State v. Ruggles , 2024 Ohio 3128 ( 2024 )

[Cite as State v. Ruggles, 2024-Ohio-3128.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
GREENE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Appellee : C.A. No. 2024-CA-2
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2023-E-00004-
: 01,02,03,04,05
LATRICIA RUGGLES :
: (Appeal from Common Pleas Court-
Appellant : Juvenile Division)
:
...........
OPINION
Rendered on August 16, 2024
...........
MAXWELL D. NEWSOME, Attorney for Appellant
MEGAN A. HAMMOND, Attorney for Appellee
.............
WELBAUM, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant Latricia Ruggles appeals from her convictions in the Greene
County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, after a jury found her guilty of five
counts of contributing to the unruliness of a child in violation of R.C. 2919.24(B)(2). In
support of her appeal, Ruggles contends that the complaint charging her with those
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counts was defective because it failed to set forth all the essential elements of the charged
offense as required by Crim.R. 3. Ruggles claims that such a defect warranted the
dismissal of the complaint and that this court should reverse her convictions on that basis.
Ruggles also claims that her convictions should be reversed because they were not
supported by sufficient evidence and were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Ruggles further claims that a reversal is warranted because the trial court committed
prejudicial error by prohibiting the admission of certain testimony about Ruggles’s niece
on grounds that such testimony was irrelevant. For the reasons outlined below, the
judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 2} On August 10, 2023, the State, through the attendance officer of Fairborn
City Schools, filed a complaint charging Ruggles with five first-degree-misdemeanor
counts of contributing to the unruliness of a child in violation of R.C. 2919.24(B)(2). The
complaint alleged that Ruggles had acted in a way tending to cause her teenage Daughter
(“Daughter”) to become an unruly child during five periods of time between September
2022 and May 2023. Under each of the five counts, the complaint alleged that Ruggles
had failed to ensure that Daughter attended the public school at which she was enrolled
and that Daughter had been absent from school without excuse for either 30 or more
hours in a week or 42 hours in a month.
{¶ 3} After being served with the complaint, on August 25, 2023, Ruggles had
counsel appear on her behalf and file a motion to dismiss the complaint on grounds of
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selective prosecution. On September 21, 2023, the trial court overruled Ruggles’s
motion to dismiss.
{¶ 4} On September 27, 2023, Ruggles filed a second motion to dismiss the
complaint in which Ruggles argued, among other things, that the complaint was defective
because it failed to include a written statement of the essential facts constituting the
charged offense as required by Crim.R. 3. On October 23, 2023, the trial court issued a
decision overruling Ruggles’s second motion to dismiss. Although the trial court
overruled the motion, it found that the time period of the conduct alleged under Count
One of the complaint, i.e., September 15, 2022, through December 8, 2022, partially
overlapped with conduct alleged in a separate case against Ruggles that had been
dismissed with prejudice. As a result, the trial court narrowed the time period alleged in
Count One to November 18, 2022, through December 8, 2022.
{¶ 5} Ruggles’s case thereafter proceeded to a two-day jury trial. During trial, the
State presented testimony from the Greene County Juvenile Court diversion counselor
who was assigned to Ruggles’s case. The State also presented testimony from various
school officials and staff members, including the attendance officer of Fairborn City
Schools, the assistant principal at Fairborn High School, the attendance and main-office
secretaries at Fairborn High School, and Daughter’s history teacher. In her defense,
Ruggles presented testimony from two Fairborn police officers who had assisted her with
Daughter. Ruggles also presented testimony from her husband, Claudio; her long-time
friend, Jamie; her teenage niece that lived with her and went to school with Daughter; and
Daughter. The following is a summary of the relevant information that was presented at
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trial.
{¶ 6} In January 2022, Ruggles enrolled Daughter, who was then 14 years old, at
Fairborn High School when Daughter was in the ninth grade. On May 20, 2022, the
attendance officer of Fairborn City Schools sent Ruggles a “Habitually Truant Notice”
advising her that Daughter had been absent from school without legitimate excuse for
either 30 or more consecutive hours, 42 or more hours in one school month, or 72 hours
during the school year. State’s Exhibit 1, p. 94. There is no dispute that if a student
meets any of the foregoing criteria, the student is considered a “habitual truant” pursuant
to R.C. 2151.011(B)(18).
{¶ 7} The “Habitually Truant Notice” stated that, because Daughter had met the
threshold for becoming a habitual truant within 21 school days prior to the last day of the
2021-2022 school year, the school was going to schedule an absence intervention
meeting to occur sometime after the start of the 2022-2023 school year. The notice
requested that Ruggles participate in the meeting and advised that the meeting would
involve discussing Daughter’s attendance with a school official and forming an absence
intervention plan. The notice further advised that if the interventions were unsuccessful,
or if more unexcused absences were accumulated after implementing the plan, the school
would have to file a complaint with the Greene County Juvenile Court.
{¶ 8} On August 24, 2023, Ruggles attended an absence intervention meeting with
Fairborn High School’s assistant principal and guidance counselor. Ruggles attended
the meeting via an online video conference call service known as Google Meet. During
the meeting, Ruggles indicated that Daughter’s absences were due to the loss of her
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grandmother, hospital visits, missing the bus, and adjusting to a new school and
schedule. After discussing the reasons for Daughter’s absences, the parties developed
an absence intervention plan. The plan included Daughter attending school daily and
communicating and reporting absences to the school. The plan also consisted of the
school monitoring Daughter’s attendance as well as providing any support and/or
resources needed to help Daughter maintain good attendance. State’s Exhibit 1, p. 102.
