Baker v. Bunker Hill Haven Home , 2024 Ohio 875 ( 2024 )

[Cite as Baker v. Bunker Hill Haven Home, 2024-Ohio-875.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
KELLY BAKER, ADMINISTRATOR FOR :
THE ESTATE OF BRYCE L. HIZER,
: CASE NO. CA2023-08-095
Appellant,
: OPINION
3/11/2024
- vs - :
:
BUNKER HILL HAVEN HOME dba
BUNKER HILL HAVEN FOR BOYS, et :
al.,
Appellees.
CIVIL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. CV 2021 12 1923
O'Connor, Acciani & Levy, and Robert B. Acciani, for appellant.
Collins Roche Utley & Garner, and Richard M. Garner; and Reminger Co., LPA, and
Vincent P. Antaki, for appellees.
S. POWELL, P.J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Kelly Baker, the administrator of the estate of her late son, Bryce
L. Hizer, appeals the decision of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas granting
summary judgment to appellees, Bunker Hill Haven for Boys and Bunker Hill Haven Trust
Butler CA2023-08-095
d/b/a Bunker Hill Haven for Boys (collectively, "Bunker Hill"), in this wrongful death action.
For the reasons outlined below, we affirm the trial court's summary judgment decision.
Introduction
{¶ 2} Bunker Hill is a private, non-lockdown, non-profit facility located in Hamilton,
Butler County, Ohio, that is licensed by the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services
to serve as a group home for wayward boys. At all times relevant, Todd Howard was one
of those boys residing on the Bunker Hill property.1 On the evening of December 30,
2019, Howard, who was then just 16 years old, snuck off the Bunker Hill property without
permission through a well-known, yet unmonitored trail leading to a nearby park. Howard
did this to meet up with several friends, including Hizer, so that they could drive to
Cincinnati to purchase and thereafter smoke marijuana. Another one of the friends
Howard was to meet up with that evening, Zeb Freeman, had been given permission by
his father, Derrick, to drive his father's car. However, it was just his son, Zeb, whom
Derrick had given permission to drive the car. There is no dispute that it was the
unlicensed Howard who was driving when the car ran off the road and struck a tree,
launching the unbuckled, 15-year-old Hizer out of the car and, ultimately, to his death.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 3} On December 28, 2021, Baker, as the administrator of the estate of her late
son, Hizer, filed a complaint naming Howard, Freeman, Freeman's father, Derrick, and
Bunker Hill as defendants. The complaint alleged a total of four causes of action against
the defendants. It was only the fourth cause of action, however, that was brought against
Bunker Hill. Within that cause of action, Baker alleged that it was Bunker Hill's negligence
in failing to properly supervise Howard and prevent Howard from sneaking off the Bunker
1. Except for Hizer, who is deceased, we have changed the names of all minors who appear in this opinion.
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Hill property without permission on the evening of December 30, 2019, that was the actual
and proximate cause of her son's death. To prevail on this claim, Baker was required to
prove: "(1) the existence of a duty owing to plaintiff's decedent, i.e., the duty to exercise
ordinary care, (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) proximate causation between the breach
of duty and the death." Bennison v. Stillpass Transit Co., 5 Ohio St.2d 122 (1966),
paragraph one of the syllabus. "The existence of a duty is fundamental to establishing
actionable negligence, without which there is no legal liability." Uhl v. Thomas, 12th Dist.
Butler No. CA2008-06-131, 2009-Ohio-196, ¶ 10.
{¶ 4} On May 22, 2023, Bunker Hill filed a motion for summary judgment on
Baker's negligent supervision claim. Baker filed a memorandum in opposition to Bunker
Hill's motion on June 30, 2023. Bunker Hill then filed a reply in support of its motion for
summary judgment on July 7, 2023. Shortly thereafter, on July 27, 2023, the trial court
issued a decision granting Bunker Hill's motion for summary judgment in its entirety. In
so holding, the trial court initially noted that Baker had posited two theories under which
she claimed Bunker Hill was responsible for her son's death: (1) "failure to have
procedures, guidelines and adequate measures to restrain residents from leaving its
property;" and (2) "the responsibility of a parent via the doctrine of in loco parentis."
(Emphasis sic.)
{¶ 5} Addressing Baker's argument under the doctrine of in loco parentis first, the
trial court stated:
In the present matter, while Plaintiff argues the defendants'
knowledge [that Howard] frequently left its grounds is
sufficient to establish a duty of care, this is not the act that is
at issue in the complaint. Plaintiff's claim is wrongful death via
a traffic accident. The mere fact that [Howard] inquired as to
obtaining a driver's license is insufficient to establish a
likelihood a parent would believe he might unlawfully operate
a motor vehicle. Even if this were enough, Plaintiff's in loco
parentis argument still fails as she does not demonstrate
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through any evidence the child's "propensity to engage" in
[the] operation of a motor vehicle.
(Emphasis sic.)
{¶ 6} Turning then to Baker's argument that she did not need to establish Bunker
Hill's duty of care through expert testimony, but could instead simply rely on lay witness
testimony, the trial court stated:
Here, Plaintiff desires to impose liability for failing to maintain
adequate control over a resident in a non-lockdown
environment without having to establish what those standards
might be. Bunker Hill maintains policies that essentially mirror
those of parents, i.e., no leaving without notification, and as
many American parents can attest from experience,
teenagers routinely violate these directives. To go beyond
this and artificially impose a higher standard of care, Plaintiff
must be able to provide some cognizable industry standard as
a home, contrary to teenage angst, is not a prison.
{¶ 7} Continuing with its analysis, the trial court then noted that, even if Baker
could prove such a duty without the need for expert witness testimony, Baker's claim still
failed to establish the "requisite causal connection." Explaining why that was, the trial
court stated:
Plaintiff argues that [Howard's] propensity to "escape" the
confines of Bunker [Hill] through the use of a "well known" trail
that avoided Bunker Hill cameras is sufficient to establish a
causal connection to the accident.
Bunker Hill may have, or not, known residents slipped away.
This at best provides evidence that delinquent teenage boys
disobey. Plaintiff fails, beyond mere conclusory statements,
to demonstrate the foreseeability [of] such behavior would
lead to negligent operation of a motor vehicle.
The trial court thereafter concluded by noting that, even where all the above facts were
true, Baker's negligent supervision claim against Bunker Hill nevertheless failed "at the
moment Hizer voluntarily opted to forgo the potentially life-saving step of buckling his
restraint system."
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Baker's Appeal and Single Assignment of Error
{¶ 8} On August 25, 2023, Baker filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's
decision granting Bunker Hill's motion for summary judgment. Following briefing, oral
argument was held before this court on February 5, 2024. Baker's appeal now properly
before this court for decision, Baker has raised one assignment of error for review. In
that single assignment of error, Baker argues the trial court erred by granting summary
judgment to Bunker Hill as it relates to her negligent supervision claim levied against it.
We disagree.
Summary Judgment Standard of Review
{¶ 9} "Summary judgment is a procedural device used to terminate litigation when
there are no issues in a case requiring a formal trial." Franchas Holdings, LLC v.
Dameron, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2015-09-073, 2016-Ohio-878, ¶ 16. "This court
reviews a trial court's summary judgment decision under a de novo standard." Faith
Lawley, LLC v. McKay, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2020-08-052, 2021-Ohio-2156, ¶ 26.
De novo review means that this court uses the same standard the trial court should have
used. Brock v. Servpro, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2021-06-075, 2022-Ohio-158, ¶ 29.
"That is to say, '[i]n de novo review, we independently review trial court decisions and
give them no deference.'" Guzzetta v. Guzzetta, 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2023-06-064
and CA2023-07-084, 2024-Ohio-294, ¶ 17, quoting Frost v. Evenflo Co., Inc., 2d Dist.
Miami No. 2022-CA-29, 2023-Ohio-4561, ¶ 29.
Summary Judgment Pursuant to Civ.R. 56
{¶ 10} "Civ.R. 56 sets forth the summary judgment standard." State ex rel. Becker
v. Faris, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2020-10-058, 2021-Ohio-1127, ¶ 14. "Pursuant to
that rule, a court may grant summary judgment only when (1) there is no genuine issue
of any material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and
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(3) the evidence submitted can only lead reasonable minds to a conclusion that is adverse
to the nonmoving party." Spitzer v. Frish's Restaurants, Inc., 12th Dist. Butler No.
