In re I.J. , 2023 Ohio 2024 ( 2023 )


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  • [Cite as In re I.J., 
    2023-Ohio-2024
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
    HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
    IN RE: I.J.                                :     APPEAL NO. C-220553
    TRIAL NO. 10-9269Z
    :
    :       O P I N I O N.
    Appeal From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court
    Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded
    Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: June 21, 2023
    Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Keith Sauter,
    Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
    Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Jessica R. Moss, Assistant
    Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    BERGERON, Presiding Judge.
    {¶1}   In 2021, defendant-appellant I.J. sought to seal and expunge 46 cases
    from his juvenile record. Ultimately, the juvenile court sealed and expunged 45 of the
    46 cases. I.J. presently appeals the denial of his application for the remaining case,
    arguing that the juvenile court abused its discretion. We agree, reverse the juvenile
    court’s judgment, and remand this cause with instructions for the juvenile court to seal
    and expunge the record of the remaining case.
    I.
    {¶2}   In December 2021, 28-year-old I.J. filed applications to seal and
    expunge his juvenile record, which contained 46 cases. The following month, a
    magistrate denied I.J.’s applications without a hearing, based on “the interests of
    society or in the interests of justice.” At this point, the procedural history becomes
    somewhat messy.
    {¶3}   One juvenile court judge handled the cases ending in “X” (the “X cases”)
    and a second judge addressed the remaining cases—those ending in “Z” (the “Z cases”).
    The first judge rejected the magistrate’s decision and granted sealing and
    expungement of the record of the X cases after finding that I.J. had been rehabilitated.
    With respect to the Z cases, I.J. filed an objection to the magistrate’s decision in
    February 2022. In July 2022, the juvenile court granted I.J.’s objection in part and
    ordered the magistrate to conduct a hearing on the Z cases to determine whether I.J.
    had been sufficiently rehabilitated. The matter was then returned to the magistrate
    for the hearing.
    {¶4}   Later in July, at the hearing, the magistrate indicated that I.J. owed
    outstanding restitution in the case numbered 10-9269Z, which reflected a charge for
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    what would be breaking and entering if committed by an adult. Although I.J. did not
    appear for the hearing, counsel informed the magistrate that I.J. had stayed out of
    trouble and had not been convicted of a felony since 2015. Counsel also explained that
    the first judge had sealed and expunged the records of the X cases after finding I.J.
    rehabilitated. In arguing against sealing and expungement, the state raised I.J.’s adult
    record, including a 2018 misdemeanor drug charge and various traffic offenses.
    {¶5}    Following the hearing, the magistrate granted sealing and expungement
    in all I.J.’s remaining cases except for the case numbered 10-9269Z, the case in which
    he failed to pay restitution. In sum, 45 of I.J.’s 46 juvenile cases were sealed and
    expunged from his record upon sufficient findings of his rehabilitation.
    {¶6}    In August 2022, I.J. filed an objection to the magistrate’s decision
    regarding the case numbered 10-9269Z, and he supplemented the objection in
    September. In October, following a hearing on the matter, the juvenile court denied
    I.J.’s objection. The court noted that the magistrate erred in basing her denial of I.J.’s
    application on the “interests of society or in the interests of justice,” but from its own
    independent review of the record, the court determined that the magistrate reached
    the appropriate legal conclusion.      The court reviewed various factors, including
    continued criminal behavior, failure to pay restitution, and lack of affirmative
    evidence of rehabilitation due to I.J.’s failure to appear in court, in concluding that the
    magistrate had properly denied I.J.’s request for sealing and expungement of his
    record in the case numbered 10-9269Z. I.J. now appeals this decision.
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    II.
    {¶7}    In his sole assignment of error, I.J. maintains that the juvenile court
    erred by refusing to seal and expunge his juvenile record in the case numbered 10-
    9269Z. He insists that the court abused its discretion when it denied his request
    because he had demonstrated sufficient rehabilitation, and that the court’s decision
    was contrary to the purposes and principles of the juvenile justice system. I.J. also
    argues that the court erred in considering his failure to pay restitution in this case as
    a factor indicating a lack of rehabilitation.
