State v. Barnhart ( 2024 )

[Cite as State v. Barnhart, 2024-Ohio-547.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
MEIGS COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, : CASE NO. 22CA13
v. :
ANGELA BARNHART, : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Defendant-Appellee. :
_________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
James K. Stanley, Meigs County Prosecuting Attorney, Pomeroy, Ohio,
for appellant.
James S. Sweeney, Powell, Ohio, for appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
DATE JOURNALIZED:2-8-24
ABELE, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal from a Meigs County Common Pleas Court
judgment that granted a motion to suppress statements that Angela
Barnhart, defendant below and appellee herein, made to police. The
State of Ohio, plaintiff below and appellant herein, assigns one
error for review:
“THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT
GRANTED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS.”
{¶2} In August 2019, a Meigs County Grand Jury returned a one-
count indictment that charged appellee with one count of complicity
to burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.12(A)(2), a second-degree
MEIGS, 22CA13 2
felony. Appellee pleaded not guilty.
{¶3} On November 7, 2022, appellee filed a motion to suppress
her oral statements. At the hearing on the motion, Meigs County
Sheriff’s Department Sergeant Frank Stewart testified that on June
8, 2019, he responded to a burglary to collect DNA samples and
fingerprints. The victims provided Stewart with a list of stolen
items that included a credit card. Stewart later contacted the
bank and learned that someone used the stolen card in Athens.
Subsequently, the Sheriff’s Department posted the bank video on
social media, and a citizen identified Jacob White and Angela
Barnhart. Stewart discovered that the pair resided at White’s
mother’s home, approximately one mile from the victim’s residence.
{¶4} After appellee’s July 21, 2019 arrest, “multiple
interviews” occurred, including at least one interview at the Meigs
County Sheriff’s Office. However, the interviews that are the
subject of this motion to suppress occurred at the Middleport
Police Department, where Sgt. Stewart took a DNA sample from
appellee and made an audio recording of the interview.
{¶5} At the suppression hearing, the state played portions of
the recording. Initially, appellee states, “I mean, I fu*ked up, I
did.” Sgt. Stewart states, “It’s Sunday, July 21st 5:53 p.m. and
we are at the Middleport Police Department. She is consenting to a
DNA swab in reference to a burglary on Burlingham Road.” Appellee
replies, “Yes.” While Stewart completes the DNA swab form,
MEIGS, 22CA13 3
appellee asks, “can we take these [cuffs] off? I mean, I’m not
going nowhere. Like I said, I fu*ked up.” Stewart presumably
leaves the room for a moment, then returns to assist appellee with
the DNA form. Immediately after, at the recording’s 3:05 mark,
Stewart states, “If you want to talk to me, we’ll do a Miranda form
and then we’ll talk.” Appellee replies, “Why do you have to read
me that?” Stewart responds, “because I’m questioning you about a
criminal case that you are still suspected in and if your DNA comes
back on this, it could be used against you.” Appellee stated, “Oh,
ok, I’m not worried about it.”
{¶6} At that point, Sgt. Stewart leaves the room and states he
will leave the recorder on and will “be right back.” Stewart
leaves for 1 minute and 20 seconds, and when he returns, appellee
initiates the conversation, saying, “You’re a sheriff, you’re
bigger than them guys, can you help me with this? Cause look, I
don’t have $500. Yes, I fu*ked up.” Stewart replies, “didn’t you
say they were dropping it?” Appellee states, “well they dropped it
because they’re supposed to be calling somebody because my other
kids’ Dad is who supplies this town with meth.” Stewart replies,
“who’s your other kids’ Dad?” Appellee gives Stewart the name and
talks about another burglary that involved an assault. Stewart
says he doesn’t know anything about that case.
{¶7} At 7:07 of the recording, Sgt. Stewart says, “you
mentioned something to somebody here about working.” Appellee
MEIGS, 22CA13 4
replies, “yes, because I want out of this * * * what you and me
talked about, I didn’t do.” Stewart informed appellee that he:
“talked to the director of the task force * * * and
he’s willing to work with you as long as you’re honest
with me. It kind of puts you in a better spot. * * *
Let’s say for instance you had something to do with
this burglary. Or you was there with Jacob, it was
Jacob’s idea, blah blah blah blah, you went in with
him, I get it, because that’s what Jacob is saying
happened. So if that’s what happened, we would indict
you and the prosecutor would be willing to work with
you.”
