State v. Johnson , 2024 Ohio 3106 ( 2024 )

[Cite as State v. Johnson, 2024-Ohio-3106.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
v. : No. 113151
MYRON JOHNSON, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 15, 2024
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-23-677883-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Maalaea Newell, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
Joseph V. Pagano, for appellant.
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Myron Johnson (“Johnson”) appeals his sentence
and asks this court to vacate his sentence and remand to the trial court for
resentencing. We affirm Johnson’s sentence.
{¶2} Johnson pleaded guilty, in an amended indictment, to two counts of
felonious assault, second-degree felonies, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2). The
trial court sentenced Johnson to two years’ imprisonment for each count to be
served concurrently to each other for a total of two years in prison. In accordance
with the Reagan Tokes Law, the trial court advised Johnson that if the Ohio
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, after a hearing, makes
determinations regarding Johnson’s conduct in prison, he could serve up to an
additional year in prison.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶3} On November 9, 2022, Johnson arrived at a tire shop and demanded
that an employee provide Johnson with the name and address of a previous
employee. When the employee did not comply, Johnson pulled out a gun and
pointed it at her and threatened to shoot. Another employee asked Johnson to
leave the tire shop, and Johnson pointed the gun at him. Surveillance footage
captured the incident. The police were called. Johnson was charged with two
counts of felonious assault with 0ne- and three-year firearm specifications.
{¶4} At the time of the incident, Johnson suffered from schizophrenia,
diagnosed in 2017 and was not taking his medication. However, after Johnson’s
sanity was evaluated by the court’s psychiatric clinic, he was found to be sane at
the time of the incident. In accordance with a plea agreement with the State,
Johnson pleaded to the two counts of felonious assault and the gun specifications
were nolled.
{¶5} On August 22, 2023, Johnson’s case proceeded to sentencing.
According to the journal entry, “the court considered all required factors of the
law” and found “that prison is consistent with the purpose of R.C. 2929.11.”
Journal Entry No. 156112967 (Aug. 22, 2023). The trial court imposed a prison
sentence of two years. Johnson appealed his sentence, assigning one error for
our review:
Appellant’s prison sentence is contrary to law under Ohio’s sentencing
statutes and violates his rights to due process and to a fair sentence
because it failed to properly weigh and consider mitigating factors and
the statutory factors set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 and
improperly imposed indefinite sentences on both felony convictions.
II. Standard of Review
{¶6} We review felony sentences under the standard set forth in R.C.
2953.08(G)(2). State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1, 21. Under R.C.
2953.08(G)(2), an appellate court may increase, reduce, modify, or vacate and
remand a challenged felony sentence if the court clearly and convincingly finds
either that the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings as required
by relevant sentencing statutes or the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. A
sentence is contrary to law if it falls outside the statutory range for the offense or if
the sentencing court failed to consider the purposes and principles of sentencing
set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12. State v.
Pawlak, 2016-Ohio-5926, ¶ 58 (8th Dist.). Conversely, if the sentence is within
the statutory range for the offense and the trial court considered both the purposes
and principles of felony sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and
recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12, the court’s imposition of any prison term for a
felony conviction is not contrary to law. State v. Woodard, 2018-Ohio-2402, ¶ 35
(8th Dist.); see also State v. Clay, 2020-Ohio-1499, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), citing Pawlak
at ¶ 58.
III. Law and Analysis
{¶7} In Johnson’s sole assignment of error he argues that his sentence is
contrary to law because (1) the trial court did not consider the statutory sentencing
factors pursuant to R.C. 2929.12(B)(4), (2) it imposes a sentence greater than
necessary to accomplish the overriding purposes of sentencing pursuant to R.C.
2929.11, and (3) it imposes indefinite sentences on each conviction when the trial
court found both convictions were qualifying felonies.
A. R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12
{¶8} R.C. 2929.12(B)(4) states:
The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that apply
regarding the offender, the offense, or the victim, and any other
relevant factors, as indicating that the offender’s conduct is more
serious than conduct normally constituting the offense: The offender’s
occupation, elected office, or profession obliged the offender to
prevent the offense or bring others committing it to justice.
[Cite as State v. Johnson, 2024-Ohio-3106.]
