Doors On-Line v. Chandra , 2023 Ohio 2018 ( 2023 )

[Cite as Doors On-Line v. Chandra, 2023-Ohio-2018.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
SHELBY COUNTY
DOORS ON-LINE INC.,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 17-22-11
v.
ROHIT CHANDRA, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Sidney Municipal Court
Trial Court No. 21CVF01181
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded
Date of Decision: June 20, 2023
APPEARANCES:
Jared B. Chamberlain for Appellant
Case No. 17-22-11
ZIMMERMAN, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Rohit Chandra (“Chandra”), appeals the
September 26, 2022 judgment of the Sidney Municipal Court granting judgment in
favor of plaintiff-appellee, Doors On-Line, Inc. (“Doors On-Line”). For the reasons
that follow, we reverse.
{¶2} This case stems from Chandra’s, a resident of California, purchase of a
garage door from Doors On-Line. Doors On-Line, an Ohio corporation, “is an
online dealership for a manufacturer of a couple different lines of doors, a
nationwide dealership * * * .” (Sept. 20, 2022 Tr. at 12). Importantly, once a
purchase is completed, an out-of-state manufacturer, not Doors On-Line, schedules
the installation and ships the product. (See id. at 53).
{¶3} Here, Chandra initially purchased a garage door from Doors On-Line
on May 28, 2020. Significantly, because Chandra’s order “was a very customized
order [, it] had to [be] placed by phone.” (Id. at 15). As a result of Chandra’s order,
a “sight check by the installer” was scheduled for July 8, 2020 to “verify that
everything on the order [would] allow [the garage door] to be installed properly.”
(Id. at 16). (See also Plaintiff’s Ex. 2). However, because Chandra requested
“various changes that needed to be made to the order for the installer to complete
the work,” “a new order [was] placed on July 29, 2020 to incorporate the various
changes.” (Doc. No. 8). The garage door was installed in October 2020.
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{¶4} Nevertheless, since Chandra was not satisfied with the installation of
the garage door, he filed a complaint with his credit-card company, which
“reversed” the charge. (See Sept. 20, 2022 Tr. at 39). As a result, Doors On-Line
did not receive payment for the garage door or installation costs. Consequently, on
November 1, 2021, Doors On-Line filed a small-claims complaint in the Sidney
Municipal Court seeking a judgment in the amount of $3,253.51, plus interest, from
Chandra.
{¶5} Chandra filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for a lack of personal
jurisdiction on February 11, 2022. On February 25, 2022, Doors On-Line filed a
memorandum in opposition to Chandra’s motion to dismiss. On May 23, 2022, the
trial court denied Chandra’s motion to dismiss without a hearing after concluding
that Doors On-Line satisfied its burden of proving that the trial court has personal
jurisdiction over Chandra since he had minimum contacts in Ohio. Specifically, the
trial court concluded that Doors-Online proved that Chandra had minimum contacts
in Ohio since Doors-Online “has [its] own website which [Chandra] used to contact
[Doors On-Line] for materials and services” and such “website * * * clearly
indicates [Doors On-Line’s] address in Russia, Shelby County, Ohio.” (Doc. No.
22).
{¶6} On August 5, 2022, Chandra filed his answer along with counterclaims
for breach of contract, a violation of Ohio’s consumer sales practices act, and design
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defect. Doors On-Line filed its answer to Chandra’s counterclaims on August 19,
2022.
{¶7} The case proceeded to a bench trial on September 20, 2022. On
September 26, 2022, the trial court, again concluding that it had personal jurisdiction
over Chandra, awarded judgment in favor of Doors On-Line for $2,528.51—the cost
of only the garage door. (Doc. No. 34).
{¶8} Chandra filed his notice of appeal on October 24, 2022. He raises one
assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
The Trial Court incorrectly determined it had personal
jurisdiction over Defendant/Appellant, a California resident
with no minimum contacts with Ohio.
