State v. Raines ( 2024 )

[Cite as State v. Raines, 2024-Ohio-2401.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
UNION COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
CASE NO. 14-23-40
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
KEVIN RAY RAINES, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Union County Common Pleas Court
Criminal Division
Trial Court No. 2022-CR-0265
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: June 24, 2024
APPEARANCES:
Alison Boggs for Appellant
Andrew M Bigler for Appellee
Case No. 14-23-40
WALDICK, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Kevin R. Raines (“Raines”), appeals the
judgment of sentence entered against him in the Union County Court of Common
Pleas on November 17, 2023. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
Procedural History
{¶2} This case originated on November 4, 2022, when the Union County
grand jury returned a seven-count indictment charging Raines as follows: Count 1
– Corrupting Another With Drugs, a second-degree felony in violation of R.C.
2925.02(A)(4)(a) and (C)(1); Count 2 – Corrupting Another With Drugs, a second-
degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.02(A)(3) and (C)(1); Count 3 – Aggravated
Possession of Drugs, a second-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and
(C)(1)(c); Count 4 – Having Weapons While Under Disability, a third-degree felony
in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2); Count 5 – Gross Sexual Imposition, a fourth-
degree felony in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1) and (C)(1); Count 6 – Aggravated
Trafficking in Drugs, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) and
(C)(1)(c); and Count 7 – Aggravated Trafficking in Drugs, a second-degree felony
in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) and (C)(1)(d). Count 1 of the indictment also
contained a three-year firearm specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.145, and Count
3 contained a one-year firearm specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.141.
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{¶3} On February 9, 2023, an arraignment was held and Raines entered an
initial plea of not guilty to the indictment. Nearly eight months of pretrial
proceedings then ensued.
{¶4} On October 5, 2023, a change of plea hearing was held. At that time,
Raines entered negotiated pleas of guilty to Count 3, amended to dismiss the firearm
specification, and to Counts 4, 6, and 7 as indicted. In exchange for the guilty pleas
as outlined, the prosecution dismissed Counts 1, 2, and 5. The trial court accepted
the guilty pleas and ordered a presentence investigation.
{¶5} On November 17, 2023, a sentencing hearing was held. At that time,
Raines was sentenced as follows: Count 3 – a minimum prison term of six years
with a potential maximum prison term of nine years; Count 4 – 36 months in prison;
Count 6 – 36 months in prison; and Count 7 – six years in prison. The trial court
ordered that all prison terms be served consecutively, for an aggregate minimum
prison term of 18 years and an aggregate potential maximum prison term of 21
years.
{¶6} On December 15, 2023, Raines filed the instant appeal, in which he
raises one assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
The trial court erred when it sentenced appellant to maximum
sentences on two counts and further erred when it ordered the
sentences were to be served consecutive.
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{¶7} In the sole assignment of error, Raines contends that the trial court erred
in imposing maximum prison terms on Counts 4 and 6 and in ordering that all
sentences be served consecutively.
{¶8} The standard of review in this sentencing appeal is whether the sentence
is clearly and convincingly contrary to law. State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516,
2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 10; R.C. 2953.08. The Supreme Court of Ohio has further
limited sentencing review by holding that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) “does not provide
a basis for an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence based on its view that
the sentence is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” State
v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 39. A trial court has full discretion
to impose any sentence within the statutory range. State v. Johnson, 3d Dist. Allen
Nos. 1-20-48 and 1-20-49, 2021-Ohio-1768, ¶ 9. “A sentence imposed within the
statutory range is not contrary to law as long as the trial court considered the
purposes and principles of felony sentencing contained in R.C. 2929.11 and the
sentencing factors contained in R.C. 2929.12. Id., citing State v. Dorsey, 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 28747, 2021-Ohio-76, ¶ 16.
{¶9} With regard to the maximum sentences imposed on Counts 4 and 6,
Raines was convicted on Count 4 of Having Weapons While Under Disability, a
third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), and was convicted on Count
6 of Aggravated Trafficking in Drugs, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C.
2925.03(A)(1) and (C)(1)(c). The authorized range of prison sentences for those
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types of third-degree felonies is a definite term of nine, twelve, eighteen, twenty-
four, thirty, or thirty-six months. R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(b). Thus, the 36-month prison
terms imposed by the trial court for Counts 4 and 6 were within the statutory range.
{¶10} On the record at the time of sentencing, the trial court specifically
noted that it had considered “the record, the oral statements, the presentence
investigation report, the purposes and principles of sentencing under Revised Code
Section 2929.11, the serious and recidivism factors relevant to the offense and the
offender pursuant to Revised Code Section 2929.12, and the need for deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation, and restitution.” (11/17/23 Tr., 12-13). The
judgment entry of sentencing reflects the same. (Docket No. 43).
{¶11} The trial court went on to find that at the time of committing the
offenses at issue, Raines was on parole, that he had a history of juvenile delinquency
adjudications beginning at age 14, and an extensive history of adult criminal
convictions. The trial court determined that Raines had not previously been
rehabilitated to a satisfactory degree and had not responded favorably to sanctions
previously imposed for his criminal convictions. The trial court noted that Raines
was 41-years-old, that his ORAS score of 41 indicated a high risk of recidivism, and
that he had served three prior prison sentences in Ohio and at least one in Montana.
The trial court concluded that Raines shows a complete disregard for others and
poses a definite risk to the community.
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{¶12} While Raines asserts on appeal that the trial court erroneously found
that he had committed one or more of the multiple offenses while awaiting trial or
sentencing, a review of the record reflects that Raines’ argument is misguided.
R.C. 2929.12(D)(1) provides:
(D) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that apply
regarding the offender, and any other relevant factors, as factors
indicating that the offender is likely to commit future crimes:
(1) At the time of committing the offense, the offender was under
release from confinement before trial or sentencing; was under a
sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of
the Revised Code; was under post-release control pursuant to
section 2967.28 or any other provision of the Revised Code for an
earlier offense or had been unfavorably terminated from post-release
control for a prior offense pursuant to division (B) of
section 2967.16 or section 2929.141 of the Revised Code; was under
transitional control in connection with a prior offense; or had
absconded from the offender's approved community placement
resulting in the offender's removal from the transitional control
program under section 2967.26 of the Revised Code.
{¶13} At the sentencing hearing in this case, the trial court began to make a
finding pursuant to R.C. 2929.12(D)(1) by referencing all of the language in that
statutory subsection but then immediately stopped and said, “well, just to shortcut
that, [he] was on parole on all – when he committed all three of the offenses.”
(11/17/23 Tr., 15-16). Thus, upon considering the trial court’s remark in context,
Raines’ argument lacks merit.
{¶14} Raines also argues that the prosecutor impermissibly referred to
evidence of offenses with which Raines had previously been charged but for which
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he was not convicted. However, even assuming arguendo that the prosecutor’s
passing reference to Raines’ prior charges was impermissible, the record does not
establish that the trial court relied in any way on that reference in making its
sentencing decision.
{¶15} In summary, the record before us confirms that the trial court
considered the overriding purposes of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11
and the statutory factors relating to seriousness and recidivism set forth in R.C.
2929.12. As the trial court gave consideration to the applicable sentencing factors
and because the maximum sentences imposed are within the statutory range of
sentencing options, the maximum sentences in this case are not clearly and
convincingly contrary to law.
{¶16} Raines also argues that the trial court erred in ordering that the prison
terms in this case be served consecutively. Specifically, Raines suggests that the
aggregate sentence here is overly severe.
{¶17} In order to impose consecutive sentences, “a trial court is required to
make the findings mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and
incorporate its findings into its sentencing entry * * *.” State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio
St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, syllabus.
R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) provides:
If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of
multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the
prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive
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service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to
punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not
disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to
the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds
any of the following:
(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while
the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction
imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the
Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.
(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of
one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more
of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no
single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of
the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the
offender’s conduct.
(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future
crime by the offender.
{¶18} When reviewing consecutive sentences on appeal, “[t]he plain
language of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) requires an appellate court to defer to a trial court’s
consecutive-sentence findings, and the trial court’s findings must be upheld unless
those findings are clearly and convincingly not supported by the record.” State v.
Gwynne, 173 Ohio St.3d 525, 2023-Ohio-3851, ¶ 5.
{¶19} Here, the trial court made findings pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4),
and Raines does not contest those findings on appeal. Upon reviewing the entire
record before us, we do not clearly and convincingly find that the record does not
support the trial court’s findings with regard to consecutive sentences. The record
is replete with factors that support consecutive sentences, including Raines’
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extensive criminal history, the multiple offenses he committed in this case, the
demonstrated risk that he poses to the public, and the likelihood of recidivism.
{¶20} In sum, when considering the record as a whole, we do not find that
Raines has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that his maximum
sentences or his consecutive sentences are clearly and convincingly contrary to law.
Therefore, the assignment of error is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶21} Having found no error prejudicial to the defendant-appellant, Kevin
R. Raines, in the particulars assigned and argued, the judgment of the Union County
Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed
WILLAMOWSKI, P.J., and MILLER, J., concur.
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