{¶9} In the appellant’s brief, he does not provide an argument in support of
this issue. However, the appellant does argue that R.C. 2929.12(B)(2) is the only
factor that applies in this case. The appellant argues that because of his mental
illness, he did not intend to harm anyone, and the trial court should consider his
mental illness for the purposes of imposing an appropriate sentence.
{¶10} “R.C. 2929.11 addresses the purposes of felony sentencing while R.C.
2929.12 addresses the factors that a trial court should take into account when
imposing a sentence pursuant to R.C. 2929.11.” State v. Pettigrew, 2023-Ohio-
3877, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 18, 19. “Neither of
these sections require a trial court to make any specific factual findings on the
record.” Id., citing id. at ¶ 20, citing State v. Wilson, 2011-Ohio-2669, ¶ 31. “The
court’s consideration of the factors is presumed unless the defendant affirmatively
shows otherwise.” Id., citing State v. Wright, 2018-Ohio-965, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.).
“The ‘court’s statement in its sentencing journal entry that it considered the
required statutory factors is alone sufficient to fulfill its obligations under R.C.
2929.11 and 2929.12.’” Id., quoting id.{¶11} The trial court’s journal entry indicates that it “considered all required
factors of the law” and found that prison was “consistent with the purpose of R.C.
2929.11.” Further, during sentencing, the trial court advised:
So I want you to know, Mr. Johnson, that in imposing the following
sentences, first of all, I’m taking into account everything that the
prosecutor said, that your lawyer said, and that you said. . . . Second,
obviously, I’ve watched the video. I’m taking that into account. Third,
the following written information: the presentence report dated
August 17 and completed by Investigator Dorothy Davis. I’ve reviewed
the June 26th three-page reintegration plan completed by the social
worker, Ariel Irwin-Peel, of Ms. Dobroshi’s office. I’ve considered the
August 14, 2022 seven-page report of Michael Aronoff of the court
clinic. And I’ve rereviewed the April 17 competency report and the
July 6th sanity evaluation. Additionally, I’m taking into account the
sentencing guidelines in Chapter 2929 of the Ohio Revised Code.
Tr. 44-45.
{¶12} Based on the trial court’s statements and the record before us, we are
persuaded that the trial court was aware of all the mitigation evidence presented
at the sentencing hearing. Further, the court’s statements during the sentencing
hearing and in the journal entry demonstrate that the court considered the
required factors. See Pettigrew at ¶ 17.
{¶13} Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s guidance concerning appellate
review of R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 in Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, at ¶ 18, 19, we
cannot say that Johnson has clearly and convincingly demonstrated that his
sentence was contrary to law. Johnson’s sentence is within the statutory range
permitted for the offenses that he pled guilty to, and the trial court considered the
principles and purposes of felony sentencing under R.C. 2929.
B. Indefinite Sentences
{¶14} Further, Johnson argued that the trial court’s imposition of an
indefinite sentence was invalid and not properly done. R.C. 2929.144(B)(3) states:
The court imposing a prison term on an offender under division
(A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code for a
qualifying felony of the first or second degree shall determine the
maximum prison term that is part of the sentence in accordance with
the following: If the offender is being sentenced for more than one
felony, if one or more of the felonies is a qualifying felony of the first
or second degree, and if the court orders that all of the prison terms
imposed are to run concurrently, the maximum term shall be equal to
the longest of the minimum terms imposed on the offender under
division (A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code for
a qualifying felony of the first or second degree for which the sentence
is being imposed plus fifty per cent of the longest minimum term for
the most serious qualifying felony being sentenced.
{¶15} Johnson argues that the trial court imposed the one-year indefinite
sentence on both qualifying felonies. However, his argument is misplaced.
According to the journal entry, the trial court sentenced Johnson to two years on
both counts of felonious assault. The trial court ran the sentences concurrently to
each other and imposed an indefinite term of one year. As stated above, R.C.
2929.144(B)(3) requires the trial court to sentence the appellants to the maximum
term, which should be equal to the longest of the minimum terms imposed on the
offender under division (A)(1)(a) or (2)(a) of section 2929.14 of the Revised Code
for a qualifying felony of one-half of the longest minimum term for the most
serious qualifying felony being sentenced, which in this case is one year. See State
v. McLoyd, 2023-Ohio-3971, ¶ 66 (8th Dist.).
{¶16} Therefore, Johnson’s sole assignment of error is overruled.
{¶17} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
___________________________
ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J., and
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR