Kruthaup v. Schoen Builders, L.L.C. , 2023 Ohio 2090 ( 2023 )

[Cite as Kruthaup v. Schoen Builders, L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-2090.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
WOOD COUNTY
Joseph Kruthaup Court of Appeals No. WD-22-057
Appellant Trial Court No. 2020CV0439
v.
Schoen Builders, LLC, et al. DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellee Decided: June 23, 2023
*****
Eric W. Henry, for appellant.
Shannon J. George, for appellee..
*****
ZMUDA, J.
I. Introduction
{¶ 1} Appellant, Joseph Kruthaup, appeals the judgment of the Wood County
Court of Common Pleas, granting a motion for summary judgment filed by appellee,
Schoen Builders, LLC (“Schoen”), and thereby dismissing appellant’s negligence claims
against Schoen. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
A. Facts and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} On February 12, 2019, appellant was working with Christopher Tammarine
as a drywaller on a home that was being built in Perrysburg, Ohio (the “Fry home”). At
the time, Tammarine was hired as an independent subcontractor of Justin St. Clair, who
was himself hired as a subcontractor to hang and finish the drywall at the Fry home by
Schoen, the general contractor responsible for building the home.
{¶ 3} As appellant was carrying a sheet of drywall along a balcony walkway with
an unprotected edge on the second story of the home, he stepped off the edge, fell, and
sustained injuries. Consequently, on November 13, 2020, appellant filed a complaint,
which he amended on February 12, 2021, asserting claims of negligence and negligence
per se and seeking to recover damages from appellees, Schoen Builders, LLC, Justin St.
Clair, Christopher Tammarine, and several unknown subcontractors.1
{¶ 4} On February 12, 2021, Schoen filed its answer, in which it denied any
liability arising out of appellant’s fall at the Fry home and asserted that appellant was an
independent contractor who was responsible for compliance with all safety regulations at
the construction site. Thereafter, the matter proceeded through pretrial motion practice
1
During the pendency of the proceedings before the trial court, appellant dismissed his
claims against Tammarine and St. Clair. Additionally, the unnamed defendants were
dismissed by the trial court after it found that Schoen was entitled to summary judgment
on all claims asserted by appellant. Appellant does not challenge the dismissal of the
unnamed defendants on appeal.
2.
and discovery. During discovery, several witnesses were deposed. The following is a
summary of the testimony elicited during the depositions.
{¶ 5} Tammarine was the first witness to be deposed. At the outset of the
deposition, Tammarine testified that he is a self-employed drywaller who hangs drywall
on exposed wood framing and prepares the drywall “to allow the finishers to come in an
do their portion.” Tammarine indicated that he was regularly hired by St. Clair as an
independent contractor to perform such work. In such cases, St. Clair paid Tammarine in
cash and did not provide Tammarine with any written instructions or work orders.
Tammarine confirmed that this was the arrangement between he and St. Clair concerning
the work performed at the Fry home. Moreover, Tammarine testified that all of his
communications concerning his work were handled by St. Clair. Tammarine did not get
his work orders from Schoen, nor was he ever paid by Schoen. Nonetheless, Tammarine
was familiar with Schoen’s owner, Aaron Schoen, and Schoen’s employees, Matt and
Tom Brusoe, having previously worked on Schoen home building projects.
{¶ 6} Tammarine first met appellant in 2016 through a mutual friend. After
learning of appellant’s construction experience, Tammarine decided to utilize him to
assist with drywall hanging projects. The two began working together in 2016, and by
the time of appellant’s accident, they had worked together on between 10 and 15 jobs.
According to Tammarine, he paid appellant in cash on a daily basis.
{¶ 7} On the day of the accident, Tammarine picked appellant up from his
residence and the two men traveled together to the Fry home. This was their first day on
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the Fry home site. Upon arrival to the construction site, they hauled their tools to the
second floor of the unfinished home over the course of several trips. Tammarine testified
that Schoen did not have a supervisor on site at the Fry home on the day of the accident,
and he stated that nobody from Schoen was directing or controlling the drywall work he
and appellant were subcontracted to perform.
{¶ 8} Approximately one hour after arriving at the Fry home, Tammarine and
appellant began carrying a large sheet of drywall along a balcony on the second floor.
The balcony overlooked an open foyer and the first floor below. According to
Tammarine, there was no railing installed along the edge of the balcony facing the foyer
at the time. Tammarine stated that appellant would have had an opportunity to observe
the lack of a railing as he hauled tools into the home from Tammarine’s truck upon
arrival at the home. However, Tammarine admitted that he never noticed the lack of
railing prior to the accident.
{¶ 9} As Tammarine and appellant were carrying the sheet of drywall around a
corner toward their ultimate destination, appellant stepped off the unprotected edge and
fell to the floor below, a distance of approximately nine feet. Tammarine confirmed that
he did not witness the fall, and nobody else was present at the time to witness the fall.
When asked whether appellant fell because of the lack of a railing, Tammarine stated that
it was a combination of the lack of a railing and a “lack of paying attention on
[appellant’s] part.”
4.
{¶ 10} Tammarine was subsequently asked about whether a railing should have
been installed along the balcony at this stage in the construction process. Tammarine
responded: “I don’t know what the code standards are, to be honest with you. I just
noticed them from before hanging drywall that usually builders have them up. After he
obviously fell is when I said, ‘Huh, you know, man, I wonder – I wonder why there ain’t
a railing there.’”
