State v. Bradley , 2024 Ohio 1057 ( 2024 )

[Cite as State v. Bradley, 2024-Ohio-1057.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 112913
v. :
JOHN BRADLEY, JR., :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 21, 2024
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case Nos. CR-21-655788-A, CR-21-657513-A,
CR-21-657961-A, and CR-21-658136-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Tasha L. Forchione, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
John T. Martin, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, A.J.:
Defendant-appellant, John Bradley, Jr., appeals from the trial court’s
decisions denying his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas in four different cases.
For the reasons that follow, we reverse the trial court’s decisions and remand for
further proceedings.
I. Procedural Background
In August 2021, Bradley entered guilty pleas in Cuyahoga C.P. Nos.
CR-21-655788-A, CR-21-657513-A, CR-21-657961-A, and CR-21-658136-A. During
the plea hearing on these four separate cases, Bradley stated that he understood the
maximum penalties involved, including that (1) he faced a mandatory prison
sentence on the felonious assault offense in CR-657961 because of the one-year
firearm specification, (2) felonious assault carried a potential range of two to eight
years, and (3) the Reagan Tokes Law would apply to this sentence.1 (Tr. 17-18.) He
denied that anyone made any threats or promises to induce him into accepting the
plea. (Tr. 12.)
In September 2021, the trial court sentenced Bradley on all four cases.
The court ordered Bradley’s sentences in CR-655788, CR-657513, and CR-658136
to run concurrently with the sentence in CR-657961. In that case, after applying the
Reagan Tokes Law, the court imposed a prison sentence on Count 1 (felonious
assault) of seven to ten and one-half years, plus a mandatory, consecutive one-year
sentence on the firearm specification, for a total prison sentence of eight to ten and
one-half years.
1 The record before this court is an App.R. 9(A) record. The only transcript in the
record is the August 2021 plea hearing that the state attached to its brief in opposition to
Bradley’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Bradley has not requested to transfer any
transcripts filed in the prior appeals to this appeal for this court to consider.
Bradley appealed his convictions in these cases and raised two
assignments of error — the first challenging the constitutionality of the Reagan
Tokes Law, and the second contending that his counsel was ineffective for failing to
object to the Reagan Tokes sentence. State v. Bradley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
110882, 2022-Ohio-1075, ¶ 5 (“Bradley I”). This court overruled his assignments of
error and affirmed his convictions. Id. Bradley timely appealed Bradley I to the
Ohio Supreme Court, which accepted the appeal and held the matter for the
resolution of State v. Hacker, Ohio Supreme Court Case Nos. 2020-1496 and 2021-
0532. See State v. Bradley, Ohio Supreme Court Case No. 2022-0522, and
07/19/2022 Case Announcements, 2022-Ohio-2446.
In June 2022, Bradley successfully reopened his direct appeal
pursuant to App.R. 26(B) because the trial court failed to provide him with the
required notifications under R.C. 2929.17(B)(2)(c) when imposing a Reagan Tokes
sentence. State v. Bradley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110882, 2022-Ohio-2954, ¶ 13-
14 (“Bradley II”). Accordingly, this court “vacated, in part” Bradley’s sentence for
Count 1 in CR-657961 and “remanded [the matter] to the trial court for the limited
purpose of resentencing to provide the notifications required by R.C.
2929.19(B)(2)(c).” Id. at ¶ 16.
On December 8, 2022, prior to the limited-purpose resentencing,
Bradley filed identical motions to withdraw his guilty pleas in all four cases,
contending that (1) he would not have pleaded guilty if he knew he would receive an
indefinite sentence under Reagan Tokes and (2) his attorney promised him that he
would only receive two years in prison. Bradley did not support his motion with any
documentary evidence supporting either argument. The state opposed the motion,
contending that res judicata barred his claims, his convictions were previously
affirmed in his direct appeal, and no manifest injustice occurred.
On December 13, 2022, the trial court conducted the limited-purpose
resentencing as mandated by this court in Bradley II. The trial court provided the
requisite Reagan Tokes notifications pursuant to R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c). On January
12, 2023, Bradley appealed his sentence, once again challenging the
constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law. This court, noting the release of State v.
Hacker, Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-2535, the day before Bradley filed his notice
of appeal, overruled his assignment of error on the authority of Hacker, which found
the Reagan Tokes Law constitutional. State v. Bradley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
112320, 2023-Ohio-3630, ¶ 4 (“Bradley III”).2 Bradley appealed Bradley III to the
Ohio Supreme Court; the court declined jurisdiction in January 2024.
On May 26, 2023, while Bradley III was pending in this court and
Bradley I was still pending in the Ohio Supreme Court, the trial court summarily
denied Bradley’s motions to withdraw his guilty pleas in all four cases.
Bradley now appeals, raising two assignments of error that challenge
the trial court’s summary denial of his motions to withdraw without conducting an
evidentiary hearing.
2 On October 26, 2023, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed Bradley I on the
authority of Hacker. See 10/26/2023 Case Announcements, 2023-Ohio-3863.