Appellee responded, “On my kids, honest to God, I did not enter
that man’s home.” Stewart stated, “Ok. Were you outside the home
when Jacob did?” Appellee replied, “No. I was down the road at my
house * * * which isn’t far by his house, which isn’t far away, but
I wasn’t standing outside.” Stewart stated, “because initially I
thought you told me you drove.” Appellee replied, “No, * * * I
didn’t tell you that. * * * The only thing I told you * * * was I
know things. I think I said I was there with the stuff, like I
know what was there. * * * I wasn’t physically at the home. I
didn’t physically go in that man’s home. I didn’t physically take
Jacob to that man’s home.”
{¶8} At 9:00 minutes into the recording, Sgt. Stewart asked
for appellee’s birthday, social security number, contact
information, and advised appellee of her Miranda rights. Appellee
signed the Waiver of Rights form at 10:05 of the recording.
MEIGS, 22CA13 5
{¶9} After her Miranda warnings, appellee told Sgt. Stewart
that (1) she could not tell him much about the burglary itself, (2)
Jacob called her to come and get him at the scene, and (3) she
drove to a stop sign near the victim’s home and Jacob loaded the
vehicle with stolen items. Stewart told appellee that Jacob said
he wore gloves at the scene, but appellee did not. Appellee’s
response was, “DNA it. * * * No, I never went into that man’s
house. * * * That’s the honest to God’s truth.” Although appellee
said people threatened her online regarding talking about the
burglary and even threatened to torture her mother, appellee
continued to deny entering the victim’s home. Appellee did,
however, confirm that she picked up Jacob and the stolen items near
the victim’s home and they drove to Jacob’s apartment. Appellee
stated that Jacob always said he wanted to “hit that house,” and,
after the burglary, Jacob told her he “hit the mother load.”
{¶10} When Sgt. Stewart asked about the location of the stolen
items, appellee stated that Jacob took some of the items to a pawn
shop and most of the weapons to drug dealers. Appellee said she
could ask Jacob about the items when she talked to him. Appellee
also stated that she has “been through the justice system” and
“been to prison. * * * I didn’t know he was going to do it, but I
did know that he did it. But no, I didn’t enter that man’s home.”
{¶11} After Sgt. Stewart informed appellee that she may be
charged with misuse of a credit card, he said he did not believe
MEIGS, 22CA13 6
they would indict her other than for “obstructing.” Stewart then
left to inquire whether the task force intended to work with
appellee and the tape concludes at 30:55.
{¶12} Sgt. Stewart testified that he “was getting the Miranda
form and also getting ready to take a DNA sample,” when appellee
brought up the subject of her mother’s home in Paigeville, a
substantial distance from the burglary. Stewart stated that “in
the previous interview * * * at the Sheriff’s Office, she had
mentioned that she would be willing to buy drugs for the Task Force
in exchange for a lesser sentence or lighter sentence or something
to that effect. So I had spoken with * * * Director Bill Gilkey *
* * about using her * * * and we was [sic.] talking about that
during the interview.” When asked if he had inquired of appellee
about this particular case, he said he did not. Later, Stewart
said the appellee maintained that she did not enter the burglarized
residence, nor did she take Jacob to the residence. Stewart did
not think he asked appellee a question to prompt that information.
{¶13} Sgt. Stewart further testified that he asked appellee
“several questions” because he wanted to determine “her involvement
and then see if we could work with her through the Task Force.”
However, Stewart testified that in response to his questions
appellee did not admit anything. Stewart asked appellee for her
name, birthday, social security number, and contact information to
complete the waiver of rights form, which appellee signed. Stewart
MEIGS, 22CA13 7
then related that, after he advised appellee of her Miranda rights,
she continued to state that she did not go to the scene of the
burglary, but believed “Jacob made several trips to the ditch line,
which is in front of the residence, uh, by the road, and dumped
items off there.” Stewart also asked appellee about stolen
property, but did not recall the rest of the interview.
