In re C.J.H. ( 2024 )

[Cite as In re C.J.H., 2024-Ohio-1233.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
CLERMONT COUNTY
IN RE: :
C.J.H., et al. : CASE NOS. CA2023-04-024
CA2023-04-025
: CA2023-04-026
CA2023-04-027
: CA2023-04-028
: OPINION
4/1/2024
:
APPEAL FROM CLERMONT COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
JUVENILE DIVISION
Case No. 2022 JA 57022, 57026, 56938, 56939, 56940
Mark J. Tekulve, Clermont County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nicholas Horton, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
Brafford Law, LLC, and Suellen Brafford, for appellee, C.J.H.
Glaser Law Office, and Angela J. Glaser, for appellee, P.S.
Crousey Law Firm, and Joshua R. Crousey, for appellee, R.B.
HENDRICKSON, P.J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, the state of Ohio, appeals from the Clermont County Juvenile
Court's entry denying the state's motion for mandatory bindover. For the reasons outlined
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below, we reverse the juvenile court's decision and remand the matter for further
proceedings.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On July 14, 2022, Rusty and Ryan Larison were shot and killed at the
Richmond Estates Mobile Home Park in New Richmond, Clermont County, Ohio. The
state alleges appellees, C.J.H., 17 years old; P.S., 16 years old; and R.B., 17 years old,
along with another juvenile, C.M., killed the Larisons during a robbery.
{¶ 3} On July 16, 2022, the state filed numerous complaints against C.M.,
including multiple counts of aggravated murder and murder, related to the deaths of Rusty
and Ryan Larison.
{¶ 4} Over the next few months, the state filed a total of 18 complaints against
C.J.H, 19 complaints against P.S., and 19 complaints against R.B. Relevant to this case,
each appellee was charged with: two counts of aggravated murder under R.C.
2903.01(A); two counts of aggravated murder under R.C. 2903.01(B); two counts of
murder under R.C. 2903.02(A); and two counts of murder under R.C. 2903.02(B), all
related to the deaths of Rusty and Ryan Larison.
{¶ 5} After a joint probable cause hearing, the juvenile court found probable
cause to believe C.M., as principal offender, committed each of the complaints for
aggravated murder and murder. The juvenile court further determined that C.J.H., P.S.,
and R.B. did not act as principal offenders for each of the aggravated murder and murder
complaints, but found that there was probable cause to believe they were complicit for
each of the complaints. On April 13, 2023, based on a perceived conflict in the law on
the issue of complicity and mandatory bindover, the juvenile court denied the state's
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motion for mandatory bindover of C.J.H., P.S. and R.B., retained jurisdiction, and set the
matter for an amenability hearing in preparation for potential discretionary bindover.
{¶ 6} The state appealed on April 21, 2023.
II. Legal Analysis
Motion to Dismiss the Appeal
{¶ 7} Before addressing the merits of appellant's assignment of error, we must
first decide P.S.'s August 4, 2023 motion to dismiss the state's appeal.1 In the motion,
P.S. asserts that the juvenile court's entry denying the state's motion for mandatory
bindover is not a final appealable order and the state failed to file a motion for leave to
appeal under App. R. 5(C). The issue, then, is whether the state has an absolute right to
appeal a juvenile court's denial of the state's request for mandatory bindover without first
seeking leave to appeal.
{¶ 8} The Ohio Supreme Court ruled on this issue in its decision in In re A.J.S.,
120 Ohio St.3d 185, 2008-Ohio-5307. In that case, the high court held that "The order of
a juvenile court denying a motion for mandatory bindover bars the state from prosecuting
a juvenile offender as an adult for a criminal offense. It is therefore the functional
equivalent of a dismissal of a criminal indictment and constitutes a final order from which
the state may appeal as a matter of right." Id. at syllabus.
