Woodbury Garden Homes v. Davis , 2024 Ohio 3414 ( 2024 )

[Cite as Woodbury Garden Homes v. Davis, 2024-Ohio-3414.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Woodbury Garden Homes, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 23AP-693
(M.C. No. 2023 CVG 038186)
v. :
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
Patrick E. Davis, :
Defendant-Appellant, :
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on September 5, 2024
On brief: Poynter Law Firm LLC, and Angel V. Poynter, for
appellee. Argued: Angel V. Poynter.
On brief: Legal Aid of Southeast and Central Ohio,
Madison A. Hill, and Jyoshu L. Tsushima, for appellant.
Argued: Madison A. Hill.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Municipal Court
LUPER SCHUSTER, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Patrick E. Davis, appeals from a judgment of the
Franklin County Municipal Court entered in favor of plaintiff-appellee, Woodbury Garden
Homes, for restitution of the premises and court costs. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On October 10, 2023, Woodbury Garden Homes filed a complaint in forcible
entry and retainer against Davis for nonpayment of October 2023 rent. Davis filed a motion
for a more definite statement, a motion for judgment on the merits, and a motion to dismiss
for failure to comply with the 30-day notice of eviction requirement in Section 4024 of the
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”). A magistrate heard the
No. 23AP-693 2
matter on October 31, 2023. A week later, the magistrate issued a decision finding that
Woodbury Garden Homes is entitled to judgment in its favor. The magistrate concluded,
inter alia, that the 30-day eviction notice requirement did not apply. Two days later, the
trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision and awarded judgment in favor of Woodbury
Garden Homes for restitution of the premises and court costs. Davis did not file objections
to the magistrate’s decision as permitted under Civ.R. 53(D)(3). Instead, he filed a timely
notice of appeal on November 14, 2023.
II. Assignment of Error
{¶ 3} Davis assigns the following sole assignment of error for our review:
The Magistrate plainly erred when it concluded that the Section
4024 of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act
did not apply to the property in question.
III. Discussion
{¶ 4} In his sole assignment of error, Davis asserts the magistrate erred in
concluding that Section 4024 of the CARES Act, codified as 15 U.S.C. 9058, did not apply
to the property at issue. He argues Woodbury Garden Homes did not comply with the 30-
day eviction notice requirement under the CARES Act. Because Davis appeals from the
trial court’s adoption of the magistrate’s decision and grant of judgment in favor of
Woodbury Garden Homes, we construe Davis’s sole assignment of error as challenging the
trial court’s judgment. This assignment of error is not well-taken.
{¶ 5} Davis must demonstrate plain error because he did not timely object to the
magistrate’s decision. As required under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii), the magistrate’s decision
conspicuously indicates that a “party shall not assign as error on appeal the Court’s
adoption of any findings of fact or conclusions of law contained in this decision unless the
party timely and specifically objects to that finding or conclusion.” (Emphasis omitted.)
(Nov. 7, 2023 Mag.’s Decision at 6.) If a party does not file objections, the party waives all
but plain error. “Except for a claim of plain error, a party shall not assign as error on appeal
the court’s adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically
designated as a finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the
party has objected to that finding or conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).” Civ.R.
No. 23AP-693 3
53(D)(3)(b)(iv). Thus, because Davis did not file any timely objections to the magistrate’s
decision, he has waived all but plain error on appeal.
{¶ 6} “In civil cases, courts apply the doctrine of plain error ‘with the utmost
caution.’ ” Caballero v. Caballero, 10th Dist. No. 22AP-450, 2023-Ohio-1006, ¶ 11, quoting
Goldfuss v. Davidson, 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 121 (1997). A “ ‘plain error’ is one that is ‘obvious
and prejudicial although neither objected to nor affirmatively waived.’ ” In re J.L., 10th
Dist. No. 15AP-889, 2016-Ohio-2858, ¶ 60, quoting Schade v. Carnegie Body Co., 70 Ohio
St.2d 207, 209 (1982). “Courts will find that plain error has occurred ‘only in the extremely
rare case involving exceptional circumstances where error . . . seriously affects the basic
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process, thereby challenging the
legitimacy of the underlying judicial process itself.’ ” Caballero at ¶ 11, quoting Goldfuss at
syllabus.
