State v. Wood , 2023 Ohio 2045 ( 2023 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Wood, 
    2023-Ohio-2045
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    STARK COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO                                 JUDGES:
    Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
    Plaintiff-Appellee                    Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
    Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
    -vs-
    Case No. 2022CA00144
    CHRISTOPHER WOOD
    Defendant-Appellant                   OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS:                     Appeal from the Stark County Court of
    Common Pleas, Case No. 2022-CR-0246
    JUDGMENT:                                     Affirmed
    DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                       June 21, 2023
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee                        For Defendant-Appellant
    KYLE L. STONE                                 D. COLEMAN BOND
    Prosecuting Attorney                          116 Cleveland Avenue, N.W.
    Stark County, Ohio                            Suite #600
    Canton, Ohio 44702
    CHRISTOPHER A. PIEKARSKI
    Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
    Appellate Division
    110 Central Plaza, South
    Suite #510
    Canton, Ohio 44702-1413
    Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00144                                                         2
    Hoffman, J.
    {¶1}      Defendant-appellant Christopher Wood appeals the judgment entered by
    the Stark County Common Pleas Court convicting him following his pleas of no contest
    to rape (R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b)(B)) and gross sexual imposition (R.C. 2907.05(A)(4)), and
    sentencing him to an aggregate term of ten years to life in prison. Plaintiff-appellee is the
    state of Ohio.
    STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
    {¶2}      In early 2022, Massillon police were investigating allegations Appellant had
    engaged in sexual activity with his niece when she was seven or eight years old. One of
    the allegations involved Appellant engaging in anal intercourse with her when they were
    sleeping next to each other on the floor of her grandmother’s house. A second allegation
    involved Appellant touching the child’s vaginal area and digitally penetrating her with his
    fingers.
    {¶3}      On January 21, 2022, Appellant voluntarily came to the Massillon Police
    Department for an interview with Detective David McConnell. Prior to speaking with
    Appellant, Det. McConnell informed Appellant he was free to leave at any time. The
    detective told Appellant the door to the room was closed, but unlocked.
    {¶4}      The interview lasted approximately thirty minutes. Det. McConnell noted no
    signs Appellant might be intoxicated during the interview. Although the detective did not
    specifically ask about drug or alcohol use, Appellant explained during the interview he
    had used drugs in the past, specifically during the time the incidents occurred with his
    niece, but had “gotten clean” since that time. Appellant made incriminating statements to
    Detective McConnell concerning the allegations of sexual abuse of his niece.
    Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00144                                                        3
    {¶5}   Appellant was indicted by the Stark County Grand Jury with two counts of
    rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b)(B).        Appellant moved to suppress the
    statements he made to Det. McConnell on the basis the statements were involuntary
    because he used drugs on the day of the interview.
    {¶6}   The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress. The
    parties submitted a video recording of the interview to the trial court for review. Det.
    McConnell testified he observed no signs of intoxication in Appellant during the interview.
    Appellant testified he used opiates on a daily basis for four to five years. He testified on
    the morning of the interview, he had crushed Vicodin pills and snorted them. Appellant
    testified he was not coherent during the interview. Appellant testified “in his mind” he saw
    the detective leaning forward and pointing a finger at him, and Appellant testified he felt
    threatened. Supp. Tr. 33-34. However, Appellant admitted the video did not support this
    testimony concerning the detective’s conduct during the interview. Appellant testified his
    drug use caused him to be overemotional during the interview, and rendered him unable
    to hear or understand the questions. He testified he could not focus, as evidenced by the
    fact he kept his head down during the interview.
    {¶7}   Appellant sought to call his brother to the stand, who had watched the video
    at Appellant’s attorney’s office, and in counsel’s understanding would testify as to whether
    or not Appellant was intoxicated by drug use during the interview. The trial court did not
    allow Appellant to call his brother to testify.
    {¶8}   Following the hearing, the trial court found Appellant was not intoxicated by
    drug use during the interview, and overruled the motion to suppress. The State amended
    one charge of rape to gross sexual imposition. As to the second charge of rape, the State
    Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00144                                                        4
    amended the charge to remove the special finding the victim was under the age of ten,
    while maintaining the statutory language the victim was under the age of thirteen.
