Rennell v. Rennell ( 2024 )

[Cite as Rennell v. Rennell, 2024-Ohio-2454.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
ANDREW W. RENNELL, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 113256
v. :
SUSAN L. RENNELL, ET AL., :
Defendants-Appellees. :
[Appeal by Joseph Bancsi, :
Intervenor-Appellant]
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART, AND DISMISSED IN
PART
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 27, 2024
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Domestic Relations Division
Case No. DR-19-379000
Appearances:
Joseph Bancsi, pro se.
Rosenthal | Lane, L.L.C., and James L. Lane, for appellee
Susan L. Rennell.
LISA B. FORBES, J.:
Joseph Bancsi (“Bancsi”) appeals from the domestic relations court’s
judgment entry denying his motion to intervene and its judgment entry striking his
brief in opposition to motion for sanctions. After reviewing the facts of the case and
pertinent law, we affirm the lower court’s judgment in part and dismiss this appeal
in part for lack of a final appealable order.
The dispute in this appeal stems from a divorce case filed in October
2019. On May 16, 2022, Bancsi filed a “notice of limited appearance of additional
counsel for plaintiff.” Bancsi filed additional motions, briefs, and notices1 in the trial
court in May 2022, June 2022, July 2022, August 2022, December 2022, and
January 2023.
On January 27, 2023, defendant filed a motion for sanctions against
Bancsi. Bancsi filed a brief in opposition to the motion for sanctions on August 2,
2023, which is approximately six months after the motion for sanctions was filed.
That same day, August 2, 2023, Bancsi filed a motion to withdraw as attorney of
record for the plaintiff. On August 3, 2023, the court issued a journal entry ordering
Bancsi released as attorney of record for the plaintiff.
On August 4, 2023, the defendant filed a motion to strike Bancsi’s
brief in opposition to motion for sanctions, which the court granted on August 8,
2023, finding that the brief in opposition was untimely.
1 On September 5, 2022, Bancsi filed a notice of appeal in this court.See Rennell
v. Rennell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111941. This case was stayed pending bankruptcy
proceedings, and on August 2, 2023, Bancsi filed a motion to withdraw as appellate
counsel, which this court granted the same day. Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed on
December 1, 2023, for failure to file an appellate brief.
On September 7, 2023, Bancsi filed a motion to intervene in the trial
court “to protect his interests and defend against the unwarranted filing by
Defendant . . . of a Motion for Sanctions . . . against” him. The court denied this
motion on September 13, 2023.
It is from these orders that Bancsi appeals, raising four assignments
of error for our review.
I. The trial court committed reversible error as a matter of law
when it granted the motion to strike of appellee and struck the brief of
appellant in opposition to the motion of appellee for sanctions upon the
ground of untimeliness and denied appellant due process of law.
II. The trial court committed reversible error as a matter of law
when (1) it ruled upon and granted motion of appellee to strike brief of
appellant. And when (2) [it] ruled upon and denied motion of appellant
to intervene since the trial court . . . was not assigned by []random
selection and she should have recused herself from the case and now
should be disqualified.
III. The trial court committed reversible error as a matter of law
when it ruled upon and denied motion to intervene of appellant after
the trial court received notice of decision of the Supreme Court dated
August 18, 2023, in case No. 23-AP-070, entitled, In Re
Disqualification of Hon. Leslie Ann Celebrezze ruling that a Judge
[who] is not randomly assigned to a case is disqualified to preside over
the case.
IV. The trial court committed reversible error as a matter of law
when it denied appellant’s motion to intervene and abused its
discretion, upon the ground of untimeliness denying appellant due
process of law.
Because Bancsi’s assignments of error are interrelated, we review
them together. We note that Bancsi challenges two court orders in his four
assignments of error: whether the court erred by granting defendant’s motion to
strike and whether the court erred by denying his motion to intervene.2
I. Motion to Strike Brief in Opposition
As a preliminary issue, we must determine whether the trial court’s
journal entry granting the defendant’s motion to strike Bancsi’s brief in opposition
to the motion for sanctions against him is a final appealable order. “It is well-
established that an order must be final before it can be reviewed by an appellate
court. If an order is not final, then an appellate court has no jurisdiction.” Gen. Acc.
Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 44 Ohio St.3d 17, 20 (1989).
This court reviewed the issue of whether a journal entry granting a
motion to strike is a final appealable order in Smith v. Smith, 2019-Ohio-990, ¶ 11
(8th Dist.):
In Grahl v. Matthews, 172 Ohio St. 135, 136, 174 N.E.2d 100 (1961), the
Ohio Supreme Court held the following: “The sustaining of the motion
to strike . . . leaves the cause still pending in the trial court. The order
of the trial court, considering the motion to strike . . . and sustaining it,
is not a final order from which an appeal may be taken.” See also
George H. Ritz, Jr., Ph. D., Inc. v. Lefton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
36722, 1977 Ohio App. LEXIS 8542 (Dec. 8, 1977) (court’s granting
motion to strike not a final appealable order; “[a]s plaintiff’s action
remains to be resolved, this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this
appeal . . . .”).
2 To the extent that Bancsi raises the issue of recusal or disqualification of the trial
judge in his appellate brief, we find that this issue was not properly before the trial court
nor did the trial court rule on this issue. See State v. Peagler, 76 Ohio St.3d 496, 501
(1996) (“A court of appeals cannot consider [an] issue for the first time without the trial
court having had an opportunity to address the issue.”).
