Parma v. Coyne , 2024 Ohio 3192 ( 2024 )

[Cite as Parma v. Coyne, 2024-Ohio-3192.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
CITY OF PARMA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 113407
:
v.
:
STEVE COYNE,
:
Defendant-Appellant.
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: August 22, 2024
Criminal Appeal from the Parma Municipal Court
Case No. 23TRC02379
Appearances:
Scott M. Tuma, Parma Chief Prosecutor/Law Director,
and John L. Reulback, Jr., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney,
for appellee.
Annotico Law, Inc. and Ronald A. Annotico, for appellant.
EMMANUELA D. GROVES, J.:
Defendant-appellant, Steve Coyne (“Coyne”), appeals the trial court’s
decision denying his motion to suppress. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
I. Facts and Procedural History
In February 2022, Coyne was pulled over and arrested by Parma
Police Department Patrolman Matthew Bertole (“Officer Bertole”), who was
responding to a 9-1-1 disturbance call made from an apartment on Stumph Road.
Plaintiff-appellee, City of Parma (“City”), subsequently charged Coyne with
operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of R.C.
4511.19(A)(1) (“OVI”), a misdemeanor of the first degree. Coyne pled not guilty.
In May 2023, Coyne filed a motion to suppress, seeking to exclude (1)
all evidence gathered as a result of the stop of Coyne’s vehicle; (2) tests of Coyne’s
coordination and intoxication level, including bodily substance tests; (3) Coyne’s
statements; (4) observations and opinions of the officers involved; (5) and any and
all evidence obtained as a result of Coyne’s purported illegal, warrantless seizure.
Coyne argued that this “illegally and unconstitutionally obtained” evidence should
be suppressed because the initial seizure was accomplished in the absence of any
reasonable and articulable suspicion that Coyne had violated, was violating, or was
about to violate any traffic law and contravened R.C. 2935.03 and 2935.04. As a
result, Coyne claimed he was subjected to an unreasonable seizure, contrary to his
rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and
Article 1, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. Coyne further argued that absent this
evidence, there was no lawful cause to detain Coyne or probable cause to arrest him
without a warrant.
In June 2023, a hearing was held on Coyne’s motion to suppress. The
following evidence was adduced at the hearing. In February 2022, Shawn Bolling
(“Bolling”) called 9-1-1 and informed the dispatcher that “there’s somebody that
refuses to leave my mom’s apartment. He’s belligerent, he’s drunk, he’s threatening
me and my mom.” (06/28/23, Tr. 38.) Bolling identified Coyne, his mother’s
boyfriend, in the call and advised that Coyne was “threatening to be” physically
aggressive. Id. At the end of the call, Bolling informed the dispatcher that Coyne
“just left” and he believed Coyne was in a vehicle, although he did not know what
kind of vehicle Coyne drove and could not provide Coyne’s physical description. Id.
at 39. Bolling then ended the call, saying, “I’m not trying to deal with this . . . right
now.” Id. at 40.
The radio-transmission recordings between Parma dispatch and
responding officers and computer-aided dispatch report (“CAD Report”) associated
with the call revealed the following timeline of events. At 11:32 p.m., dispatch
radioed, “Male is intoxicated and belligerent, believed to be a Steve Coyne,
threatening to be physically aggressive.” Id. at 16, 20. Two minutes later, at 11:34
p.m., dispatch indicated that “the male just walked out the door.” Id. at 18, 21. At
the suppression hearing, Officer Bertole, the responding officer who ultimately
stopped and arrested Coyne, advised that he had not reached the apartment or
encountered Coyne at that time. Officer Bertole explained that while the
disturbance was “not active,” officers were still responding to the address to
investigate whether a crime occurred since “[the caller] wanted us to come there
because they called 9-1-1” and “we’re obligated to respond.” Id. at 21-22.
Descriptions of Coyne and his vehicle, a gray Ford Edge, were then
provided by dispatch over the radio, along with Coyne’s license plate number. At
11:38 p.m., Officer Bertole located a vehicle matching dispatch’s description at the
intersection of Snow Road and Stumph Road/Chevrolet Boulevard while enroute to
the Stumph Road apartment. Officer Bertole indicated to dispatch that he was going
to stop the gray Ford Edge and speak with the driver.
