Orr v. Brantley , 2024 Ohio 3245 ( 2024 )

[Cite as Orr v. Brantley, 2024-Ohio-3245.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAKE COUNTY
BRENTNEY ORR, CASE NO. 2024-L-009
Petitioner-Appellee,
Civil Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas
EBONI BRANTLEY,
Trial Court No. 2023 CS 001540
Respondent-Appellant.
OPINION
Decided: August 26, 2024
Judgment: Affirmed
Brentney Orr, pro se, Eastlake, OH (Petitioner-Appellee).
Mary Catherine Corrigan, 6555A Wilson Mills Boulevard, Suite 102, Mayfield Village,
OH 44143 (For Respondent-Appellant).
ROBERT J. PATTON, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Eboni Brantley (“Brantley”), appeals the decision of the Lake
County Court of Common Pleas granting a Civil Stalking Protection Order against her.
For the following reasons, we affirm.
{¶2} The following facts were derived from the record including testimony
presented at the full hearing held on December 11, 2023.
{¶3} Appellee, Brentney Orr (“Orr”), and Brantley went to the same nursing
school. They began studying together in September of 2023, at first over the phone and
then in person. A romantic relationship developed, but by October, Orr had ended the
relationship and told Brantley she wanted to remain friends and nothing more. Not long
after, sometime towards the end of October of 2023, Brantley and Orr went to a haunted
house together. On the way home from the haunted house, the two got into an argument
after Orr told Brantley she did not like a girl that she knows. This argument marked the
end of the women’s friendship and was the catalyst for more volatile interactions that
occurred over the next week. Brantley immediately took offense to Orr’s comment and
while still riding in Orr’s car, called a mutual acquaintance. Orr became angry and argued
with Brantley. At one point Orr locked Brantley out of the car, keeping Brantley’s phone
inside with her, while Brantley remained outside of the car without shoes. Brantley
testified that at some point during this interaction Orr hit her.
{¶4} The following Friday after the haunted house incident, Brantley confronted
Orr at school. Brantley parked near Orr and had another woman in the vehicle with her.
The other woman blocked Orr from going to class and initiated an argument with Orr.
During the argument between Orr and the woman, Brantley tugged on Orr’s jacket. Orr
told Brantley not to touch her. Brantley tugged on her jacket again. Brantley testified that
Orr was yelling, and that Brantley was attempting to calm her down. The women yelled
at each other and then Orr went into the school. When Orr went into the school, a faculty
member who witnessed some of the interaction asked what was going on. Orr explained
what had happened, and then went to class. Brantley separately went to class. During
class, Brantley was talking and saying things Orr could not hear. Orr testified that during
class Brantley received a warning from the teacher that she would be dismissed from the
class for being disruptive if she continued to talk. Brantley continued making comments,
but Orr could not hear what they were. The teacher then asked Brantley to leave. Brantley
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stood up and pointed at Orr and the teacher both saying more things that Orr was unable
to hear.
{¶5} Later that same evening, during the class break, Orr went outside to smoke
and discovered that Brantley was there. Brantley was standing outside of her vehicle with
other classmates around her. Orr could hear Brantley swearing and saying, “I know hoe.”
Orr believed the statements were about her. Orr cut her break short and went back into
the school. When she went back inside the teacher told Orr that Brantley would not be
back. It is unclear from the testimony exactly when and by who, but at some point, during
the evening at the school the police were called, and Orr spoke with them. The interaction
resulted in Brantley being dismissed from the school, and a no trespassing order being
issued for the school against Brantley.
{¶6} That same evening, Orr went home and received several texts and phone
calls from Brantley. Orr continued to get phone calls and texts from Brantley coming from
different phone numbers. At ten o’clock, Orr began receiving text messages from
Brantley’s phone number that read, “police ass bitch,” and other aggressive comments
asking Orr if she wants to fight. Orr told Brantley she did not want to fight and to stop
contacting her. Orr blocked Brantley’s cell phone number, but she continued to receive
texts from Brantley from a different number. Orr testified that Brantley would apologize
first, and then text “fuck you” immediately after. Brantley continued to text Orr despite her
repeated requests to stop.
