Vandalia-Butler City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Ohio Dept. of Edn. ( 2024 )

[Cite as Vandalia-Butler City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Ohio Dept. of Edn., 2024-Ohio-742.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Vandalia-Butler City School District
Board of Education, :
Appellant-Appellant, : No. 23AP-474
(C.P.C. No. 22CV-9106)
v. :
(ACCELERATED CALENDAR)
Ohio Department of Education et al., :
Appellees-Appellees. :
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on February 29, 2024
On brief: Frost Brown Todd LLP, and Alexander L. Ewing,
and Jonathan E. Roach, for appellant. Argued: Jonathan E.
Roach.
On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Erin F. Kelly, for
appellee, Ohio Department of Education. Argued: Erin F.
Kelly.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
BEATTY BLUNT, J.
{¶ 1} Vandalia-Butler City School District Board of Education (“Vandalia-Butler
SD”), appellant, appeals from the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas,
in which the trial court affirmed the December 13, 2022 resolution passed by the Ohio State
Board of Education (“State Board”)1 granting the petition filed by Ryan and Rochelle
Bednarczuk (“Petitioners”) to transfer certain property they own from the Vandalia-Butler
SD to Tipp City Exempted Village Schools (“Tipp City SD”). For the reasons that follow, we
affirm.
1 The State Board is part of the Ohio Department of Education (“ODE”), appellee in this matter. R.C. 3301.13.
No. 23AP-474 2
{¶ 2} Petitioners currently reside in Tipp City SD and their three children attend
school there. Petitioners purchased 40 undeveloped acres (the “Property”), located in
Vandalia-Butler SD, with the intention of building a home and a barn on the Property. The
Property is contiguous to Tipp City SD and is bordered on the north by a residential
subdivision, Deer Cliff Run. Deer Cliff Run is located in Tipp City SD. Further, the Property
can only be accessed through Deer Cliff Run. Because Petitioners want their children to
continue to attend school in Tipp City SD, on March 18, 2020, pursuant to R.C. 3311.24,
they submitted a petition to the State Board to transfer the Property from Vandalia-Butler
SD to Tipp City SD. In accordance with R.C. 3311.24(A)(2), the petition was forwarded to
ODE.
{¶ 3} Thereafter, pursuant to Ohio Adm.Code 3301-89-02(D), ODE requested that
Vandalia-Butler SD and Tipp City SD each submit answers to a District Information Form
for Requesting Territory Transfer, and a 25 Questions form. Both school districts
responded.
{¶ 4} On May 12, 2020, ODE issued a notice of opportunity for hearing. On June 1,
2020, Petitioners requested a hearing, and on June 8, 2020, Vandalia-Butler SD requested
a hearing.
{¶ 5} On September 25, 2020, a hearing on the matter was held before a hearing
officer for the State Board. Petitioners, Vandalia-Butler SD, and Tipp City SD appeared at
the hearing. During the hearing, testimony was received from Petitioners and
representatives of Vandalia-Butler SD, and extensive evidence was admitted by Petitioners,
Vandalia-Butler SD, Tipp City SD, and ODE. Petitioners were in favor of the transfer;
Vandalia-Butler SD was not in favor of the transfer. ODE took no official position on the
matter.
{¶ 6} On December 29, 2020, the hearing officer issued a report and
recommendation, recommending the transfer request be granted and the petition
approved. Most pertinently, the hearing officer stated:
If the transfer is approved, then any school age children living
on the [P]roperty would attend the same school as the other
school age children in the subdivision. If the transfer is not
approved, then any school age children living on the [P]roperty
No. 23AP-474 3
would attend a different school. [Vandalia-Butler SD] has not
shown a sufficiently good reason to subject future school age
children who might live on the property to that detriment by
requiring them to remain in the [Vandalia-Butler SD].
[Vandalia-Butler SD]’s apprehension about a possible exodus
from the district is not adequate to overcome approval of the
transfer under these specific facts.
(Dec. 29, 2020 Hearing Officer’s Report & Recommendation at 12.)
{¶ 7} On April 13, 2021, the State Board issued a resolution adopting the
recommendation of the hearing officer and approving Petitioners’ request for transfer of
territory from Vandalia-Butler SD to Tipp City SD. The resolution was certified on April 15,
2021.
{¶ 8} On May 21, 2021, Vandalia-Butler SD timely appealed the State Board’s
resolution approving the transfer of territory to the trial court in case No. 21CV-3277. The
trial court remanded the matter to the State Board for further investigation and clarification
regarding the location of the Property. (Jan. 18, 2022 Decision & Final Jgmt. Entry
Vacating Apr. 15, 2021 Resolution of the Ohio State Bd. of Edn. & Remanding for a New
Hearing at 5.) Upon remand, on September 23, 2022, the parties submitted a joint
stipulation of facts to the hearing officer clarifying both the location of and access to the
Property and requested the hearing officer issue his supplemental report and
recommendation based on the then-current record and the joint stipulation.
{¶ 9} On November 2, 2022, the hearing officer issued a Supplemental Report and
Recommendation (“Supp. R&R”), which adopted the initial report and recommendation
that the transfer request be granted and the petition approved, and supplemented the
findings of fact to include the joint stipulations. Vandalia-Butler SD objected to the
Supplemental R&R.