Officer Bertole explained the events in February 2022 leading up to
Coyne’s arrest as follows:
We received a call for service. It was a report of a disturbance at an
apartment on Stumph Road. The male was being verbally abusive, I
think they said threatening to be physical.
As I was responding, I saw a vehicle that matched the description
g[iven] by our dispatch. I got behind it and ran the license plate, I
believe, which showed me that it was, in fact, the male in question. And
I chose to stop the vehicle as part of the investigation into what
happened at Stumph Road.
Id. at 8. Officer Bertole stated that he had not witnessed a traffic violation when he
turned on his overhead lights and initiated the traffic stop; rather, he was pulling the
vehicle over only because of what he heard about the 9-1-1 call from dispatch. Officer
Bertole claimed that at the time he initiated the traffic stop, it was not an OVI
investigation; instead, he was investigating the 9-1-1 call.
Officer Bertole observed Coyne slurring his speech and he noticed that
Coyne’s eyes were “pretty glassy.” Id. at 10. Officer Bertole stated:
I asked [Coyne] if he had been drinking and he admitted that he was,
in fact, drinking earlier. And multiple times he told me that he knew
he shouldn’t be driving. I was asking him what was going on at the
apartment. And they had an argument of some sort, if I recall. He just
wanted to leave, remove himself from the situation before anything else
happened.
Id. As a result of his conversations with and observations of Coyne, Officer Bertole
asked him to step out of the vehicle and perform field sobriety tests. Coyne was
either unable to complete the tests or showed clues of intoxication.
While Officer Bertole was conducting his traffic stop in front of the
UAW Hall, another officer advised over the radio that “after speaking to the caller it
sounds like it was verbal, he’s okay with just the man leaving for tonight . . . .” Id. at
28. At the suppression hearing, Bolling explained that he spoke to a police officer
after his initial call with dispatch and “informed him on the phone call that I did not
want to deal with the situation any longer, situation was resolved. He left peacefully,
nothing had happened, and the situation was done. I deemed it over the moment
[Coyne] closed the door.” Id. at 46. Bolling said that he did not tell police officers
to investigate further or to press charges and no actual physical violence occurred
between him and Coyne.
In August 2023, the trial court ruled on Coyne’s motion to suppress
and issued a judgment entry with findings of fact and conclusions of law. In holding
that “the police had reasonable suspicion to encounter and engage [Coyne]
notwithstanding the lack of an observed traffic violation[,]” the trial court found:
The officers were dispatched regarding a citizen complaint by an
identified phone caller, indicating a situation needing police response.
This included references to the aggressive and intoxicated behavior of
[Coyne]. The initial dispatch of officers was relative to a possible
disturbance situation. Police were further advised that [Coyne] had left
the residence and had left in his [gray] Ford Edge. [Officer] Bertol[e]
encountered [Coyne] and engaged in a traffic stop at the UAW Hall on
Stump/Chevrolet, which is not a long distance from the address of the
call, and is consistent with [Coyne] leaving and going northbound, in a
contemporaneous time frame with the call. The officers had the right
to detain [Coyne] for further investigation as it relates to the initial call
of a disturbance at the apartment.
(Judgment Entry, 08/31/23.) The trial court then held that the police had
reasonable suspicion to engage in further investigation regarding a possible OVI
given the information provided by dispatch and Officer Bertole’s observation of
signs of possible impairment, including slurred speech and Coyne’s admission that
he was drinking earlier. Id. Finally, the trial court held that police had probable
cause to arrest Coyne for an OVI violation, finding:
The initial call [from] the apartment indicated that [Coyne] was drunk.
He was stopped in a motor vehicle, having operated the same from the
apartment to the stopping point near the UAW Hall. [Officer] Bertol[e]
noticed indicia of alcohol consumption, including [Coyne’s] own
admission. The [one field sobriety test], which appears to be properly
conducted, resulted in six clues; raising a presumption that [Coyne]
would test over .08 if he tested. [The other two tests] were unable to be
completed, due to [Coyne’s] inability to complete the tests.
Id. Based on the foregoing, the trial court denied Coyne’s motion to suppress and
set the matter for a final pretrial and trial.
At the final pretrial in October 2023, Coyne entered a plea of no
contest to the OVI charge. The trial court accepted Coyne’s plea and found him
guilty. A sentencing hearing was held on November 6, 2023, and a journal entry
memorializing his sentence was docketed on December 6, 2023.
