State v. Spears ( 2024 )

[Cite as State v. Spears, 2024-Ohio-2384.]
COURT OF APPEALS
FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES:
:
: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, J.
: Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
-vs- :
: Case No. 23CA17
:
LANDON SPEARS :
:
:
Defendant-Appellant : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Fairfield County Court
of Common Pleas, Case No.
2021CR00152
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: June 21, 2024
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee: For Defendant-Appellant:
R. KYLE WITT ERIC W. BREHM
FAIRFIELD CO. PROSECUTOR 100 East Main St.
239 West Main St., Suite 101 Columbus, OH 43215
Lancaster, OH 43130
[Cite as State v. Spears, 2024-Ohio-2384.]
Delaney, P.J.
{¶1} Appellant Landon Spears appeals from the March 29, 2023 Judgment Entry
of Sentence of the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas. Appellee is the state of
Ohio.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶2} This case arises from a remand for resentencing.
{¶3} A complete statement of the facts underlying appellant’s convictions and
sentencing upon one count of involuntary manslaughter, one count of aggravated
robbery, a firearm specification, and a forfeiture specification may be found at our decision
at State v. Spears, 5th Dist. No. 2021 CA 00030, 2023-Ohio-187, 205 N.E.3d 1261(“Spears I”). In that case, we overruled three assignments of error, but agreed with
appellant that the trial court did not consider all of the factors listed under R.C.
2929.19(B)(1)(b) requiring it to “consider youth and its characteristics as mitigating
factors” in sentencing. Id., ¶ 37.
{¶4} Appellant was resentenced by the trial court on March 24, 2023, with
appellee recommending the same 17-year prison sentence and appellant requesting that
the trial court consider his youth in imposing a sentence at the lower end of the specified
range.
{¶5} The trial court thereupon imposed a total aggregate definite minimum prison
term of 16 years and a maximum indefinite prison term of 21 years.
{¶6} Appellant appeals from the trial court’s Judgment Entry of Sentence of
March 29, 2023.
{¶7} Appellant raises one assignment of error:
[Cite as State v. Spears, 2024-Ohio-2384.]
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶8} “THE TRIAL COURT’S RESENTENCING OF APPELLANT WAS
CONTRARY TO LAW FOR FAILING TO CONSIDER APPELLANT’S YOUTH AS A
FACTOR, AS REQUIRED UNDER R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(B).”
ANALYSIS
{¶9} Appellant argues that because the trial court imposed the same sentence
upon resentencing after remand, it failed to properly consider his youth as a factor. We
disagree.
{¶10} A court reviewing a criminal sentence is required by R.C. 2953.08(F) to
review the entire trial court record, including any oral or written statements and
presentence investigation reports. R.C. 2953.08(F)(1) through (4). R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)
provides we may either increase, reduce, modify, or vacate a sentence and remand for
resentencing where we clearly and convincingly find that either the record does not
support the sentencing court's findings under R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D), 2929.14(B)(2)(e) or
(C)(4), or 2929.20(I), or the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. See, State v. Bonnell,
140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.2d 659, ¶ 28.
{¶11} In Spears I, we looked to the language of R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12
for guidance in the application of R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b). Id., 2023-Ohio-187, ¶ 36.
Appellant was age 16 at the time of committing the offenses, and R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b)
applies when the offender is under the age of eighteen. The trial court must consider
youth and its characteristics as mitigating factors, and the statute includes a non-
exclusive list of five categories of information to be considered. Unlike R.C. 2929.11 and
2929.12, these factors are less related to the offense or the purposes of the Code, and
[Cite as State v. Spears, 2024-Ohio-2384.]
are more related to environmental factors that might impact the offender's behavior or
mitigate his criminal responsibility. The trial court is not required to issue an express
finding or acknowledgment of the factors. Spears I, 2023-Ohio-187, ¶ 37.
{¶12} While precedent does not require the trial court to make explicit findings,
our holdings with regard to R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 require that the “necessary
findings can be found in the record.” Spears I, 2023-Ohio-187, ¶ 38, citing State v. Taylor,
5th Dist. Richland No. 17CA29, 2017-Ohio-8996, ¶ 27; State v. Webb, 5th Dist.
Muskingum No. CT2018-0069, 2019-Ohio-4195, ¶ 19. In the absence of findings, the
record must “reflect[ ] that the trial court considered the purposes and principles of
sentencing and the seriousness and recidivism factors as required in Sections 2929.11
and 2929.12 of the Ohio Revised Code.” Id., citing State v. Hayes, 5th Dist. Knox No.
18CA10, 2019-Ohio-1629, ¶ 55, additional citations omitted. The mandate of R.C.
2929.19 is sufficiently similar to the language of R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 to
warrant to the same analysis. Spears I, 2023-Ohio-187, ¶ 40. Consequently, while the
trial court need not specify findings regarding the factors listed in R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b),
we must review the record to determine whether it affirmatively shows the court failed to
consider those factors. Id.{¶13} R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b) states in pertinent part:
(b) If the offense was committed when the offender was under
eighteen years of age, in addition to other factors considered,
consider youth and its characteristics as mitigating factors, including:
(i) The chronological age of the offender at the time of the
offense and that age's hallmark features, including intellectual
[Cite as State v. Spears, 2024-Ohio-2384.]
capacity, immaturity, impetuosity, and a failure to appreciate risks
and consequences;
(ii) The family and home environment of the offender at the
time of the offense, the offender's inability to control the offender's
surroundings, a history of trauma regarding the offender, and the
offender's school and special education history;
(iii) The circumstances of the offense, including the extent of
the offender's participation in the conduct and the way familial and
peer pressures may have impacted the offender's conduct;
(iv) Whether the offender might have been charged and
convicted of a lesser offense if not for the incompetencies associated
with youth, such as the offender's inability to deal with police officers
and prosecutors during the offender's interrogation or possible plea
agreement or the offender's inability to assist the offender's own
attorney;
(v) Examples of the offender's rehabilitation, including any
subsequent growth or increase in maturity during confinement.