    Appellant pled no contest to the charges as amended, and was convicted. The trial court
    sentenced Appellant to ten years to life incarceration for rape and to five years
    incarceration for gross sexual imposition, to be served concurrently. It is from the October
    12, 2022 judgment of the trial court Appellant prosecutes his appeal, assigning as error:
    I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT’S
    MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
    II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY EXCLUDING
    THE TESTIMONY OF DAVID BATTLES DURING THE SUPPRESSION
    HEARING.
    I.
    {¶9}   In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in
    denying his motion to suppress because (a) Miranda warnings were not given, and (b)
    his statement was not voluntary because he was under the influence of drugs at the time
    of the interview.
    {¶10} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law
    and fact. State v. Burnside, 
    100 Ohio St.3d 152
    , 154-155, 
    2003-Ohio-5372
    , 
    797 N.E.2d 71
    , ¶ 8. When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of
    fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate witness
    credibility. See State v. Dunlap, 
    73 Ohio St.3d 308
    ,314, 
    1995-Ohio-243
    , 
    652 N.E.2d 988
    ;
    Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00144                                                         5
    State v. Fanning, 
    1 Ohio St.3d 19
    , 20, 
    437 N.E.2d 583
     (1982). Accordingly, a reviewing
    court must defer to the trial court's factual findings if competent, credible evidence exists
    to support those findings. See Burnside, supra; Dunlap, supra; State v. Long, 
    127 Ohio App.3d 328
    , 332, 
    713 N.E.2d 1
    (4th Dist. 1998); State v. Medcalf, 
    111 Ohio App.3d 142
    ,
    
    675 N.E.2d 1268
     (4th Dist. 1996). However, once this Court has accepted those facts as
    true, it must independently determine as a matter of law whether the trial court met the
    applicable legal standard. See Burnside, supra, citing State v. McNamara, 
    124 Ohio App.3d 706
    , 
    707 N.E.2d 539
    (4th Dist. 1997); See, generally, United States v. Arvizu, 
    534 U.S. 266
    , 
    122 S.Ct. 744
    , 
    151 L.Ed.2d 740
    (2002); Ornelas v. United States, 
    517 U.S. 690
    ,
    
    116 S.Ct. 1657
    , 
    134 L.Ed.2d 911
    (1996). That is, the application of the law to the trial
    court's findings of fact is subject to a de novo standard of review. Ornelas, 
    supra.
    Moreover, due weight should be given “to inferences drawn from those facts by resident
    judges and local law enforcement officers.” Ornelas, 
    supra at 698
    , 
    116 S.Ct. at 1663
    .
    {¶11} Appellant first argues the trial court erred in finding Miranda warnings were
    not required. Appellant’s motion to suppress did not raise this issue, nor did he argue at
    the suppression hearing Miranda warnings were required. Throughout the suppression
    hearing, Appellant argued only that his statement was involuntary because it was made
    while he was under the influence of drugs.
    {¶12} A criminal defendant is required to raise a Miranda violation in a pretrial
    motion to suppress or the issue is waived. State v. Montalvo, 5th Dist. Knox No. 17 CA
    000019, 
    2018-Ohio-3142
    , ¶37, citing State v. Moody, 
    55 Ohio St.2d 64
    , 66 (1978). The
    issue of whether a confession is voluntary and whether a suspect has been subject to
    custodial interrogation so as to require Miranda warnings are analytically separate issues.
    Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00144                                                          6
    See., e.g. State v. Fowler, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2016AP040024, 
    2016-Ohio-5940
    ,
    ¶29.
    {¶13} Crim. R. 47 requires all written motions to “state with particularity the
    grounds upon which it is made.” “By requiring the defendant to state with particularity the
    legal and factual issues to be resolved, the prosecutor and court are placed on notice of
    those issues to be heard and decided by the court and, by omission, those issues which
    are otherwise being waived.” State v. Shindler, 
    70 Ohio St.3d 54
    , 58, 
    636 N.E.2d 319
    ,
    322 (1994).
    {¶14} The trial court sua sponte found Miranda warnings were not required
    because Appellant was not subjected to a custodial interrogation However, because
    Appellant failed to raise the issue in the trial court, the State was not placed on notice the
    failure to give Appellant Miranda warnings was an issue at the suppression hearing, and
    accordingly the State was not required to bring forth evidence demonstrating the interview
    was noncustodial in nature and Miranda warnings were not required. Despite the trial
    court’s consideration of the issue, we find Appellant has waived any claim of a Miranda
    violation by his failure to raise the issue in the trial court.
    {¶15} Appellant next argues the trial court erred in finding his statement was
    voluntary, maintaining he was under the influence of drugs at the time of the interview.
