In re O.E. ( 2023 )

[Cite as In re O.E., 2023-Ohio-1946.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAKE COUNTY
IN THE MATTER OF: CASE NO. 2022-L-049
O.E., DELINQUENT CHILD
Criminal Appeal from the
Court of Common Pleas,
Juvenile Division
Trial Court No. 2021 DL 01260
OPINION
Decided: June 12, 2023
Judgment: Reversed and remanded
Ron M. Graham, 8270 Harbor Drive, Mentor, OH 44060 (For Appellant, O.E.).
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, Teri R. Daniel and Emily E. Kontur,
Assistant Prosecutors, Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box
490, Painesville, OH 44077 (For Appellee, State of Ohio).
MATT LYNCH, J.
{¶1} Appellant, O.E., appeals from the judgment of the Lake County Court of
Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, denying his motion to suppress his confession to
Rape. For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the lower court granting the
motion to suppress, vacate O.E.’s conviction for Rape, and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
{¶2} On November 24, 2021, a Complaint was filed in the juvenile court alleging
that O.E. committed Rape, a felony of the first degree if committed by an adult, in violation
of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), and Sexual Battery, a felony of the third degree if committed by
an adult, in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(3).
{¶3} O.E. filed a Motion to Suppress on February 15, 2022. It alleged that he
should have been given Miranda warnings, emphasizing his age and autism diagnosis.
A hearing on the motion to suppress was held on March 15, 2022. The following
testimony was given:
{¶4} Detective Gregory Spakes of the Willowick Police Department investigated
allegations of sexual abuse of a seven-year-old girl by her brother, 13-year-old O.E.
Spakes requested that their mother bring them to the police department. After the victim
spoke to a Job and Family Services employee, the mother gave a written statement. She
left and then brought O.E. to the police station. Before O.E. was interviewed, his mother
inquired whether he was going to be prosecuted, to which Spakes responded that it would
be decided by the prosecutor’s office. She asked if she needed to have an attorney and
Spakes responded that he “could not advise her of that, that that was entirely up to her.”
According to Spakes, he told O.E. and his mother that they were “there on their own free
will and that they could leave at any time.” No Miranda warnings were given.
{¶5} According to Spakes, O.E. stated that he wanted to talk to him and was
taken to an interview room without his mother, whom Spakes said did not wish to be
present during the interview. Spakes testified that the mother informed him O.E. was “a
highly functioning” autistic individual and, during the interview, he observed that O.E. was
able to read, write, and “understand what was happening.” During the interview, the door
to the room was not locked; it was described as “shut” but “not connected,” since it was
the department policy to have the door closed to prevent recording of outside sounds.
Spakes stated that he reminded O.E. three or four times during the interview that “the
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door was open.” O.E. was not handcuffed or arrested, although Spakes indicated that he
did view him as a suspect.
{¶6} A recording of the interview, missing the first four minutes, was presented.
Spakes did not know why the beginning was not recorded but noted that the department
was using a new system. A video of the interview was played, during which, when asked
what happened with his sister, O.E. stated that he began “feeling weird” and pulled down
his sister’s pants and engaged in an act of sexual intercourse. The officer described
female and male anatomy and inquired as to the body parts involved in this act, which
O.E. described. At the conclusion of the interview, O.E. gave a written statement.
{¶7} O.E.’s mother testified that she was not told by Spakes that she did not have
to speak with him or about the right to leave. She testified that she was told she would
be in the conference room during the interview and could watch video. This allowed her
to hear some of the interview. She heard Spakes talk to O.E. about being free to leave
“but they didn’t make it out like he couldn’t talk to them.” She did not recall discussing an
attorney with Spakes. She testified that she allowed O.E. to speak with Spakes although
O.E. did not want to do so.
{¶8} The trial court denied the motion to suppress. It found that “the door was
open, the juvenile was not under arrest, he was not handcuffed, not in a police car, not in
a holding cell, not fingerprinted, his Mother was outside of the room, the door was
unlocked, the Juvenile was not crying,” that O.E. told Spakes he wanted to talk to him,
and O.E. appeared intelligent and articulate. It found that “a reasonable 13 year old child
would have felt free to terminate the interview and leave,” he was not in custody, and an
advisement of Miranda rights was not required.
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{¶9} A trial was subsequently held, at which the State moved to dismiss the count
of Sexual Battery. Following the trial, the court found the Rape charge to be true and
found O.E. to be a delinquent child. He was sentenced to a term of 90 days in the
detention facility and a suspended indefinite term of one year to the age of 21 in the
Department of Youth Services.
{¶10} O.E. timely appeals and raises the following assignment of error:
{¶11} “The trial court erred in denying [the] motion to suppress, since statements
were elicited during a custodial interrogation, thus, juvenile was required to be
Mirandized, so admitting these statements violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
Right[s].”
{¶12} O.E. argues that his admission was obtained during a custodial
interrogation without being advised of his Miranda rights. He argues that the “interview”
with the detective was conducted while he was in custody, emphasizing his age, the fact
that the door was closed, that he was treated as a suspect, that he was led into answers,
that the portion of the videotaped interview where O.E. was allegedly advised he was free
to leave was missing, and that he was alone with the detective.
{¶13} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law
and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8.
“[A]n appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by
competent, credible evidence,” but “must then independently determine, without
deference to the conclusion of the trial court [i.e., de novo], whether the facts satisfy the
applicable legal standard.” Id.{¶14} In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 6944
Case No. 2022-L-049
(1966), “the United States Supreme Court established procedural safeguards for securing
the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.” Cleveland v. Oles, 152 Ohio St.3d 1, 2017-Ohio-5834, 92 N.E.3d
810, ¶ 8; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964) (“[t]he
Fourteenth Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth
Amendment guarantees against federal infringement–the right of a person to remain
silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will”).
{¶15} “The procedural safeguards identified in Miranda apply only when one is
subjected to custodial interrogation.” State v. Hoffner, 102 Ohio St.3d 358, 2004-Ohio-
3430, 811 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 26. “A custodial interrogation is ‘questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way.’” Oles at ¶ 9, quoting Miranda at 444.
{¶16} To determine whether an individual is in custody for the purposes of
Miranda, the court considers “the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” and
whether, under those circumstances, “a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she
was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Thompson v. Keohane, 516
U.S. 99, 112, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995). “A non-custodial interrogation
becomes custodial when there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’
similar to that of a formal arrest.” State v. Guzzi, 2015-Ohio-4426, 47 N.E.3d 476, ¶ 18
(11th Dist.), citing California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d
1275 (1983). “A determination of whether an interrogation is custodial or non-custodial
depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not the subjective views held
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by either the officer or the person being questioned.” Id., citing Stansbury v. California,
511 U.S. 318, 323, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994).
{¶17} In determining whether an interview is custodial, several factors have been
considered. “In order to determine whether a person was in custody for purposes of
providing Miranda warnings, ‘the court should apply a totality of the circumstances test,
including where the interrogation occurred, whether the investigation had focused on the
subject, whether the objective indicia of arrest were present, and the length of the
questioning involved.’” (Citations omitted.) State v. Cheadle, 11th Dist. Portage No.
2007-P-0083, 2008-Ohio-2393, ¶ 37; State v. Billenstein, 3d Dist. Mercer No. 10-13-10,
2014-Ohio-255, ¶ 44, citing Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 510, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 182
L.E.2d 17 (2012) (factors to consider include the duration and location of questioning, the
use of physical restraints, statements made during the interview, and whether the
interviewee was released following questioning). See also In re B.J., 11th Dist. Lake No.
2013-L-091, 2014-Ohio-5701, ¶ 19 (considering, inter alia, that the minor was told “he did
not need to talk,” the minor was brought to the station by his father, the presence of the
minor’s father in the interview room, the age of the minor, and the minor appeared “mature
and intelligent”).
{¶18} “In cases involving a juvenile, the juvenile suspect’s age may be analyzed
as part of the court’s determination on whether a custodial interrogation occurred.” In re
A.M., 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-20-23, 2021-Ohio-432, ¶ 29. The United States Supreme
Court, in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 265, 272, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 180 L.Ed.2d
310 (2011), found that “a child’s age properly informs the Miranda custody analysis,” since
“a reasonable child subjected to police questioning will sometimes feel pressured to
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submit when a reasonable adult would feel free to go.” The court emphasized that
children “often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid
choices that could be detrimental to them,” and “are more vulnerable or susceptible to …
outside pressures” than an adult would be. (Citations omitted.) Id. at 272.
