Sawyer v. Raney ( 2024 )

[Cite as Sawyer v. Raney, 2024-Ohio-690.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
CHRISTINA SUZANNE SAWYER :
fka CHRISTINA SUZANNE RANEY,
: CASE NO. CA2023-07-079
Appellee and Cross-Appellant,
: OPINION
2/26/2024
- vs - :
:
LEWIS SPENCER RANEY,
:
Appellant and Cross-Appellee.
CIVIL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION
Case No. DR20020156
Thomas G. Eagle, for appellee and cross-appellant.
Mark W. Raines, for appellant and cross-appellee.
S. POWELL, P.J.
{¶ 1} Appellant and cross-appellee, Lewis Spencer Raney ("Husband"), appeals
the decision of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division,
dismissing his motion to modify spousal support. Appellee and cross-appellant, Christina
Suzanne Sawyer fka Christina Suzanne Raney ("Wife"), also appeals challenging the
domestic relations court's decision denying her motion for attorney fees. For the reasons
outlined below, we affirm the domestic relations court's decision in both respects.
Butler CA2023-07-079
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On July 3, 2011, Husband and Wife were married in Middletown, Butler
County, Ohio. There were no children born issue of the marriage. Husband and Wife
thereafter separated on July 1, 2018. On February 21, 2020, Husband and Wife filed a
petition for dissolution of their marriage. The petition included an attached separation
agreement. The separation agreement provided that neither Husband nor Wife would
pay spousal support to the other. The separation agreement also provided that the
domestic relations court would not retain jurisdiction over the issue of spousal support.
{¶ 3} On July 22, 2020, the domestic relations court held a hearing on the matter.
During this hearing, Husband and Wife submitted an amended separation agreement to
the domestic relations court. The amended separation agreement provided the following
as it relates to spousal support:
{¶ 4} The amended separation agreement also provided that spousal support
was unconditional and would not terminate for any reason during those ten years,
including Wife's cohabitation or remarriage. The amended separation agreement further
provided that the domestic relations court would not retain jurisdiction over the issue of
spousal support. The domestic relations court later modified the parties' amended
separation agreement, with the consent of both parties, to include a general reservation
of jurisdiction over spousal support. However, although noting that it would make a
general reservation of jurisdiction over spousal support, the domestic relations court's
reservation did not affirmatively state whether that reservation was over "the amount or
-2-
Butler CA2023-07-079
terms of * * * spousal support" as required by R.C. 3105.18(E)(2).
{¶ 5} On July 23, 2020, the domestic relations court filed a decree granting the
dissolution of Husband and Wife's marriage. Within that decree, the domestic relations
court noted that it had approved and was incorporating into its decree both the parties'
original and amended separation agreements. Approximately two years later, on June 3,
2022, Husband filed a motion requesting the domestic relations court terminate Wife's
spousal support given that Wife had since remarried.1 Wife responded on November 2,
2022 by filing a motion to dismiss. Wife also filed a request that Husband pay her attorney
fees.
{¶ 6} To support her motion to dismiss, Wife argued that the domestic relations
court lacked jurisdiction to modify or terminate spousal support in accordance with R.C.
3105.18(E)(2). Pursuant to that statute, for dissolution of marriage actions that are
determined on or after January 1, 1991, such as the case here with the dissolution of
Husband's and Wife's marriage:
the court that enters the decree of divorce or dissolution of
marriage does not have jurisdiction to modify the amount or
terms of the alimony or spousal support unless the court
determines that the circumstances of either party have
changed and * * * the separation agreement that is approved
by the court and incorporated into the decree contains a
provision specifically authorizing the court to modify the
amount or terms of alimony or spousal support.
{¶ 7} On March 24, 2023, a domestic relations court magistrate issued a decision
dismissing Husband's motion to modify spousal support and denying Wife's request that
Husband pay her attorney fees. In so holding, the magistrate stated, in pertinent part, the
following:
Each of the agreements and documents standing on their own
1. The record indicates that Wife remarried on September 4, 2020, approximately two years prior to when
Husband filed his motion to modify spousal support at issue in this case.
-3-
Butler CA2023-07-079
is clear and unambiguous; however, they conflict with others.
* * * Based upon the conflict in and between the relevant
documents, the magistrate relies on the court's limited
jurisdiction in dissolution cases and resolves the issue
pursuant to the directive in R.C. 3105.18(E) requires a specific
provision.
There is nothing specific in the [parties' original and amended
separation agreements] and nothing in the records which is
more persuasive, or which persuasively suggests that one
provision/version should be followed over the other.
Therefore, the [parties' amended separation agreement] does
not meet the statutory requirement for the court to possess
continuing jurisdiction to modify the spousal support award.
{¶ 8} The magistrate thereafter concluded by stating:
It is clear from the briefs submitted and the procedural posture
of this case that the parties' intention was for [Husband] to pay
[Wife] $2100.00 for ten (10) years and for the court not to
retain jurisdiction on the issue of spousal support.
As such [Wife's] Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. [Husband's]
Motion to Modify Spousal Support is DENIED.
(Emphasis sic.)
{¶ 9} On April 4, 2023, Husband filed an objection to the magistrate's decision.
To support his objection, Husband argued the magistrate's decision to dismiss his motion
to modify spousal support was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Husband
also argued that, as a court of equity, the facts of this case required the domestic relations
court to "step in and right this wrong." The following day, on April 5, 2023, Wife filed her
own objection to the magistrate's decision to deny her request that Husband pay her
attorney fees. To support her objection, Wife argued that her "claim for attorney fees
should have been preserved, and granted," given that she had been "subjected to
litigation over a motion [Husband] filed that the court has no jurisdiction to even consider."
{¶ 10} On June 15, 2023, the domestic relations court issued a decision affirming
the magistrate's decision in its entirety. In so holding, the domestic relations court noted
-4-
Butler CA2023-07-079
that, after a full and complete review of the record, it was "not persuaded by arguments
in opposition" to the magistrate's decision raised by either Husband or Wife. The
domestic relations court instead found the magistrate's decision was "complete and
based on sound reasoning." Husband filed a notice of appeal from the domestic relations
court's decision on July 11, 2023. Wife filed a notice of cross-appeal on July 20, 2023.
Oral argument was thereafter held before this court on January 16, 2024. Husband's
appeal and Wife's cross-appeal now properly before this court for decision, Husband and
Wife have collectively raised three assignments of error for review.
Husband's Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 11} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO MODIFY SPOUSAL SUPPORT BECAUSE DESPITE THE CLERICAL
ERROR IN THE SEPARATION AGREEMENT, THE COURT RETAINED JURISDICTION
OVER THE TERM AND DURATION OF SPOUSAL SUPPORT.
{¶ 12} In his first assignment of error, Husband argues the domestic relations court
erred by dismissing his motion to modify spousal support. To support this claim, Husband
argues that it was improper for the domestic relations court to find it lacked jurisdiction to
modify spousal support in accordance with R.C. 3105.18(E)(2) upon the court finding it
had not affirmatively reserved jurisdiction over "the amount or terms of * * * spousal
support" within its decree of dissolution. To this, Wife responds by noting that Husband
never raised this as an objection to the magistrate's decision issued on March 24, 2023.
The record supports Wife's claim. Therefore, by not raising this issue as part of his
objections to the magistrate's decision, Husband has waived all but plain error on appeal.
"Should a party fail to properly object [to a magistrate's decision], that party has waived
the right of appeal except for plain error." Paeltz v. Paeltz, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2022-
05-031, 2022-Ohio-3964, ¶ 14; see, e.g., Koehler v. Koehler, 12th Dist. Brown Nos.
-5-
Butler CA2023-07-079
CA2017-12-016 and CA2017-12-017, 2018-Ohio-4933, ¶ 62 (appellant waived all but
plain error on appeal where he did not object to a magistrate's decision).
