Ames v. Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. ( 2024 )

[Cite as Ames v. Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2024-Ohio-3411.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Brian M. Ames, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 24AP-143
(C.P.C. No. 23CV-1849)
v. :
(ACCELERATED CALENDAR)
Columbus City School District Board :
of Education,
:
Defendant-Appellee.
:
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on September 5, 2024
On brief: Barry M. Ward, for appellant. Argued: Barry M.
Ward.
On brief: Amundsen Davis, LLC, and John C. Albert, for
appellee. Argued: John C. Albert.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
JAMISON, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Brian M. Ames, appeals a judgment of the Franklin
County Court of Common Pleas that granted summary judgment to defendant-appellee,
the Columbus City School District Board of Education (“Board”). For the following reasons,
we affirm that judgment.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} On June 1, 2021, the Board adopted a “Resolution of Joinder of Prospective
Litigation” at a regular business meeting after a discussion amongst Board members. (Pl.’s
Exs. to Mot. for Summ. Jgmt., Ex. 8 at CCSD_000114.) Pursuant to this resolution, the
No. 24AP-143 2
Board authorized the Columbus City School District (“District”) to join the Ohio Coalition
for Equity and Adequacy of School Funding (“OCEASF”) and pay the annual membership
fee of $2.00 per district pupil. OCEASF intended to pursue litigation to eliminate Ohio’s
EdChoice voucher program.
{¶ 3} Over a year later—on August 10, 2022—the Board’s Finance and
Appropriations Committee held a public meeting. The agenda for that meeting, which was
available prior to the meeting, included “Voucher Project Litigation” under “FY 2023
Budget Request.” (Def. Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn.’s Memo Contra Pl.’s Mot.
for Summ. Jgmt. & Def. Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn.’s Mot. for Summ. Jgmt.,
Ex. D.) At the meeting, information was presented regarding a budget request for
$91,018.00 to pay OCEASF for the District’s 2022-2023 member dues.
{¶ 4} The Board held a regular business meeting on August 16, 2022. Prior to the
meeting, the Board posted the agenda for the meeting on the District’s website. Item 11.1
of the agenda was listed as “Authority to Renew the District’s Membership in the Ohio
Coalition for Equity and Adequacy of School Funding and Voucher Litigation Dues.” (Id.
at Ex. B.) Regarding Item 11.1, the agenda stated that “[i]t is recommended the board of
education authorize the treasurer/CFO to pay the annual membership fee of $91,018.00,
paid out of the FY 23 General Fund.” (Pl.’s Exs. to Mot. for Summ. Jgmt., Ex. 2.) The
agenda further provided that “the Board of Education approved the Resolution of Joinder
of Prospective Litigation on June 1, 2021. This is the annual membership dues to continue
the implementation of the resolution.” (Id.)
{¶ 5} Item 11.1 was included in the Board’s consent agenda. According to Board
Policy 0165.1(E):
No. 24AP-143 3
The Board shall use a consent agenda to keep routine matters
within a reasonable time frame.
The following routine business items may be included in a
single resolution for consideration by the Board.
1. minutes of prior meetings
2. bills for payment
3. hiring of personnel
4. resolutions that require annual adoption, such as bank
signatories, Ohio School Athletic membership, etc.
5. resignations and leaves
6. authorization legislation
A member of the Board may request any item may be removed
from the consent resolution by the majority vote of the Board.
(Pl.’s Exs. to Mot. for Summ. Jgmt., Ex. 8 at CCSD_000119.)
{¶ 6} During the August 16, 2022 board meeting, the Board president asked if any
member wanted to remove any item from the consent agenda for separate consideration.
No member requested the removal of any item from the consent agenda. The Board
president then asked if any member wanted to discuss any item on the consent agenda.
One Board member raised questions regarding two different items on the consent agenda,
but not Item 11.1. After discussion of the two items, the Board adopted the consent agenda
by a roll call vote. By adopting the consent agenda, the Board adopted every item on the
consent agenda.
{¶ 7} On March 17, 2023, Ames filed a complaint against the Board alleging that
the Board violated R.C. 121.22, the Open Meetings Act, by using a consent agenda to
approve the payment of the District’s annual membership dues to OCEASF. Ames sought
a declaratory judgment that the Board had violated the Open Meetings Act as alleged in the
No. 24AP-143 4
complaint, an injunction to compel the Board to comply with R.C. 121.22, reasonable
attorney fees, and a civil forfeiture of $500.