{¶19} Consideration of the totality of the circumstances supports the conclusion
that O.E. was in custody and Miranda warnings were necessary. O.E. was only 13 years
old during the interview, which is a significant factor for the reasons set forth in J.D.B.
While age is not determinative, it is an important consideration here where the juvenile
was very young, was not accompanied by his parents during the interview, the record did
not indicate he had experience with the criminal justice system, and, according to Spakes,
was known to have “high functioning” autism. The interview was conducted in the police
station, in an interview room alone with a police officer much larger in size than the
juvenile and wearing a visible firearm on his hip, all of which increased the likelihood that
O.E. would not feel free to leave. While O.E.’s mother was present at the police station,
she was not in the room during the interview. O.E. was in the interview room for
approximately an hour, which is not a short period of time, particularly for a juvenile. The
record also clearly indicates that the investigation had focused on O.E. as the suspect
since he had been identified by the victim as perpetrating the sexual acts.
{¶20} Also significant here is the fact that the door was visibly shut during the
interview process. Although it was not locked or “latched,” this bears little weight. In the
eyes of a juvenile, or any individual being questioned by police, the fact that the door was
closed undercuts a belief that the individual can walk out at any time. Further, Spakes
repeated to O.E. that the door was “open” when O.E. could observe this was not the case.
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This could have easily confused O.E., leading him to believe he must remain in the
interview room. Spakes’ testimony that the door was open when it was contrary to the
facts brings into question the credibility of his other testimony. This is particularly relevant
here where Spakes testified that he informed O.E. that he was “free to leave” but such
statements do not appear on the videotaped interview. Although this could be due to the
fact that a portion of the interview was not recorded, it raises questions about the weight
to be given to this testimony. See In re J.S., 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2011-09-067,
2012-Ohio-3534, ¶ 14 (the court considered, in reaching the conclusion that the
defendant was in custody, the fact that the video of the interview did not contain a
statement that the defendant was told he was not under arrest, although the officer
testified he had made such a statement).
{¶21} As facts weighing against a determination of a custodial interrogation, we
note that O.E. was not restrained and was not taken into custody at the conclusion of the
interview. Further, Spakes asked open-ended questions which allowed O.E. to speak
and did not coerce or coach him into the answers given. O.E. appeared able to clearly
describe his thoughts and understand the questions being asked, although we again must
note the overall nature of the environment in which he was interviewed likely influenced
O.E. and the statements he chose to make.
{¶22} A few other facts also warrant consideration. Although Spakes testified that
he told O.E. and his mother that he was free to leave, it should be questioned to what
degree a juvenile who was brought to the police station by his mother and is unable to
drive was there of his own free will. It has been observed that, where a 14-year-old boy’s
mother agreed to bring him in for an interview, this “limit[ed] the extent of his control over
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being there, * * * rendering his presence ostensibly involuntary.” In re T.W., 3d Dist.
Marion No 9-10-63, 2012-Ohio-2361, ¶ 29. Also, as noted above, statements by Spakes
to O.E. that the door was open and that he was free to leave do not weigh in favor of a
finding that there was no custodial interrogation given the fact that these statements were
inconsistent and did not reflect the reality of the circumstances faced by O.E.