{¶14} On cross-examination, Sgt. Stewart conceded that appellee
had been in custody in the Middleport Police Department at the time
of her interview and had not been advised of her Miranda rights
until 10 or 11 minutes into the video. Stewart acknowledged that
he took the DNA sample before appellee’s Miranda rights, and
conceded that “in one of the interviews she [appellee] was talking
about being, um, under the influence.” Stewart also agreed that,
at some point, he left and then returned and recalled that six or
seven minutes into the recording he talked about matters unrelated
to the burglary. Stewart did acknowledge that, before he advised
appellee of her Miranda rights, he asked “two to three questions”
about the incident. Stewart also admitted that he said something
to the effect that, if appellee had something to do with the
burglary, she would “be in a better spot” if she “worked with us.”
He also admitted that he told appellee something to the effect that
he would “talk to the Prosecutor to see if he would be willing to
work with her on that.” Finally, Stewart acknowledged that, before
he advised appellee of her Miranda rights, he asked “if she was
MEIGS, 22CA13 8
outside the home.”
{¶15} Defense counsel asked Sgt. Stewart if he asked appellee
similar questions before and after he advised appellee of her
Miranda rights. Stewart said he discussed appellee’s possible
cooperation with the investigation, both before and after. Stewart
also acknowledged that he thought appellee initially told him that
she drove to the burglary scene. Counsel stated, “[a]nd these
kinds of questions and talking, you know, this was all . . . you
had talked to her about the same topics after Miranda, correct?”
Stewart replied, “Correct, yes.” When asked if he remembered
telling appellee that any statements she made before the Miranda
warnings could be used against her, Stewart replied, “I don’t
believe I did, no.” When asked if he considered earlier advising
appellee of her Miranda rights, Stewart replied, “Um, no, not
really, because we were more so in a conversation about her working
for the Task Force at that time and then the conversation continued
to build, which was what we were trying to do was fill out a
Miranda waiver form.” When defense counsel asked, “But * * * the
conversation shifted from strictly her on the Task Force * * *
working for the Task Force, possible to asking questions about the
burglary, correct?” Stewart replied, “Correct. The conversation
shifted to that, which is why we filled out the Miranda form eleven
(11) minutes into the video, once we realized that it was not going
to go, uh, in terms of her working for, uh, the Task Force buying
MEIGS, 22CA13 9
drugs, we filled out the Miranda form.”
{¶16} Once again, defense counsel asked Sgt. Stewart to admit
that he asked appellee questions about the burglary pre-Miranda, to
which Stewart replied, “Yes.” Stewart then elaborated, “that was
why I reiterated the same questions, once she was actually
mirandized.” Stewart stated that appellee gave the same answers
both before and after being advised of her Miranda rights. After
the interview, appellee remained in custody due to the statements
that implicated her and her co-defendant.
{¶17} On re-direct examination, Sgt. Stewart testified that, in
response to his first question pre-Miranda, appellee stated, “I’m
telling you on my kid’s life and I * * * I did not enter that man’s
home.” When Stewart asked her if she was outside when Jacob
entered the home, appellee answered, no. Appellee stated, “I ran
down * * * I was down the road by my house, which isn’t far away,
but I wasn’t standing outside.” Stewart inquired, “I thought you
told me you didn’t drive there, but you were there, but didn’t go
in the house.” Appellee said, “I didn’t tell you that.”
{¶18} After hearing the evidence, the trial court granted the
motion to suppress. The court ordered “[a]ll statements provided
to Sgt. Stewart by Defendant on July 21, 2019 are hereby SUPRESSED
[sic.] and therefore not to be testified about or offered as
evidence before the jury.”
MEIGS, 22CA13 10
{¶19} Pursuant to Crim.R. 12(K), the state filed its appeal to
challenge the trial court’s order to suppress appellee’s
statements.
I.
{¶20} In its sole assignment of error, the state asserts that
the trial court erred when it granted appellee’s motion to
suppress. Specifically, the state contends that (1) the trial
court did not cite any legal authority to grant the suppression
motion, (2) although the post-warning portion of appellee’s
interview is an interrogation, the pre-warning portion of the
interview was not an interrogation, and (3) appellee’s post-warning
statement differed from her pre-warning statement, and, therefore,
should not be suppressed.