{¶7} On Saturday night, Brantley went to Orr’s house. The interaction began with
Brantley calling Orr around midnight. Brantley told Orr she was going to come to her
house. Orr told Brantley not to come to her house and began to ignore the multiple phone
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calls and text messages that ensued. Brantley continued to call and text Orr, and despite
being told not to, came to Orr’s house. Orr testified that when Brantley came to her house,
her daughter recorded it outside of her window. When Brantley saw she was recording
she took off. Brantley testified that Orr invited her to the house. Orr stated when she saw
Brantley standing on the sidewalk near her home, she told her to “get the F away from
my property.” Both agreed that Brantley never actually came in. At that point Orr called
the police and made a report. This is the second interaction Orr had with the police about
Brantley’s behavior. The police contacted Brantley and told her to stop contacting Orr.
Brantley did not contact Orr again after that.
{¶8} Orr testified that on Saturday, before she made the police report against
Brantley, she reached out to Brantley. Orr said that she contacted Brantley because she
felt guilty Brantley had been dismissed from the school due to their fight. Brantley then
asked Orr to watch her son, and Orr agreed. Shortly thereafter she declined. Orr testified
that when she declined to watch Brantley’s son, Brantley became angry and the repeated
phone calls and texts began.
{¶9} Images of texts between the two were received into evidence during the
December 11, 2023 hearing. Most of the texts consist of arguments between Orr and
Brantley. Orr in one text told Brantley, “You really making me scared. [Y]ou calling me
names you’re calling me threatening me. You texted me telling me you want your way
please leave me alone. Don’t come to my house.” In another text Orr indicated to Brantley
that she’s blocked five numbers that Brantley has used to text her from and asks her to
stop calling her.
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{¶10} Orr filed a Petition for a Civil Stalking Protection Order (“CSPO”), which was
granted ex parte on November 9, 2023. The matter was set for a full hearing on November
27, 2023. Both parties appeared on November 27, 2023. Instead of going forward,
however, Brantley requested a continuance to hire counsel. The request was granted,
and the hearing was reset for December 11, 2023. At the December 11th hearing, both
parties appeared. Brantley again requested a continuance to hire counsel. The trial court
denied Brantley’s request, stating “I had mentioned to you last time that I would certainly
give you a continuance, but to make sure that your counsel was either available or contact
the Court to request a continuance to notify [Orr] so she didn’t appear and be ready to go
and then find out that you’re not able to go forward.” The trial court told Brantley a request
for a continuance would be denied, and then asked, “are you prepared to go forward or
do you want a continuance?” Brantley replied, “I’m prepared; ready to go.”
{¶11} The hearing went forward. An order granting the protection order was filed
on January 18, 2024.1 Brantley timely appeals that January 18, 2024 order.
{¶12} On appeal, Brantley asserts two assignments of error:
{¶13} [1.] “The trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant a continuance to
allow the respondent to secure counsel.”
{¶14} [2.] “The trial court erred by granting the civil stalking protection order.”
Denial of Brantley’s Request for Continuance
{¶15} In Brantley’s first assignment of error, she asserts that the trial court erred
by not granting her request for a continuance to obtain counsel. Courts have broad
1. R.C. 2903.214(E)(2)(a) allows the trial court to issue a CSPO up to five years. However, here the
protection order granted on January 18, 2024, protects Orr for one year from the date of issuance, until
November 9, 2024.
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discretion when deciding to grant or deny a continuance. “The grant or denial of a
continuance is a matter that is entrusted to the broad, sound discretion of the trial judge.”
State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 67. “An appellate court must not reverse the denial of
a continuance unless there has been an abuse of discretion.” (Citations omitted.) Id. at
67. An abuse of discretion is the trial court’s “‘failure to exercise sound, reasonable, and
legal decision-making.’” State v. Beechler, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶ 62, quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary 11 (8th Ed.Rev.2004).
{¶16} Brantley cites R.H. v. J.H., 2020-Ohio-3402 (9th Dist.), in support of her
argument that the denial of her request was arbitrary and an abuse of discretion. R.H. is
factually distinguishable from this case. In R.H., after a failure of the first service attempt,
the appellant was successfully served the day immediately preceding the hearing. This
left the appellant only a day to obtain counsel. When appellant in R.H. arrived at the
hearing, he asked for a continuance to obtain counsel after the hearing had already
begun. The trial court, in that case, denied the appellant’s request because they had
already been in the hearing for approximately 30 minutes before the request was made.
The parties at that point were involved in negotiations for a proposed agreement. During
the negotiations, the appellant apologized to the trial court, and requested time to get an
attorney. The request was denied. The appellate court reversed on appeal and deemed
the denial an abuse of discretion because in that circumstance, it was so arbitrary that it
violated due process. The trial court used Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964) as
its authority, and articulated the reasoning set forth in Unger when it cited, “‘There are no
mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate
due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case,
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particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied.’”