{¶ 9} The Court went on to note that "In certain situations specified by statute, the
juvenile court is required to transfer a case to the general division of the common pleas
court for prosecution of the juvenile defendant as an adult. R.C. 2152.12. These transfers
1. The state filed its response opposing the motion on August 14, 2023. By entry dated August 30, 2023,
we deferred consideration of this motion until the case was submitted to a panel for decision on the merits.
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are referred to as 'mandatory bindovers' because if the statutory conditions are met, the
judge must transfer jurisdiction." Id. at ¶ 1, fn. 1. "Despite the general rule that the juvenile
court has exclusive original jurisdiction over any child alleged to be delinquent, the court
has a duty to transfer a case when it determines that the elements of the transfer statute
are met." Id. at ¶ 22. "Mandatory transfer removes discretion from judges in the transfer
decision." State v. Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 90 (2000).
{¶ 10} Here, the juvenile court denied the state's motion for mandatory bindover,
finding that, although probable cause had been established, the criteria for mandatory
bindover set forth in R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(a) had not been met where appellees were
charged with complicity to aggravated murder and complicity to murder (as opposed to
being charged as principal offenders). The state's present appeal challenges the juvenile
court's finding that the applicable statutory criteria for mandatory bindover has not been
met in this case. This is a legal issue which must be determined in order to resolve
whether the juvenile court erred in finding that this was a discretionary bindover, and if it
did in fact err, it would then lack jurisdiction to proceed as it did below. This is because a
juvenile court may not retain jurisdiction over a case subject to mandatory bindover.
{¶ 11} While the present case differs somewhat from A.J.S., where the juvenile
court had denied mandatory bindover for lack of probable cause, the same rationale
applies here: the juvenile court's decision has terminated the state's ability to secure a
criminal indictment for the acts charged, and therefore it is the functional equivalent of the
dismissal of a criminal indictment. Therefore, we hereby deny P.S.'s motion to dismiss
the state's appeal and proceed to the merits.
Mandatory Bindover for Complicity Offenses
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{¶ 12} The state's sole assignment of error states:
THE JUVENILE COURT ERRED BY NOT BINDING C.J.H.,
P.S., AND R.B. OVER TO THE ADULT DIVISION OF THE
CLERMONT COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
UNDER SECTION 2152.12(A)(1)(a)(i).
{¶ 13} In its sole assignment of error, the state argues the juvenile court erred
when it found that appellees were not subject to mandatory bindover and instead
scheduled them for an amenability hearing in preparation for potential discretionary
bindover. We agree with the state.
{¶ 14} Ohio law requires the mandatory transfer of certain juvenile cases to the
general division of the common pleas court where the juvenile offenders are tried and
punished as adults. See R.C. 2152.10 and 2152.12. R.C. 2152.10(A)(1) provides that a
child charged with a "category one offense"—murder or aggravated murder—who is 16
years of age or older at the time of the offense is eligible for mandatory transfer and shall
be transferred as provided in R.C. 2152.12. In turn, R.C. 2152.12(A)(1) provides:
(a) After a complaint has been filed alleging that a child is a
delinquent child for committing one or more acts that would
be an offense if committed by an adult, if any of those acts
would be aggravated murder, murder, attempted aggravated
murder, or attempted murder if committed by an adult, the
juvenile court at a hearing shall transfer the case if either of
the following applies:
(i) The child was sixteen or seventeen years of age at the
time of the act charged that would be aggravated murder,
murder, attempted aggravated murder, or attempted
murder and there is probable cause to believe that the
child committed the act charged.
(ii) The child was fourteen or fifteen years of age at the
time of the act charged that would be aggravated murder,
murder, attempted aggravated murder, or attempted
murder, section 2152.10 of the Revised Code provides
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that the child is eligible for mandatory transfer, and there
is probable cause to believe that the child committed the
act charged.
***
Here, the complaints filed against appellees allege that each committed murder and
aggravated murder, and appellees were 16 or 17 years old at the time of the alleged
offenses.