{¶9} In his sole assignment of error, Chandra argues that the trial court erred
by concluding that it had personal jurisdiction over him because “[h]e has no
connection to Ohio, except a single online consumer purchase of a garage door from
an Ohio corporation known as Doors On-Line” that he “purchased * * * via Internet
transaction on May 28, 2020.” (Appellant’s Brief at 1). Specifically, Chandra
contends that he “had absolutely no reason – other than the obscurely located
address on the bottom/left corner of [Doors On-Line’s] website – to know he was
dealing with an Ohio corporation, and” his “single online purchase” “falls well short
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of the threshold whereby Ohio could exercise personal jurisdiction over him.” (Id.
at 3). We agree.
Standard of Review
{¶10} “Whether personal jurisdiction exists is a question of law that we
review de novo.” Wedemeyer v. U.S.S. F.D.R (CV-42) Reunion Assoc., 3d Dist.
Allen No. 1-09-57, 2010-Ohio-1502, ¶ 37. “De novo review is independent and
without deference to the trial court’s determination.” ISHA, Inc. v. Risser, 3d Dist.
Allen No. 1-12-47, 2013-Ohio-2149, ¶ 25.
Analysis
{¶11} In this case, the trial court concluded that Doors On-Line presented
sufficient evidence for reasonable minds to conclude that it could exercise personal
jurisdiction over Chandra. Specifically, the trial court found that Doors On-Line
“has their [sic] own website which [Chandra] used to contact [Doors On-Line] for
materials and services” and that the website “clearly indicates [Doors On-Line’s]
address in Russia, Shelby County, Ohio.” (Doc. No. 22).
{¶12} However, Chandra argues that the trial court erred by concluding that
it had personal jurisdiction over him because its assertion of personal jurisdiction in
this case does not comport with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In particular, Chandra contends that the trial court does not have
specific jurisdiction over him since he did not have “minimum contacts with the
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State of Ohio * * * .” (Appellant’s Brief at 8). That is, Chandra argues that (1) he
“did not purposely avail himself of any privilege of doing business in the State of
Ohio where he merely used a publicly available website to complete a single
consumer transaction”; (2) “the cause of action does not arise from [his] activities
in Ohio”; and (3) he does not have a “substantial connection to Ohio * * * .”
(Emphasis sic.) (Id.).
{¶13} Doors On-Line did not respond to Chandra’s appellate argument
because it failed to file a brief in this case. Under such circumstances, App.R. 18(C)
provides that this court “may accept the appellant’s statement of the facts and issues
as correct and reverse the judgment if appellant’s brief reasonably appears to sustain
such action.” See Spinner v. Barger, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-16-27, 2017-Ohio-
1489, ¶ 5, fn. 1. After reviewing the record, and for the following reasons, we
conclude that Chandra’s brief reasonably appears to sustain a reversal.
{¶14} “This Court applies a two-part inquiry when deciding whether an out-
of-state defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in an Ohio court.” Magnum
Asset Acquisition, LLC v. Green Energy Techs., LLC, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29789,
2022-Ohio-2247, ¶ 7. “‘First, the court must determine whether the defendant’s
conduct falls within Ohio’s long-arm statute or the applicable civil rule.’” Id.,quoting Fraley v. Estate of Oeding, 138 Ohio St.3d 250, 2014-Ohio-452, ¶ 12. “If
it does, then the court must consider whether the assertion of jurisdiction over the
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nonresident defendant would deprive the defendant of due process of law under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Id., quoting Fraley at ¶
12.
{¶15} “Once a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal
jurisdiction under Civ.R. 12(B)(2), the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant.” Wedemeyer, 2010-Ohio-1502, at ¶ 37.
“[T]he trial court has the discretion to rule upon the motion with or without a
hearing.” Magnum at ¶ 7. “When a court determines personal jurisdiction without
an evidentiary hearing, it must ‘view allegations in the pleadings and documentary
evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party’ and ‘resolv[e] all
reasonable competing inferences’ in favor of the non-moving party.” Wedemeyer
at ¶ 37, quoting Goldstein v. Christiansen, 70 Ohio St.3d 232, 236 (1994) and
Giachetti v. Holmes, 14 Ohio App.3d 306, 307 (1984) (8th Dist.).
{¶16} “Where * * * the trial court determines personal jurisdiction without
an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only establish a prima facie showing of
personal jurisdiction, which requires sufficient evidence to allow reasonable minds
to conclude that the trial court has personal jurisdiction.” Austin Miller Am.