In the interim, Coyne filed the instant appeal and sentencing matters
were stayed pending resolution. Coyne raises two assignments of error for review.
Assignment of Error No. 1
The trial court’s findings of fact were against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
Assignment of Error No. 2
The trial court erred when it denied [Coyne’s] motion to suppress,
holding in error that the police had reasonable suspicion to initiate a
traffic stop, without any observed traffic violations, to investigate a
telephoned complaint to police of a disturbance at an apartment.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Suppression Overview
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
I, Section 14, of the Ohio Constitution guarantee “the right of people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects [or possessions], against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” Evidence obtained in violation of these constitutional
prohibitions is considered “fruit of the poisonous tree” and must be suppressed from
use in the criminal prosecution of the person from whom it was obtained. State v.
Parrish, 2023-Ohio-3356, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Boulis, 2006-Ohio-3693,
¶ 12, 22 (8th Dist.). “‘The purpose of suppression is not to vindicate the rights of the
accused person, who may very well have engaged in illegal conduct, but to deter the
state from such acts in the future.’” Id., quoting State v Stagger, 2005-Ohio-4586,
¶ 11 (8th Dist.). This purpose should not be overshadowed by confirmation of the
detained person’s commission of an alleged criminal act. Id., citing State v. Byrd,
2022-Ohio-4635, ¶ 32 (8th Dist.).
B. Standard of Review
Appellate review of a motion to suppress generally presents a mixed
question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. At a suppression
hearing, the trial court is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the
credibility of witnesses and, therefore, assumes the role of trier of fact when
considering a motion to suppress. Id. On appeal, an appellate court must accept the
trial court’s findings of fact as true so long as they are supported by competent,
credible evidence. Id. The appellate court must then apply the de novo standard of
review to the trial court’s conclusions of law, independently determining whether
the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard without deference to the trial court’s
legal conclusions. Id.When a defendant raises a manifest-weight challenge, the appellate
court must review the entire record, weigh all evidence and reasonable inferences,
and consider witness credibility to determine whether the factfinder clearly lost its
way in its resolution of evidentiary conflicts and created a manifest miscarriage of
justice. State v. Wilks, 2018-Ohio-1562, ¶ 168, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio
St.3d 380, 387, (1997). But “[i]n conducting such a review, this court remains
mindful that the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence are matters
primarily for the trier of fact to assess.” Cleveland v. Giering, 2017-Ohio-8059, ¶ 36
(8th Dist.), citing State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraphs one and
two of the syllabus.
With these principles in mind, we jointly review Coyne’s two
assignments of error concerning the trial court’s factual findings and legal
conclusions resulting in the denial of his motion to suppress.
C. Denial of Motion to Suppress
In his first assignment of error, Coyne argues that the trial court’s
findings of fact were incomplete and against the manifest weight of the evidence. In
his second assignment of error, Coyne asserts that the trial court erred by denying
his pretrial motion to suppress because the trial court failed to apply relevant state
and federal caselaw to the facts of this case. Coyne further argues that any
reasonable suspicion arising from the 9-1-1 call ceased once Bolling advised that the
situation was over and voluntarily terminated the call. Finally, Coyne claims that
there was no probable cause for his arrest because all evidence gathered from the
“unjustified traffic stop” was “illegally obtained” and subject to suppression.
The Fourth Amendment applies to seizures of a person, including brief
investigatory stops of persons in a vehicle. Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393,
396 (2014); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809 (1996); United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). When a police officer has a reasonable suspicion
that the person being stopped has or is engaged in criminal activity, an investigatory
stop, or Terry stop, does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Fairview Park v.
Bowman, 2023-Ohio-4210, ¶ 52 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Jones, 2014-Ohio-2763,
¶ 17 (8th Dist.).
When determining whether reasonable suspicion exists for purposes
of an investigatory stop, the need for the search or seizure must be balanced against
the search’s invasion upon constitutionally protected interests. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 21 (1968). To justify a particular intrusion, “the police officer must be able to
point to specific and articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Id. Thus, reasonable suspicion
involves more than “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion” or a mere “hunch,”
but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause. Id. at 27. This
“reasonableness” determination hinges upon objective factors, rather than the
actual subjective motivation of the officer involved. In re E.H., 2019-Ohio-2572, ¶
24 (8th Dist.), citing Whren at 813. Finally, the “totality of the circumstances — the
whole picture” must be considered when evaluating whether a detaining officer had
the required “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person
stopped of criminal activity.” Cortez at 417-418.