{¶ 9} Although the absence intervention plan went into effect on September 6,
2022, Daughter’s attendance did not improve. The State presented records establishing
that the school sent Ruggles several written notices of excessive absences and habitual
truancy pertaining to Daughter throughout the 2022-2023 school year. Specifically, the
school sent notices of excessive absences to Ruggles on October 31, 2022; November
8, 2022; February 16, 2023; March 23, 2023; April 14, 2023; and May 16, 2023. State’s
Exhibit 1, p. 123-129. In addition, the school sent notices of habitual truancy to Ruggles
on November 21, 2022; February 16, 2023; March 23, 2023; April 10, 2023; April 18,
2023; May 23, 2023; and May 25, 2023. Id.{¶ 10} The records presented by the State also established that the school tried to
call Ruggles on November 28, and 30, 2022, to discuss Daughter’s habitual truancy, and
that Ruggles hung up on both occasions. Id. at 125-126. In addition, the records
established that on November 28, 2022, the school sent Ruggles an e-mail invitation to
participate in a second absence intervention meeting, which the assistant principal
indicated that Ruggles did not attend.
{¶ 11} Daughter’s history teacher also contacted Ruggles several times via e-mail
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and text messages and voiced concerns about Daughter’s poor attendance. Despite the
history teacher’s setting up a telephone parent-teacher conference around Ruggles’s
work schedule, Ruggles failed to attend the conference. As a result, the history teacher
testified that she never had the opportunity to discuss the reasons for Daughter’s
absences with Ruggles.
{¶ 12} Given the lack of improvement in Daughter’s attendance, a third absence
intervention meeting was scheduled for February 23, 2023, which Ruggles did not attend.
The assistant principal testified that she called Ruggles and left her a voice message on
February 16, 2023, to schedule the absence intervention meeting, and that Ruggles
responded the same day with a voice message stating that she refused to participate in
the meeting. The assistant principal testified that Ruggles also left a second voice
message an hour later stating that she was not being notified of her Daughter’s absences
because the school was using the wrong phone number to contact her.
{¶ 13} The attendance secretaries at Fairborn High School testified that the school
uses an automated phone system that initiates calls to parents at 9:15 a.m. to notify them
when their child is marked absent from school. The secretaries explained that the
automated system calls the primary phone number listed on a child’s emergency contact
and health information form—a form that is completed by parents at the time their child is
enrolled with the school. The secretaries’ testimony established that only parents can
update the primary phone number listed on the emergency contact form, and that Ruggles
had updated Daughter’s form on October 6, 2022.
{¶ 14} The State presented a call sheet that the attendance secretaries identified
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as the record of automated calls made to Ruggles when Daughter was marked absent
from school. State’s Exhibit 1, p. 133-139. The call sheet showed that, during the
relevant time periods, the automated phone system called Ruggles multiple times each
day her Daughter was marked absent from school, with the exception of two days—
November 18, 2022, and April 14, 2023. The call sheet showed that out of 45 full-day,
unexcused absences that Daughter had during the relevant time periods, Ruggles was
successfully reached for 35 of those absences using the primary phone number listed on
Daughter’s emergency contact form. The call sheet also showed that Ruggles had
received a voice message for six of the absences, was not successfully reached for two
of the absences, and, as previously discussed, received no call for two of the absences.
Although Ruggles had been reached a majority of the time, the attendance secretaries
did not recall Ruggles ever calling the office to give an excuse for Daughter’s absences.
{¶ 15} Due to Daughter’s continued unexcused absences, the attendance officer
of Fairborn City Schools filed a complaint against Ruggles in the Greene County Juvenile
Court. As previously discussed, the complaint alleged five counts of contributing to the
unruliness of a child in violation of R.C. 2919.24(B)(2), with each count relating to a
specific time frame during the 2022-2023 school year. The State presented records
establishing that Daughter had had a total of 45 full-day, unexcused absences during the
time frames alleged in the complaint and 56 full-day, unexcused absences during the
entire 2022-2023 school year. State’s Exhibit 1, p. 117-121. Daughter also had four
unexcused partial absences and five unexcused tardies during the school year. The
following table shows the number and timing of Daughter’s full-day, unexcused absences
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in relation to each count of the complaint.
Count November 18, 2022 – December 8, 2022 2 full-day absences
One (as amended by the trial court) (12 hours)1
Count February 3, 2023 – February 23, 2023 8 full-day absences
Two (48 hours)
Count March 2, 2023 – March 24, 2023 9 full-day absences
Three (54 hours)
Count April 3, 2023 – April 28, 2023 13 full-day absences
Four (78 hours)
Count May 2, 2023 – May 26, 2023 13 full-day absences
Five (78 hours)
{¶ 16} The complaint against Ruggles was referred to the Greene County Juvenile
Court’s Diversion Program, and the matter was thereafter scheduled for an informal
diversion hearing with the court’s diversion counselor. The purpose of the diversion
hearing was to try and resolve Daughter’s attendance issues before the matter was
officially submitted to the juvenile court. On May 11, 2023, Ruggles and the assistant
principal appeared at court for the diversion hearing. The diversion counselor testified
regarding the hearing and stated that Ruggles complained that the school was not doing
a good job of notifying her when Daughter was absent from school. Ruggles also
claimed that Daughter was being marked absent for full days when they were only half-
1 The assistant principal provided testimony indicating that a school day is six hours long.
See Trial Tr., p. 151.