CA2020-12-128, 2021-Ohio-1913, ¶ 6. "An issue is genuine only if the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party." Abbuhl v. Orange Village, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82203, 2003-Ohio-4662, ¶ 14. "A material fact is one which would
affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law." Hillstreet Fund III,
L.P. v. Bloom, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2009-07-178, 2010-Ohio-2961, ¶ 9, citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986).
{¶ 11} "The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis
for the motion and demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."
Berkheimer v. REKM, LLC, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2022-03-026, 2023-Ohio-116, ¶ 18,
citing Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292 (1996). "Once this burden is met, the
nonmoving party has a reciprocal burden to set forth specific facts showing there is some
genuine issue of material fact yet remaining for the trier of fact to resolve." Sullivan v.
Mercy Health, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2022-02-023, 2022-Ohio-4445, ¶ 21. To do this,
the nonmoving party may not simply rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the
pleadings, but must instead "supply evidentiary materials setting forth specific facts
showing there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial." Anderson v. Jancoa, 12th Dist.
Butler No. CA2019-01-018, 2019-Ohio-3617, ¶ 23. "Summary judgment is proper if the
nonmoving party fails to set forth such facts." Taylor v. Atrium, 12th Dist. Warren No.
CA2018-07-074, 2019-Ohio-447, ¶ 10.
Baker's Arguments and Analysis
{¶ 12} To support her single assignment of error, Baker raises three arguments for
this court's consideration. We will address each of those arguments in turn.
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Baker's First Argument
{¶ 13} Initially, Baker argues the trial court erred by finding she could not, as a
matter of law, establish a negligent supervision claim against Bunker Hill based upon the
doctrine of in loco parentis. According to the Ohio Supreme Court, "'the term 'in loco
parentis' means 'charged, factitiously, with a parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities.'"
State v. Noggle, 67 Ohio St.3d 31, 33 (1993), quoting Black's Law Dictionary (6th
Ed.1990). "A person in loco parentis has assumed the same duties as a guardian or
custodian, only not through a legal proceeding." Glancy v. Spradley, 12th Dist. Butler No.
CA2012-02-024, 2012-Ohio-4224, ¶ 7. "'The key factors of an in loco parentis relationship
have been delineated as the intentional assumption of obligations incidental to the
parental relationship, especially support and maintenance.'" (Emphasis deleted.)
McLoughlin v. Williams, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2015-02-020, 2015-Ohio-3287, ¶ 9,
quoting Evans v. Ohio State Univ., 112 Ohio App.3d 724, 736 (10th Dist.1996).
{¶ 14} Given these principles, Baker argues that Bunker Hill clearly stood in the
place of a parent⎯in loco parentis⎯to that of its residents by providing them with "a
nurturing environment, a place to live, food, shelter and services such as psychiatric,
medical and schooling and took on the overall obligations of care and supervision of each
boy under its care." This would include Bunker Hill's then 16-year-old resident Howard.
Therefore, according to Baker, given the special relationship that existed between Bunker
Hill and Howard, it was error for the trial court to find she could not, as a matter of law,
establish a negligent supervision claim against Bunker Hill based upon the doctrine of in
loco parentis.
{¶ 15} However, even assuming Bunker Hill could be considered in loco parentis
to Howard, it is well established that, in Ohio, "parental knowledge of a child's 'vicious
propensities' is an essential element in establishing [a claim of parental] negligent
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supervision." Ross v. Wendel, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2016-10-070, 2017-Ohio-7804,
¶ 26, quoting Huston v. Konieczny, 52 Ohio St.3d 214, 217 (1990). Therefore, to prove
negligent supervision on behalf of a parent over his or her child, the plaintiff "must show
that defendant parents had prior knowledge that the offending child had a particular
'vicious propensity' and they failed to exercise proper control over him." Hau v. Gill, 9th
Dist. Lorain No. 98CA007061, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 3258, *9 (July 14, 1999); see, e.g.,
Geico Choice Ins. Co. v. Willis, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2022-03-010, 2022-Ohio-4227(affirming trial court's decision granting summary judgment to insurance company on its
parental negligent supervision claim against a mother where the mother did not offer any
evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether she knew
her 17-year-old son had stolen the insured's vehicle and that she knew it was not the first
time that her son had stolen a vehicle).