{¶ 13} However, even if Husband had properly raised the issue in his objection to
the magistrate's decision, we would still find no error, plain or otherwise, in the domestic
relation court's decision to dismiss Husband's motion to modify spousal support. This is
because, just as the domestic relations court found, Husband and Wife's amended
separation agreement does not meet the statutory requirements set forth in R.C.
3105.18(E)(2) for the domestic relations court to possess continuing jurisdiction to modify
spousal support in this case. This is also because, given the record properly before this
court, Husband and Wife simply never intended the domestic relations court to possess
continuing jurisdiction to modify their agreed upon spousal support award. This includes
either "the amount or terms of * * * spousal support" as required by R.C. 3105.18(E)(2).
Husband and Wife instead clearly intended for Husband to pay Wife monthly spousal
support in the amount of $2,100 for a period of ten years, irrespective of any change in
circumstances that may occur, including Wife's remarriage. Consequently, seeing as
Husband's and Wife's intentions were clear, the domestic relations court did not err by
dismissing Husband's motion to modify spousal support. Therefore, finding no error in
the domestic relations court's decision, Husband's first assignment of error lacks merit
and is overruled.
Husband's Assignment of Error No. 2:
{¶ 14} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THE DISSOLUTION WAS
ENFORCEABLE BECAUSE EVEN WITH THE CONSENT OF THE PARTIES THE TRIAL
COURT DID NOT HAVE AUTHORITY TO ADD TERMS TO THE AMENDED
SEPARATION AGREEMENT.
{¶ 15} In his second assignment of error, Husband argues the domestic relations
-6-
Butler CA2023-07-079
court erred by finding that, pursuant to R.C. 3106.65(B), the domestic relations court
could, "with consent of the parties," propose and subsequently amend a term in his and
Wife's original separation agreement. Husband argues that, rather than the domestic
relations court, only he and Wife could propose an amendment to that agreement. The
domestic relations court found this issue moot given that such a challenge should have
been raised in an appeal from the decree of dissolution filed on July 23, 2020. Within his
appellate brief, Husband notes his agreement "with the trial court's assertion that the issue
is moot as the time for appeal would have been in the thirty days after the filing of the
Decree of Dissolution." Nevertheless, although agreeing with the domestic relations
court's decision, Husband has decided to raise the issue now, in this appeal, "to clarify
the remedy" should this court find "the issue is not moot and was appropriately raised."
This court, however, agrees with the domestic relations court's decision finding Husband's
challenge should have been raised in an appeal from the court's decree of dissolution
filed on July 23, 2020, thereby rendering the issue moot and we need not consider
Husband's second assignment of error.
Wife's Cross-Assignment of Error No. 1:
{¶ 16} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING WIFE'S MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY FEES.
{¶ 17} In her single cross-assignment of error, Wife argues the domestic relations
court erred by denying her motion for attorney fees, or, at the very least, by not first
holding a hearing on the matter. We disagree with both of Wife's claims.
{¶ 18} Pursuant to R.C. 3105.73(B), in any post-decree motion or proceeding that
arises out of an action for divorce, dissolution, legal separation, or annulment of a
marriage, a domestic relations court is authorized to "award all or part of reasonable
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses to either party if the court finds the award
-7-
Butler CA2023-07-079
equitable." Thus, "[b]ased upon the plain language of R.C. 3105.73(B), the main
consideration in awarding attorney fees under this section is whether the court finds such
an award 'equitable.'" Lykins v. Lykins, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2022-07-034, 2023-
Ohio-4469, ¶ 68. "In determining whether such an award is equitable, the domestic
relations court 'may consider the parties’ income, the conduct of the parties, and any other
relevant factors the court deems appropriate, but it may not consider the parties’ assets.'"