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day absences. In addition, the diversion counselor testified that Ruggles was upset
about the complaint being filed against her and decided to contest the complaint as
opposed to utilizing the court’s Diversion Program. As a result, the diversion counselor
officially submitted the complaint to the Greene County Juvenile Court.
{¶ 17} The assistant principal testified that Ruggles had claimed that a barrier to
Daughter’s attendance at school was that she (Ruggles) worked from 10 a.m. to 10 p.m.,
and that her husband got Daughter up in the morning but could not guarantee Daughter
got on the school bus because he had to leave for work. During his testimony, Ruggles’s
husband, Claudio, confirmed that Ruggles worked from 10 a.m. to 10 p.m. He also
testified that Ruggles worked from home. In addition, he testified that Ruggles suffered
from back issues and that Ruggles had fallen and injured her ankle sometime during the
fall of 2022. According to Claudio, Ruggles’s ankle injury required her to be on crutches
for a month. Claudio also claimed that Ruggles had to “[wear] something to help her
walk.” Trial Tr., p. 122, 124. When asked whether Ruggles was allowed to drive after
her ankle injury, Claudio testified that did not know whether Ruggles’s doctor had told her
not to drive.
{¶ 18} Claudio also testified that between September 2022 and May 2023, he was
the person who always woke up Daughter in the mornings. He testified that Daughter’s
school bus arrived around 6:30 a.m. and that he did not know whether Daughter made it
on the bus since he had to leave for work before that time. He also testified that once
he woke up Daughter, it was Daughter’s responsibility to get up and go to school.
However, Claudio’s testimony indicated that Daughter did not always respond when he
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woke her up. When asked if there were any other ways for Daughter to wake up other
than him, Claudio testified that Daughter had an Alexa alarm. Claudio also indirectly
indicated that Ruggles was asleep during the time Daughter was supposed to wake up
for school. Claudio testified that Ruggles “works from 10:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. and, you
know, she has a back issue, she has some medical issues. She gets home tired. So
my compromise, at least, is that I will get them up in the mornings.” Trial Tr., p. 120.
{¶ 19} Ruggles’s 17-year-old niece, who lived with Ruggles and went to school
with Daughter, testified that Claudio was the person who woke her and Daughter up in
the mornings. Ruggles’s niece also testified that Ruggles would sometimes wake her
and Daughter up, but not every day. Ruggles’s niece testified that if she (the niece)
missed the bus, she would either call an Uber driver to come pick her up while Ruggles
was sleeping or she would go and tell Ruggles that she had missed the bus. Ruggles’s
niece testified that when she told Ruggles that she had missed the bus, Ruggles would
sometimes call and have the bus come back and pick her up. Ruggles’s niece, however,
testified that she did not typically miss the bus. Ruggles’s niece also did not indicate
whether Ruggles ever called the bus back for Daughter.
{¶ 20} Daughter testified that either Claudio or her Alexa alarm would wake her up
on school mornings. Daughter’s testimony and the testimony of Ruggles’s niece
indicated that Daughter would miss the bus either because Daughter did not wake up or
because she would sneak back into her house after initially going out to the bus stop.
Daughter testified that Ruggles would be sleeping when she snuck back into the house
and would not hear her return. Daughter claimed that once she was back inside the
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house, she would hide in her room or the basement and fall asleep. Ruggles’s niece
testified that Ruggles would sometimes lock Daughter out of the house if she caught
Daughter trying to sneak back inside. Daughter testified that on the occasions when she
would arrive late at school after missing the bus, she would not always notify the school
of her presence by signing in at the office. Daughter also testified that she would
sometimes leave school and go to Starbucks and Kroger.
{¶ 21} Ruggles’s long-time friend, Jamie, testified that Ruggles woke Daughter up
every single morning. However, on cross-examination, Jamie clarified that Ruggles did
so using Alexa alarms and Claudio. Jamie testified that she would occasionally stay
overnight at Ruggles’s residence and observe Ruggles go upstairs to wake up Daughter
in the morning. Jamie clarified, however, that she observed this before Ruggles hurt her
ankle during the 2022-2023 school year. According to Jamie, that injury prevented
Ruggles from going upstairs to see if Daughter was still at home and from driving
Daughter to school. Jamie also testified that Ruggles had ongoing car trouble that
prevented Ruggles from driving Daughter to school. Jamie testified that Ruggles’s car
trouble began around April 2022 and was resolved around March 2023. Daughter and
Ruggles’s niece also testified that Ruggles did not have reliable transportation during the
2022-2023 school year. Ruggles’s niece testified that their vehicle was fixed just a week
before trial. Jamie testified that during Ruggles’s injury and car trouble, she would give
Ruggles rides “a lot of different times for different things whenever she needed me.” Trial
Tr., p. 270.
{¶ 22} When asked what efforts Ruggles made to get Daughter to go to school,
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Jamie testified that Ruggles set Alexa alarms for Daughter and would try to bribe
Daughter to go to school by buying her new clothes. However, Jamie did not know
whether Ruggles ever made any arrangements or efforts to get Daughter to school when
Daughter missed the bus. Ruggles’s niece testified that Ruggles would give Daughter
spending money to go to school but would also take away Daughter’s phone or ground
Daughter as punishment for missing school. Daughter similarly testified that Ruggles
would ground her, give her a “whipping,” and take her phone away as punishment for
missing school. Trial Tr., p. 303. Daughter also claimed that Ruggles would plead with
her to go to school and would tell Ruggles’s niece to make sure that she (Daughter) woke
up and got on the bus. Daughter also claimed that Ruggles called the police on her when
she ran away after refusing to go to school. The defense presented brief testimony from
two police officers who confirmed that they had responded to a call about Daughter on
October 18, 2022.