    {¶8}    “The sealing of a record of a criminal conviction is a privilege, not a
    right.” State v. D.K., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106539, 
    2018-Ohio-2522
    , ¶ 13. But
    sealing and expungement provisions are remedial in nature and are to be liberally
    construed. See State v. A.S., 
    2022-Ohio-3833
    , 
    199 N.E.3d 994
    , ¶ 7 (1st Dist.); D.K. at
    ¶ 13, quoting State v. M.D., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92534, 
    2009-Ohio-5694
    , ¶ 9.
    Moreover, statutory provisions “ ‘regarding the sealing of juvenile delinquency records
    promote [the] goals of rehabilitation and reintegration into society by permitting
    rehabilitated offenders to have their records sealed so that they can leave their
    youthful offenses in the past.’ ” In re C.T., 5th Dist. Licking No. 11 CA 19, 2011-Ohio-
    4275, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Bloomer, 
    122 Ohio St.3d 200
    , 
    2009-Ohio-2462
    , 
    909 N.E.2d 1254
    , ¶ 54; see In re H.S., 
    2020-Ohio-4530
    , 
    159 N.E.3d 344
    , ¶ 24 (11th Dist.).
    Sealing and expungement provisions provide persons “who have demonstrated
    rehabilitation with a second chance, so that they can avoid [the] collateral
    consequences of a criminal record and the associated obstacles to becoming a thriving
    and productive member of society.” A.S. at ¶ 10, citing State v. R.S., 1st Dist. Hamilton
    Nos. C-210169, C-210170, C-210171, C-210172 and C-210173, 
    2022-Ohio-1108
    , ¶ 10.
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    {¶9}   We review the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. See In re
    A.J., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-210111, 
    2021-Ohio-3917
    , ¶ 6 (“Generally, appellate
    courts review a trial court’s decision whether to seal records under an abuse-of-
    discretion standard.”). We will thus not reverse the trial court’s judgment unless the
    court has exercised its discretionary judgment over the matter in an unwarranted way
    or committed legal error. See Johnson v. Abdullah, 
    166 Ohio St.3d 427
    , 2021-Ohio-
    3304, 
    187 N.E.3d 463
    , ¶ 35.
    {¶10} The juvenile record sealing statute provides, in relevant part, that “the
    court may order the records of the person that are the subject of the motion or
    application to be sealed if it finds that the person has been rehabilitated to a
    satisfactory degree.” R.C. 2151.356(C)(2)(e). In determining whether the person has
    been satisfactorily rehabilitated, the court may consider all of the following:
    (i) The age of the person;
    (ii) The nature of the case;
    (iii) The cessation or continuation of delinquent, unruly, or criminal
    behavior;
    (iv) The education and employment history of the person;
    (v) The granting of a new tier classification or declassification from the
    juvenile offender registry * * *;
    (vi) Any other circumstances that may relate to the rehabilitation of the
    person who is the subject of the records under consideration.
    
    Id.
    {¶11} Here, the juvenile court weighed these statutory factors and made
    various findings. The court concluded that the magistrate properly denied I.J.’s
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    application for sealing and expungement of the case numbered 10-9269Z, after
    considering I.J.’s age (29 years old), the nature of the offense (if he were an adult at
    the time of the offense, breaking and entering—a felony of the fifth degree), the
    continuation of delinquent or criminal behavior (a 2015 traffic-related felony
    conviction, 2018 misdemeanor drug charge, and various traffic offenses), education
    and employment history (noting that there is no evidence in the record regarding I.J.’s
    employment and education), and other circumstances that may relate to rehabilitation
    (the failure to pay restitution in this case).
    {¶12} In light of the findings of rehabilitation in 45 of the 46 cases on his
    juvenile record, for the juvenile court’s denial of the application to seal and expunge
    the record of the final case to constitute a proper exercise of its discretion, there would
    need to exist a compelling rationale for reaching a different outcome in the remaining
    case. Because I.J.’s age, adult record, and education and employment history are
    consistent factors across all 46 cases, they cannot justify the different conclusion
    reached by the juvenile court in this case. And from our review of the record, we
    conclude that the remaining factors weighed by the court—the nature of the offense
    and the “other circumstances” factor (here, nonpayment of restitution)—fail to provide
    a sufficient basis for the denial of I.J.’s application to seal and expunge the record of
    the case numbered 10-9269Z where the courts found him to have been satisfactorily
    rehabilitated in the other 45 cases on his juvenile record.
    {¶13} Turning first to the nature of the case—the offense in this case was for
    breaking and entering, a felony of the fifth degree if committed by an adult. I.J.
    committed the offense when he was just 17 years old, 12 years prior to the juvenile
    court’s decision. The crime was nonviolent, and in light of I.J.’s sparse adult record,
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    the nature of the case cannot, on its own, support the juvenile court’s decision adopting
    the magistrate’s denial of the application to seal and expunge the record of this case.
    Additionally, the nature of the offense is the only legitimate factor weighed by the court
    differentiating the case at hand from the cases in which I.J. was found to have been
    rehabilitated, and “the nature of the offense ‘cannot provide the sole basis to deny an
    application.’ ” A.S., 
    2022-Ohio-3833
    , 
    199 N.E.3d 994
    , at ¶ 15, quoting R.S., 1st Dist.
    Hamilton Nos. C-210169, C-210170, C-210171, C-210172 and C-210173, 2022-Ohio-
    1108, at ¶ 29.
    {¶14} We turn next to a review of the “other circumstances” factor, under
    which the juvenile court considered I.J.’s failure to pay restitution. The juvenile court
    relies on this court’s decision in State v. Ushery, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-120515,
    
    2013-Ohio-2509
    , in weighing I.J.’s nonpayment of restitution as a factor bearing on
    his rehabilitation. However, Ushery addresses the consideration of nonpayment of
    court costs in determining whether to seal adult cases. Ushery at ¶ 15 (“[Defendant’s]
    failure to pay the court costs is a factor that the trial court can consider when
    determining, in the exercise of its discretion, whether [defendant] has been
    rehabilitated such that expungement of her [adult] conviction is appropriate.”).
    Juvenile cases are distinguishable, because a juvenile court may no longer exercise its
    jurisdiction over a person once that person reaches the age of 21. Accordingly, “when
    a juvenile has been adjudicated delinquent prior to his 18th birthday, any dispositional
    order that the juvenile court makes, including an order of restitution, terminates by
    operation of law on the juvenile’s 21st birthday.” (Emphasis added.) In re J.Z., 6th
    Dist. Huron No. H-11-003, 
    2012-Ohio-1105
    , ¶ 11; R.C. 2151.38; R.C. 2152.22(A)
    (“[D]ispositional orders made by the court under this chapter shall be temporary and
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    shall continue for a period that is designated by the court in its order, until terminated
    or modified by the court or until the child attains twenty-one years of age.”); R.C.
    2152.o2(C)(6); In re R.K., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84948, 
    2004-Ohio-6918
    , ¶ 6, 15-16
    (holding that the juvenile court’s jurisdiction to collect court costs, fines, and to impose
    other sanctions ends when the person reaches the age of 21). As such, an adult
    applicant’s failure to pay restitution in a juvenile case is probative only of that person
    at 21 years old, not whether he or she is rehabilitated at the time of applying for sealing
    and expungement. Here, the juvenile court issued its decision when I.J. was 29 years
    old—over 8 years after the juvenile court lost jurisdiction over him and the order of
    restitution terminated.
    {¶15} Therefore, in light of the record at hand and the fact that 45 of I.J.’s 46
    juvenile cases were sealed and expunged upon findings of rehabilitation, we conclude
    that the juvenile court’s findings in the case numbered 10-9269Z were not so
    dissimilar to the findings in the 45 sealed and expunged cases to warrant the different
    outcome in this case. The court’s decision to the contrary represents an abuse of
    discretion, see Johnson, 
    166 Ohio St.3d 427
    , 
    2021-Ohio-3304
    , 
    187 N.E.3d 463
    , at ¶ 35,
    so we sustain I.J.’s assignment of error.
    *       *       *
    {¶16} In light of the foregoing analysis, we sustain I.J.’s sole assignment of
    error. We reverse the judgment of the juvenile court and remand this matter to the
    court with instructions to seal and expunge the record of I.J.’s juvenile adjudication in
    the case numbered 10-9269Z.
    Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
    BOCK and KINSLEY, JJ., concur.
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    Please note:
    The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
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