{¶ 11} Following the fall, Tammarine looked around to see if a temporary railing
was lying around in the home, but never found one. He speculated that perhaps the
drywall delivery company removed such a railing when they delivered the drywall.
However, Tammarine was unaware of whether a railing was ever installed at the Fry
home prior to appellant’s fall.
{¶ 12} Tammarine confirmed that balconies such as the one off of which appellant
fell were typically guarded by a railing by this point in the construction process.
Tammarine went on to indicate that no such railing was installed at the Fry home after the
accident. Notwithstanding this fact, Tammarine stated that he completed his work at the
home without “one bit” of concern for his safety.
{¶ 13} Tammarine was unsure as to whose responsibility it was to erect such a
railing. He testified that he never raised the issue of a lack of railing along the balcony in
the Fry home with anyone at the job site, because he “didn’t think it was really an issue.”
Later, Tammarine stated that he did not ask anyone to install a railing at the Fry home.
5.
Further, he indicated that appellant never asked anyone to install a railing at the Fry home
while in his presence.
{¶ 14} Following the fall, Tammarine was hanging drywall in another home and
noticed that there was no temporary railing installed on a second-floor open area. With
appellant’s fall in mind, Tammarine asked Matt, Schoen’s project manager, to have a
railing installed. Matt agreed, and the railing was promptly installed. Tammarine
confirmed that he asked Matt to install the railing because Matt had the power to erect the
railing. When asked whether the balcony area from which appellant fell was under
Schoen’s control, Tammarine stated “that is correct.”
{¶ 15} As to the nature of Schoen’s oversight of his work, Tammarine stated that
Schoen “did not come in and tell me how to hang the drywall.” He noted that he brings
his own tools to each job and sets his own hours. As to safety on the job, Tammarine
stated that, as a drywall hanger “you’ve kind of got to know I guess your surroundings to
make sure you stay safe.”
{¶ 16} Matt Brusoe was the next witness to be deposed. He stated that he is a
project manager for Schoen and reports directly to Schoen’s owner, Aaron Schoen. Matt
and Aaron are cousins.
{¶ 17} At the time of the deposition, Matt had worked for Schoen for
approximately 15 years. Concerning his job duties, Matt testified that he oversees the
project, schedules subcontractors and material deliveries, and responds to questions and
concerns from subcontractors and homeowners. Asked how often he picks up a hammer,
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Matt responded, “very rarely. * * * I’m not like out there swinging a hammer next to the
framers, I’m not out there helping like nail drywall to the walls or anything like that.”
{¶ 18} As to Schoen’s role in the overall building process, Matt explained: “We
are essentially like a main contractor. We subcontract out like all the work for the
construction.” Matt stated that Schoen utilizes approximately 12 subcontractors during
the building process, and generally selects the same subcontractors on every building
project.
{¶ 19} Matt explained that Schoen trusts its subcontractors as experienced
professionals who know how to complete the work they are hired to do. As such,
according to Matt: “It’s not like I have to babysit them, make sure they’re going to hang
the drywall correctly or run the correct wiring or whatever it is. I know from experience
that they are doing things that they need to be doing how they need to do it.” Matt
maintained that Schoen was not the sole decisionmaker as to whether or not to put up a
guardrail along the ledge from which appellant fell. However, he later testified that
Schoen, as the general contractor, would ultimately decide whether or not to put up the
guardrail.
{¶ 20} During his deposition, Matt was asked to examine several photographs of
the home that were taken during an earlier stage of the construction process. One of the
photographs depicts the unguarded ledge off of which appellant fell. Referring to that
photograph, appellant’s trial counsel asked Matt whether the image depicted the
condition of the ledge on the day appellant fell. Matt responded in the negative, and
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indicated his belief that Schoen “would have had like a guardrail up on that right side.”
Thereafter, the following colloquy took place:
Q. Why would you believe that? Why would you need to have a guardrail
up?
A. We don’t need to. It’s more so that like – maybe like a year prior our
insulators started asking us to have them up on our job sites if we could
when they came in to start insulating. So when this picture was taken – I
take these pictures the day I do the rough structure inspection with the
inspector. And so I would have taken these pictures, then had our
inspection with the inspector, had like a laundry list of items for our
framing carpenter to take care of. When he would come back, that’s when
– if he doesn’t have a handrail on, at that point of the build, that’s when I
would also say to him to put the rails up when he’s correcting his items on
the inspection list.
Q. Okay. Having an unprotected edge like this, without a handrail, would
be a hazard, true?
A. So that’s kind of a tricky question. Yes, it could be hazardous, but the
entire job site is also a hazard in itself. It’s not like this is a house that
somebody’s living in and all of a sudden we’re cutting out their wall and
saying good luck to you. This is an evolving project that has thousands of
ways that anybody could get hurt in one of these houses if they aren’t aware
8.
of – completely 100 percent aware of their surroundings. That’s kind of
how I look at it.
***
Q. Okay. So you were at this house at least the day before February 12th, correct?
A. To the best of my knowledge, yeah.
Q. Was there a railing on the edge of this landing leading into the foyer?
A. To the best of my knowledge.
{¶ 21} Subsequently, Matt was asked for an explanation as to how appellant could
have fallen if a guardrail was installed as he suspected. Matt speculated that Tammarine
and appellant must have removed the guardrail in order to maneuver the drywall around
the corner from the walkway into an adjacent room, leaving the ledge unprotected at the
time of the fall. He explained that “whatever railing would have been there they had to
take down to do their job, [Tammarine] and [St. Clair].”