{¶ 23} After considering the testimony and exhibits presented at trial, the jury found
Ruggles guilty of all five counts of contributing to the unruliness of a child that were alleged
in the State’s complaint. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a six-month jail term for
each of the five counts. The trial court, however, suspended the jail terms for Counts
One, Two, Three, and Four, and all but 60 days of the jail-term imposed for Count Five.
The trial court ordered the resulting 60-day jail term to be served by Ruggles on weekends
beginning November 17, 2023. The trial court also ordered Ruggles to pay $80 in court
costs, $469.51 in subpoena fees, and a $150 fine for each count with $100 suspended
on the condition that Daughter attend school as required by law. The trial court further
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ordered Ruggles to complete a parenting class and to ensure that Daughter attends
school every day on time.
{¶ 24} Ruggles appeals from her convictions, raising four assignments of error for
review.
First Assignment of Error
{¶ 25} Under her first assignment of error, Ruggles contends that the trial court
erred by overruling her second motion to dismiss the State’s complaint. Ruggles claims
that the complaint was invalid and should have been dismissed because it failed to set
forth all the essential elements of contributing to the unruliness of a child under R.C.
2919.24(B)(2). We disagree.
{¶ 26} As a preliminary matter, we note that an appellate court reviews a trial
court’s decision on a motion to dismiss a complaint de novo. State v. Fields, 2017-Ohio-
400, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.); State v. Miles, 2018-Ohio-4444, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.). “ ‘De novo review
requires an independent review of the trial court’s decision without any deference to the
trial court’s determination.’ ” Fields at ¶ 19, quoting State v. Clay, 2016-Ohio-424, ¶ 5
(2d Dist.).
{¶ 27} The purpose of a complaint is to give the accused adequate notice of the
crime charged. Fields at ¶ 17. Crim.R. 3 governs the requirements of a valid complaint
in Ohio and provides, in relevant part, that a complaint must contain “the essential facts
constituting the offense charged.” Crim.R. 3; State v. Sampson, 2008-Ohio-775, ¶ 10
(2d Dist.). Ohio courts have uniformly held that the phrase “essential facts constituting
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the offense charged” means “those facts which the State must prove in order to obtain a
conviction, i.e., the essential elements of the crime charged.” State v. Wheeler, 2017-
Ohio-1200, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.), citing Sampson at ¶ 10. “Therefore, a complaint must contain
the essential elements of the crime charged.” (Citations omitted.) Sampson at ¶ 10.
{¶ 28} A complaint that alleges an offense in the language of the statute on which
the offense is based is sufficient to satisfy the essential-elements requirement in Crim.R.
3. State v. Gerding, 1998 WL 666950, *2 (6th Dist. Sept. 30, 1998), citing State v.
Broughton, 51 Ohio App.3d 10, 11 (12th Dist. 1988); accord Wheeler at ¶ 7 (“[g]enerally,
the requirements of a complaint or indictment may be met by reciting the language of the
criminal statute”), citing State v. Childs, 88 Ohio St.3d 194, 199 (2000), citing State v.
Murphy, 65 Ohio St.3d 554, 583 (1992). “It is well-settled under Ohio law that a charging
instrument affords adequate notice to the accused if it tracks the language of the statute.”
(Citation omitted.) State v. Santos, 2020-Ohio-1043, ¶ 39 (2d Dist.). A “complaint that
does not set forth all of the essential elements of the crime [however] is invalid.” Wheeler
at ¶ 7, citing Sampson at ¶ 9, citing State v. Cimpritz, 158 Ohio St. 490 (1953).
{¶ 29} As previously discussed, Ruggles contends that the State’s complaint was
invalid and should have been dismissed because it did not contain all the essential
elements of contributing to the unruliness of a child under R.C. 2919.24(B)(2). Pursuant
to that statute: “No person, including a parent, guardian, or other custodian of a child,
shall . . . [a]ct in a way tending to cause a child or a ward of the juvenile court to become
an unruly child or a delinquent child[.]” R.C. 2919.24(B)(2). An “unruly child” includes
“[a]ny child who is a habitual truant from school[.]” R.C. 2151.022(B). A “habitual
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truant” is defined as “any child of compulsory school age who is absent without legitimate
excuse for absence from the public school the child is supposed to attend for thirty or
more consecutive hours, forty-two or more hours in one school month, or seventy-two or
more hours in a school year.” R.C. 2151.011(B)(18).
{¶ 30} Ruggles claims that the State’s complaint failed to allege that she had
affirmatively acted in a way tending to cause Daughter to become an unruly child.
However, the record establishes that such an allegation was made within the complaint.
The complaint specifically alleged that Ruggles “did act in a way tending to cause a child
or a ward of the juvenile court, [Daughter], . . . to become an unruly child[.]” Complaint.
