Canter v. Kingdomwork, L.L.C. ( 2024 )


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  • [Cite as Canter v. Kingdomwork, L.L.C., 
    2024-Ohio-1231
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
    BUTLER COUNTY
    DOMINICK CANTER, et al.,                            :
    Appellants,                                  :     CASE NO. CA2023-05-049
    :          OPINION
    - vs -                                                      4/1/2024
    :
    KINGDOMWORK, LLC, et al.,                           :
    Appellees.                                   :
    APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
    Case No. CV 2021 09 1343
    The Attkisson Law Firm, LLC, and Jack J. Lah, for appellant, Dominick Canter.
    Bruns, Connell, Vollmar & Armstrong, LLC, and Thomas B. Bruns and Lucinda C.
    Shirooni, for appellee, Kingdomwork, LLC.
    PIPER, J.
    {¶ 1} Appellant, Dominick Canter ("Canter"), timely appeals the trial court's entry
    which adopted the magistrate's decision granting summary judgment to appellee,
    Kingdomwork, LLC ("Kingdomwork").
    {¶ 2} The single-car accident that is the subject of this suit occurred on March 9,
    Butler CA2023-05-049
    2021. Canter was a passenger along with Charles Barrett and Kahil Cozad in a vehicle
    driven by Jordan Kenyon. Kenyon was driving nearly 80 miles per hour when he lost
    control of the vehicle. The car went off the road onto Kingdomwork's property and hit a
    freestanding sign constructed of brick. The vehicle then careened onward, hitting a
    nearby building. Canter and Cozad were seriously injured while Barrett died from the
    injuries he sustained.
    {¶ 3} Canter filed suit against Kenyon and Kingdomwork,1 and alleged that
    Kingdomwork was negligent per se because the sign was too close to the road. Andrew
    Larkin, personal representative of Barrett's estate, and Cozad later joined the suit, also
    alleging negligence by Kingdomwork for the sign's placement.
    {¶ 4} Canter filed a motion for summary judgment, and Kingdomwork filed a
    motion for summary judgment against all three passengers. The parties' cross motions
    focused on whether the placement of the brick sign on Kingdomwork's property
    constituted negligence per se. The parties agreed that because the sign was less than
    10 feet from the road that it would be in violation of the Middletown Development Code
    ("MDC") unless an exception applied.
    {¶ 5} Kingdomwork presented to the court, via affidavit, a certified copy of a
    certificate of zoning compliance from the city of Middletown regarding the construction of
    the sign at the property. According to that document, the sign was constructed in 1974
    when the property was owned by Ohio Bell Telephone. The certificate is not signed by
    the applicant who submitted the form, but it was signed by the Middletown zoning
    administrator on April 2, 1974 and issued certificate number 1990.74. The copy of the
    certificate submitted with Kingdomwork's motion was certified as a true and accurate copy
    1. The complaint also named State Farm Mutual Insurance, the Ohio Department of Medicaid, and United
    Healthcare as defendants because they may have subrogation interest in the case.
    -2-
    Butler CA2023-05-049
    by Middletown Development Services on July 26, 2022.
    {¶ 6} In resolving the motions for summary judgment, a Butler County magistrate
    applied a "grandfather clause" found within the MDC and found that because the sign
    was compliant when it was constructed, the sign remained compliant at the time of the
    accident. The magistrate also noted that Canter did not provide any evidence to counter
    the evidence put forward by Kingdomwork that showed the sign was compliant when it
    was installed. Thus, the trial court found negligence per se could not be established and
    that Kingdomwork was entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to the parties' negligence
    claim.
    {¶ 7} Kingdomwork moved for summary judgment on several other grounds as
    well: (1) the sign was not a hazard to ordinary on the road travel; (2) Canter had assumed
    the risk of being in a high-speed vehicle; (3) that Canter and the others in the vehicle were
    trespassers; (4) the sign was an open and obvious risk; and (5) the sign was not the
    proximate cause of Canter's injuries. Regarding these arguments, the magistrate simply
    stated, "With the exception of Kingdomwork's arguments regarding primary assumption
    of the risk, this Court finds all of Kingdomwork's arguments persuasive. This Court finds
    particularly persuasive the authority set forth in the case of Snay v. Burr, 
    167 Ohio St.3d 123
    , 
    2021-Ohio-4113
     (2021)."
    {¶ 8} After reviewing the applicable law and the magistrate's factual
    determinations, the trial court adopted the magistrate's decision, and Canter filed this
    appeal.
    {¶ 9} On appeal, Canter raises a single assignment of error:
    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW TO
    APPELLANT'S PREJUDICE IN HOLDING THAT A
    VIOLATION OF MIDDLETOWN DEVELOPMENT CODE
    SECTION   122.08(d)(4), A SAFETY  ORDINANCE
    REQUIRING ALL FREESTANDING SIGNS TO BE SET
    -3-
    Butler CA2023-05-049
    BACK NO LESS THAN TEN FEET FROM THE PUBLIC
    RIGHT-OF-WAY, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE NEGLIGENCE
    PER SE.
    {¶ 10} As an initial matter, we note that Canter's single assignment of error does
    not address the other grounds under which summary judgment was granted. As a result,
    our analysis on review will be limited to whether the placement of the sign was compliant
    under the law and whether Kingdomwork was negligent per se.
    {¶ 11} Canter argues on appeal there is no evidence which shows the certificate
    of zoning compliance was "valid." The certificate, he argues, was not signed by an
    applicant or accompanied by other documentation the certification required. In addition,
    Canter asserts that the certificate does not, by itself, demonstrate that the sign "was
    erected in conformance with a valid certificate of zoning and compliance." Canter asserts
    these issues should have been decided by a jury.
    {¶ 12} Under Civ.R. 56, a trial court may grant summary judgment when, "there is
    no genuine issue of material fact remaining for trial, the moving party is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law, and reasonable minds can only come to a conclusion
    adverse to the nonmoving party, construing the evidence most strongly in that party's
    favor." Total Quality Logistics, L.L.C. v. JK & R Express, L.L.C., 12th Dist. Clermont,
    