{¶14} The issue posed by the instant case is whether the record affirmatively
shows that the trial court considered the R.C. 2929.19(B)(1)(b) factors. Spears I, 2023-
Ohio-187, ¶ 49. Contrary to appellant’s assertion, the mere fact that he received the same
aggregate sentence does not imply that the trial court did not properly consider his youth
in mitigation upon resentencing. In Spears I, we expressed no opinion regarding the
[Cite as State v. Spears, 2024-Ohio-2384.]
length of the sentence and specified our opinion should not be interpreted as a finding
that the record did not support the sentence imposed. Id., at ¶ 50.
{¶15} The trial court was thorough in its review of the statutory factors at the
resentencing hearing. The record indicates the trial court based its sentence on the
following: the court record; appellant’s statement to Detective Humbert at the Lancaster
Police Department on January 26, 2021, in which he admitted his role in the charged
offenses; the entire record of the case proceedings in the Juvenile Court; the entry signed
and adopted by the Juvenile Court in which appellant was found competent to stand trial;
a psychological evaluation by Dr. Robin Rippeth, Doctor of Psychology, upon direction by
the Fairfield County Juvenile Court; the March 22, 2023 post-arraignment report prepared
by the Intake Officer of the Fairfield County Juvenile Court; the purposes of sentencing
established in state law and the overriding purposes of felony sentencing; seriousness
and recidivism factors; and victim input via the transcript of the first sentencing hearing.
T. 12-14.
{¶16} The trial court further noted it was considering the factors set forth in R.C.
2929.19(B)(1)(b) relating to youth and its characteristics. T. 14-16. In applying the youth
sentencing factors, the trial court noted appellant was age 16 at the time of the offenses
and individuals of that age may not appreciate the risks and consequences of their actions
to the extent of a mature adult. Further, individuals of that age tend to act impulsively and
“follow the crowd,” without the level of maturity and self-control an adult would exhibit.
The trial court noted Dr. Rippeth’s competency report cited supra detailed appellant’s
family, home, and school environments. T. 17.
[Cite as State v. Spears, 2024-Ohio-2384.]
{¶17} Specific to appellant, the trial court noted at the time of the offenses, he was
in 10th grade at the Success Center with an individualized education plan (IEP) due to
reading-comprehension concerns. Appellant was described as a model student who was
meeting the goals of his IEP. He never reported being physically, mentally, or sexually
abused. Appellant did report using alcohol weekly and smoking marijuana daily since
age 11. Appellant was not formally diagnosed with ADHD, but was diagnosed with
“unspecified disruptive impulse control and conduct disorder” for which he received
counseling. Dr. Rippeth opined appellant functioned in the borderline of intellectual
functioning but was noted to have not put forth his best effort on the intelligence quotient.
Appellant was aware of the plan to invade the residence where 16-year-old John Doe
would be found for the deliberate purpose of obtaining drugs and money. Appellant knew
his co-conspirator had a firearm. Appellant knew his role was to act as the “bag man”
regarding stolen property. Upon entering the home, appellant was aware a shot was
fired, but nevertheless proceeded to a rear bedroom where he stole money and drugs;
he saw that John Doe was shot, but left the house without seeking help. The trial court
found appellant acted intentionally and deliberately, and was not forced or coerced into
participating in the home invasion. T. 22.
{¶18} The trial court further found there was no evidence in the record that
appellant could have been charged with or convicted of a lesser offense, and there was
no evidence appellant was not capable of assisting his attorney with his defense. Finally,
neither the Fairfield County Sheriff nor the Ohio DRC brought any rehabilitation efforts to
the trial court’s attention during the time appellant was incarcerated. T. 23.
[Cite as State v. Spears, 2024-Ohio-2384.]
{¶19} Appellee notes appellant was initially charged with aggravated murder, a
life-tail offense, but resolved the case with a negotiated plea agreement whereby he
entered guilty pleas to involuntary manslaughter and aggravated burglary with a definite
sentence of 16 years (plus the indefinite Regan Tokes tail). We are able to conclude from
the record that appellant’s youth and its touchstone factors were major factors in the plea
agreement and that the trial court considered those mitigating factors in accepting the
plea agreement and arriving at an appropriate sentence.
{¶20} After remand and resentencing, therefore, we have reviewed the record in
this case and conclude the trial court fulfilled the obligation imposed by R.C.
2929.19(B)(1)(b) and we can discern from the record that the trial court adequately
considered youth and its characteristics in mitigation of appellant’s sentence. Appellant’s
sole assignment of error is therefore overruled.
[Cite as State v. Spears, 2024-Ohio-2384.]
CONCLUSION
{¶21} Appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled and the judgment of the
Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By: Delaney, P.J.,
Gwin, J. and
Hoffman, J., concur.