Antiques, Inc. v. Cavallaro, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-400, 2011-Ohio-6670, ¶
7. See also Wedemeyer at ¶ 37 (“In order to make a prima facie showing of personal
jurisdiction, ‘the plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence to allow reasonable
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minds to conclude that personal jurisdiction exists over the defendant.’”), quoting
Parshall v. PAID, Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-1019, 2008-Ohio-3171, ¶ 9.
“If the plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction, the trial
court shall not dismiss the complaint before it holds an evidentiary hearing.” Austin
Miller at ¶ 7.
{¶17} The determination of whether an Ohio court has personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant, depends on “(1) whether R.C. 2307.382(A), Ohio’s
long-arm statute, and Civ.R. 4.3 permit the court to assert personal jurisdiction; and,
if so, (2) whether bringing the defendant within the jurisdiction of the Ohio courts
would violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice under the Due
Process Clause.” Wedemeyer at ¶ 38. “Ohio’s long-arm statute, R.C. 2307.382,
outlines specific activities that allow Ohio courts to exert personal jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant.” Id. at ¶ 39. Specifically, “‘R.C. 2307.382 and Civ.R.
4.3(A) allow Ohio courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in
causes of action arising from several enumerated circumstances,’ including a
nonresident’s ‘[t]ransacting any business in this state.’” Figley v. Ivex Protective
Packaging, Inc., 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-16-02, 2016-Ohio-3501, ¶ 18, quoting
Cincinnati Equine v. Sandringham Farm, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150067, 2016-
Ohio-803, ¶ 12, and citing R.C. 2307.382(A)(1) and Civ.R. 4.3(A)(1).
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{¶18} “The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized ‘transacting any business’
as ‘a broad statement of jurisdiction’ and questions concerning the application of
R.C. 2307.382(A)(1) are resolved upon ‘highly particularized fact situations, thus
rendering any generalization unwarranted.’” Magnum at ¶ 9, quoting U.S. Sprint
Communications Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Mr. K’s Foods, Inc., 68 Ohio St.3d 181,
185 (1994). “Thus, a court must determine, case-by-case, whether a nonresident is
transacting business in the state of Ohio.” Id., quoting U.S. Sprint at 185.
{¶19} “[T]he term ‘transact’ as utilized in the phrase ‘transacting any
business’ means ‘to carry on business’ and ‘to have dealings’ and is broader than
the word ‘contract.’” Id. at ¶ 10, quoting Morgan Adhesives Co. v. Sonicor
Instrument Corp., 107 Ohio App.3d 327, 332 (9th Dist.1995), quoting Goldstein, 70
Ohio St.3d at 236. “Therefore, the term encompasses more than just the creation of
a contract and can include business negotiations.” Ashton Park Apts., Ltd. v.
Carlton-Naumann Constr., Inc., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-08-1395, 2009-Ohio-6335,
¶ 15. Furthermore, “‘[t]ransacting business in Ohio does not require the nonresident
party to have a physical presence in Ohio.’” Magnum at ¶ 10, quoting MJM
Holdings Inc. v. Sims, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28952, 2019-Ohio-514, ¶ 14. “One
factor that may be considered, but is not determinative as to transacting business, is
whether the nonresident initiated the business dealing.” Id.-9-
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{¶20} Importantly, “[u]se of the internet to ‘transact business’ in Ohio can
result in application of Ohio’s long-arm statute.” Ashton Park Apts. at ¶ 15, quoting
Parshall, 2008-Ohio-3171, at ¶ 16. However, “[t]he determination of when internet
use constitutes ‘transacting business’ depends upon the type of internet activity
involved.” Id., quoting Parshall at ¶ 16.
{¶21} “If it is determined that the defendant is subject to Ohio’s long-arm
statute, we proceed to ask whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction by an Ohio
court comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at
¶ 11. See also Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts, 126 Ohio St.3d 81, 2010-
Ohio-2551, ¶ 45 (noting that “Ohio’s long-arm statute is not coterminous with due
process”). However, if “‘a court decides that jurisdiction is improper under Ohio’s
long-arm statute, it need not address whether due-process requirements have been
met.’” Figley, 2016-Ohio-3501, at ¶ 17, quoting Starks v. Choice Hotels Internatl.,
175 Ohio App.3d 510, 2007-Ohio-1019, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.).
{¶22} “In order to comport with the due process requirement, a defendant
must ‘have certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.”’” Magnum at ¶ 12, quoting Internatl. Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
“‘This due process requirement may be satisfied where the forum state has either
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specific or general jurisdiction over a nonresident.’” Id., quoting State ex rel.