Unger at 67. Therefore, the appellate review of whether or not a trial court abused its
discretion in granting or denying a request for a continuance is fact sensitive.
{¶17} In the present case, Brantley had already been granted a continuance once
at the initial November 27, 2024 hearing to obtain counsel. At the December 11, 2024
hearing, the trial court noted that a previous continuance had already been granted. The
trial court told Brantley that she must come prepared with counsel at the next hearing so
that Orr would not arrive, be ready to go, only to have the hearing rescheduled again.
Brantley contends that the trial court told her the continuance would have been granted
had she called the court before arriving at the hearing, and therefore the denial once she
arrived at the hearing was arbitrary. However, the trial court’s denial of Brantley’s second
oral request for a continuance was consistent with the warning given at the time of the
first request. Similarly, had the continuance been requested prior to the parties’ arrival, it
would have prevented Orr from arriving prepared and being turned away a second time.
This appears to be consistent with the intent of the initial warning.
{¶18} Further, as noted, there are no tests for deciding when a denial of a
continuance is arbitrary. Instead, there are a set of considerations.
In evaluating a motion for continuance, a court should note,
inter alia: the length of the delay requested; whether other
continuances have been requested and received; the
inconvenience to litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel and
the court; whether the requested delay is for legitimate
reasons or whether it is dilatory, purposeful, or contrived;
whether the defendant contributed to the circumstances which
gives rise to the request for a continuance; and other relevant
factors, depending on the unique factors of each case.”
(Citations omitted.)
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Unger at 67-68.
{¶19} Considering the factors articulated in Unger, this Court notes that the trial
court had already granted Brantley’s first continuance to find counsel. The trial court gave
Brantley a warning that if she wanted another continuance to call the court ahead of time
to prevent the parties from appearing only to have to postpone again. The parties arrived
at the December 11, 2023 hearing and Brantley had not made her request prior to that
hearing as instructed. Brantley had already been given two additional weeks to obtain
counsel. On appeal, an appellate court should not reverse a decision on a motion for a
continuance unless it can be shown that the trial court abused its discretion. Here, the
trial court acted consistently with its warning to Brantley. If Brantley wanted more time,
she was required to request it prior to the hearing. Brantley did not request the
continuance prior to the hearing, so it was denied. It cannot be said that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying Brantley’s request.
{¶20} Accordingly, Brantley’s first assignment of error is without merit.
Granting of the CSPO
{¶21} In Brantley’s second assignment of error, she contends that the trial court
should not have granted the CSPO against her. This Court recently explained the process
for granting a CSPO:
The proceedings for granting a CSPO are governed by Civ.R.
65.1. Post v. Leopardi, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2019-T-0061,
2020-Ohio-2890, ¶ 10. A trial court may refer CSPO
proceedings to a magistrate. Civ.R. 65.1(F)(1). When a
petitioner requests an ex parte CSPO, the magistrate shall
conduct the ex parte hearing and, upon conclusion of the
hearing, deny or grant an ex parte CSPO. Civ.R.
65.1(F)(2)(a). The magistrate shall then conduct a full hearing
and, upon conclusion of the hearing, deny or grant a
protection order. Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(a). * * *
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A party may file written objections to the trial court’s adoption,
modification, or rejection, or any terms of the protection order,
within fourteen days of the court’s filing of the order. Civ.R.
65.1(F)(3)(d)(i). The party filing objections has the burden of
showing that an error of law or other defect is evident on the
face of the order, or that the credible evidence of record is
insufficient to support the granting or denial of the protection
order, or that the magistrate abused the magistrate’s
discretion * * * Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(d)(iii). (Emphasis added.)
Moyer v. Robinson, 2023-Ohio-764, ¶ 29-31 (11th Dist.).
{¶22} A thorough review of the record reveals that no objections were made to the
Judgment Entry Adopting Magistrate’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed on
January 18, 2024. This Court has held that without timely filed objections pursuant to
Civ.R. 65.1(G), a respondent cannot challenge the decision of a trial court to adopt a
CSPO on appeal. Post v. Leopardi, 2020-Ohio-2890, ¶ 25 (11th Dist.).
{¶23} Consistent with this Court’s existing precedent, as no objections were filed
pursuant to Civ.R. 65.1(G), the decision of the trial court to grant the CSPO must not be
disturbed. Accordingly, Brantley’s second assignment of error is not sustained.
{¶24} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the Lake County Court
of Common Pleas.
EUGENE A. LUCCI, P.J.,
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,
concur.
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