More specifically, the complaint alleged that, during five specific periods of time, Ruggles
“failed to ensure that [Daughter] attended the public school for which she was enrolled”
and that Daughter “was absent without legitimate excuse for more than 30 hours in a
week or 42 [hours] in a month period.” Id. The complaint also alleged that Ruggles
failed to participate in developing two absence intervention plans from November 30,
2022, and February 23, 2023. We find that the foregoing language in the complaint
tracked the language of R.C. 2919.24(B)(2) and sufficiently alleged that Ruggles acted in
a way tending to cause Daughter to become an unruly child. Accordingly, Ruggles’s
argument to the contrary lacks merit.
{¶ 31} Ruggles also argues that the State’s complaint failed to allege the
applicable culpable mental state of recklessness. We note that recklessness “is the
catchall culpable mental state for criminal statutes that fail to mention any degree of
culpability, except for strict liability statutes, where the accused’s mental state is
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irrelevant.” State v. Lozier, 2004-Ohio-732, ¶ 21. The Supreme Court of Ohio has
explained that: “An indictment that charges an offense by tracking the language of the
criminal statute is not defective for failure to identify a culpable mental state when the
statute itself fails to specify a mental state.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Horner, 2010-
Ohio-3830, paragraph one of the syllabus; accord State v. Lang, 2011-Ohio-4215, ¶ 36-
37, and State v. Curry, 2014-Ohio-3836, ¶ 57 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 32} As previously discussed, the State’s complaint tracked the language of R.C.
2919.24(B)(2), a statute which does not specify a culpable mental state. Therefore, the
omission of the applicable culpable mental state of recklessness in the complaint did not
constitute a defect. See Curry at ¶ 57. Accordingly, Ruggles’s argument that the
State’s complaint was invalid for failing to allege recklessness as an element of
contributing to the unruliness of a minor under R.C. 2919.24(B)(2) lacks merit.
{¶ 33} Ruggles’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Second Assignment of Error
{¶ 34} Under her second assignment of error, Ruggles contends that the evidence
presented at trial was insufficient to support her five convictions for contributing to the
unruliness of a child under R.C. 2919.24(B)(2). We disagree.
Standard of Review
{¶ 35} “A sufficiency of the evidence argument disputes whether the State has
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presented adequate evidence on each element of the offense to allow the case to go to
the jury or sustain the verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Wilson, 2009-Ohio-525, ¶ 10
(2d Dist.), citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 (1997). “When reviewing a claim
as to sufficiency of evidence, the relevant inquiry is whether any rational factfinder viewing
the evidence in a light most favorable to the state could have found the essential elements
of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Dennis,
79 Ohio St.3d 421, 430 (1997). “The verdict will not be disturbed unless the appellate
court finds that reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier-of-
fact.” (Citations omitted.) Id.{¶ 36} When reviewing a general challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, as
we are here, “we consider all of the evidence admitted at trial, regardless of the proponent
of the evidence[.]” State v. Harris, 2023-Ohio-648, ¶ 33 (2d Dist.). Therefore,
“[e]vidence supporting the sufficiency of the evidence may be introduced during the
defense’s case-in-chief.” Id., citing State v. Stokes, 2016-Ohio-612, ¶ 26 (2d Dist.), citing
State v. Richardson, 2015-Ohio-757, ¶ 22 (2d Dist.), reversed on other grounds by 2016-
Ohio-8448.
Contributing to the Unruliness of a Child
{¶ 37} A person, including a parent or guardian, commits the offense of
contributing to the unruliness of a child in violation of R.C. 2919.24(B)(2) when he or she
“[a]ct[s] in a way tending to cause a child or a ward of the juvenile court to become an
unruly child or a delinquent child.” R.C. 2919.24(B)(2). An “unruly child” includes “[a]ny
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child who is a habitual truant from school[.]” R.C. 2151.022(B). “ ‘Habitual truant’
means any child of compulsory school age who is absent without legitimate excuse for
absence from the public school the child is supposed to attend for thirty or more
consecutive hours, forty-two or more hours in one school month, or seventy-two or more
hours in a school year.” R.C. 2151.011(B)(18).
{¶ 38} As previously discussed, “ ‘[t]he culpable mental state of “recklessness”
applies to the offense of contributing to the unruliness of a minor.’ ” State v. Vertrees,
2021-Ohio-1239, ¶ 20 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Middleton, 2013-Ohio-1848, ¶ 9 (12th
Dist.), citing State v. Moody, 2004-Ohio-6395, syllabus; accord State v. Lewis, 2017-Ohio-
9311, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.). A person is reckless with respect to circumstances “when, with
heedless indifference to the consequences, the person disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the person’s conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to
be of a certain nature.” R.C. 2901.22(C).
{¶ 39} The State’s complaint against Ruggles alleged that Ruggles had acted in
way tending to cause Daughter to be an unruly child/habitual truant during five periods of
time, i.e., November 18, 2022, through December 8, 2022 (Count One as amended by
the trial court); February 3, 2023, through February 23, 2023, (Count Two); March 2, 2023,
through March 24, 2023, (Count Three); April 3, 2023, through April 28, 2023 (Count
Four), and May 5, 2023, through May 26, 2023 (Count Five). Therefore, to be convicted
of each count, the evidence presented at trial had to establish that, during each of those
time periods, Ruggles recklessly acted in a way tending to cause Daughter to become a
habitual truant.