DeWine v. 9150 Group, L.P., 9th Dist. Summit No. 25939, 2012-Ohio-3339, ¶ 18.
{¶23} “‘Specific jurisdiction exists when a plaintiff’s cause of action is
related to, or arises out of, the defendant’s contact with the forum state.’”
Wedemeyer, 2010-Ohio-1502, at ¶ 40, quoting Parshall, 2008-Ohio-3171, at ¶ 23.
“‘Conversely, general jurisdiction exists when a court exercises personal
jurisdiction over a defendant in a cause of action that does not arise out of or relate
to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.’” Id., quoting Parshall at ¶ 23. In
this case, we are concerned with whether the trial court had specific jurisdiction over
Chandra. Accord Magnum at ¶ 12.
{¶24} To establish specific jurisdiction, three requirements must be met:
“First, defendant must purposely avail himself of the privilege of
acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state.
Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant’s activities
there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or consequence caused by the
defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum
state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant
reasonable.
Id. at ¶ 13, quoting 9150 Group at ¶ 19. See also Wedemeyer at ¶ 39.
{¶25} “The first two requirements establish a defendant’s ‘minimum
contacts’ with the forum.” Magnum at ¶ 13, quoting 9150 Group at ¶ 19. “The last
requires the court to determine if exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant
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comports with the ideas of ‘fair play and substantial justice.’” Id., quoting 9150
Group at ¶ 19.
{¶26} “The first requirement of ‘purposeful availment’ looks to ‘whether the
defendant purposely availed himself of the privilege of acting in the forum state or
causing a consequence in the forum state.’” Id. at ¶ 14, quoting Kauffman, 126 Ohio
St.3d 81, 2010-Ohio-2551, at ¶ 51. “‘Purposeful availment’ is present when the
defendant’s contacts with the forum state proximately result from actions by the
defendant that create a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum State.” Id., quoting
Kauffman at ¶ 51.
Where a defendant has “deliberately” engaged in significant activities
within a State or has created “continuing obligations” between
[himself] and residents of the forum, [he] has manifestly availed
[himself] of the privilege of conducting business there, and because
[his] activities are shielded by “the benefits and protections” of the
forum state’s laws, it is presumptively not unreasonable to require
[him] to submit to the burdens of litigation in the forum as well.
Id., quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-476, 105 S.Ct. 2174
(1985). “The defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum state must be such
that it ‘should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there’ and not solely as
a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts.” Id., quoting Kauffman
at ¶ 51. “This likewise ensures the defendant will not be subjected to another state’s
jurisdiction based on the unilateral activity of another party or a third person.” Id.“‘Courts must examine the quality and nature of all the contacts a nonresident
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defendant makes with the forum during the course of the parties’ contractual
relationship.’” Id., quoting Barnabus Consulting Ltd. v. Riverside Health Sys., Inc.,
10th Dist. Franklin No. 07AP-1014, 2008-Ohio-3287, ¶ 22.
{¶27} “The second prong requires the plaintiff’s cause of action arise from
the defendant’s contacts with Ohio.” Id. at ¶ 15. “‘If a defendant’s contacts with
the forum state are related to the operative facts of the controversy, then an action
will be deemed to have arisen from those contacts.”’” Id., quoting Kauffman at ¶
70, quoting CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1267 (6th Cir.1996).
“The cause of action needs to have a substantial connection with the defendant’s in-
state activities.” Id. See also Wedemeyer, 2010-Ohio-1502, at ¶ 41 (“‘“Minimum
contacts” has been defined as conduct which creates a substantial connection to the
forum state, creates continuing obligations between a defendant and a resident of
the forum, or conducting significant activities within a state.’”), quoting Hercules
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Murphy, 133 Ohio App.3d 97, 101 (3d Dist.1999).