{¶21} In general, “appellate review of a motion to suppress
presents a mixed question of law and fact.” State v. Codeluppi,
139 Ohio St.3d 165, 2014-Ohio-1574, 10 N.E.3d 691, ¶ 7, citing
State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d
71, ¶ 8; State v. Bennett, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 20CA4, 2021-Ohio-
937, ¶ 9. The trial court is in the best position to evaluate
witness credibility at a suppression hearing. State v. Dunlap, 73
Ohio St.3d 308, 314, 652 N.E.2d 988 (1995), State v. Flanders, 4th
Dist. Washington No. 06CA16, 2007-Ohio-503, ¶ 11. Therefore, we
must uphold the trial court’s findings of fact if competent,
credible evidence in the record supports them. Dunlap, supra.MEIGS, 22CA13 11
However, we conduct a de novo review of the trial court’s
application of the law to the facts. State v. Roberts, 110 Ohio
St.3d 71, 2006-Ohio-3665, 850 N.E.2d 1168, ¶ 100, Burnside at ¶ 8,
State v. Anderson, 100 Ohio App.3d 688, 691, 654 N.E.2d 1034 (4th
Dist.1995).
{¶22} In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602,
16 L.E.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court “established
procedural safeguards for securing the privilege against self-
incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.” Cleveland v. Oles, 152 Ohio St.3d 1, 2017-
Ohio-5834, 92 N.E.3d 810, ¶ 8, Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 420,
106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). A suspect in police custody
“must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be provided for
him prior to any questioning if he so desires.” Miranda at 479, 86
S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.
{¶23} Miranda safeguards apply “only when one is subjected to
custodial interrogation.” State v. Hoffner, 102 Ohio St.3d 358,
2004-Ohio-3430, 811 N.E.2d 48, ¶ 26. “If a suspect provides
responses while in custody without having first been informed of
his or her Miranda rights, the responses may not be admitted at
trial as evidence of guilt.” Oles at ¶ 9, citing Miranda at 479.
MEIGS, 22CA13 12
After Miranda warnings are given and an opportunity to seek counsel
afforded, “the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive
these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement.”
Miranda at 479. Here, the parties agree that appellee was in
custody at the time of the police interviews.
{¶24} The state cites Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct.
1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985) when the court considered whether the
Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause requires the
suppression of a confession, made after Miranda warnings and a
valid waiver of rights, solely because the police had obtained an
earlier voluntary, but unwarned admission. In Elstad, the court
upheld a post-Miranda warning confession that followed a pre-
warning admission that an officer solicited while the suspect had
been in custody. After police first questioned and obtained
admissions from an 18-year-old defendant at his home, later at the
police station the defendant waived his Miranda rights and made a
full, detailed confession. The trial court admitted both
confessions into evidence at trial.
{¶25} The Elstad court allowed the post-Miranda confession to
be admitted into evidence. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285,
84 L.Ed.2d 222. The court held that the relevant inquiry is
“whether, in fact, the second statement was also voluntarily made.”
Id. at 318. Moreover, the court held that the failure of police to
administer Miranda warnings does not mean that the statements
MEIGS, 22CA13 13
received had been coerced, but only that courts will presume the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination has not been
intelligently exercised. Elstad at 310, citing New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550, n. 5;
Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 457. The Elstad court
observed:
There is a vast difference between the direct consequences
flowing from coercion of a confession by physical violence
or other deliberate means calculated to break the suspect's
will and the uncertain consequences of disclosure of a
“guilty secret” freely given in response to an unwarned
but noncoercive question, as in this case.
Elstad at 312, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222.
{¶26} Thus, Elstad held that in any such inquiry, in evaluating
the voluntariness of the statements the finder of fact must examine
the surrounding circumstances and the entire course of police
conduct. Id. at 318. Accordingly, the Elstad court held that a
suspect, who responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning, is
not disabled from a waiver of rights and a confession after he
received the requisite Miranda warnings. Id.