    2022-Ohio-3969
    , ¶ 17. Trial courts should hesitatingly grant summary judgment, giving
    the nonmoving party all benefits of doubt. Welco Indus., Inc. v. Applied Cos., 
    67 Ohio St.3d 344
    , 346 (1993), citing Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 
    65 Ohio St.3d 356
     (1992).
    {¶ 13} The unsupported assertion by the moving party that the nonmoving party
    has no evidence to prove its case is not sufficient ground for the trial court to grant
    summary judgment.      Dresher v. Burt, 
    75 Ohio St.3d 280
    , 
    1996-Ohio-107
     (1996).
    However, if the moving party fulfills its burden and the nonmoving party presents no
    evidence to support the merits of their case, summary judgment is proper. Welco Indus.
    -4-
    Butler CA2023-05-049
    at 346, citing Wing v. Anchor Media, Ltd. of Texas, 59 Ohio St.3d. 108, paragraph three
    of the syllabus (1991). "Mere speculation is insufficient to create a genuine issue of
    material fact to avoid summary judgment." Fontain v. H&R Cincy Properties, LLC, 12th
    Dist. Warren No. CA2021-02-015, 
    2022-Ohio-1000
    , ¶ 67.
    {¶ 14} The granting or denial of summary judgment is reviewed on a de novo basis,
    and appellate courts consider the same standard as the trial court. Holtrey v. Wiedeman,
    12th Dist. Warren No. CA2023-01-011, 
    2023-Ohio-2440
    , ¶ 12.
    {¶ 15} MDC 1230.02 defines freestanding signs as "[a]ny sign supported upon the
    ground by a monument, pedestal, pole, bracing, or other permanent measure and not
    attached to any building." Under MDC 1220.08(d)(4), "All freestanding signs shall be set
    back a minimum of 10 feet from all rights-of-way and from adjacent lot lines and 50 feet
    from any adjacent lot in a residential zoning district or used solely for residential uses."
    However, MDC 1220.10(a) states that "signs that do not conform to the specific standards
    of this code may be considered legally nonconforming if the sign was erected in
    conformance with a valid certificate of zoning compliance and complied with all applicable
    laws at the time of the sign's installation * * *."
    {¶ 16} We find no error by the trial court in granting summary judgment against
    Canter. The parties agree that the sign is not compliant under MDC 1220.08(d)(4)
    because the sign is only five feet away from the road. However, Kingdomwork presented
    evidence that the city of Middletown issued a certificate of zoning compliance regarding
    the sign in 1974. Regardless of whether the application, or the certified copy of it, contains
    the signature of the person who applied for the certification or whether all the required
    paperwork was attached to the application for certification, the certificate was signed and
    issued by the city of Middletown. As a result, there is no evidence suggesting the
    certificate is invalid or that the sign otherwise failed to comply with all applicable laws at
    -5-
    Butler CA2023-05-049
    the time it was constructed. As a result, the sign is "legally nonconforming" under the
    MDC.
    {¶ 17} Similarly, there is no reason to believe that the sign was not constructed in
    conformance with the certificate. Canter's argument amounts to mere speculation. There
    is nothing in the record which remotely speaks to, let alone supports, Canter's assertion
    that the sign was not compliant when it was constructed. Therefore, Canter's negligence
    claim on the basis of negligence per se fails as a matter of law.
    {¶ 18} As a result of the foregoing, we agree with the trial court that there is no
    genuine issue of material fact remaining for trial and that Kingdomwork was entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law. The sign fell under the "grandfather" clause of the MDC.
    {¶ 19} Judgment affirmed.
    S. POWELL, P.J., and BYRNE, J., concur.
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CA2023-05-049

Judges: Piper

Filed Date: 4/1/2024

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/1/2024