{¶ 10} On December 13, 2022, the State Board again issued a resolution adopting
the recommendation of the hearing officer and approving Petitioners’ request for transfer
of territory from Vandalia-Butler SD to Tipp City SD.
{¶ 11} Vandalia-Butler SD again appealed the State Board’s action approving the
transfer of territory requested by Petitioners to the trial court. On July 5, 2023, the trial
No. 23AP-474 4
court issued its decision and judgment entry, in which it affirmed the December 13, 2022
resolution of the State Board granting Petitioners’ request to transfer the territory. (July 5,
2023 Decision & Jgmt. Entry Affirming the December 13, 2022 Resolution of the Ohio State
Board of Education & Notice of Final Appealable Order.)
{¶ 12} Vandalia-Butler SD now timely appeals, asserting the following two
assignments of error:
[I.] The trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that there
is evidence of an educational impact supporting this transfer.
[II.] The trial court abused its discretion in finding that the
Board’s decision was supported by a preponderance of reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence.
{¶ 13} Pursuant to R.C. 3301.13, the State Board is placed within the ODE and
makes it “subject to Chapter 119[] of the Revised Code” relating to the administrative appeal
process. Thus, a decision of the State Board on an R.C. 3311.24 transfer request is
appealable under R.C. 119.12. See, e.g., Rossford Exempted Village School Dist. v. State
Bd. of Edn., 45 Ohio St.3d 356, 544 (1989), syllabus.
{¶ 14} In a R.C. 119.12 administrative appeal, the trial court reviews an order to
determine whether it is supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and is in
accordance with the law. The Supreme Court of Ohio has defined reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence as follows:
(1) “Reliable” evidence is dependable; that is, it can be
confidently trusted. In order to be reliable, there must be a
reasonable probability that the evidence is true.
(2) “Probative” evidence is evidence that tends to prove the
issue in question; it must be relevant in determining the issue.
(3) “Substantial” evidence is evidence with some weight; it
must have importance and value.
(Footnotes omitted.) Our Place, Inc. v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm., 63 Ohio St.3d 570,
571 (1992). In applying its standard of review, a trial court must “give due deference to the
administrative resolution of evidentiary conflicts.” Univ. of Cincinnati v. Conrad, 63 Ohio
No. 23AP-474 5
St.2d 108, 111 (1980). “[A]n agency’s findings of fact are presumed to be correct and must
be deferred to by a reviewing court unless that court determines that the agency’s findings
are internally inconsistent, impeached by evidence of a prior inconsistent statement, rest
upon improper inferences, or are otherwise unsupportable.” Ohio Historical Soc. v. State
Emp. Relations Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 466, 471 (1993). Although the trial court must defer to
an agency’s findings of fact, it must construe the law on its own. Id.{¶ 15} By contrast, on appeal to this court, the standard of review is more limited.
While the trial court must examine the evidence, “[s]uch is not the charge of the appellate
court.” Bd. of Edn. of Rossford Exempted Village School Dist. v. State Bd. of Edn., 63 Ohio
St.3d 705, 707 (1992). In reviewing the trial court’s determination of whether the State
Board’s order was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence, this court’s
role is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Roy v. Ohio
State Med. Bd., 80 Ohio App.3d 675, 680 (1992).
{¶ 16} A trial court abuses its discretion when it exercises its judgment in an
unwarranted way regarding a matter over which it has discretionary authority. Johnson v.
Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35. The term abuse of discretion,
“ ‘commonly employed to justify an interference by a higher court with the exercise of
discretionary power by a lower court, implies not merely error of judgment, but perversity
of will, passion, prejudice, partiality, or moral delinquency.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Id.,quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 11 (2d Ed.1910). Absent an abuse of
discretion, “ ‘[a]ppellate courts must not substitute their judgment for those of an
administrative agency or a trial court.’ ” Rossford Exempted Village School Dist. at 707,
quoting Lorain City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 40 Ohio St.3d
257, 261 (1988). Thus, the fact that we might have arrived at a different conclusion than
did the State Board is immaterial. Id. Nevertheless, “[a]n appellate court’s scope of review
on issues of law is plenary, including the issue of whether the common pleas court applied
the proper standard of review.” Bartchy v. State Bd. of Edn., 120 Ohio St.3d 205, 2008-
Ohio-4826, ¶ 43, citing Univ. Hosp., Univ. of Cincinnati College of Medicine v. State Emp.
Relations Bd., 63 Ohio St.3d 339, 343 (1992) (“it is the prerogative and the responsibility
No. 23AP-474 6
of the court entertaining the appeal to investigate whether the lower court accorded due
deference to the factfinder.”).
