State v. Bell , 2023 Ohio 2073 ( 2023 )

[Cite as State v. Bell, 2023-Ohio-2073.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-220372
TRIAL NO. B-0700957A
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. : O P I N I O N.
WILLIE BELL, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: June 23, 2023
Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Willie Bell, pro se.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
KINSLEY, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Willie Bell appeals the judgment of the Hamilton
County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his “Motion to Vacate Sentence Impartial
on Counts 1 & 3 and To Appoint Counsel to Furthermore Liberate Claim.” For the
following reasons, we affirm the court’s judgment.
Factual and Procedural History
{¶2} In 2007, Bell was convicted of three counts of aggravated robbery, each
with an accompanying gun specification, and one count of failure to comply with the
order or signal of a police officer. The trial court imposed an aggregate 22-year prison
term for these offenses. We affirmed Bell’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal.
State v. Bell, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-070804 and C-070805 (Sept. 24, 2008). In
2014 and 2018, Bell filed postconviction motions seeking to vacate his convictions and
sentences, arguing that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over his case
due to “a lack of a charging instrument” or a deficient charging instrument. The
common pleas court denied both these motions, specifically finding that because a
proper indictment had been filed, the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over
the proceedings leading to Bell’s convictions. Bell did not appeal the denial of these
motions.
{¶3} In Bell’s most recent postconviction motion, he seeks to vacate his
convictions and sentences for counts one and three of aggravated robbery. Although Bell
raises numerous grounds for relief in his motion, most of his claims either relate to his
arguments that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to investigate
the charges against him or that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over his
case. Additionally, he also raises statutory challenges to his sentences.
{¶4} On appeal from the dismissal of his motion, Bell raises nine assignments
of error. We address his assignments of error out of order for ease of discussion.
Claims Reviewable and Subject to Dismissal Under R.C. 2953.21 et seq.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶5} Bell’s second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth assignments of error
essentially restate the claims made in his motion that his trial counsel was
constitutionally ineffective for failing to investigate the charges against him and may
thus fairly be read to challenge the dismissal of those claims.
{¶6} It is unclear from the record what standard the common pleas court
used to review Bell’s motion. But the Ohio Supreme Court has held that “[w]here a
criminal defendant, subsequent to his or her direct appeal, files a motion seeking
vacation or correction of his or her sentence on the basis that his or her constitutional
rights have been violated, such a motion is a petition for postconviction relief as
defined in R.C. 2953.21.” State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 679 N.E.2d 1131 (1997);
State v. Parker, 157 Ohio St.3d 460, 2019-Ohio-3848, 137 N.E.3d 1151, ¶ 16. Because
Bell is seeking to vacate two of his convictions on constitutional grounds, the common
pleas court should have reviewed Bell’s motion as a postconviction petition under the
standards provided by R.C. 2953.21 et seq.
{¶7} Bell filed his motion well after the expiration of the time prescribed by
R.C. 2953.21(A)(2). However, a common pleas court may entertain a late
postconviction petition if the petition satisfies the jurisdictional requirements of R.C.
2953.23. But Bell cannot satisfy those requirements as the record does not
demonstrate that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering the facts underlying
his postconviction claims or that his claims were predicated upon a new or
retrospectively applicable federal or state right recognized by the United States
Supreme Court since the time for filing a postconviction petition had expired. Because
Bell satisfied neither the time strictures of R.C. 2953.21(A)(2) nor the jurisdictional
requirements of R.C. 2953.23(A), the postconviction statutes did not confer upon the
common pleas court jurisdiction to entertain Bell’s postconviction claims related to
his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, and those claims were subject to dismissal. See R.C.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
2953.21(D) and (F) and 2953.23(A). Accordingly, we overrule the second, third,
fourth, fifth, and sixth assignments of error.
Res Judicata Bars Challenge to Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
{¶8} In his first assignment of error, Bell contends that the common pleas
court erred by dismissing his claims challenging the trial court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction over the criminal proceedings leading to his convictions. We disagree.
Although a challenge to a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time,
see Dikong v. Ohio Supports, Inc., 2013-Ohio-33, 98 N.E.2d 949, ¶ 9 (1st Dist.), it may
not be repeatedly attacked. “Once [a] jurisdictional issue has been fully litigated and
determined by a court that has authority to pass upon the issues, said determination
is res judicata in a collateral action and can only be attacked directly by appeal.” State
v. Stowers, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150095, 2015-Ohio-4846, ¶ 11, citing State ex rel.
Acres v. Ohio Dept. of Job and Family Servs., 123 Ohio St.3d 54, 2009-Ohio-4176, 914
N.E.2d 170. Here, the common pleas court had previously considered Bell’s challenge
to the trial court’s jurisdiction based on a deficient charging instrument and, finding
that a proper indictment had been filed in the case, determined that the trial court had
subject-matter jurisdiction over Bell’s case. Because Bell did not appeal the common
pleas court’s denial of his motions, his challenges to the trial court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction are barred by res judicata. Accordingly, the first assignment of error is
overruled.
No Jurisdiction to Review Claims Challenging Sentences
{¶9} Bell’s seventh and eighth assignments of error restate the claims made
in his motion that his sentences are contrary to law and thus may fairly be read to
challenge the dismissal of those claims. Because we hold that the common pleas court
lacked jurisdiction to consider these claims and properly dismissed them, we overrule
these assignments of error.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶10} Bell’s sentencing claims raised statutory and not constitutional challenges
to his sentences, and thus were not reviewable under the standards provided by R.C.
2953.21 et seq., governing the proceedings upon a petition for postconviction relief. See
R.C. 2953.21(A)(1) (requiring a postconviction petitioner to demonstrate a constitutional
violation in the proceedings resulting in his conviction). Nor were the sentencing claims
reviewable under the court’s jurisdiction to correct a void judgment. In State v.
Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776, the Ohio Supreme
Court held that “[a] judgment or sentence is void only if it is rendered by a court that
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the case or personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.” Id. at ¶ 43. “If [a] court has jurisdiction over the case and the person, any
sentence based on an error in the court’s exercise of that jurisdiction is voidable.” Id. at
¶ 37.
{¶11} Here, the court had subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction
over Bell. See Article IV, Section 4(A), Ohio Constitution; R.C. 2931.03; State v. Harper,
160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 25, quoting Smith v. Sheldon,
157 Ohio St.3d 1, 2019-Ohio-1677, 131 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 8 (“[A] common pleas court has
subject-matter jurisdiction over felony cases.”); Henderson at ¶ 36, citing Tari v. State,
117 Ohio St. 481, 490-491, 159 N.E. 594 (1927) (“The court acquires jurisdiction over a
person by lawfully issued process, followed by the arrest and arraignment of the accused
and his plea to the charge” [and] where a defendant “does not object to the court’s
exercise of jurisdiction over him.”). Because the court had jurisdiction over Bell and his
criminal case, any error in imposing the sentences merely rendered Bell’s sentences
voidable and not subject to a collateral attack in a postconviction motion. See Henderson
at ¶ 43.
Grounds Not Asserted in Postconviction Motion Are Waived
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶12} Finally, Bell argues in his ninth assignment of error that the trial court
erred by failing to inform him of his right to appeal his convictions. But it is well-settled
that issues or arguments not raised in the lower court are considered waived and may
not be raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Smith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108499,
2020-Ohio-1026, ¶ 13; State v. Jones, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-150312 and C-150303,
2016-Ohio-5109, ¶ 5. Because Bell did not raise this ground in his postconviction motion,
we may not consider it now. Accordingly, his ninth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶13} In conclusion, because the postconviction statutes did not confer
jurisdiction upon the common pleas court to consider Bell’s claims challenging the
constitutional effectiveness of his counsel or his statutory challenges to his sentences,
and because Bell’s claim challenging the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction was
barred by res judicata, we affirm the lower court’s judgment dismissing Bell’s motion.
Judgment affirmed.
BERGERON, P.J., and WINKLER, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
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