In the instant case, Officer Bertole’s decision to stop Coyne was based
solely on the information provided by Bolling in his 9-1-1 call. Both the Ohio and
United States Supreme Courts have held that a reliable tip, standing alone, may
provide a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop.
In Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295 (1999), paragraph two of the syllabus, the
Ohio Supreme Court held that a telephone tip can create reasonable suspicion
justifying an investigative stop if the tip has sufficient indicia of reliability. Under
these circumstances, the determination of reasonable suspicion is limited to an
examination of the weight and reliability of that tip. Id. at 299. “[T]he informant’s
veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge” are highly relevant factors in
determining the tip’s value. Id., citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328 (1990).
Citing caselaw from federal and Ohio appellate courts, the Ohio Supreme Court
explained that tips initiating from identified citizen informants that are reported
immediately and based on personal observations are afforded greater credibility,
reliability, and accuracy. Id. at 300-302.
Similarly, in Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 399-400 (2014),
a case involving an anonymous tip that created a reasonable suspicion of drunk
driving, the U.S. Supreme Court found that eyewitness knowledge and
contemporaneous reporting lend significant support to a tip’s reliability. The U.S.
Supreme Court further found that the caller’s use of the 9-1-1 emergency system was
another indicator of veracity, noting, “A 9-1-1 call has some features that allow for
identifying and tracing callers, and thus provide some safeguards against making
false reports with immunity.” Id. at 400-401. The Navarette Court cautioned that
“[e]ven a reliable tip will justify an investigative stop only if it creates reasonable
suspicion that ‘criminal activity may be afoot.’” Id. at 401, quoting Terry at 30.
However, subsequent innocent conduct or the absence of suspicious conduct does
not dispel reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. at 403. Therefore, “an
officer who already has a reasonable suspicion need not surveil a vehicle at length in
order to personally observe suspicious driving.” Id. at 404.
In reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we find that Bolling’s tip
had sufficient indicia of reliability. Bolling called 9-1-1 and advised the dispatcher
that Coyne refused to leave his mother’s Stumph Road apartment and was
belligerent, drunk, and threatening to be physically violent with him and his mother.
Coyne does not challenge the trial court’s finding that Bolling was an “identified
phone caller” and his name and redacted telephone number appear on the CAD
Report. Bolstering the tip’s credibility, reliability, and accuracy, the record reveals
that Bolling utilized the 9-1-1 reporting system, possessed eyewitness knowledge,
and his call was made contemporaneously with the events that transpired at the
Stumph Road apartment. Bolling remained on the line with dispatch until he
believed Coyne left the apartment in a vehicle. Bolling’s initial report that Coyne
was belligerent, intoxicated, and threatening to be physically aggressive became a
matter of public safety after Coyne left the apartment and began driving a vehicle.
Thus, based on Bolling’s 9-1-1 call, it was objectively reasonable to suspect that a
crime occurred not only at the Stumph Road apartment, but was currently in
progress on public roadways. Accordingly, Bolling’s reliable tip provided a sufficient
basis to develop reasonable suspicion justifying Officer Bertole’s investigatory stop
of Coyne, who was identified by Bolling and located while driving a vehicle matching
the description provided by dispatch near the Stumph Road apartment where the
disturbance occurred. Because an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion
was created by Bolling’s tip, Officer Bertole was not required to surveil Coyne’s
vehicle or personally observe suspicious driving prior to pulling him over.
Coyne claims that the trial court clearly lost its way and created a
manifest miscarriage of justice by omitting “critical factual details,” including the
timeline of events, the specific allegations made by the caller, the way the caller
ended the 9-1-1 call, and that the caller did not wish for police to pursue the matter
any further. However, Coyne fails to make a cognizable argument that the trial
court’s “factual omissions” resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. Coyne does
not explain why the purported “factual omissions” are critical in the weighing of
evidence, establish how the trial court clearly lost its way in its resolution of
evidentiary conflicts, or cite any caselaw in support of his assertion that, because
searches and seizures are notoriously fact-sensitive, “it is essential that a trial court
articulate all of the specific facts that it relied upon to reach its determination.”