II. Trial Court’s Jurisdiction
At the outset, this court must address whether the trial court had
jurisdiction to consider Bradley’s motions to withdraw his guilty pleas. The state
raised in the trial court, and here on appeal, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction
to consider Bradley’s motions because this court affirmed his convictions in Bradley
I. The state relies on State ex rel. Special Prosecutors v. Judges, Court of Common
Pleas, 55 Ohio St.2d 94, 97-98, 378 N.E.2d 162 (1978), which held that “Crim.R. 32.1
does not vest jurisdiction in the trial court to maintain and determine a motion to
withdraw the guilty plea subsequent to an appeal and an affirmance by the appellate
court.” This court has recognized, however, that the Ohio Supreme Court
subsequently clarified that Special Prosecutors does not apply to motions filed
under the criminal rules or permitted by statute and that it specifically identified
that a Crim.R. 32.1 motion to withdraw a guilty or no contest plea is a vehicle for
seeking postconviction relief from a final judgment. State v. Walton, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 112235, 2023-Ohio-2879, ¶ 19-20, citing State v. Davis, 131 Ohio
St.3d 1, 2011-Ohio-5028, 959 N.E.2d 516, paragraph two of the syllabus; State ex
rel. Davis v. Janas, 160 Ohio St.3d 187, 2020-Ohio-1462, 155 N.E.3d 822, ¶ 11, fn.
3. Accordingly, this court’s affirmance in Bradley I did not divest the trial court of
authority to consider Bradley’s motions.
Bradley also challenges the trial court’s jurisdiction but raises this
issue for the first time in his reply brief in the instant appeal. We recognize that he
raised this issue in rebuttal to the state’s contention that the trial court lacked
authority to consider his motion because this court affirmed his convictions and thus
appears to be proper. See Loc.App.R. 16(A)(2)(c) (reply brief “must be restricted to
matters in rebuttal to the answer portion of the second brief”). He contends that
because Bradley III was pending in this court, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
consider his motion to withdraw his guilty plea in CR-657961. Bradley states that
the motions filed in the other cases were unaffected by the Bradley III appeal, and
thus the trial court had authority to rule on those motions. In support, he relies on
this court’s decision in State v. Drake, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105908, 2017-Ohio-
7328, in which we explained that where a court lacks jurisdiction to rule on a motion
due to a pending appeal, the trial court lacks authority to deny the motion and must
hold the motion in abeyance until the appeal is decided. Id. at ¶ 4.
The general rule of law is that the trial court loses jurisdiction to take
action in a cause after an appeal has been taken and decided except “to take action
in aid of the appeal, until the case is remanded to it by the appellate court.” Special
Prosecutors at 97. The trial court retains jurisdiction, however, over issues “not
inconsistent with the appellate court’s jurisdiction to reverse, modify, or affirm the
judgment from which an appeal is taken.” Yee v. Erie Cty. Sheriff’s Dept., 51 Ohio
St.3d 43, 44, 553 N.E.2d 1354 (1990).
Accordingly, we agree with Bradley that the trial court was without
jurisdiction to consider his motion to withdraw his guilty plea in CR-659761 because
Bradley III was pending in this court. The issue in Bradley III involved a facial
constitutional challenge to the Reagan Tokes Law. If the trial court granted
Bradley’s motion to withdraw and, thus, vacated his conviction that included a
Reagan Tokes sentence, Bradley would no longer have standing to challenge the
Reagan Tokes Law as unconstitutional. Accordingly, the trial court’s consideration
of the motion to withdraw would be inconsistent with this court’s jurisdiction to
reverse, modify, or affirm the trial court’s judgment.3
We disagree, however, with Bradley that the trial court had
jurisdiction to consider the other three cases. Although Bradley is correct that
Bradley III did not affect the trial court’s jurisdiction, Bradley I, which also
challenged the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Law, was pending in the Ohio
Supreme Court. The Ohio Supreme Court did not decide Bradley I until October
2023 — well after the trial court ruled on Bradley’s motions to vacate his guilty pleas.
Because Bradley I encompassed all four of his cases, the trial court lacked authority
to consider his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas. We note that the state
recognized the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction to consider Bradley’s motions because
in its brief in opposition, the state requested that the trial court hold his motions in
abeyance until the resolution of Bradley I.
Accordingly, because Bradley I was pending in the Ohio Supreme
Court and Bradley III was pending in this court, the trial court lacked jurisdiction
3 Granted, the Bradley III Court could have dismissed the appeal because the issue
raised went beyond the scope of the limited-purpose remand. The issue did not challenge
the trial court’s Reagan Tokes notifications but raised a facial constitutional challenge to
the Reagan Tokes Law — an issue this court previously decided and rejected in Bradley I
and, thus, this court could have also applied the doctrine of res judicata and overruled the
assignment of error.
to rule on his motions to vacate his guilty pleas. The trial court should have held the
motions in abeyance until the resolution of all appeals.
Our decision to reverse the trial court’s decisions and remand for
reconsideration of Bradley’s motions seems superfluous, especially when it is
entirely possible that res judicata will bar Bradley’s motions to withdraw his guilty
pleas, but a trial court’s ability to consider matters that would affect a reviewing
court’s jurisdiction and ability to consider the merits of a pending appeal cannot be
disregarded.
The assignments of error are sustained, not because the trial court
erred in failing to hold a hearing before denying Bradley’s motions, but because the
court lacked jurisdiction to consider the motions altogether. Now that Bradley’s
appeals in both Bradley I and Bradley III have been fully decided, the trial court
now has jurisdiction to consider his motions to withdraw his guilty pleas.
Judgments reversed and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
It is ordered that the parties share equally the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. Case remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., and
LISA B. FORBES, J., CONCUR