State v. Stafford ( 2023 )

[Cite as State v. Stafford, 2023-Ohio-2062.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 111989
v. :
HENRY STAFFORD, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 22, 2023
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-19-645506-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Anthony T. Miranda, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
John F. Corrigan, for appellant.
LISA B. FORBES, J.:
Henry Stafford (“Stafford”) appeals the trial court’s denial of his
motion to withdraw guilty plea. After reviewing the facts of the case and pertinent
law, we affirm the trial court’s decision.
I. Facts and Procedural History
On October 24, 2019, Stafford drove to his home with a gun “with the
intentions of confronting” his girlfriend Tabitha and her brother Christopher. When
he arrived home, Stafford “took the pistol and walked into the house and went
straight into the bedroom.” Christopher was lying in the bed. Stafford shot and
killed him.
Stafford was indicted on November 6, 2019, with seven crimes arising
from Christopher’s death, including aggravated murder. On June 30, 2020, the
state of Ohio moved to amend the indictment and Stafford pled guilty to murder, in
violation of R.C. 2903.02(A), with a firearm specification; intimidation of a crime
witness under of R.C. 2921.04(B)(2); and having a weapon while under disability in
violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3). The court sentenced Stafford the same day to life in
prison with parole eligibility after 17 years.
On February 8, 2022, Stafford filed a pro se motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. Attached to his motion was Stafford’s affidavit, which provided his
account of the events on October 24, 2019. On March 22, 2022, the court denied
Stafford’s motion. It is from this order that Stafford appeals, raising one assignment
of error for our review:1
I. The trial court erred in denying appellant’s Criminal Rule 32.1
motion to withdraw his guilty plea or in the alternative denying the
motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing.
1 On October 13, 2022, this court sua sponte assigned Stafford appellate counsel.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Withdrawal of Guilty Plea
Pursuant to Crim.R. 32.1, a “motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no
contest may be made only before sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest
injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and
permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.” Ohio courts have held that
“manifest injustice relates to some fundamental flaw in the proceedings which
result[s] in a miscarriage of justice or is inconsistent with the demands of due
process.” State v. Wooden, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 03AP-368, 2004-Ohio-588, ¶ 10.
A defendant seeking to withdraw his or her plea has the burden of establishing
manifest injustice. Id. “We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Hines, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 108326, 2020-Ohio-663, ¶ 7.
B. Hearing on Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
A “trial court need not hold an evidentiary hearing on a postsentence
motion to withdraw a guilty plea if the record indicates the movant is not entitled to
relief, and the movant has failed to submit evidentiary documents sufficient to
demonstrate a manifest injustice.” State v. Brown, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108063,
2019-Ohio-3773, ¶ 14.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
On appeal, Stafford argues that his plea was not knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent because his defense counsel was ineffective in three areas: “1) trial
counsel accepted a plea agreement without his express authorization; 2) trial
counsel misinformed him on an issue of law critical to the decision to plea or go to
trial; [and] 3) trial counsel unduly influenced his decision to plead guilty.”
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must establish that his or her attorney’s performance was deficient and that the
defendant was prejudiced by the deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). However, “a court need not
determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the
prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. The object
of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s performance.” Id. at 697. See
also State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 3743 (1989).
D. Analysis
1. Res Judicata
“Res judicata generally bars a defendant from raising claims in a
Crim.R.32.1 post-sentencing motion to withdraw guilty plea that he raised or could
have raised on direct appeal.” State v. Straley, 159 Ohio St.3d 82, 147 N.E.3d 623,
2019-Ohio-5206, ¶ 23. “Further, res judicata bars claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel that were based on facts in the record and were raised or could have been
raised on a prior appeal.” State v. Westley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108847, 2020-
Ohio-809, ¶ 11.
To the extent Stafford’s arguments that his trial counsel was
ineffective with respect to his guilty plea could have been raised in a direct appeal,
which he did not file, these arguments are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. See
State v. Bradford, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 110907, 110908, 110909, 110910, and
110912, 2022-Ohio-1503, ¶ 10 (In an appeal of the denial of a postconviction relief
petition, the doctrine of res judicata barred defendant’s argument that he was
improperly induced to plead guilty.). “In order to avoid the preclusive effect of res
judicata, post-conviction relief claims must be ‘based on evidence outside of the
original record that existed’” at the time a direct appeal was or could have been
brought. State v. Meyerson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 30260, 2023-Ohio-708, ¶ 15,
quoting State v. Bulls, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27713, 2015-Ohio-5094, ¶ 9.
2. Appellant Failed to Establish Manifest Injustice
Notwithstanding the doctrine of res judicata, even if this court were
to address the merits of the instant case, we would find that Stafford’s arguments
regarding manifest injustice due to ineffective assistance of counsel fail. Stafford’s
arguments are based on his belief that “he was guilty of voluntary manslaughter,”
and his trial counsel was ineffective when “he was rushed into a murder plea * * *.”
i. No Evidence Appellant’s Counsel Misinformed Him
We turn first to Stafford’s second argument — that his “counsel
misinformed him on an issue of law critical to the decision to plea or go to trial.”
According to Stafford’s appellate brief, the “misinformation” was his trial counsel’s
advisement “that the evidence was overwhelming that he purposely caused the
death of” Christopher. Stafford argues that the facts of his case, as set forth in his
affidavit, show that he acted as a result of “sudden passion” or a “sudden fit of rage,”
rather than purposefully. We disagree.