{¶27} On the other side of the spectrum is Missouri v. Seibert,
542 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004), a more recent
case in which the United States Supreme Court considered whether
the technique of successive interrogations, first unwarned and then
warned, violated a defendant’s Miranda rights. In Seibert, after a
police officer questioned the defendant for 30 to 40 minutes
[Cite as State v. Barnhart, 2024-Ohio-547.]
without Miranda warnings, the defendant made an admission. After a
20-minute break, the officer returned, administered Miranda
warnings, obtained a signed waiver and resumed questioning. During
the second interrogation, after the officer confronted the
defendant with her pre-Miranda statements, she repeated her
admission. The Seibert court referred to this technique as
“question first” and stated that “[t]he object of question first is
to render Miranda warnings ineffective by waiting for a
particularly opportune time to give them, after the suspect has
already confessed.” Id. at 611, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159
L.Ed.2d 643. The court determined that the post-warning statements
are inadmissible. Id. at 617.
The threshold issue when interrogators question and warn
later is thus whether it would be reasonable to find that
in these circumstances the warning could function
‘effectively’ as Miranda requires. Could the warnings
effectively advise the suspect that he had a real choice
about giving an admissible statement at that juncture?
Could they reasonably convey that he could choose to stop
talking even if he had talked earlier? For unless the
warnings could place a suspect who has just been
interrogated in a position to make an informed choice,
there is no practical justification for accepting the
formal warnings as compliance with Miranda, or for treating
the second stage of interrogation as distinct from the
first, unwarned and inadmissible segment.”
Seibert, 542 U.S. at 611-612, 135 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643.
{¶28} Two years after Seibert, the Supreme Court of Ohio
observed that “Elstad and Seibert stand on opposite sides of the
[Cite as State v. Barnhart, 2024-Ohio-547.]
line defining where pre-warning statements irretrievably affect
post-warning statements. Still, that line cannot be said to be
bright or sharply defined.” State v. Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519,
2006-Ohio-3255, 849 N.E.2d 985, ¶ 22.
{¶29} During a routine traffic stop in Farris, an officer
smelled marijuana and ordered the defendant to exit his vehicle.
Without administering Miranda warnings, the officer asked the
defendant about the smell of marijuana. The defendant stated that
his roommates smoked marijuana when he left the house. When the
officer told the defendant that he intended to search the car and
asked about drugs in the car, the defendant admitted that a
marijuana pipe could be found in the trunk. Id. at ¶ 3. The
officer then administered Miranda warnings, but did not tell the
defendant that previous admissions could not be used against him.
The officer then asked the same questions and obtained the same
responses regarding the location of the drug paraphernalia. Id. at
¶ 4. After the trial court ruled that statements prior to the
Miranda warnings must be suppressed, but statements after the
warnings would be admitted into evidence, the defendant entered a
no-contest plea and appealed.
{¶30} The Supreme Court of Ohio observed that no talismanic
incantation is required to satisfy Miranda, California v. Prysock,
453 U.S. 355, 359, 101 S.Ct. 2806, 69 L.Ed.2d 696 (1981). Instead,
[Cite as State v. Barnhart, 2024-Ohio-547.]
the inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably convey to a
suspect his or her rights as Miranda requires. Farris at ¶ 18,
quoting Seibert, 542 U.S. at 611, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643.
Farris emphasized, however, that Seibert’s admonition that in the
“question first” scenarios, when circumstances show that the
Miranda warning could not reasonably be found effective, the post-
warning statements are inadmissible because “earlier and later
statements are realistically seen as parts of a single, unwarned
sequence of questioning.” Farris at ¶ 21, quoting Seibert at 612,
124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 543, fn. 5. Farris also pointed out
that Elstad and Seibert establish factors to consider in deciding
whether sequential interrogations are essentially one continuous
interrogation, and whether an intermediate Miranda warning can be
effective. The court quoted Seibert:
“The contrast between Elstad and this case reveals a series
of relevant facts that bear on whether Miranda warnings
delivered midstream could be effective enough to accomplish
their object: [1] the completeness and detail of the
questions and answers in the first round of interrogation,
[2] the overlapping content of the two statements, [3] the
timing and setting of the first and the second, [4] the
continuity of police personnel, and [5] the degree to which
the interrogator’s questions treated the second round as
continuous with the first. In Elstad, it was not
unreasonable to see the occasion for questioning at the
station house as presenting a markedly different experience
from the short conversation at home; since a reasonable
person in the suspect’s shoes could have seen the station
house questioning as a new and distinct experience, the
Miranda warnings could have made sense as presenting a
genuine choice whether to follow up on the earlier
admission.
