State v. Abney , 2024 Ohio 983 ( 2024 )

[Cite as State v. Abney, 2024-Ohio-983.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
GREENE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Appellee : C.A. No. 2023-CA-49
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2023-CR-0217
:
CHRISTINE E. ABNEY : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
: Court)
Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on March 15, 2024
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ROBERT ALAN BRENNER, Attorney for Appellant
MEGAN A. HAMMOND, Attorney for Appellee
.............
EPLEY, P.J.
{¶ 1} Christine E. Abney appeals from her convictions in the Greene County Court
of Common Pleas for domestic violence and vandalism. She argues that the trial court
erred in imposing prison sentences rather than community control. For the following
reasons, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.
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I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} In April 2023, Abney was indicted on one count of domestic violence, a third-
degree felony, and one count of vandalism, a fourth-degree felony. The vandalism
charge related to damage she caused to a Fairborn police cruiser as she was being
transported to jail for domestic violence against her boyfriend. Abney appeared as
summoned on May 19, 2023, and she was released on her own recognizance.
{¶ 3} Approximately six weeks later, Abney pled guilty to both offenses pursuant
to a plea agreement. She also agreed to pay restitution which, according to the waiver
and plea form, amounted to $12,291.51. The State agreed to defer to a presentence
investigation report (PSI) on the sentence, but it would not be bound by that sentencing
recommendation if Abney failed to appear for sentencing. Upon accepting Abney’s plea,
the court ordered a presentence investigation and scheduled the sentencing hearing for
August 16, 2023.
{¶ 4} Prior to the hearing, defense counsel submitted a sentencing memorandum
advocating for community control. Counsel emphasized that Abney was receiving
battered woman treatment to address her mental health issues, was taking her prescribed
medication, had physical disabilities, and was no longer living with or near her boyfriend
(the victim of the offense). Counsel stated that Abney’s children provided a strong
incentive for her to comply with community control sanctions. Defense counsel further
noted that Abney was 33 years old, an age for which the recidivism rate was only two
percent. Attached to the memorandum was a letter from a victim advocate from Artemis
Center, which stated that Abney was a committed and eager participant in her intensive
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mandated domestic violence class. The victim advocate indicated that Abney was a
domestic violence survivor who was working to incorporate the lessons from the classes
to her own life.
{¶ 5} At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel reiterated that Abney had “quite
a history of mental health issues” and that she had two children under the age of ten who
were “her world.” Counsel requested community control or, alternatively, the most
lenient sentences. Speaking on her own behalf, Abney asked the trial court to consider
her children, noting that their fathers were not involved in their lives and she was all they
had. The prosecutor told the court that it was deferring to the PSI.
{¶ 6} The trial court imposed 18 months in prison on each count, to be served
concurrently. It also required Abney to pay restitution of $12,291.51 and court costs.
{¶ 7} Abney appeals from her convictions. Her sole assignment of error states
that “the trial court erred by sentencing Abney to prison time instead of community
control.”
II. Review of Abney’s Sentence
{¶ 8} In reviewing felony sentences, appellate courts must apply the standard of
review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-
Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 9. Under that statute, an appellate court may increase,
reduce, or modify a sentence, or it may vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing,
only if it “clearly and convincingly” finds either (1) that the record does not support certain
specified findings or (2) that the sentence imposed is contrary to law. State v. Huffman,
2d Dist. Miami No. 2016-CA-16, 2017-Ohio-4097, ¶ 6.
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{¶ 9} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) “does not
provide a basis for an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence based on its view
that the sentence is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” State
v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, ¶ 39. “When reviewing
felony sentences that are imposed solely after considering the factors in R.C. 2929.11
and R.C. 2929.12, we do not analyze whether those sentences are unsupported by the
record.” State v. McDaniel, 2d Dist. Darke No. 2020-CA-3, 2021-Ohio-1519, ¶ 11, citing
State v. Dorsey, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28747, 2021-Ohio-76, ¶ 18; Jones at ¶ 26-29.
Instead, “[w]e simply must determine whether those sentences are contrary to law.”
Dorsey at ¶ 18.
{¶ 10} “The trial court has full discretion to impose any sentence within the
authorized statutory range, and the court is not required to make any findings or give its
reasons for imposing maximum or more than minimum sentences.” State v. King, 2013-
Ohio-2021, 992 N.E.2d 491, ¶ 45 (2d Dist.). “A sentence is contrary to law when it does
not fall within the statutory range for the offense or if the trial court fails to consider the
purposes and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing
factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Brown, 2017-Ohio-8416, 99
N.E.3d 1135, ¶ 74 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 11} The record reflects that the trial court complied with its sentencing
obligations under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. The trial court told Abney at
sentencing that it had considered the record, the oral statements, the PSI, and the
purposes of felony sentencing under R.C. 2929.11, and that it had balanced the
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seriousness and recidivism factors pursuant to R.C. 2929.12 and the need for deterrence,
incapacitation, rehabilitation, and restitution. The court also informed Abney that it was
“guided by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing, including protection of the public
from future crime by the Defendant and others, punishment of the Defendant, and to
promote effective rehabilitation of her using the minimum sanctions the Court determines
accomplishes those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local
government resources.” The court expressly found that, after considering R.C. 2929.12,
a prison sentence was consistent with the purposes of sentencing and Abney was not
amenable to community control.
{¶ 12} Moreover, the trial court was not required to impose community control for
vandalism in this case and, instead, it had the discretion to impose a prison sentence.
See R.C. 2929.13(B)(1)(a), (b). Abney had prior felony convictions for domestic
violence, felonious assault, and violating a protection order. She was on community
control for two of these felony offenses when the vandalism occurred, and she faced
sentencing on a third-degree felony offense (domestic violence) in this case. The 18-
month sentences fell within the authorized sentencing ranges for both of Abney’s
offenses. See R.C. 2929.14(A)(3) and (4). Abney’s sentences were not contrary to law.
{¶ 13} Abney argues that “[t]he overriding purposes of felony sentencing in Ohio
would be better served if Abney is placed on community control sanctions instead of
placed in prison.” In essence, Abney argues that a prison sentence is not supported by
the record. Such an argument is precluded by Jones. We find no error in the trial court’s
imposition of concurrent 18-month prison sentences in this case.
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{¶ 14} Abney’s assignment of error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 15} The trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.
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WELBAUM, J. and TUCKER, J., concur.