State v. Grandstaff ( 2022 )

[Cite as State v. Grandstaff, 2022-Ohio-47.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
CLERMONT COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2021-06-033
:
- vs - OPINION
: 1/10/2022
MICHELLE L. GRANDSTAFF, :
Appellant. :
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM CLERMONT COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT
Case No. 2020 CRB 1556 E
Mark Tekulve, Clermont County Prosecuting Attorney, and Katherine Terpstra, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee
Denise S. Barone, for Appellant
PIPER, P.J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Michelle L. Grandstaff, appeals her sentence in the Clermont
County Municipal Court.1
{¶ 2} On April 28, 2020, the Chief Dog Warden was alerted that there were several
1. Pursuant to Loc.R. 6(A), we sua sponte remove this case from the accelerated calendar for the purposes
of issuing this written decision.
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dogs at appellant's residence that appeared to lack adequate food, water, and shelter. The
warden obtained a search warrant for the residence and discovered eighteen canines living
in and around the residence in "deplorable conditions." The eighteen canines were
suffering from medical issues as a result of their living conditions and were seized by the
warden.
{¶ 3} On May 14, 2020, Grandstaff was charged in the Clermont County Municipal
Court with eighteen counts of Cruelty to a Companion Animal in violation of R.C.
959.131(D)(2), each count related to one of the dogs seized. On August 27, 2020,
Grandstaff entered no contest pleas to three of the eighteen counts and was found guilty of
the three counts, the remainder of the charges being dismissed. The case was continued
for the purpose of determining restitution prior to sentencing.
{¶ 4} On September 23, 2020, Grandstaff failed to appear at her sentencing hearing
and a bench warrant was issued for her arrest. Grandstaff was not apprehended on the
bench warrant until May 17, 2021. Upon appearing in court, it was ordered she be held in
the Clermont County Jail without bond until sentencing. Grandstaff was sentenced to 60
days of incarceration on each of the three charges, with each sentence to run consecutive,
for a total sentence of 180 days. Grandstaff now appeals, raising the following assignment
of error.
{¶ 5} Assignment of Error:
{¶ 6} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF MICHELLE
GRANDSTAFF BY ISSUING A SENTENCE OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY DAYS.
{¶ 7} Within her sole assignment of error, Grandstaff presents three separate
arguments: 1) that the absence of a presentence investigation ("PSI") rendered her
sentences erroneous; 2) that her attorney was ineffective; and 3) the trial court abused its
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discretion by sentencing her to serve jail time rather than probation.2 We will address these
arguments out of order for the sake of clarity.
Presentence Investigation
{¶ 8} Grandstaff first argues that it was improper for the trial court to sentence her
without ordering a presentence investigation.
{¶ 9} Crim.R. 32.2 states that "the court shall, in felony cases, order a presentence
investigation and report," while "[i]n misdemeanor cases the court may order a presentence
investigation before granting probation." Crim.R. 32.2 "does not mandate a presentence
investigation and report except in a felony case in which an offender is sentenced to
community control sanctions." State v. Pottorf, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2014-03-046,
2014-Ohio-5399, ¶ 24. In all other cases, the decision whether or not to order a PSI is left
to the trial court's sound discretion. State v. Toles, 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2019-07-018,
2020-Ohio-4267, ¶ 42.
{¶ 10} In this case, Grandstaff was convicted of three offenses and sentenced to
serve a combined total of 180 days in the Clermont County Jail. All three convictions were
second degree misdemeanors, and no probation was ordered as part of the sentence. We
note Grandstaff never requested a PSI at her plea, or when her sentencing was
rescheduled. Not only is this not a felony case, there was no imposition of community
control or probation. State v. Powers, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2021-06-026, 2021-Ohio-
4357, ¶ 25, fn. 1. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not ordering a
presentence investigation report on Grandstaff.
2. We note with disapproval appellant's approach of raising multiple issues that require different legal analyses
under a single assignment of error, instead of properly raising each specific issue in separate assignments of
error. State v. Reeves, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2020-01-001, 2020-Ohio-5565, ¶ 9, fn. 1.
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Probation
{¶ 11} Grandstaff next asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by denying
her request for probation and instead imposing jail time. However, she articulates no
argument and offers no authority to justify this assertion. Grandstaff merely declares that
"the trial court failed to take into consideration the mitigating factors shared with the court"
before sentencing. Grandstaff fails to specify the nature or significance of any identified
mitigating factor.
{¶ 12} We review a trial court's sentence on a misdemeanor violation under an abuse
of discretion standard. State v. Fluhart, 12th Dist. Clermont No. 2020-12-068, 2021-Ohio-
3560, ¶ 40. An abuse of discretion implies that the trial court's attitude is unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unconscionable. State v. Kinsworthy, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2013-06-060,
2014-Ohio-2238, ¶ 31.