Despite Coyne’s contentions, our review of the August 31, 2023 judgment entry
reveals that the trial court accounted for the specific facts it relied upon in denying
Coyne’s motion to suppress and, as discussed above, those facts were consistent with
the evidence presented at the suppression hearing. Based on the record before us,
the trial court’s factual findings are supported by competent, credible evidence
within the record and there is no indication that the trial court, as the finder of fact,
lost its way or created a manifest miscarriage of justice by omitting the alleged
“critical factual details.”
Coyne also claims that the trial court erred by failing to consider or
apply State v. Amburgy, 122 Ohio App.3d 277 (12th Dist. 1997), which he believes
has “a striking factual and legal similarity” to this case. However, Amburgy is clearly
distinguishable. In Amburgy, the informant did not claim that the defendant was
belligerent, intoxicated, or threatening physical violence. Rather, the informant
reported that she wanted the defendant to leave her home and that he may have
returned to pick up drugs. Id. at 279. The informant did not see what was picked
up — she merely thought it to be drugs — nor did she state that she saw the defendant
in her home. Id. at 281. The Twelfth District Court of Appeals found that the
informant’s tip was based on speculation, not upon personal knowledge, and absent
other facts showing that the officers had a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting that the defendant possessed drugs, the officers did not have a reasonable
suspicion to stop the defendant. Id. at 281.
Unlike Amburgy, this case involves a reliable tip; Bolling provided a
real-time, firsthand account of specific and articulable facts that created reasonable
suspicion that a crime had occurred or was occurring because of Coyne’s
belligerence, intoxication, and threats. As previously discussed, Bolling’s tip alone
was sufficient to justify the stop of Coyne’s vehicle. See, e.g., State v. McKinney,
2016-Ohio-5737 (5th Dist.). (holding that a reliable informant’s report of the
defendant’s harassment, potential stalking, and possible intoxicated driving was
sufficient to justify the investigatory stop of the defendant’s vehicle, resulting in his
arrest for an OVI, without further indicia of drunk driving).
The caselaw cited by Coyne in support of his argument that reasonable
suspicion ceased once the 9-1-1 call terminated is also distinguishable: they involve
suspected equipment or license violations that proved to be unsubstantiated upon
investigation. And the principle cited by Coyne that “[a]n officer’s reasonable
suspicion that a traffic violation occurred terminates when the officer recognizes the
grounds for effectuating the stop are no longer valid[,]” does not apply to this case.
Here, Officer Bertole was investigating Bolling’s 9-1-1 call, which reported that
Coyne was belligerent, drunk, and threatening to be physically aggressive. Coyne’s
reported condition did not “cease” because Bolling ended his 9-1-1 call to dispatch,
saying he was “not trying to deal with this . . . right now,” or because Coyne left the
Stumph Road apartment. Nor was Officer Bertole required to disregard his personal
observations during the investigatory stop after he received word that the
disturbance at the Stumph Road apartment was verbal in nature and Bolling was
“okay with just the man leaving for tonight.” Rather, Officer Bertole’s observations
of Coyne’s intoxication, Coyne’s own admissions that he was drinking and should
not be driving, and subsequent field sobriety tests substantiated the reasonable
suspicion arising from Bolling’s 9-1-1 call, leading to Coyne’s OVI arrest. Therefore,
Coyne’s arguments are without merit, and we find that Officer Bertole’s
investigatory stop of Coyne was based upon reasonable suspicion deriving from
Bolling’s reliable tip.
Finally, Coyne does not argue that his arrest lacked probable cause in
light of Officer Bertole’s observations, Coyne’s admissions, and the field sobriety test
results. Rather, he claims Officer Bertole lacked probable cause to arrest him for an
OVI because this evidence, obtained after an “illegal stop,” must be suppressed.
Because we find that reasonable suspicion justified the investigatory stop, we cannot
say that the evidence gathered thereafter is “fruit of the poisonous tree” requiring
suppression. Accordingly, we overrule both of Coyne’s assignments of error and
affirm the trial court’s denial of Coyne’s motion to suppress.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue of this court directing the Parma
Municipal Court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction
having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the
trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, JUDGE
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, A.J., and
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, J., CONCUR