{¶23} When weighing these facts, we find that the totality of the circumstances
demonstrate that the questioning of O.E. was a custodial interrogation and a reasonable
child of his age would not have felt free to leave during this questioning. O.E. was a
young juvenile, was brought to a police station by his mother, and was questioned while
closed in a room alone with an armed detective. This case shares similarities with T.W.,
supra, where the Third District found a custodial interrogation occurred. In T.W., a 14-
year-old was transported to children’s services by his mother after a police request to
interview him in the investigation of a sexual crime. Prior to the interview, the child and
his parents were advised that he was not under arrest and free to leave. He was then
interviewed by a police officer in a room with a closed door. The court found that “a
reasonable juvenile in T.W.’s position would not have felt free to terminate the interview
and leave the premises.” Id. at ¶ 31. See also In re L.G., 2017-Ohio-2781, 82 N.E.3d 52,
¶ 15 (2d Dist.) (finding a custodial interrogation occurred when, in the midst of an
investigation, a 13-year-old student was questioned by a school district director of safety,
since a reasonable juvenile in his position would not have felt free to leave). While
consideration of the subjective beliefs of the defendant is not proper when determining
whether there is a custodial interrogation, consideration of certain characteristics and
circumstances of that defendant have been found appropriate for consideration under the
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objective standard, in particular the offender’s young age. The United States Supreme
Court, in J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 275-276, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 180 L.Ed.2d 310, explained that “a
child’s age differs from personal characteristics that * * * have no objectively discernable
relationship to a reasonable person’s understanding of his freedom of action” and that
considering a characteristic such as the defendant’s age does not employ an improper
subjective analysis since a reasonable juvenile’s perception differs from that of a
reasonable adult. In the present matter, we conclude that, when properly employing an
objective analysis and considering all of the circumstances, a reasonable autistic 13-year-
old would have believed he was in custody.
{¶24} The State argues that the court’s determination that a custodial interrogation
did not occur is supported by authority from other courts in this state. First, it cites to
State v. Brunson, 2016-Ohio-8519, 78 N.E.3d 1242 (11th Dist.). In Brunson, the adult
defendant was questioned by an officer in the police department squad room, with the
door left open, by an officer in plain clothes, and a portion of the interview was unrecorded.
Under these circumstances, this court held that the defendant was not in custody for the
purposes of Miranda. Id. at ¶ 18-25. Brunson is readily distinguishable from the present
matter. The interview was conducted in the “squad room,” described as “an informal area
where officers complete their paperwork,” with the door open throughout the interview. In
the present matter, the questioning took place in a separate interview room and not in an
“informal area.” Id. at ¶ 19. As discussed above, the video shows that the door was
closed, if not locked or latched. These differences are significant since they would impact
one’s belief that he was free to leave. Further, perhaps most significantly, Brunson
involved an adult rather than a juvenile.
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{¶25} The State also cites In re C.M.R., 2018-Ohio-110, 107 N.E.3d 34 (2d Dist.).
In that case, the Second District found no custodial interrogation occurred where a 15-
year-old was brought into a police station voluntarily by his mother; the detective told him
he did not have to talk to her, was free to leave, and that the interview room door was
unlocked; the interview lasted ten minutes; and the defendant was not handcuffed. Id. at
¶ 19-20. We find this distinguishable given the significant distinction that the detective
“left the door to the interview room open during the entire interview.” Id. at ¶ 20. The
defendant was also two years older than O.E., which is significant when considering the
maturity and understanding levels of a juvenile.
{¶26} For these reasons, we find that the statements made by O.E. to Spakes
during the interview must be suppressed and it was error to deny the motion to suppress.
We vacate O.E.’s conviction for Rape which resulted from improper admission of his
confession.
{¶27} We acknowledge the serious nature of the crime alleged in this matter.
Such a crime undoubtedly has a serious impact on the victim. For this reason, it is
imperative that law enforcement handle such matters involving young victims, as well as
young perpetrators, carefully and in a manner that ensures justice is served while their
individual rights are also protected. Providing Miranda rights when a suspect is arguably
in custody will not only protect the constitutional rights of that suspect but also protect the
victim by allowing for all evidence of the crime to be properly admitted at trial.
{¶28} The sole assignment of error is with merit.
{¶29} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Lake County Court of
Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, denying O.E.’s motion to suppress his confession, is
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reversed, his conviction for Rape is vacated, and this matter is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs to be taxed against appellee.
JOHN J. EKLUND, P.J., concurs,
MARY JANE TRAPP, J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion.
_________________________________________
MARY JANE TRAPP, J., dissents with a Dissenting Opinion.
{¶30} I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that Det. Spakes’
interview with O.E. was a custodial interrogation that required Miranda warnings. The
majority’s determination is based upon misconceptions of the applicable law as well as
conclusions and inferences that are not supported by the evidence. A proper
consideration of the objective circumstances surrounding the interview demonstrates
O.E. was not in custody for purposes of Miranda.
