In re M.V. , 2024 Ohio 618 ( 2024 )

[Cite as In re M.V., 2024-Ohio-618.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF MEDINA )
IN RE: M.V. C.A. No. 2023CA0058-M
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO
CASE No. 2022 03 DE 0045
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: February 20, 2024
SUTTON, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, S.S., appeals from a judgment of the Medina County Court of Common
Pleas, Juvenile Division, that denied her motion to intervene in the dependency proceedings
involving a half-sibling of her child. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} The child at issue in this case is M.V., born August 14, 2007. M.V.’s mother has
been deceased for many years and the child’s father (“Father”) did not appeal from the trial court’s
judgment. Appellant S.S. was romantically involved with Father and is the mother of M.V.’s half-
sibling, I.V.
{¶3} This case began on March 28, 2022, when Medina County Job and Family Services
(“MCJFS”) filed a complaint, alleging that M.V. was a dependent child. In a related case that is
not part of the record in this appeal, MCJFS apparently also filed a complaint pertaining to I.V.
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Nevertheless, there is nothing in the record in this case about I.V. or S.S. until S.S. moved to
intervene as a party in this case more than one year later.
{¶4} M.V. was later adjudicated a dependent child and placed in the temporary custody
of MCJFS. M.V.’s case proceeded forward for the next several months. On February 28, 2023,
MCJFS moved for permanent custody of M.V.
{¶5} On June 22, 2023, 15 months after this case began and almost four months after
MCJFS moved for permanent custody, S.S. filed a motion to intervene in this case. There is
nothing in the record to indicate that S.S. had attempted to have any involvement in this case prior
to that time. Her motion alleged that she had lived with Father and M.V. for a “substantial amount
of time” and that, therefore, she stood in loco parentis to the child. She did not explain why she
had not moved to intervene in this case sooner. A few weeks later, S.S. filed motions for legal
custody of M.V. and to begin visitation with the child.
{¶6} The trial court held a hearing on S.S.’s motion to intervene and, on July 31, 2023,
denied the motion. On August 7, 2023, S.S. timely appealed from the trial court’s judgment
denying her motion to intervene as a party to this case.
{¶7} On appeal, S.S. has raised one assignment of error pertaining to the trial court’s
order denying her motion to intervene. Because S.S. timely appealed from that order and raises
one assignment of error that she supports with a legal argument, the relevant transcript, and other
necessary materials in the appellate record, this Court will review the merits of that assigned error.
{¶8} S.S’s brief also includes a page that lists five different assignments of error, but she
has not supported any of them with a legal argument. Moreover, those assigned errors are not
relevant to the hearing or order on S.S.’s motion to intervene. Instead, they appear to apply to a
judgment that S.S. filed, outside the record, to supplement her brief. The order filed by S.S., if
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authentic, indicates that, after S.S. filed her appeal, MCJFS apparently filed an alternative
dispositional motion for M.V. to be placed in a planned permanent living arrangement (“PPLA”),
and the trial court granted that motion following a hearing.
{¶9} This Court will not reach the merits of any challenges by S.S. to the PPLA
placement. In addition to her failure to comply with the appellate rules pertaining to developing
an argument in her brief, the record does not include relevant materials such as MCJFS’s motion,
the hearing transcript, or the judgment pertaining to the PPLA placement. See App.R. 16(A)(7);
App.R. 16(D); App.R. 10(A). Moreover, because S.S. was not permitted to intervene as a party in
this dependency case, her appeal is necessarily limited to the trial court’s denial of her motion to
intervene, not the merits of the ultimate decision in a case to which she was not a party. See State
ex rel. Sawicki v. Court of Common Pleas of Lucas Cty., 121 Ohio St.3d 507, 2009-Ohio-1523, ¶
18-20.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE JUDGE’S DECISION WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND
AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE[.]
{¶10} S.S.’s assignment of error is that the trial court erred in denying her motion to
intervene in this dependency case. On appeal, S.S. argues that her motion to intervene should have
been granted under either Civ.R. 24(A) or 24(B), but her argument to the trial court was premised
only on Civ.R. 24(B). As S.S. has assigned error to the trial court’s denial of her motion, this
Court will confine its review to the Civ.R. 24(B) permissive intervention argument that she raised,
and the trial court rejected.
{¶11} In relevant part, Civ.R. 24(B) provides:
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Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: * * *
when an applicant’s claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or
fact in common. * * * In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether
the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶12} By its explicit terms, Civ.R. 24(B) provides that, upon a “timely” request, the trial
court “may” permit a party to intervene under certain circumstances. By its use of the term “may,”
coupled with its explicit reference to how the court should “exercis[e] its discretion,” Civ.R 24(B)
places the decision of whether to permit intervention within the sound discretion of the trial court.
See State v. Stutler, 169 Ohio St.3d 639, 2022-Ohio-2792, ¶ 15, citing United States v. Rogers,
461 U.S. 677, 706, (1983) (The term “may” usually implies some degree of discretion, but
reference should also be made to its use within the context of the surrounding language and other
indications of the drafters’ intent.)
{¶13} “In exercising its discretion,” the trial court was required to “consider whether the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.”
Civ.R. 24(B). The trial court explicitly considered that S.S. did not file her motion to intervene
until this case had been pending for more than a year. The court emphasized that, by that late stage
of the proceedings, a motion for permanent custody was pending and the parties were prepared to
proceed to the final disposition of the case. The trial court explicitly concluded that allowing S.S.
to intervene at that late stage of the proceedings would unduly delay and/or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the parties, including the minor child. Consequently, it denied the
motion.
{¶14} S.S. focuses her argument solely on whether she had stood in loco parentis to M.V.
before the child’s removal from the home. S.S. offers no explanation for why she did not seek to
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intervene in this case earlier. In fact, she does not attempt to dispute the trial court’s conclusion
that her intervention 15 months into the proceedings would unduly delay and/or prejudice M.V.’s
need for a legally secure permanent placement. Consequently, S.S. has failed to demonstrate an
abuse of discretion by the trial court and her assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶15} The assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Medina County Court
of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
BETTY SUTTON
FOR THE COURT
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STEVENSON, P. J.
FLAGG LANZINGER, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
JESSICA A.L. CAMARGO, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
MELISSA ZAWADSKI, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.
MARC STOLARSKY, Guardian ad Litem.