{¶ 16} The plaintiff must also "show that the alleged parental negligence was the
proximate and foreseeable cause of the injury suffered." Cogswell v. Clark Retail Ent.,
11th Dist. Geauga No. 2003-G-2519, 2004-Ohio-5640, ¶ 19. "'To establish foreseeability
of the act or injury pursuant to negligent supervision, plaintiff must prove that specific
instances of prior conduct were sufficient to put a reasonable person on notice that the
act complained of was likely to occur.'" (Brackets deleted.) Shaver v. Peters, 6th Dist.
Erie No. E-22-028, 2023-Ohio-1097, ¶ 26, quoting Nearor v. Davis, 118 Ohio App.3d 806,
813 (1st Dist.1997). This is because, even where the doctrine of in loco parentis applies,
"'parents cannot be held liable for negligent supervision of their children when the parents
do not know of the children's propensity to engage in the sort of conduct that caused the
plaintiff's injury.'" Ross, quoting Shupe v. Childers, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 2003CA00068,
2004-Ohio-1767, ¶ 16, citing Doe v. Kahrs, 75 Ohio Misc.2d 7, 10 (C.P.1995).
{¶ 17} In this case, Baker failed to provide any evidence to indicate Bunker Hill
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knew its resident, Howard, had a propensity to engage in the unlawful and negligent
operation of a motor vehicle after sneaking off its property without its permission. Rather,
when viewing the evidence in the light most favorably to Baker, as the non-moving party,
the record establishes that Bunker Hill knew, at worst, that Howard would occasionally
sneak off its property to smoke marijuana. However, that Howard would occasionally
sneak off the Bunker Hill property without its permission to smoke marijuana is not the
sort of conduct that caused Hizer's death. It was instead Howard's unlawful and negligent
operation of a motor vehicle that caused the unbuckled, 15-year-old Hizer's tragic passing
after Howard drove off the road and into a tree, launching Hizer out of the car and,
ultimately, to his death.
{¶ 18} Contrary to what Baker argued to this court during oral argument, the then
16-year-old Howard's propensity to occasionally sneak off Bunker Hill's property to smoke
marijuana is not the same, and is in fact qualitatively different from, the propensity of a
16-year-old boy like Howard to engage in the negligent operation of a motor vehicle. See,
e.g., Ross, 2017-Ohio-7804 at ¶ 29 (finding a 16-year-old boy's "propensity to poach deer
and his purchase of a hunting rifle for allegedly defensive purposes, is qualitatively
different from a propensity to commit arson" in a case alleging negligent supervision by
the 16-year-old boy's parents). Therefore, because Baker failed to provide any evidence
to indicate Bunker Hill knew its unlicensed resident, Howard, had a propensity to engage
in the unlawful and negligent operation of a motor vehicle after sneaking off its property,
the trial court did not err by finding Baker could not, as a matter of law, establish a claim
of negligent supervision against Bunker Hill based upon the doctrine of in loco parentis.
Accordingly, finding no error in the trial court's decision, Baker's first argument fails.2
2. In reaching this decision, we take the time to note the trial court's finding "the mere fact that [Howard]
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Baker's Second Argument
{¶ 19} Next, Baker argues the trial court erred by finding Bunker Hill's actions in
"negligently failing to supervise" the then 16-year-old Howard was not the "actual and
proximate" cause of her son Hizer's death. We disagree.
{¶ 20} As noted above, it was not Bunker Hill's alleged negligent supervision of
Howard that caused Hizer's death. It was instead Howard's unlawful and negligent
operation of a motor vehicle that caused Hizer's tragic passing. Baker's argument that,
"but for" Bunker Hill failing to "exercise parental control over" its residents, Howard "would
have stayed under the supervision of the staff" at Bunker Hill, "would not have been
behind the wheel of a vehicle," and thus, "would not have caused injury to [Hizer]," is not
well taken. With that logic, the person who planted the tree that Howard struck would
also be liable.