{¶31} While I understand and share the concern about the power dynamic when
a juvenile is facing a law enforcement officer during an investigation, the case law that
controls our analysis makes it clear we are to consider the objective rather than subjective
circumstances of the encounter in order to determine whether there was a significant
restraint on this young man’s freedom implicating Miranda. In this case, the video
evidence before the trial court (even with the omission of the first four minutes of the
encounter) and the testimony supports the trial court’s decision to overrule the motion to
suppress the juvenile’s statements.
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Legal Standards
{¶32} Police are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone they
question. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977).
Miranda warnings are required in the context of “custodial interrogations.” Yarborough v.
Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 661, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004). “Custodial
interrogation” means “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
{¶33} To determine whether an individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda,
the court considers “the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” and whether, under
those circumstances, “a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty
to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116
S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995). A determination of whether an interrogation is
custodial or non-custodial depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation,
not the subjective views held by either the officer or the person being questioned.
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994).
“[T]he ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom
of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” California v. Beheler, 463
U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983), quoting Mathiason at 495.
{¶34} Relevant factors include (1) the location of the questioning; (2) its duration;
(3) statements made during the interview; (4) the presence or absence of physical
restraints during the questioning; and (5) the release of the interviewee at the end of the
questioning. Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509, 132 S.Ct. 1181, 182 L.Ed.2d 17 (2012).
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In addition, the Supreme Court of the United States has held a juvenile’s age may be
considered in the Miranda analysis, so long as the juvenile’s age was known to the officer
at the time of questioning or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer.
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 277, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011).
{¶35} The Second District Court of Appeals has consistently considered ten
factors to assess how a reasonable person would understand his or her situation:
“1. What was the location where the questioning took place—i.e., was the
defendant comfortable and in a place a person would normally feel free to leave? For
example, the defendant might be at home as opposed to being in the more restrictive
environment of a police station;
“2. Was the defendant a suspect at the time the interview began (bearing in mind
that Miranda warnings are not required simply because the investigation has focused);
“3. Was the defendant’s freedom to leave restricted in any way;
“4. Was the defendant handcuffed or told he was under arrest;
“5. Were threats made during the interrogation;
“6. Was the defendant physically intimidated during the interrogation;
“7. Did the police verbally dominate the interrogation;
“8. What was the defendant’s purpose for being at the place where questioning
took place? For example, [a] defendant might be at a hospital for treatment instead of
being brought to the location for questioning;
“9. Were neutral parties present at any point during the questioning;
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“10. Did police take any action to overpower, trick or coerce the defendant into
making a statement.” State v. McCrary, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 18885, 2002 WL
125760, *2-3 (Feb. 1, 2002).
{¶36} I find these factors to be helpful in keeping the focus on the objective
circumstances.
The Trial Court’s Findings
{¶37} The trial court found “this youth was not handcuffed, not in a police car, not
in a holding cell, not fingerprinted, not arrested, his mother was outside the room, the
door was unlocked, the juvenile was not crying, * * * the detective conducted an interview
with the juvenile. The detective testified that the youth wanted to talk to me. The detective
told the youth, ‘You are here voluntarily’ and the child’s response was, ‘Okay.’
Furthermore, the juvenile * * * appeared to be intelligent and articulate and mature on that
videotape. The Court must determine whether or not the thirteen-year-old would have
felt free to terminate the interview and leave. Based on the circumstances, the Court
finds that a reasonable thirteen-year-old would have felt free to terminate the interview
and leave. The Court further finds that the juvenile was not in custody and, therefore,
Miranda rights were not required to be given.” I agree.
The Majority’s Analysis
{¶38} The majority concludes the questioning of O.E. was a custodial interrogation
because (1) O.E. was 13 years old; (2) he is a “highly functioning” autistic person; (3) he
lacked experience with the criminal justice system; (4) his mother brought him to the
police station; (5) he was questioned without his parents in a closed interview room with
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a much larger, armed police officer; (6) he was in the interview room for approximately
one hour; and (7) he was viewed as a suspect.