{¶ 22} According to Matt, drywallers routinely removed temporary guardrails at
Schoen’s construction sites. Matt stated: “What would happen from time to time is in
order to hang the drywall, the drywall hangers ultimately have to take the guardrail
down.” Indeed, Matt testified that drywallers removed guardrails on “every house” in
order to give them better access to complete their work.
{¶ 23} Matt further testified that he visited the construction site the day after
appellant fell, and he “vaguely remember[ed]” seeing a guardrail lying on the floor. He
insisted: “I had our carpenter put the guardrail up, so I know it was at the house.”
9.
However, Matt later acknowledged: “I can’t say 100 percent certain that I saw the railing
up there.”
{¶ 24} In addition to maintaining that a temporary guardrail was installed prior to
appellant’s fall, Matt testified that Schoen would not hesitate to install such a guardrail
when asked by its subcontractors to do so. Further, Matt indicated that “there was always
material laying around that if somebody felt that strongly about it, I would want – like I
would expect that they would either say I am not working in this house without it or I am
going to go and make one myself and charge the builder because I’m making it and I feel
I need to do this.” Ultimately, Matt explained that Schoen had its framing carpenter
install guardrails, not because they were legally required to do so, but as “a gesture
towards the subcontractors that ask for it,” and “before [Tammarine] or before the
insulators started, the railing would have been up in place.” Matt confirmed that he did
not receive any complaints from Schoen’s subcontractors regarding the lack of a
temporary guardrail along the ledge from which appellant fell prior to the fall.
{¶ 25} Aaron Schoen was the third witness to be deposed in this case. As the
owner of Schoen, Aaron’s responsibilities include monitoring the subcontractors used by
Schoen and conducting weekly visits to the homes as they are being built. During his
deposition, Aaron testified that Schoen is a custom homebuilder and functions as the
general contractor whose responsibility it is to “select the subcontractors, bid out the
house, and ultimately deliver the finished product.” He agreed that Schoen has the
authority to direct the operations of subcontractors at home construction sites, and that
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the subcontractors’ authority at the sites is limited to their particular scope of work.
Aaron further agreed that drywallers were not authorized to erect their own railing on the
ledge where appellant fell. However, he stated that unprotected edges on the second floor
of home construction sites was typical and do not require a temporary railing.
{¶ 26} Aaron recounted a conversation he had with Tammarine, during which he
asked Tammarine if he recalled whether there was a guardrail installed along the ledge
where appellant fell prior to the fall. According to Aaron, Tammarine “said he wasn’t
sure, but if there was one, he would have taken it down anyway because he would need to
in order to hang drywall.” Later in his deposition, Aaron acknowledged that he could not
recall personally seeing a temporary guardrail installed at the site prior to the fall.
{¶ 27} Justin St. Clair was the fourth witness to provide deposition testimony in
this case. Schoen routinely uses St. Clair as a drywall subcontractor on its home
construction projects. Schoen hired St. Clair to install the drywall at the Fry home. Due
to the large size of the Fry home, St. Clair hired Tammarine as a subcontractor to assist
him on the project by hanging the drywall. Once Tammarine finished hanging the
drywall, St. Clair came in to finish the project.
{¶ 28} According to St. Clair, Schoen does not provide daily oversight or direction
of his work as a drywall subcontractor. He stated that he supplies his own tools at job
sites, and he confirmed that Tammarine also supplies his own tools when working as St.
Clair’s subcontractor. St. Clair does not direct Tammarine’s work or set Tammarine’s
work schedule. In short, St. Clair agreed that he and Tammarine are responsible for the
11.
means and methods they use to accomplish their work and are responsible for their own
safety while performing that work.
{¶ 29} At his deposition, St. Clair testified that he knew appellant through
appellant’s affiliation with Tammarine. However, St. Clair stated that he has never
worked alongside appellant or paid appellant directly for any of the work appellant has
performed.
{¶ 30} Prior to beginning his drywall work on the Fry home, St. Clair conducted a
walk through of the property in order to estimate the amount of work involved. He could
not recall observing that the ledge from which appellant fell was unprotected at the time
of his walkthrough. St. Clair testified that such a condition was typical and would not
have concerned him. Referring to a temporary guardrail, St. Clair stated: “If I wanted
one, I could install one myself.” He further explained that if he wanted to have a
temporary guardrail, he “could put one up” and “wouldn’t need authority” to do so.
However, St. Clair later acknowledged that he would call Schoen and ask for permission
before installing a temporary guardrail.
{¶ 31} St. Clair confirmed that he had no discussions with anyone about the
unprotected ledge at the Fry home prior to the fall. He testified that he has never asked
Schoen to install a temporary guardrail at any construction site. He also indicated that
Tammarine has never asked him to install such a guardrail. Moreover, St. Clair indicated
that anytime he asked Schoen to do something for him, “they would get it done.”
12.
{¶ 32} St. Clair testified that “there [have] been times” when he has had to remove
temporary guardrails to allow access to the area where he needs to install drywall. St.
Clair was shown a picture of the balcony area from which appellant fell and asked
whether a temporary railing on the balcony edge would have to be removed in order to
install drywall. St. Clair responded in the affirmative.
{¶ 33} In addition to the foregoing witnesses, appellant was also deposed in this
case. According to appellant, he first began working in the construction industry in 1998.