{¶ 21} No, even if we were to accept Baker's argument, there was a clear break in
the chain causation, and at least one, if not more, sufficient superseding causes that
absolve Bunker Hill from liability for Hizer's untimely and unfortunate passing. See, e.g.,
Magill v. Moore, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2005-08-211, 2006-Ohio-3466, ¶ 14-21 (rejecting
appellant's contention "that it is a question for the jury to decide whether it was
foreseeable that a thief might steal appellee's car, and that a police pursuit with possible
injuries to [appellant] would follow," as the theft of the car was a sufficient superseding
cause to, as a matter of law, absolve the appellee from liability for appellant's injuries).
This would include, just as the trial court found, the fact that Hizer chose, for whatever
reason, not to buckle himself into his seat with his seatbelt prior to the accident.
inquired as to obtaining a driver's license [to be] insufficient to establish a likelihood a parent would believe
he might unlawfully operate a motor vehicle." We agree with the trial court's finding. To hold otherwise
would subject virtually every parent to potential liability should their otherwise well-behaved, albeit
unlicensed, 16-year-old child cause a tragic automobile accident after making the decision to take the family
car out for a drive without permission.
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Therefore, finding no error in the trial court's decision finding Bunker Hill's actions in
"negligently failing to supervise" Howard was not the "actual and proximate" cause of her
son Hizer's death, Baker's second argument also fails.
Baker's Third Argument
{¶ 22} Lastly, Baker argues the trial court erred by finding she needed to "produce
an expert witness" if she hoped to overcome Bunker Hill's motion for summary judgment
in this case. That is, Baker argues the trial court erred by finding expert witness testimony
was necessary to establish her claim of negligent supervision against Bunker Hill based
upon the doctrine of in loco parentis. To support this claim, Baker argues that, rather than
procuring an expert witness, "[s]urely, an ordinary lay person can appreciate, understand,
and evaluate the reasonable level of supervision that a parent should exercise over their
children."
{¶ 23} However, while this may very well be true, the portion of the trial court's
decision that Baker takes issue with did not require her to "qualify a 'parent' as an expert
witness," as Baker suggests. That portion of the trial court's decision was instead nothing
more than the trial court noting that expert witness testimony would be necessary to
establish what the "reasonable standards of care and control" were in the industry in
which Bunker Hill operates, i.e., what the "reasonable standards of care and control" were
for private, non-lockdown, non-profit facilities like Bunker Hill catering to wayward boys.
What those standards are, or should be, is clearly not something that would be within the
knowledge or experience possessed by lay persons. That is instead an issue that would
require testimony from an expert witness in accordance with Evid.R. 702.
{¶ 24} Pursuant to Evid.R. 702, expert witness testimony is necessary where the
testimony being offered by the witness "either relates to matters beyond the knowledge
or experience possessed by lay persons or dispels a misconception common among lay
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persons." This would include, for instance, the standard of care for dentists, see, e.g.,
Johnson v. Erbeck, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2023-05-038, 2023-Ohio-3402, ¶ 29 ("the
standard of care and skill expected of a dentist must be determined from the testimony of
dental experts"), as well as for residential group homes catering to individuals with autism.
See e.g., V. v. New Horizons in Autism, 2023 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1450, *22-27
(Aug. 21, 2023) (trial court did not err by finding plaintiffs were required to procure expert
testimony to establish the standard of care in a residential group home for autistic
individuals). We see no reason why that would be any different for private, non-lockdown,
non-profit facilities like Bunker Hill catering to a group of wayward boys. Therefore, finding
no error in the trial court's decision, Baker's third argument likewise fails.
Conclusion
{¶ 25} For the reasons outlined above, and finding no merit to any of the three
arguments raised by Baker herein, Baker's single assignment of error lacks merit and is
overruled. Accordingly, having now overruled Baker's single assignment of error, Baker's
appeal from the trial court's decision granting summary judgment to Bunker Hill is denied.
{¶ 26} Judgment affirmed.
M. POWELL and BYRNE, JJ., concur.
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