{¶ 13} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.21 and 2929.22, trial courts have broad discretion
when determining what sentence is appropriate for each given misdemeanor case. State
v. Fisher, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2019-10-080, 2020-Ohio-3764, ¶ 11. When
determining the appropriate sentence, the trial court must be guided by the purposes of
misdemeanor sentencing which are "to protect the public from future crime by the offender
and others and to punish the offender." R.C. 2929.21(A). The trial court must also consider
the factors listed in R.C. 2929.22(B)(1), including the nature and circumstances of the
offense, and may consider any other factors that are relevant to achieving the purposes and
principles of misdemeanor sentencing. R.C. 2929.22(B)(2).
{¶ 14} '''Although it is preferable that the trial court affirmatively state on the record
that it has considered the criteria set forth in R.C. 2929.22, the statute does not mandate
that the record state that the trial court considered the applicable statutory factors.''' State
v. Jezioro, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2016-10-088, 2017-Ohio-2587, ¶ 7, quoting State v.
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Wisby, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2012-06-049, 2013-Ohio-1307, ¶ 30. "A trial court is
presumed to have considered the statutory factors when the sentence is within the statutory
limits and there is no affirmative showing that the trial court failed to do so." State v. Reeves,
12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2021-06-026, 2020-Ohio-5565, at ¶ 42.
{¶ 15} Here, the trial court's sentence of 60 days for each offense was well within the
statutory limits for second degree misdemeanor sentencing. R.C. 2929.24(A)(2). Further,
there is no indication in either the record or Grandstaff's brief that the trial court failed to
consider the misdemeanor sentencing considerations described in R.C. 2929.21 and
2929.22. In fact, the trial court expressly stated that it had "considered the purposes and
principles of sentencing." It further noted Grandstaff's noncompliance and lack of respect
for the court's authority, indicating that, "one of the things that I consider when trying to
decide to place somebody on probation is whether or not they're going to show up. Because
if you don't show up, you're never going to be successful on probation." We therefore find
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Grandstaff's request for probation
in lieu of jail time.
Ineffective Assistance
{¶ 16} Finally, Grandstaff asserts that her attorney was ineffective because "it is not
abundantly clear" what her attorney "was referring to during sentencing." Grandstaff offers
no argument in support of this assertion. Instead, she merely suggests that her attorney's
usage of the phrase "self-imposed punishment" to describe the jail time that followed
Grandstaff's arrest for failure to attend her sentencing was "not clear," and that her
attorney's assistance was thereby ineffective.
{¶ 17} '''In order to prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant
must prove that counsel's performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced
by counsel's deficient performance.''' State v. Combs, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2020-01-
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004, 2020-Ohio-5397, ¶ 22, quoting State v. Davis, 159 Ohio St.3d 31, 2020-Ohio-309, ¶
10. The failure to satisfy either the deficiency prong or the prejudice prong of the test is
fatal to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Brewer, 12th Dist. Brown No.
CA2020-11-008, 2021-Ohio-2289, ¶ 7. '''[T]rial counsel is entitled to a strong presumption
that his or her conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable assistance.''' Id., quoting
State v. Smith, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2006-08-030, 2009-Ohio-197, ¶ 49.
{¶ 18} The sole aspect Grandstaff highlights in an attempt to support her claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing is her attorney's effort at mitigation. Her
attorney noted that in his opinion, the time Grandstaff spent in jail following her arrest on a
warrant for failure to appear at her previously scheduled sentencing constituted a "self-
imposed punishment," and that by missing court and spending additional time in custody,
Grandstaff "punished herself more harshly than I think the Court would have originally." Her
attorney requested that in light of this "self-imposed punishment," the court sentence
Grandstaff to community control instead of jail.
{¶ 19} Grandstaff now argues that because her attorney failed to persuade the court
to sentence her to community control, counsel's assistance was ineffective. However,
Grandstaff fails to demonstrate how her attorney's performance was deficient or that she
was somehow prejudiced. Her attorney's decision to focus on Grandstaff's incarceration
and to frame it as a "self-imposed punishment" was a tactical one. "[E]ven if the wisdom of
such an approach is debatable, 'debatable trial tactics' do not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel." State v. Green, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2017-11-161, 2018-Ohio-
3991, ¶ 43, quoting State v. Clayton, 62 Ohio St.2d 45, 49 (1980). Merely because her
attorney was unsuccessful at gaining the court's sympathy does not mean that the sentence
would likely have been different. We accordingly find that her attorney's assistance did not
fall below an "objective standard of reasonableness." Reeves, 2020-Ohio-5565, at ¶ 32.
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Conclusion
{¶ 20} After reviewing the entire record and all arguments of counsel, we find that
Grandstaff's sole assignment of error is without merit and it is therefore overruled.
{¶ 21} Judgment affirmed.
S. POWELL and BYRNE, JJ., concur.
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