For the first 12 years of his construction career, appellant worked for his uncle as a
framing carpenter. In addition to framing, appellant has also performed construction
work as a roofer and has installed vinyl siding on homes.
{¶ 34} As a framer, appellant installed temporary guardrails on two-story homes.
He testified that “[i]t was kind of a – I can’t recall exactly who directed me. That’s what
we did as soon as we got to that level. * * * It’s just a common practice.”
{¶ 35} In February 2018, appellant began working exclusively with Tammarine.
The parties have never had a written agreement governing their relationship, and
appellant did not fill out an employment application prior to working with Tammarine.
Further, appellant testified that he was free to turn down any work Tammarine offered
him. Tammarine paid appellant in cash. Notwithstanding the flexibility of this
arrangement, appellant believed that he was Tammarine’s employee, not an independent
contractor.
13.
{¶ 36} When he first began working with Tammarine, appellant had a
conversation with Tammarine about work safety. Appellant testified that he discussed
fall protection during this conversation. When asked what that conversation entailed,
appellant responded: “Again, the same stuff that you always say. Just be aware of your
surroundings. Nothing worth getting hurt for. So if you don’t feel safe doing something,
don’t do it and find a safer way.”
{¶ 37} As to the arrangement among the various parties working on the Fry home,
appellant understood Schoen hired St. Clair to install the drywall. Thereafter, St. Clair
hired Tammarine to hang the drywall in preparation for St. Clair to finish the drywall,
and Tammerine hired appellant to assist in the hanging of the drywall.
{¶ 38} On the day of the fall, appellant arrived at the Fry home expecting to hang
drywall on all of the ceilings. He and Tammarine began by taking their tools to the
second floor of the home, which required “five or six” trips to and from their vehicle.
Appellant could not recall whether he observed the open balcony during these trips, but
he stated that he “never walked by that exact area until my fall. I came up the stairs into
the elevated room and back down.”
{¶ 39} Upon retrieval of the tools, appellant and Tammarine began to transport the
sheets of drywall to their intended locations on the second floor of the Fry home. As they
were doing so, appellant fell off the open balcony, which he stated he could not see
because the drywall was impeding his vision as he was carrying it. Appellant
acknowledged that there were no representatives from Schoen at the Fry home directing
14.
his work at the time of his fall. Instead, appellant testified that Tammarine was the one
directing his work.
{¶ 40} Appellant explained the events leading up to his fall as follows:
So when we’re walking, * * * [Tammarine] has to kind of turn to the left so
that we can swing [the drywall sheet] around to try to get it up into the
bonus room. So as [Tammarine] was turning to the left, * * * pressed up
against that right hand wall, the hallway, with drywall against this wall and
me on the inside and turning, trying to turn around the corner. So that
when my end of the drywall cleared the corner, since we were turning to
that left, as soon as we cleared the corner, the drywall kind of sprang on us
because we were turning the corner and pulled me right off. There would
normally be a temporary 2-by-4 right there. For open banisters, there’s
always temporary – there’s temporary stuff to board that off.
{¶ 41} Near the end of his deposition, appellant was asked whether anyone at the
Fry home told him that he could not install a temporary guardrail on the open balcony
from which he fell. Appellant responded in the negative. Further, appellant
acknowledged that Schoen did not direct his work on the day of the fall.
{¶ 42} After the foregoing witnesses were deposed and discovery concluded, on
May 31, 2022, Schoen filed a motion for summary judgment. In its motion, Schoen
argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on appellant’s claims, because appellant
was an independent contractor and thus it owed no duty to appellant to maintain a safe
15.
workplace since it did not actively participate in appellant’s drywalling activities.
Further, Schoen argued that the unprotected ledge on the balcony was an open and
obvious danger, obviating any duty it may otherwise have owed appellant. Finally,
Schoen contended that the OSHA regulations upon which appellant’s negligence per se
claim was based are inapplicable, because appellant was an independent contractor, not
Schoen’s employee.
{¶ 43} On June 28, 2022, appellant filed his memorandum in opposition to
Schoen’s motion for summary judgment. In his memorandum, appellant asserted that
neither he nor Tammarine noticed the missing guardrail on the balcony, but even if they
did, “they would not have had the authority to do anything about it.” Appellant argued
that Schoen had exclusive control over the premises and sole authority to erect or remove
a safety guardrail at the Fry home. Therefore, appellant argued that Schoen actively
participated in his drywalling work and owed him a duty of care to ensure that the site
was safe, which it breached by failing to install a safety guardrail along the edge of the
balcony. Moreover, appellant contended that the open and obvious doctrine was
unavailable to Schoen because Schoen did not own or occupy the Fry home and attendant
circumstances prevented him from observing the unprotecting edge prior to the fall.
{¶ 44} In support of his memorandum in opposition to Schoen’s motion for
summary judgment, appellant attached an affidavit from Jon Pina, an expert in
construction practices and industry standards. In the affidavit and expert report
incorporated therein by reference, Pina stated that residential construction standards and
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OSHA regulations require a temporary guardrail of at least 39 inches in height over a
second story unprotected ledge with a fall hazard of six feet or greater. Based upon his
review of the deposition testimony produced by the parties during discovery, Pina opined
that Schoen “maintained control over the unguarded floor opening and was the only
entity with the authority to install temporary railing or otherwise correct the unguarded
ledge.” Thus, Pina found that Schoen “had a duty to install a temporary railing on the
unguarded ledge and breached that duty by failing to do so.”
