State v. Jones , 2023 Ohio 1997 ( 2023 )

[Cite as State v. Jones, 2023-Ohio-1997.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Appellee : C.A. No. 29602
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2022 CR 00490
:
RYAN C. JONES : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
: Court)
Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on June 16, 2023
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MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by MICHAEL P. ALLEN, Attorney for Appellee
KRISTIN L. ARNOLD, Attorney for Appellant
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HUFFMAN, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Ryan C. Jones appeals from a judgment of conviction
following his guilty plea. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} In February 2022, Jones was indicted for the following offenses: Count I,
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receiving stolen property, a motor vehicle; Count II, failure to comply with an order or
signal of a police officer; Count III, having weapons while under disability; Count IV,
vehicular assault; Count V, receiving stolen property, a firearm; Count VI, aggravated
robbery with a deadly weapon; and Count VII, improper handling of a firearm in a motor
vehicle. Counts I, II, III, IV, and VI each carried a three-year firearm specification under
R.C. 2929.14 and 2941.145 and a one-year firearm specification under R.C. 2929.14 and
2941.141.
{¶ 3} Jones’s trial was scheduled to begin on September 19, 2022. On September
8, 2022, Jones entered into a plea agreement in which he pled guilty to Counts I, II, III,
IV, V, and VII. As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to dismiss Count VI and
all firearm specifications except for the one-year specification attached to Count II.
{¶ 4} During the plea hearing, Jones’s counsel indicated to the trial court that there
was an agreement with the State that the trial court would terminate Jones’s post-release
control in an unrelated case, but this was disputed by the State at that time. After a brief
pause in the proceedings and sidebar, Jones’s counsel confirmed that he had been
mistaken, that the termination of post-release control was not part of the plea agreement,
and that Jones would still enter his plea pursuant to the agreement. The trial court
proceeded with the plea colloquy and advised Jones that his post-release control from
the unrelated case could be terminated by the court or that the court could sentence him
for violating his parole.
{¶ 5} At his disposition hearing, Jones was sentenced to 18 months in prison on
Counts I, IV, V, and VII and to 36 months on Counts II and III. On Count II, Jones was
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sentenced to an additional one year due to the firearm specification. Counts III, IV, V, and
VII were ordered to run concurrently with each other; Counts I and II were also ordered
to run concurrently with each other but consecutively to Counts III, IV, V, and VII.
{¶ 6} At the plea hearing, the parties had a discussion and sidebar with the court
about whether the plea agreement included the termination of Jones’s post-release
control in another case. They eventually agreed that there was no agreement regarding
the termination of post-release control. The trial court then proceeded to conduct the plea
hearing by asking Jones questions and providing him with information to ensure that
Jones was entering his plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. After doing so, the
trial court accepted Jones’s guilty plea and found him guilty.
{¶ 7} The trial court sentenced Jones to a total of seven years in prison. Jones filed
a timely notice of appeal from the trial court’s judgment.
II. Assignment of Error
{¶ 8} Jones’s sole assignment of error is as follows:
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT DID NOT KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY,
AND VOLUNTARILY ENTER HIS PLEA, AS HE WAS DENIED
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
{¶ 9} Jones argues that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter his
plea because his counsel did not fully inform him of the consequences of his plea. Jones
asserts that, during the plea colloquy, the trial court asked Jones whether he was currently
on community control sanctions, probation, or parole; Jones answered in the affirmative,
as he was on post-release control until 2027 in an unrelated case. According to Jones,
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he and his counsel were initially under the impression that, if Jones pled in this case,
Jones’s existing post-release control in the unrelated case would have been terminated.
During the plea hearing, however, Jones argues that confusion arose as to the terms of
the plea agreement with respect to the termination of Jones’s post-release control.
Ultimately, there was no agreement as to the termination of Jones’s post-release control.
Jones argues his trial counsel then moved forward with the plea proceedings without
specifically discussing with him that his post-release control in the unrelated case would
not be terminated. Jones argues that his trial counsel was ineffective by not providing
Jones with an explanation regarding his existing post-release control and, thus, that
Jones did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter his plea.
{¶ 10} A plea of guilty is a complete admission of guilt. State v. Faulkner, 2d Dist.
Champaign No. 2013-CA-43, 2015-Ohio-2059, ¶ 9. A guilty plea waives all appealable
errors, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, except to the extent that the
errors precluded the defendant from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering his
or her guilty plea. State v. Frazier, 2d. Dist. Montgomery Nos. 26495 and 26496, 2016-
Ohio-727, ¶ 81.
{¶ 11} An appellate court must determine whether the record affirmatively
demonstrates that a defendant’s plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
State v. Russell, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25132, 2012-Ohio-6051, ¶ 7. “If a defendant’s
guilty plea is not knowing and voluntary, it has been obtained in violation of due process
and is void.” State v. Brown, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 24520 and 24705, 2012-Ohio-
199, ¶ 13, citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274-5-
(1969). For a plea to be entered knowingly and voluntarily, the trial court must follow the
mandates of Crim.R. 11(C). Id.{¶ 12} Crim.R. 11(C)(2) requires the trial court to address the defendant personally
and (a) determine that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with an understanding
of the nature of the charges and the maximum penalty, and, if applicable, that the
defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions;
(b) inform the defendant of and determine that the defendant understands the effect of
the plea of guilty and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with
judgment and sentencing; and (c) inform the defendant and determine that he
understands that, by entering the plea, the defendant is waiving the rights to a jury trial,
to confront witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses,
and to require the State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which
he cannot be compelled to testify against himself. State v. Brown, 2d Dist. Montgomery
No. 21896, 2007-Ohio-6675, ¶ 3.