{¶ 7} Davis fails to demonstrate plain error. He contends the trial court plainly
erred in finding the 30-day eviction notice requirement of the CARES Act did not apply. In
response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress passed the CARES Act, which states in part
that “[t]he lessor of a covered dwelling unit may not require the tenant to vacate the covered
dwelling unit before the date that is 30 days after the date on which the lessor provides the
tenant with a notice to vacate.” 15 U.S.C. 9058(c)(1). Woodbury Garden Homes argues the
30-day notice provision in 15 U.S.C. 9058(c)(1) ceased to be effective as of May 11, 2023,
which was the end of the COVID-19 public health emergency. For the purpose of our
analysis in this appeal, we assume the CARES Act 30-day eviction notice requirement
continues to apply to a “covered dwelling,” as the CARES Act defines that term.
{¶ 8} Davis argues the property at issue was a “covered dwelling.” A “covered
dwelling” includes residential tenancies, if the rented premises is “on or in a covered
property,” and the tenant occupies the premises. 15 U.S.C. 9058(a)(1)(A) and (B). The term
“covered property” means any property that: (1) participates in a certain federal housing
program, or (2) has a “federally backed mortgage loan” or “federally backed multifamily
mortgage loan.” Olentangy Commons Owner L.L.C. v. Fawley, 10th Dist. No. 22AP-293,
2023-Ohio-4039, ¶ 25, quoting 15 U.S.C. 9058(a)(2)(A) and (B). A “federally backed
multifamily mortgage loan” includes any loan that is secured by a lien on property
“designed principally for the occupancy of 5 or more families,” and “is purchased or
No. 23AP-693 4
securitized by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation [“Freddie Mac”] or the
Federal National Mortgage Association [“Fannie Mae”].” 15 U.S.C. 9058(a)(5). Davis
contends the property at issue met these requirements because it contains 103 units and
the mortgage loan on the property was securitized by Freddie Mac. Although there is no
dispute that the property was designed principally for the occupancy of 5 or more families,
Woodbury Garden Homes challenges the establishment of the second requirement.
{¶ 9} In support of his contention that Freddie Mac securitized the mortgage loan,
Davis cites Exhibits A, B, C, and D, which were admitted into evidence at the hearing before
the magistrate. Exhibit A is the July 2015 mortgage on the property at issue. Exhibit B is
the simultaneous assignment of that security instrument to Freddie Mac. Exhibit C is the
October 2015 assignment of the security instrument to “U.S. BANK NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE REGISTERED HOLDERS OF WELLS FARGO
COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES, INC., MULTIFAMILY MORTGAGE PASS-
THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2015-SB5.” (Emphasis sic.) And Exhibit D is an
“Offering Circular dated August 2, 2023.” This document explains that Freddie Mac “issues
and guarantees several types of multifamily ‘Pass-Through Certificates,’ ” and it advises the
reader that these “may not be suitable investments for you.” (Ex. D.) Davis, directing this
court to the name of the assignee in Exhibit C, asserts that this exhibit facially demonstrates
that Freddie Mac securitized the mortgage loan. He further asserts that Exhibit D explains
Freddie Mac’s securitization of mortgage loans and provides context for Exhibit C, namely,
that “the type of security interest transferred in Exhibit C (pass through certificate series)
is securitized by Freddie Mac.” (Reply Brief at 7.)
{¶ 10} In essence, Davis argues that Exhibit C, by itself, demonstrates Freddie Mac
securitized the mortgage loan, and that if context is required to explain Exhibit C and this
securitization, Exhibit D provides that context. We are unpersuaded. Exhibit C reflects an
October 2015 security interest transfer relating to the property at issue. The name of the
assignee, “U.S. BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE REGISTERED
HOLDERS OF WELLS FARGO COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES, INC.,
MULTIFAMILY MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2015-SB5,”
suggests, but does not demonstrate, the mortgage loan on the property at issue had been
pooled with others and securitized. (Emphasis sic.) (Ex. C.) And Exhibit D, the “Offering
No. 23AP-693 5
Circular dated August 2, 2023,” which Davis identifies as explaining the significance of
Exhibit C, expressly only “relates to Pass-Through Certificates issued on and after August 2,
2023.” This Offering Circular, by its own terms, does not “relate” to pass-through
certificates issued before that date, including any issued in 2015. Consequently, we find
Davis failed to submit sufficient evidence showing Freddie Mac securitized the mortgage
loan on the property at issue. Therefore, we conclude Davis has not demonstrated plain
error.
{¶ 11} Because Davis fails to demonstrate plain error, we overrule his sole
assignment of error.
IV. Disposition
{¶ 12} Having overruled Davis’s sole assignment of error, we affirm the judgment of
the Franklin County Municipal Court.
Judgment affirmed.
EDELSTEIN and LELAND, JJ., concur.