{¶39} I disagree. First, there is no evidentiary basis to treat O.E.’s age as a
significant factor. While a juvenile’s age may be considered in the Miranda custody
analysis, the Supreme Court of the United States cautioned this does not mean “a child’s
age will be a determinative, or even a significant, factor in every case.” J.D.B. at 277.
There is no evidence indicating O.E. failed to appreciate the nature of the interview.
Rather, the trial court found O.E. was “not crying” and “appeared to be intelligent and
articulate.”
{¶40} Second, there is no basis to treat O.E.’s status as a “highly functioning”
autistic person as a significant factor. The majority cites no authority indicating this is a
proper “objective” factor to consider. Further, there was no testimony regarding whether,
and to what extent, O.E.’s autism affected his ability to comprehend his situation.
{¶41} Third, there was no testimony regarding O.E.’s prior experience with the
criminal justice system. Even if there was such testimony, the Supreme Court of the
United States has held it is improper to consider this factor. See Yarborough, supra, at
668. This is because “the relationship between a suspect’s past experiences and the
likelihood a reasonable person with that experience would feel free to leave often will be
speculative.” Id.{¶42} Fourth, the majority’s finding that O.E.’s presence at the police station was
“ostensibly involuntary” is not supported by the record. The trial court cited Det. Spakes’
testimony that O.E. wanted to talk to him, which suggests O.E.’s presence was voluntary.
When an appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, it must
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accept the trial court’s findings of facts so long as they are supported by competent,
credible evidence. State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d
1168, ¶ 100.
{¶43} The majority cites In re T.W., 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-10-63, 2012-Ohio-2361,
where the Third District made a similar finding and cited the Supreme Court of the United
States’ decision in Yarborough. See id. at ¶ 29. However, it was the dissenting opinion
in Yarborough that stated, “the involvement of [the juvenile]’s parents suggest involuntary,
not voluntary behavior on [the juvenile]’s part.” (Emphasis sic.) Id. at 671 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). The majority found the fact the juvenile “was brought to the police station by
his legal guardians rather than arriving on his own accord” made “the extent of his control
over his presence unclear.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 665.
{¶44} Fifth, the fact O.E.’s parents did not accompany him into the interview room
is not necessarily a significant factor. The law does not require a parent to be present
during the questioning of a juvenile. See In re Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d 86, 89, 548 N.E.2d
210 (1989). O.E.’s mother was present in a conference room next door, which may weigh
against a finding that O.E. was in custody. See Yarborough at 664 (noting the juvenile’s
“parents remained in the lobby during the interview”).
{¶45} Sixth, there was no testimony about whether Det. Spakes was armed. Det.
Spakes testified he was wearing “511s,” which he described as “cargo pants” and a “polo
shirt.” While the video indicates Det. Spakes was armed, his firearm was housed in a
holster on his hip. He did not display or brandish it at any time. For much of the interview,
Det. Spakes’ firearm was concealed by the desk at which he sat. Thus, when viewed
objectively, “the presence of a firearm * * * merely identified [Det. Spakes] as a law
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enforcement officer.” In re J.C., 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2011-G-3017, 2011-Ohio-5864, ¶
76.
{¶46} Seventh, there is no evidentiary support for the majority’s finding that O.E.
could have been “confused” by Det. Spakes’ statement that “the door is open.” Det.
Spakes testified his statement meant O.E. could pull open the unlatched door and leave
the interview room. This is confirmed by the video, which depicts Det. Spakes telling O.E.
“I’ll leave the door open” and “The door’s still open” on occasions when the detective
momentarily left the interview room. There was no testimony suggesting O.E. was
confused, and the majority’s interpretation of the statement is not objectively reasonable.
{¶47} Eighth, the majority improperly questions Det. Spakes’ credibility in order to
discount his testimony that he informed O.E. he was “free to leave.” “At a suppression
hearing, * * * the credibility of witnesses are issues for the trier of fact.” State v. Mills, 62
Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 582 N.E.2d 972 (1992). Thus, “a reviewing court should not disturb
the trial court’s findings on the issue of credibility.” State v. Ashford, 11th Dist. Trumbull
No. 99-T-0015, 2001 WL 137595, *2 (Feb. 16, 2001). The trial court’s decision indicates
it found Det. Spakes to be a credible witness. There is no valid basis for the majority to
conclude otherwise.