{¶ 13} We review alleged instances of ineffective assistance of trial counsel under
the two-pronged analysis set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct.
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and adopted by the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v.
Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989). “Pursuant to those cases, trial
counsel is entitled to a strong presumption that his or her conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable assistance.” State v. Leonard, 2d. Dist. Montgomery No. 27411,
2017-Ohio-8421, ¶ 10, citing Strickland. “To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must demonstrate both that trial counsel’s conduct fell below an objective
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standard of reasonableness and that the errors were serious enough to create a
reasonable probability that, but for the errors, the outcome of the case would have been
different.” (Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 11. In other words, if a defendant pleads guilty on
the advice of counsel, he must demonstrate that the advice was not “within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” (Citations omitted.) Frazier, 2d
Dist. Montgomery Nos. 26495 and 26496, 2016-Ohio-727, at ¶ 81. Furthermore, “[o]nly if
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the defendant would not
have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on going to trial will the judgment be
reversed.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Huddleson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20653, 2005-
Ohio-4029, ¶ 9, citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 52-53, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203(1985).
{¶ 14} At the outset, we note that both parties suggested plain error as the
standard of review in this matter. However, plain error is wholly inapplicable to an
ineffective assistance of counsel argument.
{¶ 15} Jones’s argument focuses on the terms of the plea agreement and whether
he understood that his existing post-release control was not guaranteed to be terminated
under the agreement. Specifically, Jones asserts that his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance by proceeding with the plea hearing without discussing with him the fact that
termination of his existing post-release control was not a part of the plea agreement. On
this basis, Jones asserts that his plea was less than knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
We do not agree.
{¶ 16} The trial court conducted Jones’s plea hearing in accordance with Crim.R.
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11(C). Jones was 29 years old at the time of the hearing, had finished eleventh grade,
and could read. Jones appeared in open court and expressed to the trial court that he
understood the plea form, the constitutional rights that he waived by foregoing a trial, the
nature of the offenses, and the maximum penalties that could be imposed. Jones denied
being under the influence of any drug, alcohol, or medication and having any physical or
mental problems. Jones expressed that he understood that his existing post-release
control could be terminated or that the trial court could sentence him for violating his
parole, as could the parole board. Jones also expressed that he understood that there
was no agreement on sentencing and that he had not been promised that he would
receive community control sanctions and not receive a prison sentence. He understood
that there would be a mandatory period of post-release control in the disposition of this
case and pleading guilty would be a complete admission of guilt.
{¶ 17} Jones indicated that he understood everything that the prosecutor had said
during the plea hearing, and that the facts stated in the indictment were true. He stated
that he had discussed with his attorney what the prosecutor would have to prove in order
for him to be found guilty and that he was satisfied with the representation of his attorney.
Jones stated that he was entering his plea voluntarily.
{¶ 18} The trial court informed Jones that, by pleading guilty, he waived the right
to appeal the court’s disposition with respect to any of his pretrial motions. The trial court
also inquired of Jones whether he had any emotional or mental issues that were hindering
his ability to understand the nature of the plea proceedings. The trial court asked Jones
whether any competency issues existed that would render his plea less than knowing,
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intelligent, and voluntary, and Jones denied any such concerns. Upon review, we
conclude that Jones knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered his guilty plea.
{¶ 19} Further, to demonstrate that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient,
Jones was required to show that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
error, Jones would not have pled guilty but would have insisted on going to trial. Jones
complains that his attorney failed to properly explain that his existing post-release control
would not be terminated pursuant to the plea agreement as counsel originally stated was
his understanding. However, although it was determined at the plea hearing that the
termination of Jones’s existing post-release control was not, in fact, part of the plea
agreement, the trial court advised Jones that the court could terminate his existing post-
release control or could sentence him for violating his parole; Jones acknowledged his
understanding of the same without asking any questions about the plea agreement. The
plea agreement resulted in the dismissal of the most serious charge, aggravated robbery,
and all of the three-year firearm specifications attached to the counts to which Jones
entered guilty pleas. Moreover, when asked if he was satisfied with his trial counsel, Jones
answered in the affirmative. Jones has failed to show that, but for the alleged error of
counsel, he would not have entered into the plea agreement.
{¶ 20} Jones has not demonstrated that his counsel’s advice was not within the
range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases or that his counsel’s
conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Jones also has not
demonstrated that his counsel’s alleged error was serious enough to create a reasonable
probability that, but for the error, the outcome of Jones’s case would have been different.
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Jones did not even suggest that the outcome of his case would have been different had
he known in advance of the plea hearing that termination of his existing post-release
control was not part of the plea agreement. Thus, we conclude that Jones has not shown
that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel. Therefore, Jones has not
demonstrated that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter his guilty plea.
{¶ 21} Jones’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 22} Having overruled Jones’s assignment of error, the judgment of the trial court
is affirmed.
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EPLEY, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.