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{¶ 40} When it is alleged that a defendant acted in a way tending to cause a child
to become a habitual truant, to be found guilty under R.C. 2919.24(B)(2), the State must
establish that “ ‘a child is absent from school without permission due to some act of the
defendant.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Michael, 108 Ohio App.3d 285, 289 (2d
Dist. 1996), quoting State v. Wood, 63 Ohio App.3d 855 (6th Dist. 1989), abrogated on
other grounds by Moody, 2004-Ohio-6395. However, this court has recognized that the
language of R.C. 2919.24(B)(2) has been construed as broad enough to include a
defendant’s failure to act, where an affirmative duty to act exists. Id., citing State v.
Groves, 1994 WL 313782, *1 (5th Dist. June 13, 1994). For example, in Vertrees, the
Third District Court of Appeals held that a defendant’s conviction for contributing to the
unruliness of a child was supported by sufficient evidence where the evidence established
that the defendant disregarded her responsibility to report her child’s absences from
school and failed to report the absences even though she was aware of her responsibility
to do so. Vertrees at ¶ 26.
{¶ 41} In State v. Schnebeli, 2019-Ohio-860 (5th Dist.), the Fifth District Court of
Appeals upheld a conviction for contributing to the unruliness of a child where the
defendant testified that her ten-year-old son was a sensitive child who would not go to
school because a teacher had embarrassed him. Id. at ¶ 11. Although the defendant
testified that she had asked to have her son placed in a different class, the evidence
established that the matter was never resolved because the defendant never met with
her son’s teacher. Id.
{¶ 42} The evidence in Schnebeli also established that there was a school bus
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available to take defendant’s son to school, but that son frequently missed the bus
because he disliked the crowd and the noise of the bus. Id. The evidence further
established that the defendant did not work during the relevant timeframe and had her
own means of transportation to get her son to school. Id. In addition, the son’s
attendance did not improve after a state attendance officer provided the defendant with
an absence intervention plan and went over the plan with her. Id. at ¶ 5. The evidence
also established that the defendant missed a scheduled absence intervention meeting
because she claimed that she had never received a letter or phone call advising her of
the meeting. Id. at ¶ 12.
{¶ 43} The defendant in Schnebeli testified that she had tried grounding her son
and taking away his video games as punishment for his not attending school. She also
testified that she went to juvenile court to file unruly charges against her son but ended
up not filing any charges. Id. The defendant further testified that she considered
sending her son to a school counselor, but she ultimately decided against it because
counseling had not worked for her older child. Id.
{¶ 44} Based on the foregoing evidence, the Fifth District in Schnebeli found that
there was sufficient evidence supporting the defendant’s conviction for contributing to the
unruliness of a child. The court reached this conclusion because it found the evidence
established that the defendant sought no outside help and enabled behavior that led to
her son’s missing 42 hours of school in one month without excuse. Id. at ¶ 16-27.
{¶ 45} In contrast, in Michael, 108 Ohio App.3d 285, this court found insufficient
evidence of contributing to the unruliness of a child where the evidence established that
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the defendant affirmatively had tried to send her two grandchildren to school by
encouraging them to attend school, telling them they had to attend school, waking them
up in the morning for school, and, on occasion, driving one of them to school. Id. at 287,
289. In so holding, we explained that the evidence did not establish that the defendant
affirmatively kept her grandchildren home from school or failed to take steps to ensure
that her grandchildren would attend school. Id. at 290. We also explained that the
evidence did not establish that defendant had failed to discipline her grandchildren for not
attending school. Id. Because the evidence in Michael established that the defendant
had consistently attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to ensure that her grandchildren
attended school on a regular basis, we could not say that a rational trier of fact could have
concluded that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had
acted in a way tending to cause her grandchildren to become unruly. Id.Sufficiency Analysis
{¶ 46} Upon review, we find that the evidence presented in this case was more
akin to the evidence presented in Schnebeli than Michael. In this case, both the State
and the defense presented evidence establishing that a significant barrier to Daughter’s
attending school during the 2022-2023 school year was her missing the bus in the
mornings. The evidence indicated that Daughter would miss the bus either because she
did not wake up or because she would sneak back into her house and hide after she
initially went out to the bus stop. The evidence also indicated that Daughter would
sometimes fail to sign in at school when she arrived late after missing the bus and would
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sometimes leave school and go to Starbucks or Kroger.
{¶ 47} We find it significant that there was evidence establishing that Ruggles’s
husband, Claudio, was the person who always woke Daughter up in the mornings for
school. We also find it significant that there was evidence establishing that Ruggles was
asleep during the time that Daughter had to wake up for school, and that Ruggles worked
from home between 10 a.m. and 10 p.m. Daughter specifically testified that Ruggles
would be asleep and not hear her when she would sneak back into her house from the
bus stop. The testimony of Daughter and Ruggles’s niece indicated that Daughter’s
conduct of sleeping in and/or sneaking back home from the bus stop were regular
occurrences during the 2022-2023 school year. Although Ruggles’s niece testified that
Ruggles would sometimes catch Daughter trying to sneak back into the house, the niece
testified that, on those occasions, Ruggles would lock Daughter out of the house, a
response that was not conducive to getting Daughter to school on time. In addition,
Daughter provided testimony indicating that Ruggles put the onus on her niece to make
sure that Daughter woke up and went to school.