{¶ 45} On July 13, 2022, Schoen filed its reply in support of its motion for
summary judgment, reiterating its argument that it did not actively participate in
appellant’s drywalling work, did not violate OSHA regulations, and was entitled to rely
upon the open and obvious as a residential builder of a home still under construction, and
thus “occupied” by the builder.
{¶ 46} Upon consideration of the parties’ arguments, the trial court issued its
decision on Schoen’s motion for summary judgment on August 25, 2022. In its decision,
the trial court found no evidence to support appellant’s negligence per se claim after
concluding that OSHA regulations do not create a duty owed to appellant which could
give rise to a civil action and noting that appellant failed to articulate any other statutory
basis for negligence per se in this case.
{¶ 47} The court also determined that appellant’s negligence claim against Schoen
failed as a matter of law because Schoen did not owe appellant any duty to ensure a safe
workplace. The court recognized that appellant was hired as an independent contractor to
17.
perform inherently dangerous work and found that Schoen did not actively participate,
other than in a supervisory role, in appellant’s drywalling work. Finding that Schoen was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on appellant’s claims for negligence per se and
negligence, the trial court granted Schoen’s motion for summary judgment and entered
judgment in Schoen’s favor.
{¶ 48} Thereafter, on September 12, 2022, appellant filed his timely notice of
appeal.
B. Assignment of Error
{¶ 49} On appeal, appellant assigns the following error for our review:
The Trial Court erred in granting Summary Judgment for
Defendants/Appellees.
{¶ 50} While appellant’s assignment of error is framed as a challenge to the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment to “Defendants/Appellees,” the arguments he raises
in his brief are directed exclusively at the trial court’s judgment in favor of Schoen.
Therefore, our analysis in this appeal will be limited to whether the trial court properly
granted summary judgment to Schoen.
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II. Analysis
{¶ 51} In his sole assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in
granting Schoen’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing his negligence claim
against Schoen.2
A. Standard of Review
{¶ 52} We review the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo,
applying the same standard as the trial court. Lorain Natl. Bank v. Saratoga Apts., 61
Ohio App.3d 127, 129, 572 N.E.2d 198 (9th Dist.1989); Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77
Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). Under Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is
appropriate where (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact exists; (2) the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one
conclusion, and viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that
conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party. Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co.,
54 Ohio St.2d 64, 66, 375 N.E.2d 46 (1978).
B. Relevant Law
{¶ 53} In order to prove Schoen’s negligence, appellant must show: (1) the
existence of a legal duty, (2) Schoen’s breach of that duty, and (3) injury that is the
proximate cause of Schoen’s breach. Wallace v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 96 Ohio St.3d
2Appellant does not challenge the trial court’s dismissal of his claim for negligence per
se. Therefore, we will not address that claim.
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266, 2002-Ohio-4210, 773 N.E.2d 1018, ¶ 22, citing Mussivand v. David, 45 Ohio St.3d
314, 318, 544 N.E.2d 265 (1989).
{¶ 54} The primary issue in this appeal is whether Schoen had a legal duty to
install a temporary guardrail on the second story balcony area of the Fry home in order to
protect subcontractors like appellant from fall hazards. Since Schoen was the moving
party, we must determine whether the evidence in the record, when viewed in a light
most favorable to appellant, establishes that Schoen lacked any such duty toward
appellant. For the following reasons, we hold that it does not, and thus find that the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment to Schoen in this case.
{¶ 55} “Duty, as used in Ohio tort law, refers to the relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant from which arises an obligation on the part of the defendant to
exercise due care toward the plaintiff.” Commerce & Industry Ins. Co., 45 Ohio St.3d 96,
98, 543 N.E.2d 1188 (1989). “[T]he existence of a duty depends upon the foreseeability
of harm: if a reasonably prudent person would have anticipated that an injury was likely
to result from a particular act, the court could find that the duty element of negligence is
satisfied.” Wallace at ¶ 23.
{¶ 56} The relationship between Schoen and appellant is one of a general
contractor to subcontractor or employee of a subcontractor.3 Ordinarily, Ohio law
3
During his deposition, appellant testified that he considered himself to be Tammarine’s
employee. However, Tammarine insisted that appellant was himself a subcontractor.
The same legal principles will apply irrespective of appellant’s status as Tammarine’s
20.
imposes no duty upon a general contractor to render a workplace safe for its
subcontractors who are engaged in inherently dangerous work. Rembowski v.
Rudolph/Libbe Inc., 2020-Ohio-2864, 154 N.E.3d 564, ¶ 22 (6th Dist.), citing Morris v.
Collier Construction, 5th Dist. Stark No. 218CA00167, 2019-Ohio-3946, ¶ 14, and Frost
v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 138 Ohio App.3d 182, 190, 740 N.E.2d 734 (4th
Dist.2000). “A construction site is an inherently dangerous place and a subcontractor
who works at a construction site engages in inherently dangerous work.” Id. at ¶ 23,
citing Michaels v. Ford Motor Co., 72 Ohio St.3d 475, 478, 650 N.E.2d 1352 (1995), fn.
4.
{¶ 57} However, the general rule articulated above is not absolute. Indeed, the
Ohio Supreme Court articulated an exception to the general rule 40 years ago when it
stated:
One who engages the services of an independent contractor, and who
actually participates in the job operation performed by such contractor and
thereby fails to eliminate a hazard which he, in the exercise of ordinary
care, could have eliminated, can be held responsible for the injury or death
of an employee of the independent contractor.
employee or independent subcontractor. Therefore, we need not decide this dispute in
order to resolve the issue before us.
21.
Hirschbach v. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co., 6 Ohio St.3d 206, 452 N.E.2d 326 (1983),
syllabus.
{¶ 58} The Ohio Supreme Court has refined this exception on several occasions
since Hirschbach was decided. First, the court limited the exception in Cafferkey v.
Turner Const. Co., 21 Ohio St.3d 110, 488 N.E.2d 189 (1986), as follows: “A general
contractor who has not actively participated in the subcontractor’s work, does not, merely
by virtue of its supervisory capacity, owe a duty of care to employees of the
subcontractor who are injured while engaged in inherently dangerous work.” (Emphasis
added). Id. at 113.4 Second, the court expressly defined the phrase “actively
participated” in a decision it issued nine years after Cafferkey, and stated: “Accordingly,
we hold that for purposes of establishing liability to the injured employee of an
independent subcontractor, ‘actively participated’ means that the general contractor
directed the activity which resulted in the injury and/or gave or denied permission for the
critical acts that led to the employee’s injury.” Bond v. Howard Corp., 72 Ohio St.3d
332, 337, 650 N.E.2d 416 (1995). The “entire point of the Bond decision was to refine
[the court’s] holding in Cafferkey and to cut a definitive line between those situations in
which a general contractor can be said to have ‘actively participated’ in the work of an
4
The cases following Cafferkey use the terms “actively participated” and “actually
participates” interchangeably and synonymously. The Ohio Supreme Court has not
attempted to distinguish these terms. For the sake of consistency, we will utilize the
phrase “actively participated” and its variants throughout this decision.
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independent subcontractor, and those situations in which a general contractor merely
exercises a general supervisory role over the construction project.” Sopkovich v. Ohio
Edison Co., 81 Ohio St.3d 628, 640, 693 N.E.2d 233 (1998).
{¶ 59} Third, the court created another means for relief under its active
participation exception when it issued its decision in Sopkovich three years after Bond
was decided. There, the court stated that active participation will be found “where a
property owner either directs or exercises control over the work activities of the
independent contractor’s employees, or where the owner retains or exercises control over
a critical variable in the workplace.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 643.
{¶ 60} Since Edison was both the defendant and the property owner in Sopkovich,
the language employed in that decision was limited to “property owners.” Nonetheless,
“the Ohio Supreme Court has previously held that the same legal test may be used for
general contractors as for property owners when determining whether the entity owes a
duty.” Paul v. Grae-Con Const., Inc., 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 97 JE 49, 1999 WL
689246, *4 (Sep. 2, 1999), citing Michaels v. Ford Motor Co., 72 Ohio St.3d 475, 478,
650 N.E.2d 1352 (1995). Indeed, most courts, including this court, have applied
Sopkovich to both property owners and general contractors. See Rembowski v.
Rudolph/Libbe Inc., 2020-Ohio-2864, 154 N.E.3d 564 (6th Dist.) (applying the critical
variable language from Sopkovich to a claim brought by an ironworker against a general
contractor); Morris v. Collier Construction, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2018CA00167, 2019-
Ohio-3946 (finding no evidence that the general contractor exercised control over a
23.
critical aspect of the working environment); but see Pinkerton v. J & H Reinforcing, 4th
Dist., Scioto Nos. 10CA3386, 10CA3388, 2012-Ohio-1606, ¶ 35 (“In fact, throughout
Sopkovich, the Supreme Court of Ohio expressly limited its holding to property
owners.”). The parties do not dispute that Sopkovich applies to this case, and we will
proceed accordingly.
{¶ 61} In sum, the foregoing case law establishes that a general contractor like
Schoen has no duty to render the workplace safe for its independent subcontractor who is
engaged in inherently dangerous work unless it actively participates in, rather than
merely supervises, the subcontractor’s work. Such active participation will be found
where the general contractor either (1) directed the activity which resulted in the injury
and/or gave or denied permission for the critical acts that led to the employee’s injury, or
(2) retains or exercises control over a critical variable in the workplace. Clark v. Ohio
Dept. of Transp., 163 Ohio St.3d 1443, 2021-Ohio-1925, 168 N.E.3d 1204, ¶ 9.
C. Legal Analysis
{¶ 62} At the outset of our analysis, we note that there is no evidence that Schoen
directed appellant’s activity or gave or denied permission for the installation of a
temporary guardrail at the Fry home. During his deposition, appellant acknowledged that
Schoen did not direct his work on the day of the fall. Indeed, the undisputed testimony
provided by appellant and Tammarine establish that the two men arrived at the Fry home,
unloaded their tools, and began their work without the presence of any Schoen
employees. Appellant’s work was entirely self-directed. Further, appellant conceded that
24.
he was never told by a Schoen employee that he could not install a temporary guardrail
on the open balcony from which he fell. Indeed, the record is devoid of any evidence that
Schoen’s employees ever had any contact with appellant at the Fry home prior to his fall.
{¶ 63} Furthermore, there is no evidence that Schoen directed appellant’s
drywalling work or gave or denied permission for the installation of a temporary
guardrail at the Fry home. Thus, Schoen may only be found to have actively participated
in appellant’s work, thereby triggering a duty, if it retained or exercised control over a
critical variable in the workplace.
{¶ 64} Appellant, in his brief to this court, focuses his argument on the critical
variable prong of the active participation exception, and argues that Schoen actively
participated in his work by exclusively controlling a critical variable in the working
environment at the Fry home, namely the installation of guardrails. Appellant reasons
that Schoen had a duty to render the Fry home site safe by installing a temporary
guardrail on the open balcony area from which he fell. Schoen does not dispute that the
installation of guardrails was a critical variable at the Fry home. However, Schoen
argues that it owes no duty to appellant because it did not exclusively control that
variable.5
5
Despite the fact that appellant does not claim in his brief that Schoen actively
participated in this case by directing his work activities, Schoen raises this argument in its
brief. Having already determined that there is no evidence that Schoen directed
appellant’s work at the Fry home, we need not address that issue further.
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{¶ 65} In support of his argument, appellant primarily relies upon Sopkovich, but
also cites Cefaratti v. Mason Structural Steel Co., 136 Ohio App.3d 363, 736 N.E.2d 913(8th Dist.1999), and Bacha v. Sam Pitzulo Homes & Remodeling, LLC, 7th Dist.
Mahoning No. 17 MA 0097, 2019-Ohio-878.
{¶ 66} In Sopkovich, Ohio Edison Company hired an independent contractor,
Morakis Sons Industrial Painting Company, Inc., to paint steel structures at Edison’s
Masury, Ohio high voltage electric transmission substation. It was not feasible for
Edison to shut off the entire flow of electricity at the substation while the painting was
underway, so Edison had to de-energize certain areas within the substation to allow those
areas to be safely painted. Consequently, an Edison employee informed a Morakis
representative each day which areas were energized and which were not. The Morakis
representative then passed along the information to Morakis employees who were
painting at the facility. Notably, only Edison had control over the activation and
deactivation of electrical circuits that was necessary in order to de-energize portions of
the substation.
{¶ 67} While painting at the substation, one of Morakis’s employees, Michael
Lexie, came into contact with an energized area and sustained severe injuries.
Consequently, Lexie filed a complaint against Edison, alleging negligence on the part of
Edison for “failing to (1) provide a safe place of employment, (2) eliminate known
hazards, (3) ‘adequately supervise the work activities,’ (4) install proper safety devices,
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and (5) de-energize the electrical lines involved in the accident.” Sopkovich at 631. The
trial court granted summary judgment in Edison’s favor and Lexie appealed.
{¶ 68} The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that Edison did not direct or
control the activities of Morakis’s painting crew, but found that Edison did control the
deactivation of specific electrical lines in the substation, thereby making Lexie’s safety
dependent upon Edison’s proper handling of its deactivation responsibilities and
communication thereof. Therefore, the court of appeals found that a genuine issue of
material fact existed as to whether Edison created a duty of care by retaining and exerting
control over a critical aspect of Lexie’s working environment.
{¶ 69} After reviewing its prior decisions involving the duties and responsibilities
owed by one who hires an independent contractor to perform inherently dangerous work,
the court held that “active participation giving rise to a duty of care may be found to exist
where a property owner either directs or exercises control over the work activities of the
independent contractor’s employees, or where the owner retains or exercises control over
a critical variable in the workplace.” Sopkovich at 635. The court applied this standard
and found that Edison did not direct or control Lexie’s work activities, but did retain
exclusive control over a critical variable, namely the de-activation of specific electrical
conductors in the work area. Id. at 643.
{¶ 70} One year after Sopkovich was decided, the Eighth District Court of Appeals
issued its decision in Cefaratti. There, an employee of a plumbing subcontractor,
American Piping, was injured when he fell in an open stairwell. The employee
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commenced a negligence action against the general contractor of the construction site,
which had originally installed a guardrail on the stairway but later removed it.
{¶ 71} On review of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the
general contractor, the Eighth District reviewed Sopkovich and distinguished “work-
activities cases” like Cafferkey and Bond from “work environment [cases]” like
Sopkovich. Cefaratti, 136 Ohio App.3d at 366, 736 N.E.2d 913. The court found that the
general contractor did not actively participate in the employee’s work activities, but that
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the general contractor was
responsible for the absence of the guardrail and whether the absence of the guardrail
constituted a critical variable in the workplace. Id. The court noted the existence of
record evidence suggesting that the general contractor retained control over the staircase
and that this was a critical variable in the workplace. Id. Accordingly, the court reversed
the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the general contractor. Id.{¶ 72} In 2019, the Seventh District issued its decision in Bacha. In that case, an
electrical subcontractor’s employee was injured at a home remodel site after falling
through an opening in the floor after the general contractors’ employees removed
floorboards in the area in which the employee was working. The subcontractor brought
suit against the general contractors, alleging claims of negligence and negligence per se.
{¶ 73} Following discovery, the general contractors moved for summary
judgment, arguing they had no duty to protect the subcontractor’s employee from hazards
that are inherently present in construction work. The trial court granted the general
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contractor’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the general contractors did not
direct or control the subcontractor’s employee or participate in the employee’s work on
the date of his injury.
{¶ 74} On appeal, the Seventh District determined that the general contractors’
removal of the floorboards constituted a critical variable that gave rise to a duty on the
part of the general contractors. Bacha, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 17 MA 0097, 2019-Ohio-
878, at ¶ 30. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded
the matter for further proceedings. Id. at ¶ 44.