{¶28} “If the court determines that the defendant has the necessary minimum
contacts within the forum state for specific jurisdiction, the court must then
determine whether asserting personal jurisdiction over the defendant would ‘offend
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”’” Wedemeyer at ¶ 42,
quoting Parshall, 2008-Ohio-3171, at ¶ 25, quoting Internatl. Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320,
quoting Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463. To do so, the trial court must evaluate five
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factors: (1) the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum State’s interest in resolving
the dispute; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief;
(4) the interstate-judicial system’s interest in obtaining an efficient resolution to the
controversy; and (5) “‘the shared interest of the several States in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies.’” Burger King at 477, quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 100 S.Ct. 559 (1980).
{¶29} Generally, “‘[i]f the first two prongs are satisfied, there is an inference
the third prong is also satisfied.’” Magnum, 2022-Ohio-2247, at ¶ 16, quoting MJM
Holdings, 2019-Ohio-514, at ¶ 42. “‘Only in unusual circumstances is the third
element left unsatisfied, and it is the burden of the defendant to show it.’” Id.,quoting MJM Holdings at ¶ 42.
{¶30} “The development and advances in technology have required Federal
and State Courts to tackle unique situations such as the one presented in the instant
action.” Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts, 5th Dist. Knox No. 07-CA-14,
2008-Ohio-1922, ¶ 27. “‘Traditionally, when an entity intentionally reaches beyond
its boundaries to conduct business with foreign residents, the exercise of specific
jurisdiction is proper.’” Id. at ¶ 31, quoting Burger King at 475. Importantly,
“[d]ifferent results should not be reached simply because business is conducted over
the Internet.” Id., quoting Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1119,
1124 (W.D.Pa.1997). “A non-resident defendant who avails himself of the
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expansive reach of the Internet should not be able to use his non-residency as a
shield against defending tortious activity against a plaintiff harmed in a different
state.” Id. at ¶ 32.
{¶31} Even assuming without deciding that Chandra transacted business in
Ohio, we conclude that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him is not
permissible under the Due Process Clause. Accord Austin Miller, 2011-Ohio-6670,
at ¶ 21; Parshall, 2008-Ohio-3171, at ¶ 22. That is, based on our review of the
record, we conclude that Chandra had insufficient contacts with Ohio to justify the
exercise of personal jurisdiction. Accord Austin Miller at ¶ 21. Indeed, the record
reflects that Chandra did not purposely avail himself of the privilege of acting or
causing a consequence in Ohio.
{¶32} Importantly, several courts have “recognized that a single, isolated act
is generally insufficient to establish the requisite minimum contacts.” Id. at ¶ 18.
See also Barnabus, 2008-Ohio-3287, at ¶ 23 (“Generally, ‘“a one-shot deal” or a
single, isolated act’ is insufficient to establish the necessary minimum contacts for
the exercise of jurisdiction”), quoting Ricker v. Bobcat of Orlando, Inc., 10th Dist.
Franklin No. 04AP-481, 2004-Ohio-6070, ¶ 17. Stated another way, a contract for
a single-consumer purchase in a forum state, standing alone, “‘cannot be
constitutionally subject to the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the courts of the
forum state.’” Austin Miller at ¶ 16, quoting Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v.
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Lovett & Tharpe, Inc., 786 F.2d 1055, 1059 (11th Cir.1986). Instead, to determine
whether a party’s contacts constitute purposeful availment, courts must examine the
quality of the contacts, not the number or status of such contacts. Ricker v.
Mercedes-Benz of Georgetown, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 21AP-43, 2022-Ohio-1860,
¶ 32.
{¶33} Based on the facts presented, we conclude that the “quality” of the
contacts in this case to constitute the purposeful availment of Chandra to Ohio is
missing. Accord Reynolds at 1119. Importantly, the parties’ agreement amounted
to “a single contract for the sale of goods.” Barnabus at ¶ 23. Accord Hwy. Auto
Sales, Inc. v. Auto-Konig of Scottsdale, Inc., 943 F.Supp. 825, 831 (N.D.Ohio 1996)
(“Advertising in a nationally circulated publication, negotiating the sale of a single
vehicle over telephone and fax lines, and arranging the delivery of the vehicle to the
forum state involve contacts of a short and fleeting character—contacts which are
insufficient to create a ‘realistic and foreseeable impact’ on the commerce of Ohio”).