Jestice v. Jestice, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2023-07-072, 2024-Ohio-122, ¶ 30, quoting
R.C. 3105.73(B). However, although statutorily authorized to do so, the domestic
relations court is not obligated to make such an award in every case. Davis v. Davis, 6th
Dist. Wood No. WD-15-028, 2016-Ohio-1388, ¶ 31.
{¶ 19} The decision instead rests within the domestic relations court's sound
discretion. Theurer v. Foster-Theurer, 12th Dist. Warren Nos. CA2008-06-074 and
CA2008-06-083, 2009-Ohio-1457, ¶ 57. This necessarily means that the domestic
relations court's "decision to award attorney fees will be reversed only if it amounts to an
abuse of discretion." Coomes v. Coomes, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2019-10-076, 2020-
Ohio-3839, ¶ 12. "An abuse of discretion is more than an error of law; it implies that the
trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably." Combs v. Ellington, 12th
Dist. Butler CA2022-01-001, 2022-Ohio-3514, ¶ 18, citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5
Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). "The vast majority of cases in which an abuse of discretion
is asserted involve claims that the decision is unreasonable." Bonifield v. Bonifield, 12th
Dist. Butler No. CA2020-02-022, 2021-Ohio-95, ¶ 11. "A decision is 'unreasonable' when
there is no sound reasoning process to support it." Vaughn v. Vaughn, 12th Dist. Warren
No. CA2007-02-021, 2007-Ohio-6569, ¶ 12.
{¶ 20} Wife argues the domestic relations court abused its discretion by denying
her motion for attorney fees because she "had her spousal support withheld from her that
-8-
Butler CA2023-07-079
Husband agreed to pay, and subjected [her] to litigation over a motion he filed that the
court had no jurisdiction to even consider." Wife also argues the domestic relations court
erred by denying her motion for attorney fees because she "had to go to extraordinary
lengths to protect and preserve her support order and property division and reinstate the
spousal support." However, while we can certainly understand why Wife would disagree
with the domestic relations court's decision, the domestic relations court determined that
ordering Husband to pay Wife's attorney fees would be inequitable given the confusion
between the parties' original and amended separation agreements as to whether the court
would retain jurisdiction over spousal support. The domestic relations court's decision, to
the extent that it found ordering Husband to pay attorney fees to Wife would be
inequitable, does not amount to an abuse of discretion. That is to say, given the facts
and circumstances of this case, the domestic relations court's decision to deny Wife's
motion for attorney fees was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.
{¶ 21} The same holds true for the domestic relations court's decision not to first
hold a hearing on the matter. This is because, similar to the domestic relations court's
decision to deny Wife's motion for attorney fees, the trial court's decision not to first hold
a hearing on the matter was also not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable under
the facts of this case. This is particularly true here when considering the record was
already established as it relates to the question of whether ordering Husband to pay Wife
attorney fees would, or would not, be equitable in this case. This remains true even if this
court would have granted Wife's motion for attorney fees for it is well established that,
absent an abuse of discretion, this court must not substitute its judgment for that of the
domestic relations court under these circumstances. See Lawson v. Taylor, 105 Ohio
App.3d 191, 194 (12th Dist.1995) ("[i]n reviewing a trial court's award of attorney fees, an
appellate court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court unless the trial
-9-
Butler CA2023-07-079
court's decision amounts to an abuse of discretion"). Therefore, given the record in this
case, Wife's arguments challenging the domestic relations court's decision to deny her
motion for attorney fees without first holding a hearing lacks merit. Accordingly, finding
no merit to either of the arguments raised by Wife herein, Wife's single cross-assignment
of error lacks merit and is overruled.
Conclusion
{¶ 22} For the reasons outlined above, and finding no merit to any of the
arguments raised herein by either Husband or Wife in support of their respective
assignment(s) of error, both Husband's appeal from the domestic relations court's
decision dismissing his motion to modify spousal support, and Wife's appeal challenging
the domestic relations court's decision denying her motion for attorney fees, are denied.
{¶ 23} Judgment affirmed.
M. POWELL and BYRNE, JJ., concur.
- 10 -