{¶ 8} Each party moved for summary judgment. The trial court concluded that the
Board’s use of a consent agenda to authorize the payment of the District’s annual
membership dues to OCEASF did not violate the Open Meetings Act. Consequently, in a
judgment dated January 31, 2024, the trial court granted the Board summary judgment
and denied Ames summary judgment.
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 9} Ames appeals the January 31, 2024 judgment and assigns the following error:
The trial court erred when it granted Appellee’s Motion for
Summary Judgment and denied Appellant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶ 10} A trial court must grant summary judgment under Civ.R. 56 when the moving
party demonstrates that: (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact; (2) the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one
conclusion when viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, and
that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party. A.J.R. v. Lute, 163 Ohio St.3d 172, 2020-
Ohio-5168, ¶ 15; McConnell v. Dudley, 158 Ohio St.3d 388, 2019-Ohio-4740, ¶ 18.
Appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment is de novo.
A.J.R. at ¶ 15. This means that an appellate court conducts an independent review, without
deference to the trial court’s determination. Schumacher v. Patel, 10th Dist. No. 23AP-254,
2023-Ohio-4623, ¶ 16; Coppo v. Fixari Family Dental Practice, L.L.C., 10th Dist. No. 21AP-
593, 2022-Ohio-1828, ¶ 9.
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
No. 24AP-143 5
{¶ 11} By his sole assignment of error, Ames argues that the Open Meetings Act
prohibited the Board from using a consent agenda at its August 16, 2022 meeting. We
disagree.
{¶ 12} The purpose of the Open Meetings Act is “to require that public business be
conducted in a manner that is accessible to the public.” State ex rel. More Bratenahl v.
Bratenahl, 157 Ohio St.3d 309, 2019-Ohio-3233, ¶ 15. The Open Meetings Act begins with
the statement: “This section shall be liberally construed to require public officials to take
official action and to conduct all deliberations upon official business only in open meetings
unless the subject matter is specifically excepted by law.” R.C. 121.22(A). It directs that
“[a]ll meetings of any public body are declared to be public meetings open to the public at
all times.” R.C. 121.22(C). It further provides, “[a] resolution, rule, or formal action of any
kind is invalid unless adopted in an open meeting of the public body.” R.C. 121.22(H).
{¶ 13} Ames begins his appellate brief by pointing this court to State ex rel. Ames v.
Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 165 Ohio St.3d 292, 2021-Ohio-2374. He relies on that case
for the proposition that consent agendas are “clearly an attempted end-run around the
[Open Meetings] Act.” (Appellant’s Brief at 10.) Ames misreads Ames, a case to which he
was a party.
{¶ 14} In Ames, the Portage County Solid Waste Management District Board of
Commissioners (“SWMD”) adopted a consent agenda procedure to approve routine items.
A board member’s “yes” vote on the consent agenda was a “yes” vote on each of the items
included on the consent agenda. At SWMD meetings, the members would not discuss
consent agenda items; a roll call vote would be taken to adopt the consent agenda. The
public would not learn what resolutions the SWMD had adopted by consent agenda until
the publication of the meeting minutes, which would contain the full text of the resolutions.
No. 24AP-143 6
{¶ 15} Ames filed a petition for a writ of mandamus against the SWMD, alleging in
relevant part that the use of consent agendas at the SWMD’s September 2019 meetings
violated the Open Meetings Act. The Eleventh District Court of Appeals denied the writ on
summary judgment, finding no violation of the Open Meetings Act occurred as a matter of
law. When appealing that ruling to the Supreme Court of Ohio, Ames argued that the use
of consent agendas effectively closed SWMD meetings because members of the public did
not know what resolutions the SWMD was adopting. Id. at ¶ 16, 19. Although the Supreme
Court found this argument persuasive, it did not hold that the Open Meetings Act
prohibited the use of consent agendas. Instead, the Supreme Court stated:
While the Open Meetings Act does not appear to prevent the
board from using consent agendas as a general matter, Ames
has raised a plausible theory—sufficient to survive a motion for
summary judgment—that the board’s use of a consent agenda
in this manner constructively closes its public meetings and is
an impermissible end run around the Open Meetings Act. We
therefore conclude that the court of appeals erred in finding, as
a matter of law, that the use of a consent agenda in the manner
described did not violate the Open Meetings Act.
Id. at ¶ 19.
{¶ 16} In other words, the problem in Ames was not the SWMD’s use of consent
agendas, but the SWMD’s failure to make public at the time of their meetings the specific
resolutions they were voting on as part of the consent agenda. By keeping secret the
resolutions being voted on, the SWMD arguably “constructively close[d] its public
meetings,” which could amount to a violation of the Open Meetings Act. Id.