Upon review, we find that the trial court’s journal entry granting the
defendant’s motion to strike is not a final appealable order, and we cannot consider
the merits of Bancsi’s arguments concerning this issue.
II. Motion to Intervene
We review a court’s ruling on a motion to intervene pursuant to
Civ.R. 24(A) for an abuse of discretion. See Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland v. Lynch,
2002-Ohio-3748, ¶ 47. An abuse of discretion “connotes more than an error of law
or judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or
unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). Trial
“courts lack the discretion to make errors of law, particularly when the trial court’s
decision goes against the plain language of a statute or rule.” Johnson v. Abdullah,
2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 39.
Civ.R. 24(A) governs intervention of right, and it states as follows:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an
action: (1) when a statute of this state confers an unconditional right to
intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction that is the subject of the action and the
applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that
interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by
existing parties.
Civ.R. 75 governs divorce, annulment, and legal separation actions,
and section (B) of this rule states that Civ.R. 24 intervention is not allowed in divorce
actions except under the following circumstances:
Civ.R. 14, 19, 19.1, and 24 shall not apply in divorce, annulment, or legal
separation actions, however:
(1) A person or corporation having possession of, control of, or claiming
an interest in property, whether real, personal, or mixed, out of which
a party seeks a division of marital property, a distributive award, or an
award of spousal support or other support, may be made a party
defendant;
(2) When it is essential to protect the interests of a child, the court may
join the child of the parties as a party defendant and appoint a guardian
ad litem and legal counsel, if necessary, for the child and tax the costs;
(3) The court may make any person or agency claiming to have an
interest in or rights to a child by rule or statute, including but not
limited to R.C. 3109.04 and R.C. 3109.051, a party defendant;
(4) When child support is ordered, the court, on its own motion or that
of an interested person, after notice to the party ordered to pay child
support and to his or her employer, may make the employer a party
defendant.
This court has recognized that “‘the object of Civ.R. 75(B) is to prevent the
intervention of a third-party to a divorce action.’” Victor v. Kaplan, 2020-Ohio-
3116, ¶ 161 (8th Dist.), quoting Chrisman v. Chrisman, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 937,
5 (12th Dist. Mar. 13, 2000).
In the case at hand, Bancsi filed a motion to intervene pursuant to
Civ.R. 24(A) on September 7, 2023, which is just over one month after the domestic
relations court granted his motion to withdraw as plaintiff’s counsel. On
September 13, 2023, the court denied Bancsi’s motion to intervene, noting that
“Civ.R. 75(B) states that Civ.R. 24 does not apply in divorce proceedings.” The trial
court is correct to the extent that none of the enumerated exceptions in Civ.R. 75(B)
apply to Bancsi’s motion.
Bancsi’s motion to intervene states that he seeks to intervene in this
case “to protect his interests and defend against the unwarranted filing by Defendant
. . . of a Motion for Sanctions, on January 27, 2023, solely against” him. We turn to
whether Bancsi’s stated reasons fit within one of the exceptions to Civ.R. 75’s
mandate that Civ.R. 24 intervention does not apply in divorce cases.
The first exception states that a person having or claiming an interest
in property that is subject to division or an award as part of the divorce “may be
made a party defendant . . . .” Our review of Bancsi’s motion to intervene shows that
he is not claiming an interest in property under this exception.
The second exception states that “the court may join the child of the
parties as a party defendant” in the divorce action. It goes without saying, but we
say it anyway — Bancsi is not a child of the parties to the divorce in this case.
The third exception states that the “court may make any person . . .
claiming to have an interest in or rights to a child . . . a party defendant . . . .” Our
review of Bancsi’s motion to intervene shows that he is not claiming an interest in a
child under this exception.
The fourth and final exception states that an employer of a party
ordered to pay child support in the divorce proceedings may be made a party
defendant to the case. Our review of Bancsi’s motion to intervene shows that he is
not claiming to be an employer of any party in this case.
This court recently reviewed and rejected a request by former counsel
to intervene in divorce proceedings, applying Civ.R. 75(B). In Victor, 2020-Ohio-
3116, at ¶ 157, a wife’s former attorney in a divorce action “filed a motion to intervene
pursuant to Civ.R. 24(A)(2) claiming a third-party interest in the outcome of the
trial.” The trial court granted this motion to intervene. Id. On appeal, this court
held that the attorney did “not have an interest in the marital property.” Id. at ¶ 164.
Rather, we found that this attorney’s “interest is only in recovering [his] own
attorney fees” and he “has an alternate means to protect [his] interests in the form
of civil litigation to collect [his] fees.” Id. at ¶ 164. This court concluded that the
trial court abused its discretion by allowing the attorney “to intervene in the divorce
proceeding to collect [his] attorney fees.” Id. at ¶ 165.
In the case at hand, Bancsi does not claim an interest authorizing him
to intervene in a divorce action pursuant to Civ.R. 75(B)(1)-(4). Upon review, we
find that the court acted within its discretion when it denied Bancsi’s motion to
intervene in this divorce proceeding because none of the exceptions permitting
intervention in divorce cases under Civ.R. 75(B) apply.
Accordingly, Bancsi’s four assignments of error are overruled.
Judgment affirmed in part as to the denial of Bancsi’s motion to
intervene and dismissed in part as to the granting of the defendant’s motion to
strike.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment
into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
LISA B. FORBES, JUDGE
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, A.J., and
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCUR