors that may supply an officer with reasonable suspicion to conduct
    field sobriety tests include, but are not limited to:
    10.
    (1) the time of day that the stop occurred; (2) the area where the stop
    occurred; (3) whether there was erratic driving that might point to a lack of
    coordination; (4) the existence of a ‘cognizable report’ that the driver might
    be intoxicated; (5) the appearance of the suspect’s eyes; (6) impairments
    related to the individual’s speech; (7) an odor of alcohol in the car or on the
    person; (8) the strength of that odor; (9) lack of coordination after the stop;
    (10) ‘the suspect’s demeanor’; and (11) the suspect’s admission of alcohol
    consumption.
    Id. at ¶ 17, citing Dye at ¶ 65.
    {¶ 34} This court has repeatedly held that “[w]here a non-investigatory stop is
    initiated and the odor of alcohol is combined with glassy or bloodshot eyes and further
    indicia of intoxication * * * reasonable suspicion exists.” (emphasis sic.) Id., citing Dye
    at ¶ 68.
    {¶ 35} As an initial matter, a review of the dash cam video supports the trial
    court’s finding, and the officers’ testimony, that Bailey slurred his speech during the
    traffic stop. Due to the loudness of Bailey’s vehicle, little of the discussion between
    Mulinix and Bailey could be discerned; however, from what can be heard, Bailey spoke
    with a slow, lazy drawl that could reasonably be perceived as impaired speech.
    {¶ 36} In addition, the traffic stop occurred in the early morning hours following
    St. Patrick’s Day. Bailey drove his vehicle in an erratic manner by driving over a curb
    11.
    and then brushing up against it. When the officers pulled Bailey over, he immediately
    exited the car and then had difficulty following instructions to get back in it. Officer
    Mulinix observed an odor of alcohol coming from the car and from Bailey’s breath. He
    noticed opened and unopened beer cans on the passenger side of the car and next to
    Bailey. Bailey, who was wearing a St. Patrick’s Day themed necklace with a shot glass
    pendant, had glassy, bloodshot eyes and his speech was slightly slurred and lethargic.
    {¶ 37} Accordingly, under the totality of the circumstances, the officers had a
    reasonable, articulable suspicion to request that Bailey submit to field sobriety tests.
    The Bowling Green police officers had probable cause to arrest Bailey for OVI.
    {¶ 38} Bailey next argues that officers lacked probable cause to arrest him because
    he did not demonstrate any impaired motor coordination.
    {¶ 39} “‘The legal standard for determining whether the police had probable cause
    to arrest an individual for OVI is whether, at the moment of arrest, the police had
    sufficient information, derived from a reasonably trustworthy source of facts and
    circumstances, sufficient to cause a prudent person to believe that the suspect was driving
    under the influence.’” State v. Bruck, 6th Dist. Wood No WD-20-072, 
    2021-Ohio-2789
    , ¶
    23, citing State v. Groszewski, 
    183 Ohio App.3d 718
    , 
    2009-Ohio-4062
    , 
    918 N.E.2d 547
    ,
    ¶ 22 (6th Dist.). “When determining probable cause, the court must examine the totality
    of the facts and circumstances surrounding the arrest.” 
    Id.,
     citing Groszewski at ¶ 22.
    (Additional citation omitted.)
    12.
    {¶ 40} In the instant case, not only was Bailey’s late-night driving – and
    subsequent behavior upon being stopped – erratic, his eyes were glassy and bloodshot,
    his speech was slurred and lethargic, and his driving attire included a St. Patrick’s Day
    themed necklace with a shot glass pendant. The odor of alcohol emanated from both his
    truck – which contained opened and unopened beer cans that were in close proximity to
    the driver’s seat – and from his breath. Field sobriety testing revealed a score of six out
    of six indicators on the HGN test. During the walk and turn test, Bailey was unsteady.
    He stepped off of the line and did not walk heel-to-toe. And during the one-leg test,
    Bailey “put his foot down and was swaying,” and was “unable to keep his balance.”
    Finally, Bailey failed to successfully recite the alphabet. Under these facts and
    circumstances, probable cause existed to believe that Bailey was driving under the
    influence.
    {¶ 41} For all of the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not err in concluding that
    the officers had probable cause to arrest Bailey for OVI.
    The trial court did not err in refusing to vacate the ALS against Bailey
    {¶ 42} Finally, Bailey asserts that the trial court erred in its denial of his ALS
    appeal because officers lacked reasonable ground to believe that Bailey was operating a
    vehicle while under the influence. See R.C. 4511.191(D)(1). We disagree.
    {¶ 43} In his appeal, Bailey had the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the
    evidence, that officers did not have a reasonable ground to believe that he was driving
    13.
    under the influence. See Miracle v. Petit, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-19-50, 
    2020-Ohio-1567
    ,
    ¶ 10-11; R.C. 4511.197(D). “Ohio courts have consistently applied the totality-of-the-
    circumstances test to determine if there were reasonable grounds to believe that a person
    had been operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.” State v.
    McCaig, 
    51 Ohio App.3d 94
    , 94, 
    554 N.E.2d 925
     (6th Dist.1988), citing Atwell v. State,
    
    35 Ohio App.2d 221
    , 
    301 N.E.2d 709
     (8th Dist.1973).
    {¶ 44} As indicated above, under the circumstances of this case, probable cause
    existed to arrest appellant for driving under the influence. As the “probable cause”
    standard is a higher standard than the “reasonable ground” standard that is required for a
    license suspension, the “reasonable ground” standard has been met.
    IV.    Conclusion
    {¶ 45} The trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress because the
    officers had: (1) reasonable, articulable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop on Bailey’s
    vehicle; (2) reasonable, articulable suspicion to request Bailey to submit to sobriety tests;
    and (3) and probable cause to arrest Bailey for OVI. In addition, the trial court did not err
    in refusing to vacate the ALS against Bailey.
    {¶ 46} Bailey’s sole assignment of error is found not well-taken, and the judgment
    of the Bowling Green Municipal Court is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs
    of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
    Judgment affirmed.
    14.
    State of Ohio/City of Bowling Green
    v. Dakota Lee Bailey
    WD-22-052
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
    See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
    Thomas J. Osowik, J.                           ____________________________
    JUDGE
    Christine E. Mayle, J.
    ____________________________
    Charles E. Sulek, J.                                   JUDGE
    CONCUR.
    ____________________________
    JUDGE
    This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
    Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
    version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
    http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
    15.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: WD-22-052

Citation Numbers: 2023 Ohio 1594

Judges: Sulek

Filed Date: 5/12/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/12/2023