Voluntary manslaughter is defined in R.C. 2903.03(A), which states
that “[n]o person, while under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of
rage, either of which is brought on by serious provocation occasioned by the victim
that is reasonably sufficient to incite the person into using deadly force, shall
knowingly cause the death of another * * *.” It is well established that “sudden”
passion or fit of rage is negated when there is time for the defendant to “cool off.”
See, e.g., State v. Burkes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106412, 2018-Ohio-4854, ¶ 32 (A
10-15 minute “lapse of time between the alleged threat and the shooting enabled
Burkes to ‘cool off.’ Therefore, as a matter of law, Burkes cannot establish ‘sudden
passion’ or a ‘sudden fit of rage’ required for voluntary manslaughter.”).
In contrast, murder is defined under R.C. 2903.02(A) which provides,
“No person shall purposely cause the death of another * * *.”
The Ohio Supreme Court has long held that voluntary manslaughter
is an inferior degree of murder. State v. Rhodes, 63 Ohio St.3d 613, 617, 590 N.E.2d
261 (1992). The element of provocation required to prove voluntary manslaughter
“mitigates the offender’s culpability” for murder. State v. Tyler, 50 Ohio St.3d 24,
37, 553 N.E.2d 576 (1990); Rhodes at 617-618.
In the case at hand, Stafford’s affidavit, which he attached to his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, states that he overheard Tabitha and Christopher
talking to each other via a phone call between Stafford and Tabitha that Tabitha did
not disconnect. Stafford inferred from Tabitha and Christopher’s conversation that
he overheard that they were “having sex.” According to Stafford, the following is
what happened next:
Because of the dangerous community that me and Tabitha lived in I
kept a pistol on my person at all times. I drove home with the
intentions of confronting Tabitha and Christopher. * * * I tried to break
free from the anger, but I could not. The closer I got to my home, the
more I thought about what they were doing. * * *
When I arrived home I took the pistol and walked into the house and
went straight into the bedroom. I wanted to catch them in the act so
they would not be able to deny it. But when I went into the bedroom I
saw Christopher lying in my bed, naked. The hurt and pain I was
experiencing turned into black rage, and without giving it a thought, or
saying a single word, I began shooting him.
Upon review, we find that Stafford’s trial counsel did not misinform
him “on an issue of law critical to the decision to plea or go to trial.” The allegations
in Stafford’s affidavit do not show that he acted “under the influence of sudden
passion or in a sudden fit of rage,” as required to support an involuntary
manslaughter conviction pursuant to R.C. 2903.03(A). Rather, Stafford’s affidavit
shows that he purposely drove home with a loaded gun to confront Tabitha and
Christopher. Importantly, Stafford admits that he “thought about” what he believed
he learned through the phone call as he was driving. When he arrived home, he
“took the pistol,” walked into the bedroom, and killed Christopher. This is evidence
that Stafford acted with purpose and had time to cool off.
ii. No Evidence of Impropriety at Plea Hearing
Regarding Stafford’s first and third arguments, we find that there is
no evidence in the record to support Stafford’s assertions that his “counsel accepted
a plea agreement without his express authorization” or that his “counsel unduly
influenced his decision to plead guilty.” Rather, the evidence in the record shows
that Stafford knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily pled guilty to murder.
Our review of Stafford’s plea hearing transcript shows that nothing
was stated on the record about the events depicted in Stafford’s affidavit. At his plea
hearing, the prosecutor set forth the offenses to which Stafford would be pleading
guilty, namely murder, intimidation of a witness, and having a weapon while under
disability. According to the record, in exchange for his guilty plea, the state would
dismiss the remaining charges, including aggravated murder. The court reiterated
the terms of Stafford’s plea deal. Stafford stated on the record that he was satisfied
with his lawyers, he understood the charge of murder and the effect of pleading
guilty to murder, and that “I want to take the plea bargain.”
The court conducted a full Crim.R. 11 hearing, and Stafford pled guilty
to the agreed-upon three offenses. The following colloquy occurred:
THE COURT: [D]id you, in fact, purposely cause the death of
Christopher Eden?”
THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.
***
THE COURT: Why are you pleading guilty, then?
THE DEFENDANT: Because I did it.
At the plea hearing, the court asked defense counsel if they received
in discovery “evidence that, if believed by a jury, could support a finding that * * *
Stafford purposely caused the death?” Defense counsel replied, “Yes, we [did], Your
Honor. We have shared that with [Stafford].”
A review of the transcript of the plea hearing reveals that Stafford
entered his plea of guilty, not counsel. Further, there is no evidence of undue
influence by counsel.
Stafford’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and accompanying
affidavit do not show that his trial counsel was ineffective; therefore, no manifest
injustice occurred when the trial court accepted Stafford’s guilty plea. Additionally,
as previously stated, the trial court need not hold a hearing on a motion to withdraw
a plea when the defendant “has failed to submit evidentiary documents sufficient to
demonstrate a manifest injustice.” Brown, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108063, 2019-
Ohio-3773, at ¶ 14.
Accordingly, the trial court acted within its discretion when it denied
Stafford’s postsentence motion without holding a hearing, and Stafford’s sole
assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case
remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
LISA B. FORBES, JUDGE
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J., and
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR