Marysville Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Union Cty. Bd. of Revision , 2023 Ohio 2020 ( 2023 )


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  • [Cite as Marysville Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Union Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2023-Ohio-
    2020.]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
    UNION COUNTY
    MARYSVILLE EXEMPTED VILLAGE
    SCHOOLS BOARD OF EDUCATION
    APPELLANT,                                                  CASE NO. 14-23-03
    v.
    UNION COUNTY BOARD OF
    REVISION, ET AL.,                                                   OPINION
    APPELLEES.
    Appeal from Ohio Board of Tax Appeals
    BTA No. 2022-1552
    Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded
    Date of Decision: June 20, 2023
    APPEARANCES:
    Mark H. Gillis and Kelley A. Gorry for Appellant
    Steven L. Smiseck and Lauren M. Johnson for Appellee The
    Residence at Cooks Pointe, LLC
    Case No. 14-23-03
    WALDICK, J.
    {¶1} Appellant, Marysville Exempted Village Schools Board of Education
    (“school board”), appeals the decision and order of the Ohio Board of Tax Appeals
    (“BTA”), in which the BTA dismissed the school board’s appeal from a decision of
    the Union County Board of Revision. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.
    Procedural History and Relevant Facts
    {¶2} This case originated on February 25, 2022, when two Union County
    residents, Dean Cook and Dave Cook, filed a third-party taxpayer complaint for the
    2021 tax year with the Union County Board of Revision. In that complaint, the
    Cooks sought an increase in the valuation of certain real property located at 1805
    Mill Point Road in Marysville, Ohio. That property is owned by The Residence at
    Cooks Pointe, LLC, the appellee herein.
    {¶3} On May 3, 2022, the school board filed a counter-complaint with
    respect to the same real property, in which the school board joined in the Cooks’
    position that the valuation of the subject property should be increased by several
    million dollars.
    {¶4} On August 1, 2022, the Union County Board of Revision held a hearing
    on the complaints. On September 5, 2022, the Board of Revision ruled that no
    change would be made in the valuation of the real property for the tax year in
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    Case No. 14-23-03
    question, finding that the complainants failed to meet the burden of proof necessary
    to justify a change in value.
    {¶5} On September 30, 2022, the school board filed a notice of appeal with
    the Board of Tax Appeals.
    {¶6} On or about December 8, 2022, the appellee owner of the property at
    issue, The Residence at Cooks Pointe, LLC, filed a motion with the BTA seeking to
    dismiss the appeal filed by the school board. The motion to dismiss was based upon
    a recent amendment to R.C. 5717.01, which substantially restricted the right of a
    board of education to appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals.
    {¶7} On or about December 21, 2022, the school board filed a response
    opposing the motion to dismiss its appeal.
    {¶8} On December 28, 2022, the Board of Tax Appeals issued a decision and
    order dismissing the school board’s appeal. In support of that dismissal, the BTA
    relied upon a decision it had issued on October 31, 2022, North Ridgeville City
    Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Revision, BTA No. 2022-1152, 
    2022 WL 16725740
    . Based upon the reasoning set forth in the North Ridgeville decision, the
    BTA concluded that R.C. 5717.01., as amended on July 21, 2022 by H.B. 126,
    precluded the school board’s appeal in this case.
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    Case No. 14-23-03
    {¶9} On January 6, 2023, the school board filed the instant appeal, in which
    eleven assignments of error have been raised.1
    First Assignment of Error
    The Decision is unreasonable and unlawful because the BTA
    relied solely upon its erroneous decision in North Ridgeville City
    Schools Board of Education v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Revision, et al.,
    BTA No. 2022-1152, 2022 Ohio Tax LEXIS 2518 (Oct. 31, 2022)
    (“North Ridgeville”) (attached hereto in Appendix) (Decision at p.
    2).
    Second Assignment of Error
    The Decision is unreasonable and unlawful because in North
    Ridgeville, the BTA ignored the plain meaning of the
    unambiguous words the General Assembly used in the revisions
    to R.C. 5717.01 (North Ridgeville, at *2-5).
    Third Assignment of Error
    The BTA committed legal error in North Ridgeville by failing to
    recognize that the General Assembly’s use of the phrase “a
    subdivision that files” in R.C. 5717.01 as the operative language
    in present tense applies prospectively only [sic] present and future
    actions and does not include past actions (North Ridgeville, at *2-
    5). Carr v. United States, 
    130 S.Ct. 2229
    , 2236, 
    176 L.E.2d 1152
    (2010); Smith v. Ohio Valley Ins. Co., 
    27 Ohio St.2d 268
    , 276, 
    272 N.E. 171
     (1971).
    Fourth Assignment of Error
    The Decision is unreasonable and unlawful because the BTA
    failed to apply the rules of grammar and violated the rules of
    statutory construction in North Ridgeville in interpreting the
    present tense language in R.C. 5717.01 as including any
    1
    In its merit brief, the appellant-school board sets forth the eleven assignments of error noted here but then,
    without explanation, rephrases and reorders the assignments of error in the body of the brief. For the sake of
    simplicity and brevity, we will not set forth the “re-phrased” assignments of error in this opinion.
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    Case No. 14-23-03
    complaints filed prior to the effective date of the legislation (North
    Ridgeville, at *2-5). R.C. 1.42; R.C. 1.43(C); R.C. 1.48; Smith, at
    276.
    Fifth Assignment of Error
    The BTA committed legal error in North Ridgeville after correctly
    determining that the revisions to R.C. 5717.01 are clear and
    unambiguous but then utilizing the General Assembly’s perceived
    legislative intent as support for its interpretation of the revisions
    directly inconsistent with the actual words used by the General
    Assembly. North Ridgeville, at *7 (“Our decision hardly offends
    that intent”); Jacobsen v. Kaforey, 
    149 Ohio St.3d 398
    , 2016-Ohio-
    8434, 
    75 N.E.3d 203
    , ¶ 8.
    Sixth Assignment of Error
    The BTA committed legal error in North Ridgeville by rewriting
    the language of the revisions to R.C. 5717.01 as follows: “except
    that a subdivision with respect to property the subdivision does
    not own or lease may not appeal the decision of the board of
    revision.” North Ridgeville, at *2 (“Therefore, we hold that boards
    of education now have no appeal rights to this Board unless the
    board of education owns or leases the property”); 
    Id.
     At *5
    (“***in order to lawfully appeal a board of revision decision to
    this Board, the appellant cannot be a subdivision that does not
    own or lease the property at issue in the original complaint”).
    Seventh Assignment of Error
    The Decision is unreasonable and unlawful as the BTA failed to
    recognize in North Ridgeville that the General Assembly’s
    retention of the former appeal right in R.C. 5717.01 for any
    “board, legislative authority, public official” authorized to file
    complaints pursuant to R.C. 5715.19 in the revisions to R.C.
    5717.01 preserves the existing appeal rights of those entities for
    any complaint filed prior to the effective date of the revisions
    (North Ridgeville, at *10-13). See Jacobsen, at ¶ 19.
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    Case No. 14-23-03
    Eighth Assignment of Error
    The BTA committed legal error in North Ridgeville by concluding
    that the revisions to R.C. 5717.01 did not incorporate the new
    definitions of “subdivision” [or rather “legislative authority of a
    subdivision”], “original complaint” and “counter-complaint”
    from revised R.C. 5715.19, effective for tax year 2022, when the
    plain meaning of the language used by the General Assembly in
    the revisions to R.C. 5717.01 clearly and unambiguously
    incorporates these definitions (North Ridgeville, at *10-13). See
    R.C. 5717.01 (“a subdivision that files an original complaint or
    counter-complaint under that section***”).
    Ninth Assignment of Error
    The Decision is unreasonable and unlawful because the BTA held
    in North Ridgeville that the new definitions in R.C. 5715.19,
    effective for tax year 2022, had no new meaning when the General
    Assembly retained the terms “board”, “legislative authority”,
    “public official”, and “complaints” from former R.C. 5717.01
    (North Ridgeville, at *10-13).
    Tenth Assignment of Error
    The BTA erred in North Ridgeville in concluding that
    “jurisdiction is not conferred on appeal merely because the
    underlying cause of action was validly filed” when Appellant
    Board of Education never argued that the right to appeal was
    vested in a validly filed complaint (North Ridgeville, at *8-10).
    Eleventh Assignment of Error
    The BTA erred in North Ridgeville by comparing the revisions to
    R.C. 5717.01 to the revisions to R.C. 5717.04 because the language
    the General Assembly used in the revisions to R.C. 5717.04 is not
    even remotely comparable to the words the General Assembly
    used in the revisions to R.C. 5717.01 (North Ridgeville, at *9-10).
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    Case No. 14-23-03
    {¶10} All eleven assignments of error set forth by the school board ultimately
    raise the same claim, being that the Board of Tax Appeals erred in dismissing the
    school board’s appeal, but for varying reasons.         Because we find the related
    arguments set forth in the first, second, third, and fourth assignments of error to be
    dispositive of the case, we will collectively address those four assignments of error
    first.
    {¶11} In the first four assignments of error, the school board asserts that the
    BTA’s decision dismissing the school board’s appeal was erroneous because that
    dismissal, and the North Ridgeville decision upon which the dismissal was based,
    resulted from a misreading of the amended statute and a misapplication of
    established rules of statutory construction.
    {¶12} An appellate court reviews a Board of Tax Appeals decision to
    determine if it is reasonable and lawful; if it is both, the decision must be affirmed.
    Columbus City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 10th Dist.
    Franklin Nos. 21AP-86, 21AP-87, 21AP-88, 
    2022-Ohio-355
    , ¶ 15. However, we
    review questions of law de novo. Id. at ¶ 17. Accordingly, we “‘will not hesitate to
    reverse a BTA decision that is based on an incorrect legal conclusion.’” Westerville
    City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
    146 Ohio St.3d 412
    , 2016-
    Ohio-1506, ¶ 26, quoting Bd. of Edn. of Gahanna-Jefferson Local School Dist. v.
    Zaino, Tax Commr., 
    93 Ohio St.3d 231
    , 232, 
    754 N.E.2d 789
     (2001). In particular,
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    Case No. 14-23-03
    statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Rock City
    Church v. Franklin Cty. Bd. Of Revision, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 22AP-372, 2023-
    Ohio-1339, ¶ 5, citing Thomas v. Logue, Admr. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 10th
    Dist. Franklin No. 21AP-385, 
    2022-Ohio-1603
    , ¶ 12.
    {¶13} As to the specific issue present in this appeal, we note that it is well
    established that the Board of Tax Appeals is a “creature of statute” and, as such, has
    only the jurisdiction, power, and duties expressly provided by the General
    Assembly. Ross v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
    155 Ohio St.3d 373
    , 2018-Ohio-
    4746, ¶ 9, citing Steward v. Evatt, 
    143 Ohio St. 547
    , 
    56 N.E.2d 159
     (1944),
    paragraph one of the syllabus.
    {¶14} R.C. 5717.01 is the statute that establishes the means for invoking the
    Board of Tax Appeals’ jurisdiction in an appeal of a decision of a county board of
    revision. Ross, supra, at ¶ 9.
    {¶15} In April of 2022, while the complaint in this case was pending before
    the Union County Board of Revision, the Ohio legislature enacted H.B. 126, which
    became effective on July 21, 2022. Section 1 of H.B. 126 amended three statutes:
    R.C. 4503.06, R.C. 5715.19, and R.C. 5717.01, while Section 2 of that legislation
    repealed the existing versions of those statutes.      Section 3 of the legislation
    contained language delineating when certain portions of the amended version of
    R.C. 5715.19 were to become operable.
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    Case No. 14-23-03
    {¶16} R.C. 5717.01 formerly permitted decisions of a county board of
    revision to be appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals “by the county auditor, the tax
    commissioner, or any board, legislative authority, public official, or taxpayer
    authorized by section 5715.19 of the Revised Code to file complaints against
    valuations or assessments with the auditor.”
    {¶17} However, H.B. 126 amended R.C. 5717.01 to limit the parties
    authorized to file such appeals, with the amended version of R.C. 5717.01 reading
    in relevant part as follows:
    An appeal from a decision of a county board of revision may be taken
    to the board of tax appeals within thirty days after notice of the
    decision of the county board of revision is mailed * * *. Such an
    appeal may be taken by the county auditor, the tax commissioner, or
    any board, legislative authority, public official, or taxpayer authorized
    by section 5715.19 of the Revised Code to file complaints against
    valuations or assessments with the auditor, except that a subdivision
    that files an original complaint or counter-complaint under that
    section with respect to property the subdivision does not own or lease
    may not appeal the decision of the board of revision with respect to
    that original complaint or counter-complaint. (Emphasis added.)
    {¶18} Thus, pursuant to R.C. 5717.01 as amended, in order to lawfully
    appeal a county board of revision decision to the BTA, the appellant cannot be a
    subdivision that does not own or lease the property at issue in the original complaint.
    {¶19} The issue presented is whether that amendment, which took effect July
    21, 2022, is applicable to the instant case, where the original complaint and counter-
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    Case No. 14-23-03
    complaint were filed before July 21, 2022, but the appeal to the BTA stemming from
    those pre-July 21, 2022 complaints was filed after that date.
    {¶20} Because the school board does not own or lease the property at issue
    in the complaints filed herein, the Board of Tax Appeals ruled that the school
    board’s appeal was precluded by the recently enacted version of R.C. 5717.01. As
    previously noted, the BTA’s decision dismissing the appeal in this case was based
    directly on the BTA’s decision in a similarly situated case, North Ridgeville City
    Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Revision, BTA No. 2022-1152, 
    2022 WL 16725740
     (Oct. 31, 2022).
    {¶21} In North Ridgeville, the Board of Tax Appeals had its first opportunity
    to address the amendment to R.C. 5717.01 effectuated by H.B. 126. At issue in
    North Ridgeville, as in this case, was the question of when the amended statute’s
    disallowance of such appeals became effective. The BTA ruled that the amended
    version of R.C. 5717.01 was applicable to any such appeal filed by a board of
    education on or after July 21, 2022, the effective date of H.B. 126.
    {¶22} In its decision, the Board of Tax Appeals found that the language of
    the new version of R.C. 5717.01 was unambiguous, and noted that “[a]n
    unambiguous law ‘is to be applied, not interpreted.’” North Ridgeville, supra, at *3,
    quoting Sears v. Weimer, 
    143 Ohio St. 312
    , 316, 
    55 N.E.2d 413
     (1994). As July 21,
    2022 was the effective date of the amended legislation at issue, the BTA stated that
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    Case No. 14-23-03
    “[w]e have absolutely no authority to supply a different effective date for R.C.
    5717.01” and “[o]ur analysis can end there, and we stress our holding is entirely
    based on the straightforward application of an unambiguous law.” 
    Id.
    {¶23} Nevertheless, for “the sake of completeness”, the Board of Tax
    Appeals then went on to address the arguments raised by the school board in North
    Ridgeville. Id., at *3. Noting that the school board had argued that the BTA should
    focus on the legislative intent and other rules of statutory construction when
    determining the timing of the applicability of H.B. 126, the BTA stated, “[w]e find
    that this approach is inappropriate and unnecessary, and it would lead to the same
    result.” Id. The BTA noted that Section 3 of H.B. 126 specifically set an alternative
    effective date for some of the other amendments included in the legislation, and the
    BTA determined that, “[t]he General Assembly’s exclusion of R.C. 5717.01 from
    Section 3 demonstrates the intent for the changes [to that statute] to be operational
    on the effective date of the legislation.” Id.
    {¶24} As to school board’s argument in North Ridgeville that applying the
    July 21, 2022 effective date of the amendment to R.C. 5717.01 to appeals from
    decisions on complaints in cases where the complaint had been filed prior to that
    date would render the legislation inappropriately retroactive, the BTA stated that
    “[t]he right to appeal to this Board is independent of the right to file a complaint or
    countercomplaint with the board of revision.” North Ridgeville, supra, at *3. The
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    Board of Tax Appeals therefore found that the board of education’s statutory appeal
    right pursuant to R.C. 5717.01 “was extinguished as of the effective date and did
    not apply retroactively to pending appeals before this Board.” Id.
    {¶25} The Board of Tax Appeals in North Ridgeville also rejected the school
    board’s argument that the amended version of R.C. 5717.01 was inapplicable to
    appeals in cases where the complaint and counter-complaint had been filed prior to
    July 21, 2022 in that the terms “complaint” and “counter-complaint” as used in the
    new version of R.C. 5717.01 had been statutorily undefined until definitions for
    those terms were established by H.B. 126. In rejecting that argument, the BTA
    noted that those terms, while not previously defined by the statutes at issue, were
    nonetheless common terms that had been used frequently in the past and “it would
    be wrong to conclude that they have no legal meaning until an appeal emanates from
    a complaint filed for tax year 2022 or later.” North Ridgeville, supra, at *4. Thus,
    the BTA concluded that, “we find no reason to extend the right of a subdivision to
    appeal after the General Assembly revoked that right merely because it also codified
    a meaning for well-understood terms in the same legislation.” Id., at *5.
    {¶26} Finally, the BTA in North Ridgeville noted that there was no dispute
    in that case that the board of education had filed its counter-complaint in its capacity
    as a subdivision and that the school board did not own the subject property. Id., at
    *5. Accordingly, based upon the reasoning set forth above, the Board of Tax
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    Case No. 14-23-03
    Appeals found that the appeal filed in that case on August 9, 2022 was filed by a
    party not authorized to do so under the amended terms of R.C. 5717.01, and
    therefore dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction to consider the same. Id.
    {¶27} In the present case, based upon the reasoning set forth in the North
    Ridgeville decision, the BTA similarly concluded that R.C. 5717.01, as amended on
    July 21, 2022 by H.B. 126, precluded the school board’s appeal.
    {¶28} Upon a de novo review of the issue presented, and of that issue as
    analyzed by the Board of Tax Appeals in North Ridgeville, we find the Board of
    Tax Appeals’ ruling on the statute’s applicability here to be flawed. Specifically,
    we find that the BTA misinterpreted the plain language of the statute and overlooked
    certain principles of statutory interpretation that impact the applicability of the new
    R.C. 5717.01 to the school board’s appeal in this case.
    {¶29} First and foremost, we note that the statutory language at issue here is
    clearly written in the present tense. R.C. 5717.01, as amended and also as it did
    previously, sets forth the right of appeal to the Board of Tax Appeals from a county
    board of revision decision. The amended version of R.C. 5717.01 then imposes a
    new prohibition on appeals by boards of education, or other such subdivisions,
    stating, “except that a subdivision that files an original complaint or counter-
    complaint under [R.C. 5715.19] with respect to property the subdivision does not
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    Case No. 14-23-03
    own or lease may not appeal the decision of the board of revision with respect to
    that original complaint or counter-complaint.” (Emphasis added.)
    {¶30} If the language used in the newly enacted prohibition on appeals was
    phrased in the past tense, such as “filed” or “has filed”, that may have demonstrated
    a legislative intent that the amended statute be applied to appeals stemming from
    complaints or counter-complaints filed prior to the effective date of the statute. In
    the absence of such past-tense verbiage, however, the use of the present tense “files”
    indicates an intention that statute only be applied prospectively.
    {¶31} It is also critical to note that the indisputably present-tense phrasing
    used in the amendment (i.e. “a subdivision that files”) is specifically tied by the
    terms of the statute to the filing of a complaint or counter-complaint, not to the filing
    of an appeal. Had the amended statute made the filing of an appeal the operative
    act upon which the new prohibition on appeals was conditioned, the BTA’s decision
    might have had merit.
    {¶32} We also look to established legal principles for guidance on the issue
    of the statute’s applicability to the instant case. Pursuant to R.C. 1.48, “[a] statute
    is presumed to be prospective in its operation unless expressly made retrospective.”