{¶ 48} It is also significant that the evidence established that Ruggles was aware
of Daughter’s ongoing unexcused absences throughout the 2022-2023 school year. The
State presented testimony and records establishing that the school sent Ruggles several
written notices and e-mails and made multiple phone calls to Ruggles about Daughter’s
unexcused absences and habitual truancy. Despite Ruggles having notice of Daughter’s
ongoing attendance issues, and despite Ruggles being at home and available in the
mornings to ensure that Daughter either got on the bus or had some alternate means of
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transportation to school, the evidence established that Daughter’s attendance issues
continued throughout the 2022-2023 school year and got progressively worse. Although
there was evidence indicating that Ruggles had had car trouble and an ankle injury that
prohibited her from driving Daughter to school for a period of time, there was also
evidence of alternate forms of transportation that Ruggles could have used to get
Daughter to school. For example, the evidence indicated that Ruggles could have called
an Uber driver, requested a ride from her friend Jamie, or called the bus back like she did
for her niece.
{¶ 49} When viewing the aforementioned evidence in a light most favorable to the
State, a rational factfinder could have concluded that, during the 2022-2023 school year,
Ruggles’s failure to monitor Daughter’s whereabouts in the mornings and failure to ensure
that Daughter either got on the bus or had some alternate means of transportation to
school was conduct that tended to cause Daughter to become a habitual truant.
Therefore, a reasonable factfinder could have reached a similar conclusion as in
Schnebeli and found that Ruggles’s conduct in the mornings enabled Daughter’s ongoing
attendance problem. While Ruggles’s hands may have been tied with regard to
Daughter’s skipping school once she arrived on school grounds, the evidence indicated
that Daughter’s conduct of sleeping in and sneaking home from the bus stop were regular
occurrences that led to Daughter either missing school completely or arriving late to
school and not being accounted for due to not signing in with the office.
{¶ 50} There was also evidence indicating that Ruggles failed to utilize resources
that were offered by the school and court to help with Daughter’s attendance problem.
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Specifically, Ruggles failed to participate in absence intervention plan meetings, failed to
attend a parent-teacher conference, and declined assistance from the Greene County
Juvenile Court’s Diversion Program. Because the evidence established that Daughter’s
unexcused absences continued in full force after these failures, a rational factfinder could
have concluded that they also contributed to Daughter’s becoming a habitual truant.
{¶ 51} Considering that Daughter had 56 full-day, unexcused absences throughout
the entire school year, 45 of which occurred during the specific time periods alleged in
the complaint, and considering the evidence of Ruggles’s conduct throughout the 2022-
2023 school year, i.e., her failure to monitor Daughter’s whereabouts in the mornings,
failure to ensure that Daughter either got on the bus or had some alternate means of
transportation to school, and failure to utilize school and court resources to address
Daughter’s attendance problem, a rational factfinder could have concluded that all five
counts were supported by sufficient evidence. That is, when viewed in a light most
favorable to the State, a rational factfinder could have concluded from the evidence that
Ruggles disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that she was acting in a way
tending to cause Daughter to become an unruly child/habitual truant during the time
periods in question.
{¶ 52} We note that the fact that the time frame alleged under Count One only
encompassed two full-day absences, which did not meet the definition of a habitual truant
under R.C. 2151.011(B)(18), did not prohibit Ruggles from being guilty of that count.
This is because a child’s status as an unruly child/habitual truant is not an element of the
offense of “tending to cause” unruliness under R.C. 2919.24(B)(2). See State v.
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Andriola, 70 Ohio App.3d 69, 71 (1st Dist. 1990), citing former R.C. 2919.24(A)(2) and
State v. Gans, 168 Ohio St. 174 (1958), paragraph one of the syllabus; accord Schnebeli,
2019-Ohio-860, at ¶ 22-26; State v. Stiles, 2019-Ohio-3852, ¶ 26-27 (5th Dist.); In re
Hamblin, 2014-Ohio-3289, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.); State v. Kindle, 2003-Ohio-302, ¶ 11 (3d
Dist.). That is, the question is not whether there was sufficient evidence to establish that
Daughter was an unruly child/habitual truant between November 18, 2022, and December
8, 2022, but instead whether the State produced sufficient evidence to show that, during
that time period, Ruggles acted in a manner that would tend to cause Daughter to become
an unruly child/habitual truant. See Schnebeli at ¶ 26.
{¶ 53} Here, the time frame of Count One only encompassed 13 school days due
to Thanksgiving Break, meaning that Daughter missed two out of 13 school days. The
evidence established that before those two absences, Daughter had already accumulated
10 full-day, unexcused absences, one unexcused partial absence, and one unexcused
tardy during the 2022-2023 school year. State’s Exhibit 1, p. 120-121. Because the
evidence established that Daughter continued to have full-day absences during the
November/December time frame, a rational factfinder could have concluded that
Ruggles’s aforementioned failure to monitor Daughter in the mornings, failure to ensure
that Daughter got on the bus or had alternate transportation to school, and failure to utilize
school resources continued throughout the November/December time frame and tended
to cause Daughter to become a habitual truant. In other words, there was enough
evidence of contributory conduct prior to and during the November/December time frame
to allowed a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Ruggles had acted in a way tending
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to cause Daughter to become a habitual truant under Count One.
{¶ 54} Ruggles’s second assignment of error is overruled.
Third Assignment of Error
{¶ 55} Under her third assignment of error, Ruggles contends that all of her
convictions for contributing to the unruliness of a child were against the manifest weight
of the evidence. We disagree.
{¶ 56} “A weight of the evidence argument challenges the believability of the
evidence and asks which of the competing inferences suggested by the evidence is more
believable or persuasive.” (Citation omitted.) Wilson, 2009-Ohio-525, at ¶ 12 (2d Dist.).