{¶ 75} Application of Sopkovich, Cefaratti, and Bacha leads us to conclude that
summary judgment in Schoen’s favor was improper in this case. We begin our analysis
by recognizing the distinction observed by the court in Cefaratti between work
environment cases and work-activities cases. Since the issue in this case concerns the
installation of a safety guardrail at the Fry home site, this is a work environment case, not
a work-activities case. With that frame in mind, we turn to the application of the case
authority bearing upon our analysis.
{¶ 76} Cefaratii supports appellant’s claim, which Schoen does not contest, that
the installation of a temporary guardrail is a critical variable. Further, all three cases
establish that duty arising out of an owner’s or general contractor’s active participation
hinges upon whether the owner/contractor exercised control over the critical variable in
the workplace. See also Strother v. Frank Novak & Sons, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos.
76306, 76385, 2000 WL 1036236, *4 (Jul. 27, 2000), citing Cefaratti (“In these worksite
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injury cases involving independent contractors, the issue is who controls the danger or
who controls the safety procedures at the project.”). In each of these cases, such control
was obvious. In Sopkovich, Edison was clearly in exclusive control of the flow of
electricity at its substation. In Cefaratti and Bocha, the contractors were actively
involved in removing guardrails and floorboards, respectively. The present case is more
difficult because there is no evidence that Schoen removed a temporary guardrail that it
had previously installed. Nonetheless, there is some evidence that Schoen exercised
exclusive control over the critical variable of installing guardrails at the Fry home, and
also evidence that Tammarine and appellant could install and remove their own
temporary guardrails to protect themselves while they worked. Indeed, there is some
evidence in the record to support the notion that a temporary railing was already in place
when appellant arrived at the Fry home, and appellant and/or Tammarine removed it in
order to complete their work.
{¶ 77} Admittedly, the record contains conflicting evidence on this issue. At
times, the deposition witnesses testified as if Schoen exercised no authority over the
workplace and appellant could have constructed a temporary guardrail without asking for
Schoen’s permission. For example, Matt testified that Schoen’s role in the construction
process merely involved overseeing the project, scheduling subcontractors and material
deliveries, and responding to questions and concerns from subcontractors and
homeowners. According to St. Clair, Schoen did not oversee or direct his work as a
drywaller. He agreed that drywallers subcontracted by Schoen are responsible for the
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means and methods they use to accomplish their work and are responsible for their own
safety while performing that work. Indeed, St. Clair testified that “there [have] been
times” when he has had to remove temporary guardrails and, when shown a picture of the
balcony area from which appellant fell, he agreed that a temporary railing on the balcony
edge would have to be removed in order to install drywall. Further, Tammarine testified
that Schoen did not always have a supervisor onsite at the Fry home, and no Schoen
employee was at the site at the time of appellant’s fall.
{¶ 78} Matt maintained that Schoen was not the sole decisionmaker as to whether
or not to put up a guardrail along the ledge from which appellant fell. Matt also testified
that drywallers have the authority to remove temporary guardrails if necessary to
complete their work at Schoen’s constructions sites. Matt stated that such removal was
common, even going so far as to state that drywallers had to remove guardrails at every
home construction site. Matt further testified that subcontractors routinely had extra
building material lying around the construction site and could construct a guardrail
themselves, and then charge Schoen for the work, if they felt as though a guardrail was
necessary to ensure their safety. Similarly, St. Clair stated: “If I wanted [a temporary
guardrail], I could install one myself.” He further explained that if he wanted to have a
temporary guardrail, he “could put one up” and “wouldn’t need authority” to do so.
{¶ 79} The foregoing testimony, taken together, supports the idea that Schoen
merely supervised the Fry home construction project, and did not control the workplace
or the installation of guardrails therein, thereby distinguishing this case from Sopkovich,
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Cefaratti, and Bacha. However, deposition testimony from Aaron and Matt strongly
suggest that Schoen actively controlled the workplace and had the sole authority to
determine whether to construct a temporary safety guardrail. This testimony suggests
that Schoen actively exercised exclusive control over the installation of guardrails.
{¶ 80} Aaron testified that Schoen had the authority to direct the operations of the
subcontractors at the Fry home, and that drywallers were not authorized to erect their
own railing on the ledge where appellant fell. Although Tammarine could not identify
whose responsibility it was to erect a temporary guardrail at the Fry home, he stated that
the balcony area from which appellant fell was under Schoen’s control. Moreover, Matt
testified that Schoen, as the general contractor, would ultimately decide whether or not to
put up a guardrail. He further testified that Schoen had its framing carpenter install such
guardrails at every home construction site as a routine practice. Matt was so certain that
this practice was followed at the Fry home that he maintained that appellant’s fall could
only be explained if appellant and Tammarine removed the temporary guardrail before
beginning their drywalling work. St. Clair, despite initially stating that he could install
his own temporary guardrail whenever he felt he needed one, later acknowledged that he
would call Schoen and ask for permission before installing a temporary guardrail.
{¶ 81} Taken together and construed in a light most favorable to appellant, the
foregoing conflicting testimony manifests questions of material fact as to whether Schoen
actively participated in this case by exercising exclusive control over a critical variable in
the Fry home workplace, thereby giving rise to a duty owed by Schoen to appellant under
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Sopkovich. Consequently, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Schoen
on appellant’s negligence claim.
{¶ 82} Accordingly, we find appellant’s sole assignment of error well-taken.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 83} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Wood County Court of
Common Pleas is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this decision. Schoen is ordered to pay the costs of this
appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment reversed
And remanded.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Thomas J. Osowik, J. ____________________________
JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, J.
____________________________
Myron C. Duhart, P.J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
____________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
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