    With respect to this issue, the trial court found:
    The Court finds the majority of the defendant’s testimony to be self-
    serving and of little merit. Additionally, the Court has had the opportunity to
    view the defendant’s behavior on the recorded video and to compare it to
    Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00144                                                        7
    the defendant’s behavior and testimony during the hearing. Based upon
    such observations, the Court finds that the defendant’s mannerisms,
    speech, comprehension, and expression during the hearing were the same
    as those present during his interview. As such, the Court finds that the
    defendant was not under the influence of drugs or otherwise impaired at the
    time of the interview with Detective McConnell.
    {¶16} Judgment Entry, July 25, 2022.
    {¶17} In a footnote, the trial court noted at the time of the hearing, Appellant had
    been in jail for nearly ninety days, and no evidence was presented he abused drugs prior
    to his testimony at the suppression hearing.
    {¶18} The trial court was in a unique position to compare Appellant’s demeanor
    and behavior during his testimony at the suppression hearing with the video of the
    statement given to Det. McConnell, and is in a better position than this court to determine
    the credibility of witnesses. See Fanning, supra (weight of the evidence and credibility of
    witnesses are primarily for the trier of fact at suppression hearing). This Court has
    reviewed the video, and throughout the interview, Appellant answered the detective’s
    questions clearly and appropriately, was able to recount information upon request, and
    engaged in conversation with the detective while displaying no visible signs of intoxication
    from drug use. Det. McConnell testified he had interacted with people under the influence
    of drugs and alcohol in his work as a police officer, and Appellant did not appear
    intoxicated. Further, during the interview Appellant admitted to past drug use, but told the
    Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00144                                                      8
    detective he had stopped using drugs. We find the trial court did not err in finding
    Appellant’s statement was voluntary and overruling the motion to suppress.
    {¶19} The first assignment of error is overruled.
    II.
    {¶20} In his second assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in
    preventing his brother from testifying at the suppression hearing.
    {¶21} Evid. R. 103(A)(2) states:
    (A) Effect of Erroneous Ruling. Error may not be predicated upon
    a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the
    party is affected; and
    (2) Offer of Proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the
    substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was
    apparent from the context within which questions were asked. Offer of proof
    is not necessary if evidence is excluded during cross-examination.
    {¶22} Absent a proffer, a reviewing court has no way of determining if the
    excluded evidence prejudiced the appellant, and if no proffer is made, the party seeking
    to introduce the evidence in question waives the error on appeal. Dieble v. Auto Owner's
    Ins. Co., 5th Dist. Stark No. 2006CA00211, 
    2007-Ohio-3429
    , ¶ 32. “While the proffer of
    the expected testimony need not be as specific as the testimony itself would have been
    it must nonetheless be sufficient to enable the reviewing court to determine roughly what,
    Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00144                                                          9
    if any, impact the testimony may have had upon the final disposition of the case.” Moser
    v. Moser, 
    72 Ohio App.3d 575
    , 580, 
    595 N.E.2d 518
    , 522 (3rd Dist. Allen 1991).
    {¶23} Counsel for Appellant made the following statement to the trial court
    concerning the testimony of Appellant’s brother:
    MR. KOUKOUTAS: Your Honor, Mr. Wood wanted me to call his
    brother David Battles to the stand to testify. Mr. Battles did come to the
    office, he did review the video with me and it’s my understanding he’ll be
    able to tell us, given his experience and knowing his brother, whether he
    was high or not during the interview.
    {¶24} Supp. Tr. 39.
    {¶25} We find counsel’s statement was not a sufficient proffer of Appellant’s
    brother’s testimony to preserve the issue for our review. From this statement, we are
    unable to determine what impact the testimony might have had on the trial court’s
    disposition of the motion to suppress. It is not clear from this statement whether Mr.
    Battles would testify in a matter favorably or unfavorably to Appellant. Appellant argues
    in his brief because Battles resided with Appellant, it is very likely he encountered
    Appellant on the day of the interview and is familiar with Appellant’s behavior when he is
    under the influence of drugs. However, this is speculation and is not a part of the record
    before this Court on appeal. We find Appellant has waived any error in the trial court’s
    exclusion of his brother’s testimony by failing to make a sufficient proffer of the testimony.
    Stark County, Case No. 2022CA00144                                             10
    {¶26} The second assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Stark
    County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
    By: Hoffman, J.
    Gwin, P.J. and
    Baldwin, J. concur