{¶ 17} In this case, the Board announced to the public the items on its consent
agenda prior to the August 16, 2022 meeting by posting the entire agenda on the District’s
website. Consequently, the public knew about the resolutions the Board would be voting
on as part of the consent agenda, and members of the public could sign up to comment
No. 24AP-143 7
during the meeting about those resolutions. Thus, the Board, unlike the SWMD, did not
effectively close its public meeting by keeping secret the resolutions on the consent agenda.
Ames, therefore, is only relevant to this case to extent that it held that “the Open Meetings
Act does not appear to prevent the board from using consent agendas as a general matter.”
Id.
{¶ 18} In arguing the Open Meetings Act does prevent the use of consent agendas,
Ames first asserts that the Board’s use of a consent agenda is antithetical to the Open
Meeting Act’s definition of “meeting.” Pursuant to R.C. 121.22(B)(2), a “meeting” is “any
prearranged discussion of the public business of the public body by a majority of its
members.” Ames asserts that a consent agenda forecloses discussion, which is required for
a meeting to occur.
{¶ 19} We do not agree with Ames that the consent agenda procedure employed by
the Board foreclosed discussion of the items on the consent agenda. The consent agenda
procedure the Board adopted permitted, but did not require, Board members to discuss the
items on a consent agenda. At the August 16, 2022 meeting, the Board president gave
Board members the opportunity to discuss any consent agenda item before the roll call vote
to adopt the consent agenda. Additionally, any Board member could request to remove any
item from the consent agenda so the Board could consider—and debate—it separately.
{¶ 20} Moreover, the presence of an item on the consent agenda did not prevent the
public from discussing it with the Board. The Board published information regarding the
items on its consent agenda prior to its August 16, 2022 meeting so members of the public
could sign up to comment regarding those items at the meeting.
{¶ 21} Ames’ real concern is that the Board members chose not to discuss every item
on the consent agenda, so they did not discuss payment of OCEASF’s annual membership
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dues. But nothing in the Open Meetings Act requires a public body to discuss every issue
on which the public body votes. The Open Meetings Act, instead, mandates that the public
have meaningful access to the discussions that take place. More Bratenahl, 2019-Ohio-
3233, at ¶ 16, 19.
{¶ 22} Here, the Board conducted its public business—adoption of the resolution to
renew its membership in OCEASF and pay the annual dues—in the open. The Finance and
Appropriations Committee held an open meeting on August 10, 2022. The agenda provided
to the public prior to the meeting included an item entitled “Voucher Project Litigation”
under the heading “FY 2023 Budget Request.” (Def. Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of
Edn.’s Memo Contra Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. Jgmt. & Def. Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of
Edn.’s Mot. for Summ. Jgmt., Ex. D.) During the meeting, the committee members
discussed payment of the annual dues to OCEASF.
{¶ 23} Approximately one week after the committee meeting, the Board held a
regular business meeting that was open to the public. Before the August 16, 2022 meeting,
the Board posted an agenda to the District’s website that included as part of the consent
agenda Item 11.1, “Authority to Renew the District’s Membership in the Ohio Coalition for
Equity and Adequacy of School Funding and Voucher Litigation Dues.” (Id. at Ex. B.) The
agenda further explained that the Board was voting to authorize the expenditure of
$91,018.00 to renew the District’s membership in OCEASF. The Board voted to adopt the
consent agenda—which included Item 11.1—at the open meeting. Given these undisputed
facts, we conclude the trial court did not err in determining no violation of the Open
Meetings Act occurred.
{¶ 24} As a final matter, we note that Ames argues that the trial court erred in
implying that the Board’s adoption of Robert’s Rules of Order Newly Revised rendered a
No. 24AP-143 9
portion of R.C. 121.22(C) ineffective. The trial court did not suggest a conflict between
Robert’s Rules of Order Newly Revised and R.C. 121.22(C), much less imply that Robert’s
Rules of Order Newly Revised nullified R.C. 121.22(C). We, therefore, conclude that the
trial court did not err as alleged by Ames.
{¶ 25} In sum, we find that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to
the Board and denied summary judgment to Ames. Accordingly, we overrule Ames’ sole
assignment of error.
V. CONCLUSION
{¶ 26} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule the sole assignment of error, and we
affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
MENTEL, P.J., and BEATTY BLUNT, J., concur.
_____________