State v. Cooke , 2023 Ohio 4679 ( 2023 )

[Cite as State v. Cooke, 2023-Ohio-4679.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
FULTON COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. F-23-002
Appellee Trial Court No. 23CR000006
v.
Jonathan E. Cooke DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: December 21, 2023
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Karin L. Coble, for appellant.
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SULEK, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant Jonathan Cooke appeals the judgment of the Fulton County Court
of Common Pleas denying his post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. For the
reasons that follow, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 2} On January 10, 2023, the Fulton County Grand Jury indicted Cooke on one
count of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), with a specification that he
has previously been convicted of two or more offenses of domestic violence, a felony of
the third degree.
{¶ 3} Cooke initially pleaded not guilty. On March 27, 2023, the matter came
before the trial court for a pretrial hearing at which Cooke discussed waiving his right to
a jury trial in favor of a bench trial. Prior to Cooke’s decision, defense counsel noted that
Cooke was “pretty emotional” and “having some anxiety.” The court allowed for a
recess so that Cooke could discuss the matter with his counsel.
{¶ 4} Following the recess, Cooke indicated that he did not know if he wanted to
go to trial and communicated instead that he may be inclined to accept the state’s plea
offer. The trial court allowed the state to describe the terms of the plea agreement, which
were that Cooke would plead guilty to an amended count of domestic violence, a
misdemeanor of the first degree. In exchange, the state would nolle prosequi the felony
count of domestic violence without prejudice, reserving the right to re-file the felony
charge if Cooke did not follow the recommended conditions of his probation and
treatment programming. The court then took another recess so that Cooke could discuss
the offer with his counsel.
{¶ 5} Following the second recess, Cooke accepted the plea offer and tendered a
plea of guilty to the amended count of domestic violence, a misdemeanor of the first
degree. Defense counsel noted that Cooke understood that the felony charge could be re-
filed if he did not follow the terms of his probation and any counseling. Through
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counsel, Cooke waived preparation of a presentence investigation report and expressed
his desire to proceed immediately to sentencing.
{¶ 6} The trial court engaged Cooke in a detailed Crim.R. 11 plea colloquy. When
the court asked if he understood the terms of the plea agreement, Cooke replied that the
state’s recommendation of inpatient treatment was new to him. He said “that wasn’t
made clear to me—but I guess that I would want to move (sic) the details moving
forward.” The court then confirmed that the state’s recommendation was for him to
enroll in Fresh Start or some other type of treatment program, but it informed Cooke that
the state’s recommendation was just that, a recommendation. The court explained to
Cooke that it would be deciding the sentence in the case and described those potential
sanctions in detail.
{¶ 7} After the rest of the plea colloquy, Cooke affirmed that he was certain that
he wanted to enter the guilty plea. The trial court accepted Cooke’s plea and found him
guilty.
{¶ 8} At the request of the parties, the trial court proceeded immediately to
sentencing and ordered Cooke to serve 180 days in jail, with credit for 83 days of time
served. It suspended the remainder of the sentence pending Cooke’s successful
completion of community control. As part of his community control, the court ordered
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Cooke to receive inpatient treatment at the Renewal Center,1 following which he must get
an assessment at Recovery Services for mental health related issues. The court further
ordered him to complete the Batterer’s Treatment Program at the Center for Child and
Family Advocacy.
{¶ 9} Several days after the trial court entered its judgment of conviction, Cooke
filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea contending that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel because counsel did not fully inform him of the potential sanctions
that could be imposed such as treatment or probation in addition to a jail term. Cooke
also claimed that counsel was ineffective because he was never made aware that the state
could dismiss the felony charge without prejudice. Cooke stated that he would not have
pleaded guilty if not for the erroneous information from counsel regarding the potential
sentence. In addition, Cooke maintained that he experienced “emotional distress” and
“intense anxiety” during the plea hearing, which left him “emotionally compromised”
resulting in his desire to accept the plea deal to relieve his stress. Finally, Cooke listed
several other issues in support of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, such as being
actually innocent, not being notified of the effect of the plea agreement, and the fact that
he only pleaded guilty because of his fear of conviction due to the state’s probable
character assassination and emotional appeal at trial.