When evaluating whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the
appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, consider witness credibility, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in
the evidence, the trier of fact “ ‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage
of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’ ” Thompkins, 78
Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). A
judgment of conviction should be reversed as being against the manifest weight of the
evidence only in exceptional circumstances. Martin at 175. “The fact that the evidence
is subject to different interpretations does not render the conviction against the manifest
weight of the evidence.” State v. Adams, 2014-Ohio-3432, ¶ 24 (2d Dist.), citing Wilson
at ¶ 14.
{¶ 57} “In reaching its verdict, the jury was free to believe all, part, or none of each
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witness’s testimony.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Baker, 2024-Ohio-2550, ¶ 44 (2d
Dist.). For example, the jury was free to disbelieve the testimony of Ruggles’s niece and
her friend, Jamie, indicating that Ruggles would sometimes wake Daughter up in the
mornings or that Ruggles’s ankle injury prevented her from going upstairs to check on
Daughter and from driving Daughter to school. The jury could have discredited that
testimony since Daughter and Ruggles’s husband, Claudio, testified that Claudio was
always the person who woke Daughter up in the mornings. The jury also could have
discredited that testimony because Claudio testified that he did not know whether
Ruggles’s doctor had told Ruggles not to drive as a result of her ankle injury and never
indicated that Ruggles’s injury prevented her from going upstairs to check on Daughter.
{¶ 58} The jury was also free to disbelieve the testimony that Ruggles had car
trouble. Even if the jury credited the car trouble testimony, the evidence still indicated
that Ruggles failed to wake up in the mornings and make sure that Daughter got on the
school bus. The jury was also free to disbelieve the testimony indicating that Ruggles
encouraged Daughter to go to school and disciplined Daughter when she failed to attend.
{¶ 59} After reviewing the entire record, weighing all the evidence and reasonable
inferences, and considering witness credibility, we do not find that the jury clearly lost its
way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice by finding Ruggles guilty of all five
counts of contributing to the unruliness of a child. The weight of the evidence,
particularly the evidence indicating that Ruggles failed to monitor Daughter’s whereabouts
in the mornings and failed to ensure that Daughter either got on the bus or had some
alternate means of transportation to school during the 2022-2023 year, supported the
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jury’s verdicts finding her guilty of contributing to the unruliness of a child. Accordingly,
Ruggles’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 60} Ruggles’s third assignment of error is overruled.
Fourth Assignment of Error
{¶ 61} Under her fourth assignment of error, Ruggles contends that the trial court
committed prejudicial error by prohibiting the admission of certain testimony by Ruggles’s
niece. Specifically, Ruggles takes issue with the trial court’s prohibiting Ruggles’s friend
Jamie from testifying about what efforts Ruggles had made to ensure that Ruggles’s niece
attended school. The trial court prohibited such testimony on grounds that it was
irrelevant because Ruggles’s niece was not the subject of the charged offenses. The
trial court also found that such testimony could confuse the jurors and cause them to
improperly consider efforts that Ruggles took with her niece when deciding the case.
{¶ 62} “ ‘The admission or exclusion of relevant evidence rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court.’ ” State v. Jali, 2020-Ohio-208, ¶ 39 (2d Dist.), quoting State
v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 180 (1987). Accordingly, we review a trial court’s decision
on that matter for an abuse of discretion. Id. “A trial court abuses its discretion when it
makes a decision that is unreasonable, unconscionable, or arbitrary.” (Citation omitted.)
State v. Darmond, 2013-Ohio-966, ¶ 34. “An abuse of discretion includes a situation in
which the trial court did not engage in a ‘ “sound reasoning process.” ’ ” Id., quoting State
v. Morris, 2012-Ohio-2407, ¶ 14, quoting AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community
Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990). “Abuse-of-discretion
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review is deferential and does not permit an appellate court to simply substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court.” Id., citing Morris at ¶ 14.
{¶ 63} Except as otherwise provided by law, “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible,”
and “[e]vidence which is not relevant is not admissible.” Evid.R. 402. “ ‘Relevant
evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.” Evid.R. 401. “[I]t is the trial court’s province to
determine whether, under the circumstances, testimony is ‘essentially misleading or too
remote’ to be deemed relevant . . . Trial courts have ‘broad discretion’ in determining
relevance[.]” State v. Yarbrough, 2002-Ohio-2126, ¶ 35, quoting Whiteman v. State, 119
Ohio St. 285, 298 (1928) and State v. Hymore, 9 Ohio St.2d 122, 128 (1967); accord
Thomas v. Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 2016-Ohio-7246, ¶ 105 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 64} In this case, we find that any effort Ruggles may have taken to ensure that
her niece attended school had no bearing on the charges for which she was being tried,
which pertained solely to Daughter. Therefore, any testimony regarding Ruggles’s
efforts as to her niece would not have had a tendency to make any fact that was of
consequence to the determination of the charges being tried more or less probable.
Accordingly, it was reasonable and not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to exclude
the testimony in question on grounds that it was irrelevant. It was also reasonable for
the trial court to exclude the testimony as a way to ensure that the jurors did not improperly
consider Ruggles’s efforts with her niece when deciding the case.
{¶ 65} Ruggles’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
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Conclusion
{¶ 66} Having overruled all four of Ruggles’s assignments of error, the judgment
of the trial court is affirmed.
.............
EPLEY, P.J. and TUCKER, J., concur.