{¶48} Further, whether Det. Spakes informed O.E. he was “free to leave” is not
subject to reasonable dispute. Det. Spakes testified he made the statement to O.E. and
his mother before taking O.E. into the interview room; therefore, its absence from the
video is neither surprising nor suspicious. Most importantly, O.E.’s mother confirmed she
heard Det. Spakes “talk to [O.E.] about that * * *.”
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{¶49} Ninth, the majority’s finding that O.E. “was in the interview room for
approximately an hour” is misleading. The entire video lasts approximately one hour.
Det. Spakes’ questioning of O.E., even if the four missing minutes are included, comprises
approximately 20 minutes. This court has described an interview “lasting less than 30
minutes” as being “of a short duration.” In re B.J., 11th Dist. Lake No. 2013-L-091, 2014-
Ohio-5701, ¶ 19.
{¶50} Finally, while the majority emphasizes the fact Det. Spakes considered O.E.
to be a suspect, “[t]he fact that a suspect is being interviewed at a police station does not,
per se, require a Miranda rights warning.” State v. Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d 144, 154, 694
N.E.2d 932 (1998).
A Proper Consideration
{¶51} A proper consideration of the objective circumstances surrounding the
interview demonstrates O.E. was not in custody for purposes of Miranda.
{¶52} The record reflects Hillcrest Hospital contacted the Willowick Police
Department about a rape kit in an alleged sexual assault. O.E., the alleged offender, was
13 years old and was a “high functioning” autistic person; but again, there is nothing in
the record linking this fact to an impaired ability to understand the nature of this encounter.
{¶53} Det. Spakes contacted O.E.’s mother and asked her to bring both O.E. and
her daughter to the police station for questioning. The daughter was voluntarily
interviewed by both the detective and a Job and Family Services worker in the morning.
The mother completed a written statement and took the daughter home. She returned a
few hours later with O.E. Det. Spakes concedes he considered O.E. to be a suspect at
that time, but, upon arrival, O.E. was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained.
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{¶54} The mother asked the detective in front of O.E. whether O.E. could face
prosecution, to which the detective replied it was up to the prosecutor. She also asked in
front of O.E. whether they needed a lawyer, and the detective responded he could not
advise her. Critically, the detective testified he told O.E. and his mother they were both
there on their own free will and could leave at any time. There is nothing in this record
indicating the mother or O.E. failed to comprehend this information. According to Det.
Spakes, O.E. said he wanted to speak to the detective, and the mother did not want to be
in the room.
{¶55} Det. Spakes took O.E. to an interview room. Although O.E.’s mother was
not present, she remained in the conference room next door. The interview was recorded,
although the beginning four minutes are missing for unexplained reasons.
{¶56} In the interview room, O.E. sat in a chair, while Det. Spakes sat behind a
desk. As noted earlier, the detective was dressed in cargo pants and a polo shirt. The
door to the interview room was closed; however, it was not latched or locked. Det. Spakes
did not verbally dominate the interview; rather, he asked open-ended questions and did
not coach O.E.’s answers. The detective’s questions were mostly confined to “what
happened next?” and “describe what you mean.” Det. Spakes did not threaten or to
attempt overpower, trick, or coerce O.E, nor did he take any action that could be construed
as physical intimidation. O.E. appeared able to clearly describe his thoughts and
understand the questions being asked. The detective’s testimony about his interview and
the video evidence of that interview is consistent with an encounter at a police station
designed to determine what actually happened between brother and sister as opposed to
eliciting incriminating responses.
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{¶57} The interview lasted approximately 20 minutes. Afterward, Det. Spakes
asked O.E. to complete a written statement. Before leaving the room on two occasions,
Det. Spakes stated “I’ll leave the door open” and “The door’s still open.” After completing
his written statement, O.E. was not arrested and left with his mother.
{¶58} Based on the foregoing circumstances, there was no restraint on O.E.’s
freedom of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest. I agree with the trial
court that a reasonable juvenile in O.E.’s position would have felt free to terminate the
interview and leave. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment.
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