    More importantly, it is well established that a statute must clearly proclaim its own
    retroactivity to overcome the presumption of prospective application and
    retroactivity is not to be inferred. State v. Consilio, 
    114 Ohio St.3d 295
    , 871 N.E.2d
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    Case No. 14-23-03
    1167 (2007), ¶ 15, citing Kelley v. State, 
    94 Ohio St. 331
    , 338–339, 
    114 N.E. 255
    (1916). “If the retroactivity of a statute is not expressly stated in plain terms, the
    presumption in favor of prospective application controls.” 
    Id.,
     citing Bernier v.
    Becker, 
    37 Ohio St. 72
    , 74, 
    1881 WL 63
     (1881). Pursuant to this rule, the General
    Assembly is presumed to know that it must include expressly retroactive language
    to create that effect, and the legislature has indeed done so in the past. 
    Id.,
     citing
    Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 
    36 Ohio St.3d 100
    , 
    522 N.E.2d 489
     (1988),
    State ex rel. Slaughter v. Indus. Comm., 
    132 Ohio St. 537
    , 
    9 N.E.2d 505
     (1937).
    {¶33} In sum, “‘[a] statute, employing operative language in the present
    tense, does not purport to cover past events of a similar nature.’” Consilio, supra, at
    ¶17, quoting Smith v. Ohio Valley Ins. Co., 
    27 Ohio St.2d 268
    , 276, 
    272 N.E.2d 131
    (1971). See, also, Carr v. United States, 
    560 U.S. 438
    , 446–50, 
    130 S. Ct. 2229
    ,
    2235–37, 
    176 L. Ed. 2d 1152
     (2010).
    {¶34} By way of illustration, the Supreme Court of Ohio in Smith v. Ohio
    Valley Ins. Co., supra, at fn 3, cited to the following examples of legislative
    language evidencing a clear intention to apply statutory provisions retrospectively:
    first, the language of former G.C. 3496-3 at issue in State ex rel. Slaughter v. Indus.
    Comm., 
    132 Ohio St. 537
    , 539, 
    9 N.E.2d 505
     (1937) (“The provisions of this act
    shall apply * * * whether such injury or death occurs prior to the operative date of
    this act or subsequent thereto.”); second, the language of R.C. 4123.519 at issue in
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    Case No. 14-23-03
    Hearing v. Wylie, 
    173 Ohio St. 221
    , 
    180 N.E.2d 921
     (1962) (“[A]ny action pending
    in Common Pleas Court or any other court on the effective date of this act under
    Section 4129.519 of the Revised Code shall be governed by the terms of this act.”).
    {¶35} In the case before us, the H.B. 126 version of R.C. 5717.01 does not
    expressly mention retroactivity. Put another way, there is no plain reference
    whatsoever in the amended statute to its applicability to appeals filed prior to the
    effective date of the statute or, as is the case here, to appeals in pending actions. The
    General Assembly’s failure to include such language means, pursuant to the
    authority cited above, that the amended version of R.C. 5717.01 can only be applied
    prospectively.
    {¶36} Accordingly, given the use of the present tense in the statute and
    absent any express evidence of intended retroactivity and/or applicability to
    previously pending complaints, we find that the use of the language “a subdivision
    that files an original complaint or counter-complaint” signifies a legislative intent
    that the amended statute be applied prospectively to appeals stemming from
    complaints filed after the July 21, 2022 effective date of the new statute, as opposed
    to prohibiting appeals from complaints that were filed prior to that date.
    {¶37} As a result, we hold that R.C. 5717.01 as amended by H.B. 126 is not
    applicable to the appeal filed in this matter with the Board of Tax Appeals, as the
    complaint and the counter-complaint challenging the valuation of the property at
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    Case No. 14-23-03
    issue were both filed prior to the July 21, 2022 effective date of the new version of
    R.C. 5717.01. We therefore sustain the first, second, third, and fourth assignments
    of error. Any other arguments are moot.
    {¶38} The December 28, 2022 decision of the Board of Tax Appeals is
    reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
    opinion.
    Judgment Reversed and
    Cause Remanded
    WILLAMOWSKI and ZIMMERMAN, J.J., concur.
    /jlr
    -17-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-23-03

Citation Numbers: 2023 Ohio 2020

Judges: Waldick

Filed Date: 6/20/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/20/2023