[Cite as State v. Barnhart, 2024-Ohio-547.]
At the opposite extreme are the facts here, which by any
objective measure reveal a police strategy adapted to
undermine the Miranda warnings. The unwarned interrogation
was conducted in the station house, and the questioning
was systematic, exhaustive, and managed with psychological
skill. When the police were finished there was little, if
anything, of incriminating potential left unsaid. The
warned phase of questioning proceeded after a pause of only
15 to 20 minutes, in the same place as the unwarned segment.
When the same officer who had conducted the first phase
recited the Miranda warnings, he said nothing to counter
the probable misimpression that the advice that anything
Seibert said could be used against her also applied to the
details of the inculpatory statement previously elicited.
In particular, the police did not advise that her prior
statement could not be used. Nothing was said or done to
dispel the oddity of warning about legal rights to silence
and counsel right after the police had led her through a
systematic interrogation, and any uncertainty on her part
about a right to stop talking about matters previously
discussed would only have been aggravated by the way [the
officer] set the scene by saying ‘we’ve been talking for a
little while about what happened on Wednesday the twelfth,
haven’t’ we?’ * * * The impression that the further
questioning was a mere continuation of the earlier
questions and responses was fostered by references back to
the confession already given. It would have been
reasonable to regard the two sessions as parts of a
continuum, in which it would have been unnatural to refuse
to repeat at the second stage what had been said before.
These circumstances must be seen as challenging the
comprehensibility and efficacy of the Miranda warnings to
the point that a reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes
would not have understood them to convey a message that
she retained a choice about continuing to talk.”
Farris, supra, at ¶ 28-29, quoting Seibert, at 615-617, 124 S.Ct.
2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643.
{¶31} The Farris court concluded that the defendant’s
interrogation resembled Seibert more than Elstad, and noted: (1)
although the whole process was extremely brief, it would have been
[Cite as State v. Barnhart, 2024-Ohio-547.]
reasonable to regard the two sessions as part of a continuum, (2)
although the questioning was very simple, not in-depth, and not
lengthy, it covered exactly the same subject both before the
warning and after the warning, and (3) both statements were made in
the police cruiser to the same officer within moments of each
other. Id. at ¶ 30. Accordingly, the court held that temporally
and substantively, the questioning constituted a single
interrogation. Id. at ¶ 31.
{¶32} The Farris court also noted that, unlike Seibert, the
police employed no official strategy to intentionally bait the
suspect into talking before the Miranda warnings, then repeat the
damaging statements post-warning. However, Farris concluded that
Seibert left unclear whether the officer’s intent is relevant in
the Miranda analysis. Thus, the Supreme Court of Ohio determined
that the suspect’s state of mind is key. Id. at ¶ 35.
Accordingly, Farris held, “[b]ecause the intent of the trooper was
irrelevant here, and because Farris’s post-warning statements were
the same as his pre-warning statements, we hold that Farris’s post-
warning statements were not the result of an informed choice and
are therefore inadmissible.” Id. at ¶ 36.
{¶33} In the case sub judice, we presume from the trial court’s
judgment that it granted appellee’s suppression motion based on
[Cite as State v. Barnhart, 2024-Ohio-547.]
Seibert and Farris.1 The entry states:
This matter came on for hearing November 29, 2022 on the
Defendant’s Motion to Suppress. Present in court was the
Defendant, Angela Barnhart, her attorney, James S. Sweeney,
and the Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Jeff Adkins.
Defendant was taken into custody by the Meigs County
Sheriff’s Department on July 21, 2019. Sgt. Stewart
communicated and asked questions of Defendant while in
custody and prior to advising Defendant of her
constitutional rights under Miranda.