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The court entered a nunc pro tunc judgment entry of sentencing recognizing that Fresh
Start was a defunct program and that the Renewal Center was the appropriate program for
Cooke.
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{¶ 10} On April 11, 2023, the trial court denied Cooke’s motion without a hearing.
In its judgment, the court reasoned: “During the hearing that was held on March 27,
2023, the Court: (1) took multiple recesses so that Defendant could speak with his
attorney; and (2) took great pains to ensure that Defendant knew what was occurring, and
that Defendant was certain that proceeding with a negotiated plea was what he wanted to
do.” The court found, therefore, that Cooke had not demonstrated a “manifest injustice.”
II. Assignment of Error
{¶ 11} Cooke timely appealed the trial court’s April 11, 2023 judgment and now
asserts one assignment of error for review:
1. The trial court erred in failing to correct a manifest injustice by
refusing to allow appellant to withdraw his guilty plea.
III. Analysis
{¶ 12} Crim.R. 32.1 governs the withdrawal of guilty pleas and provides: “A
motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only before sentence is
imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the
judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea.”
{¶ 13} “A defendant who seeks to withdraw a plea of guilty after the imposition of
sentence has the burden of establishing the existence of manifest injustice.” State v.
Davis, 2020-Ohio-4539, 159 N.E.3d 331, ¶ 20 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Smith, 49 Ohio
St.2d 261, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977), paragraph one of the syllabus. “A manifest injustice
is defined as a ‘clear or openly unjust act.’ Manifest injustice is an extremely high
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standard, and a defendant may only withdraw his guilty plea in extraordinary cases.”
State v. Johnson, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-11-1257, 2012-Ohio-4866, ¶ 9, quoting State v.
Harmon, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-10-1195, 2011-Ohio-5035, ¶ 12; State v. Cain, 6th Dist.
Lucas No. L-20-1126, 2021-Ohio-1841, ¶ 14.
{¶ 14} “The decision of whether manifest injustice occurred is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court.” Davis at ¶ 20, citing Smith at paragraph two of the syllabus.
“[T]he good faith, credibility and weight of the movant’s assertions in support of the
motion are matters to be resolved by that court.” Smith at paragraph two of the syllabus.
An appellate court reviews the trial court’s denial of a post-sentence motion to withdraw
a guilty plea under an abuse of discretion standard. Davis at ¶ 21; State v. Xie, 62 Ohio
St.3d 521, 527, 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992). An abuse of discretion connotes that the trial
court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State v. Adams, 62 Ohio
St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980).
{¶ 15} In his appellate brief, Cooke argues that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to properly inform him of the potential sanctions that could be imposed, and that
counsel’s ineffectiveness constitutes a manifest injustice entitling him to withdraw his
guilty plea. He also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion
without a hearing.
{¶ 16} A hearing on a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea “is not
required if the facts alleged by the defendant, and accepted as true by the court, would not
require that the guilty plea be withdrawn.” State v. Blatnik, 17 Ohio App.3d 201, 204,
6.
478 N.E.2d 1016 (6th Dist.1984); State v. Meadows, 6th Dist. Huron No. H-20-003,
2020-Ohio-4942, ¶ 12.
{¶ 17} To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, Cooke must satisfy the
two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 694, 104
S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). That is, Cooke must show (1) “that counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) “that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.”
{¶ 18} Here, even if Cooke’s assertions are assumed true—that counsel failed to
inform him of the potential sanctions and counsel failed to inform him that the state could
re-file the felony domestic violence charge—his claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel still fails because he cannot demonstrate prejudice. As the trial court noted, and
as the transcript of the sentencing hearing makes abundantly clear, the court fully
informed Cooke of the details and potential sanctions and consequences of the plea
agreement prior to accepting his guilty plea. Thus, Cooke has not shown a reasonable
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different but for counsel’s
alleged unprofessional errors.
{¶ 19} Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined
that Cooke failed to establish the existence of a manifest injustice and denied his post-
sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea without a hearing.
{¶ 20} Cooke’s assignment of error is not well-taken.
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IV. Conclusion
{¶ 21} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Fulton County Court of
Common Pleas is affirmed. Cooke is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to
App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Thomas J. Osowik, J. ____________________________
JUDGE
Christine E. Mayle, J.
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Charles E. Sulek, J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
____________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
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