State v. Farakhan ( 2024 )

[Cite as State v. Farakhan, 2024-Ohio-1260.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 30791
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
NIA H. FARAKHAN COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. CR 18 01 0265
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: April 3, 2024
HENSAL, Judge.
{¶1} Nia Farakhan appeals her sentence from the Summit County Court of Common
Pleas. For the following reasons, this Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} Ms. Farakhan entered an Alford plea to one count of felonious assault and two
counts of endangering children after the six-month-old child she was babysitting was found
unresponsive and was later diagnosed with a traumatic brain injury. After accepting her plea and
finding her guilty of the offenses, the trial court sentenced her to a total of five to seven and a half
years imprisonment. It resentenced her to a total of five years after realizing that the offenses were
committed before the Reagan Tokes Act went into effect. Ms. Farakhan has appealed her sentence,
assigning as error that the trial court failed to properly consider the required sentencing factors.
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II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE AND PLAIN ERROR
WHEN IT FAILED TO PROPERLY CONSIDER THE SENTENCING
FACTORS AS SET FORTH IN O.R.C. 2929.11 AND 2929.12 IMPOSING A
SENTENCE WHICH IS CONTRARY TO LAW[.]
{¶3} Ms. Farakhan argues that her sentence is contrary to law because the trial court did
not properly consider the sentencing factors it was required to consider in determining her
sentence. In reviewing a felony sentence, “[t]he * * * standard for review is not whether the
sentencing court abused its discretion.” R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). “[A]n appellate court may vacate or
modify a felony sentence on appeal only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence” that:
(1) “the record does not support the trial court’s findings under relevant statutes[,]” or (2) “the
sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶
1. Clear and convincing evidence is that “which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a
firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St.
469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶4} “[N]either R.C. 2929.11 nor 2929.12 requires a trial court to make any specific
factual findings on the record.” State v. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 20. The
Ohio Supreme Court has also held that a sentence is not “otherwise contrary to law” just because
“the record does not support a sentence under R.C. 2929.11 or 2929.12[.]” Id. at ¶ 34, 38-39. “A
sentence is ‘otherwise contrary to law’ for purposes of Section 2953.08(G)(2)(b) when it is ‘in
violation of statute or legal regulations at a given time.’” State v. McKnight, 9th Dist. Medina No.
22CA0027-M, 2023-Ohio1933, ¶ 15, quoting Jones at ¶ 34. “Nothing in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)
permits an appellate court to independently weigh the evidence in the record and substitute its
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judgment for that of the trial court concerning the sentence that best reflects compliance with R.C.
2929.11 and 2929.12.” Jones at ¶ 42.
{¶5} Ms. Farakhan argues that this Court is permitted to review the findings that the trial
court did make and argues that those findings are not supported by the record. At Ms. Farakhan’s
original sentencing hearing, the trial court noted that the child had been seriously injured and that
the only way the injuries could have happened was at Ms. Farakhan’s hands. It found that the
seriousness factors weighed heavily in favor of a prison sentence. Regarding recidivism factors,
the court noted that Ms. Farakhan had no prior offenses, but determined that the seriousness factors
significantly outweighed them. It agreed with Ms. Farakhan that the offense was not the most
serious form of the offenses but noted that it had to balance all the factors. It determined that a
more significant prison sentence than the minimum was warranted and again noted the significant
injuries to the child. The court stated that, based on all the facts and circumstances, applying the
minimum sentence that would protect the public and punish Ms. Farakhan despite the burden it
might place on state and local resources, after analyzing all the factors it was required to consider,
including the seriousness and recidivism factors, and after reviewing the presentence investigation
report, the sentence it was going to impose was a prison term of five to seven-and-a-half years.
{¶6} At the resentencing hearing, the defense presented additional evidence about the
child’s progress. The State countered that he still had significant cognitive deficiencies. Although
giving Ms. Farakhan the opportunity to speak, the court stated that it was not going to reduce her
sentence. It explained that, based on the facts and circumstances, in consideration of the relevant
sentencing factors, applying the minimum sanction that would protect the public yet punish Ms.
Farakhan, analyzing all the seriousness and recidivism factors, and in consideration of the
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presentence investigation report, the victim impact statement, and family statements on both sides,
it was imposing a sentence of five years.
{¶7} The trial court did not specifically mention Sections 2929.11 and 2929.12 at the
sentencing hearing. It did, however, mention the topics that those statutes cover. It referenced the
purposes of sentencing from Section 2929.11(A). It stated that it had considered the factors that
make an offense more serious than usual, which are listed in Section 2929.12(B), and factors
regarding recidivism, which are in Sections 2919.12(D) and (E). The court was not required to
work through each part of those sections on the record. Jones, 163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-
6729 at ¶ 20. Upon review of the record, we conclude that Ms. Farakhan has not established that
the record does not support the trial court’s findings or that her sentence is otherwise contrary to
law. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002 at ¶ 1. Ms. Farakhan’s assignment of error
is overruled.
III.
{¶8} Ms. Farakhan’s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Summit
County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
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Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
JENNIFER HENSAL
FOR THE COURT
STEVENSON, P. J.
SUTTON, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
NATHAN A. RAY, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
ELLIOT KOLKOVICH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN R. DIMARTINO, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.