The Miranda warnings were eventually given to the Defendant
by Sgt. Stewart. After the Miranda advisement, additional
questions were asked of Defendant, including questions
covering topics discussed prior to the reading of her
Miranda rights.
All statements provided to Sgt. Stewart by Defendant on
July 21, 2019 are hereby SUPRESSED [sic.] and therefore
not to be testified about or offered as evidence before
the jury.
{¶34} Although the interview process was relatively brief, it
is reasonable to regard the two sessions as part of a continuum.
We note that Sgt. Stewart indicated that they conducted “multiple
interviews” with appellee, and “in one of the interviews [appellee]
was talking about being * * * under the influence.” Further,
although Stewart first mentioned a Miranda waiver at 3:05 of the
1
The state observed that the trial court’s entry did not cite
authority. However, a trial court’s failure to cite to authority
or precedent in its opinion does not necessarily affect an
appellate court's ability to examine the issues presented on
appeal. See Green v. Administrator, Ohio Bureau of Workers'
Compensation, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 17CA17, 2018-Ohio-2618, ¶ 18.
[Cite as State v. Barnhart, 2024-Ohio-547.]
recording, he did not administer the warnings until 10:05 of the
30:55 minute recording. Second, like Farris, although the
questions in the case at bar appear to be simple and not lengthy,
the questions both before and after the warnings covered the same
subject and involved the same officer at the same location.
{¶35} The state also contends that appellee’s post-warning
statement differed from her pre-warning statement because the post-
warning statement made criminally culpable admissions, whereas the
pre-warning statement denied criminal culpability. We disagree,
however. In appellee’s pre-warning statement, she admitted she was
“there with the stuff” and stated, “I know things * * * like, I
know what was there.” Both the pre-warning and post-warning
statements implicated appellee in the burglary.
{¶36} Moreover, applying the Seibert factors to the case sub
judice, the only factor that weighs in the state’s favor is the
first - the completeness and detail of the questions and answers in
the first round of interrogation. Regarding the other factors,
overlapping content exists in the two statements, the timing
between the two statements was virtually simultaneous, in the same
setting with the same officer, and the questions treated the second
round as continuous with the first. Thus, we agree with the trial
court’s conclusion that the Seibert factors weigh in favor of
suppression.
[Cite as State v. Barnhart, 2024-Ohio-547.]
{¶37} The state cites State v. Dixon, 101 Ohio St.3d 328, 2004-
Ohio-1585, 805 N.E.2d 1042, in support of its argument that
appellee’s pre-warning statement was not inculpatory. In Dixon,
police interviewed the defendant three times and the parties did
not dispute that the trial court properly suppressed the
defendant’s second interview statements. In concluding that the
other two interviews were admissible, the Supreme Court of Ohio
relied on Elstad, observed that four hours elapsed between sessions
two and three, and concluded that the breach of the Miranda
procedures involved no actual compulsion, promises, or coercive
tactics. Id. at ¶ 26, 34. Although we discern no evidence of
compulsion or coercive tactics in the case at bar, we believe Dixon
is distinguishable. Dixon involved a long break between the
interviews and, more importantly, the court decided Dixon two
months before Seibert and two years before Farris. Thus, we
believe Dixon has limited precedential value.
{¶38} In State v. Jirac, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 15-CR-756,
2016-Ohio-8187, the defendant’s initial encounter with police at a
UPS store resulted in a custodial interrogation before any Miranda
rights discussion. The same officer conducted both pre- and post-
Miranda interviews, and the interrogator treated the second
interrogation as continuous with the first by asserting at the
outset that the post-warning interrogation was designed to review
[Cite as State v. Barnhart, 2024-Ohio-547.]
the previous discussion and clarify discrepancies in the two
statements by asking the defendant to affirm the specific
statements he made during the first interrogation. The Second
District concluded that a defendant in similar circumstances
reasonably would not believe that, after being given a Miranda
warning, he had any choice but to affirm the statements already
made to police before that warning. The court concluded that the
statements were inadmissible because the defendant’s post-warning
statements did not result from an informed, voluntary choice to
waive his rights,. Id. at ¶ 15.
{¶39} In State v. Cook, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24524, 2012-
Ohio-111, the defendant’s pre-Miranda interview lasted
approximately five minutes, then, shortly thereafter, the police
transported the defendant to a building for a second interrogation.