{¶ 15} Although the juvenile court determined the juveniles were not the principal
offenders, it still found probable cause to believe they were complicit to murder and
complicit to aggravated murder. "'Under the principle of complicity or accomplice liability,
an individual may be found guilty if he solicits, aids, abets or conspires with another
individual to commit an offense and shares the criminal intent of an individual who
commits the principal offense."' State v. Buell, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2021-12-026,
2022-Ohio-3102, ¶ 17, quoting State v. Horton, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-855, 2014-
Ohio-2785, ¶ 8. There is no distinction between a defendant convicted of complicity or
convicted as a principal offender. Buell at ¶ 17. Pursuant to R.C. 2923.03(F), "[a] charge
of complicity may be stated in terms of [that] section, or in terms of the principal offense."
{¶ 16} Where there is probable cause to believe that a juvenile (who is 16 years
old or older) committed murder or aggravated murder through complicity, that juvenile is
subject to mandatory bindover. In re B.W., 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 17 MA 0071, 2017-
Ohio-9220, ¶ 28. Initially, in State v. Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d 86 (2000), the Supreme
Court of Ohio broadly stated that the complicity statute, R.C. 2923.03, does not apply to
the juvenile bindover criteria as set forth under former section R.C. 2151.26 (currently
R.C.2152.10 and R.C. 2152.12). In Hanning, the Court held that the concept of complicity
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could not be used to support mandatory bindover of Hanning, an accomplice juvenile,
based on the principal offender's use of a firearm in a category two offense: aggravated
robbery. However, one year later in Agee v. Russell, 92 Ohio St.3d 540 (2001), the Court
clarified that the Hanning rationale does not apply to all mandatory bindover proceedings,
but rather only to those based upon a firearm specification. Thus, juvenile courts will
mandatorily transfer cases for adult prosecution even if the evidence shows that the
juvenile was not a principal offender but was merely complicit in committing the offense.
State v. Legg, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 14CA23, 2016-Ohio-801, ¶ 42, appeal not accepted,
146 Ohio St.3d 1416, 2016-Ohio-3390; State v. Bishop, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 89184,
2007-Ohio-6197, ¶ 26.
{¶ 17} The juvenile court's reliance on State v. Smith, 167 Ohio St.3d 423, 2022-
Ohio-274, and State v. Taylor, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 19AP-396, 2022-Ohio-2877, in its
entry denying mandatory bindover is misplaced. In Smith, the Ohio Supreme Court held
that a juvenile court may only bindover charges for which it has found probable cause
and that the general division of the court of common pleas has no jurisdiction over charges
for which the juvenile court has found no probable cause. 2022-Ohio-274, ¶ 33-36, 44.
In Taylor, the juvenile court found probable cause to believe Taylor had committed
purposeful murder, but after Taylor was bound over to the general division, he was also
charged with felony murder by felonious assault. 2022-Ohio-2877, ¶ 19. The Tenth
District concluded that complicity to purposeful murder is not an equivalent "act charged"
to felony murder by felonious assault for purposes of transferring jurisdiction from the
juvenile division to the general division; therefore, pursuant to Smith, the general division
did not have jurisdiction over Taylor's felony murder charge. There is no such
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discrepancy in the charges in the present case.
{¶ 18} Here, the juvenile court found that there was probable cause to believe
appellees were complicit in committing murder and aggravated murder, category one
offenses. The use of a firearm is not necessary for mandatory bindover to apply to
category one offenses. Therefore, Hanning does not apply to the present case, and
appellees are subject to mandatory bindover.
Conclusion
{¶ 19} In light of the foregoing, we conclude the juvenile court erred in denying the
state's motion for mandatory bindover. Therefore, the state's sole assignment of error is
sustained and this matter is reversed and remanded to the juvenile court with instructions
to transfer appellees' cases to the general division of the common pleas court for further
proceedings.
{¶ 20} Judgment reversed and remanded.
PIPER and BYRNE, JJ., concur.
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