Indeed, the parties’ agreement does not contemplate ongoing obligations. See Hwy.
Auto Sales at 831 (concluding that the “defendant’s contacts cannot be characterized
as creating ‘continuing obligations”’ to or an ongoing relationship with plaintiff”).
{¶34} Furthermore, even though the trial court makes much about Doors On-
Line’s website, the record reflects that Chandra initiated his relationship with Doors
On-Line through a telephone call. However, that telephone communication is
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“‘insufficient to establish purposeful availment.’” Hwy. Auto Sales at 831 (“Even
though defendant advertised in a national publication and, through its General
Manager, initiated a phone call to Liber for purposes of explaining the condition and
quality of the automobile, such communications ‘are insufficient to establish
purposeful availment.’”), quoting Reynolds at 1119. Accord Joffe v. Cable Tech,
Inc., 163 Ohio App.3d 479, 2005-Ohio-4930, ¶ 33 (10th Dist.) (concluding that the
“telephone communications” in that case were “[in]sufficient to establish the
requisite ‘minimum contacts’”). Significantly, “the use of interstate facilities,
including telephone, mail, and e-mail, are secondary or ancillary factors and cannot
alone provide the ‘minimum contacts’ required by due process.” Magnum, 2022-
Ohio-2247, at ¶ 27.
{¶35} Likewise, the record reflects that Chandra’s activities did not create a
substantial connection with Ohio for the trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction
over him. Rather, Chandra’s connection with Ohio is better characterized as
“‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts.” Magnum at ¶ 14, quoting
Kauffman, 126 Ohio St.3d 81, 2010-Ohio-2551, at ¶ 51. Critically, the record
reflects that the parties negotiated the contract for the garage door (over the
telephone) but that the manufacturer (in another state) coordinated construction,
shipment, and installation of the garage door in Chandra’s home state. Compare
Hammill Mfg. Co. v. Quality Rubber Prod., Inc., 82 Ohio App.3d 369, 371 (6th
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Dist.1992) (concluding that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over the
nonresident defendant because, in part, the product was designed and built in Ohio).
Further, the record reveals that even though Chandra and Doors On-Line exchanged
emails following the initiation with the project, the totality of those messages reflect
that Doors On-Line simply forwarded Chandra’s concerns to the manufacturer (in
another state) and that the manufacturer provided proposed resolutions to Chandra
in his home state. See Joffe at ¶ 33 (concluding that communications, originating in
the forum state, are “insignificant to the specific jurisdiction inquiry”). In other
words, based on the facts presented, there is insufficient evidence reflecting that
Chandra could reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Ohio.
{¶36} For these reasons, we conclude that Chandra’s contacts with Ohio do
“not rise to the level of a ‘substantial connection’” with Ohio which would allow
him to “‘reasonably anticipate being haled into court’” here. XPX Armor & Equip.,
Inc. v. SkyLIFE Co., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-20-1123, 2021-Ohio-2559, ¶ 35, quoting
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474-475. Therefore, Doors On-Line failed to establish
that Chandra had the necessary minimum contacts with Ohio for the trial court to
exercise jurisdiction.
{¶37} Accordingly, “[w]ithout the requisite ‘minimum contacts,’ our
specific jurisdiction inquiry ends, and we need not examine whether asserting
personal jurisdiction over appellees comports with ‘“fair play and substantial
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justice.”’” Joffe at ¶ 35, quoting Burger King at 477. Consequently, since Doors
On-Line failed to establish the requisite “minimum contacts” relevant to the contract
for the garage door executed with Chandra, “we conclude that the due process clause
preclude[s] the trial court from exercising personal jurisdiction over [Chandra]
through specific jurisdiction.” Id. Thus, we conclude that the trial court erred by
concluding that it had personal jurisdiction over Chandra.
{¶38} Chandra’s assignment of error is sustained.
{¶39} Having found error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the particulars
assigned and argued, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for
further proceedings.
Judgment Reversed and
Cause Remanded
MILLER, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.
/jlr
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