Before the second interrogation, the same officer advised the
defendant of her Miranda rights. The officer testified that the
second interview, substantially longer than the first, covered the
same event, but “started at the beginning and went through to the
end.” Id. at ¶ 17. The Second District concluded that the case
“fell on the Seibert side of the Elstad/Seibert continuum” because
the content overlapped, the same officer elicited both statements,
and the interviews were designed to elicit incriminating
statements. Id. at ¶ 29.
[Cite as State v. Barnhart, 2024-Ohio-547.]
{¶40} Similarly, in State v. Bonnell, 5th Dist. Delaware No.
07CAA 01 0006, 2008-Ohio-28, when officers at a rest area checked a
vehicle’s license plates and ran the defendant’s license, they
learned that a rental company had reported the vehicle stolen.
When an officer patted down and handcuffed the defendant and then
attempted to confirm ownership, the officer asked if the defendant
owned the vehicle. The defendant told him the vehicle was a rental
car. When the officer asked if he knew why he had been detained,
the defendant responded that the rental car was overdue for several
months. Id. at ¶ 6. Officers then placed the defendant in their
cruiser while they awaited confirmation about the vehicle’s status.
{¶41} After confirming that the vehicle had been stolen,
officers advised the defendant of his Miranda rights. At that
point, the defendant admitted that three months before he signed a
two week rental agreement. The trial court suppressed the
defendant’s statements made before officers placed him in the
cruiser and advised him of his Miranda rights, but allowed the
statements made post-Miranda. Id. at ¶ 7.
{¶42} On appeal, the Fifth District reversed and held that the
trial court should have suppressed statements made after the
defendant had been advised of his Miranda rights.
The statements were close in time to the statements
appellant made prior to being given Miranda warnings, were
elicited by the same deputy and overlapped in content with
[Cite as State v. Barnhart, 2024-Ohio-547.]
his earlier, pre-Miranda statements. * * * [B]oth the pre
and post-Miranda interrogations concerned whether
appellant had permission to use the vehicle and whether it
was overdue. While the first interrogation occurred
outside of Deputy Pollock’s cruiser, the second occurred
just minutes later while appellant was seated in the back
of the cruiser. * * * [Thus], the court found that the
‘mid-stream’ Miranda warnings in this case were not
effective enough to accomplish their objectives and that
the trial court, therefore, erred in not granting
appellant’s Motion to Suppress appellant’s statements.
Id. at ¶ 52.
{¶43} In the case sub judice, the state argues that the
appellee offered some unsolicited statements and because an
unsolicited and spontaneous statement is not the product of
interrogation, Miranda does not apply. State v. Neyland, 139 Ohio
St.3d 353, 2014-Ohio-1914, 12 N.E.3d 1112, ¶ 119. We may agree
that arguably some statements, like the first statement pre-Miranda
“I mean, I fu*ked up, I did,” and later statement after Sgt.
Stewart reentered the room, “You’re a sheriff, you’re bigger than
them guys, can you help me with this? Cause look, I don’t have
$500. Yes, I fu*ked up,” are examples of unsolicited and
spontaneous statements, the appellee gave several statements in
response to questions, such as “Were you outside the home when
Jacob did [the robbery]?” and “because initially I thought you told
me you drove.” Those questions clearly pertained to the burglary.
Further, Stewart’s statement at the suppression hearing reveals
that he asked appellee “several questions” because he attempted to
[Cite as State v. Barnhart, 2024-Ohio-547.]
determine “her involvement and then see if we could work with her
through the Task Force.” When asked if he posed similar questions
before and after Miranda, Stewart replied, “Correct, yes.”
{¶44} Accordingly, based on Farris and Seibert, we conclude
that the trial court did not err in its decision to suppress all
statements appellee provided to Sgt. Stewart on July 21, 2019.
Therefore, for all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
MEIGS, 22CA13 26
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed and appellant bear
the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court
directing the Meigs County Common Pleas Court to carry this
judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J. & Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion
For the Court
BY:_____________________________
Peter B. Abele, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a
final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
commences from the date of filing with the clerk.