{¶ 17} “R.C. 3311.24 itself contains little guidance for the state board’s consideration
of a petition for a transfer [of school district territory] under that statute, “but more specific
“standards, factors, and procedures for the administrative consideration of such a petition
are contained in Ohio Adm.Code Chapter 3301-89.” Bartchy at ¶ 44. Ohio Adm.Code
3301-89-01 sets forth the State Board’s general policies regarding transfers of territory and
provides, at subsection (F), that “[a] request for transfer of territory shall be considered
upon its merit with primary consideration given to the present and ultimate good of the
pupils in the affected districts.” Ohio Adm.Code 3301-89-02(D) outlines procedures for
considering a petition for transfer of territory and sets forth 25 questions that each school
district implicated by a requested transfer must answer to aid the State Board in its
consideration. Those questions are:
(1) Why is the request being made?
(2) Are there racial isolation implications?
(a) What is the percentage of minority students in the
relinquishing district?
(b) What is the percentage of minority students in the acquiring
district?
(c) If approved, would the transfer result in an increase in the
percentage of minority pupils in the relinquishing district?
(3) What long-range educational planning for the students in
the districts affected has taken place?
(4) Will the acquiring district have the fiscal and human
resources to efficiently operate an expanded educational
program?
(5) Will the acquiring district have adequate facilities to
accommodate the additional enrollment?
(6) Will both the districts involved have pupil population and
property valuation sufficient to maintain high school centers?
No. 23AP-474 7
(7) Will the proposed transfer of territory contribute to good
district organization for the acquiring district?
(8) Does the acquiring district have the capacity to assume any
financial obligation that might accompany the relinquished
territory?
(9) Will the loss of either pupils or valuation be detrimental to
the fiscal or educational operation of the relinquishing school
district?
(10) Have previous transfers caused substantive harm to the
relinquishing district?
(11) Is the property wealth in the affected area such that the
motivation for the request could be considered a mechanism
for the receiving school district to receive additional real estate
tax revenue?
(12) Are there any school buildings in the area proposed for
transfer? If so, was the school building constructed within the
last five years?
(13) What are the distances between the school buildings
within:
(a) The present school district?
(b) The proposed school district?
(14) What are the distances between:
(a) The area proposed for transfer and each building in the
present school district?
(b) The area proposed for transfer and each building in the
proposed school district?
(15) If approved, will the requested transfer create a school
district with noncontiguous territory?
(16) Is the area being requested an isolated segment of the
district of which it is a part?
No. 23AP-474 8
(17) Will the municipal and school district boundary lines
become coterminous?
(18) For each district affected:
(a) What is the inside millage?
(b) What is the outside operating millage?
(c) What is the bonded indebtedness millage?
(19) What is the levy history in each of the affected districts?
(20) Will the transfer of school district territory cause a
negative impact on the state of Ohio?
(21) How will the projected revenues and expenditures as set
forth in the most recent five-year forecasts be impacted by the
transfer, if implemented? Each district shall provide the
department of education with copies of their most recent five-
year forecasts.
(22) What designation did each of the affected districts and
building receive on their state report cards for the last five
years?
(23) How will the proposed transfer affect the educational
offerings/programs of the affected districts?
(24) What course offerings will be available through the
acquiring district, as compared to the relinquishing district?
(25) How will the proposed transfer affect the athletic
programs and extracurricular activities of the affected
districts? Will similar programs and activities be available to
students of the affected districts?
{¶ 18} Ohio Adm.Code 3301-89-03(B) contains a non-exhaustive list of other
factors to be considered:
(1) Documented agreements made by public agencies involved
in municipal annexation proceedings should be honored;
No. 23AP-474 9
(2) A previous agreement entered into by the school districts
concerned should be honored unless all concerned districts
agree to amend it;
(3) The statement signed by the school district boards of
education after negotiations as required by paragraph (D)(4) of
Rule 3301-89-04 of the Administrative Code;
(4) There should not be undue delay in requesting a transfer for
school purposes after a territory has been annexed for
municipal purposes;
(5) The transfer shall not cause, preserve, or increase racial
isolation;
(6) All school district territories should be contiguous unless
otherwise authorized by law;
(7) School district boundary lines that have existed for a long
period of time should not be changed if substantial upheaval
results because of long-held loyalties by the parties involved;
(8) The pupil loss of the relinquishing district should not be
such that the educational program of that district is severely
impaired;
(9) The fiscal resources acquired should be commensurate with
the educational responsibilities assumed;
(10) The educational facilities of districts should be effectively
utilized; and
(11) The preference of the residents with school-age children
who live in the territory sought to be transferred to another
school district shall be considered if evidence establishing that
preference is admitted, provided the articulated reasons are
not contrary to existing statutes or rules.
{¶ 19} “In supplying the overall standard for considering school district territory
transfer requests, the Administrative Code focuses on educational impact as the key to
whether such requests should be approved.” Bartchy at ¶ 86. “ ‘[T]he several factors for
No. 23AP-474 10
consideration set forth in Ohio Adm.Code 3301-89-02[(D)]2 and 3301-89-03(B) are
intended to be an integral part of the board’s transfer decision with primary consideration
given to the present and ultimate good of all the students who are affected by the proposed
transfer.’ ” Id. at ¶ 50, quoting Garfield Hts. City School Dist. v. State Bd. of Edn., 62 Ohio
App.3d 308, 319 (1990). The good of the pupils must be the primary consideration of the
State Board. Id. at ¶ 51, citing Cincinnati City School Dist. v. State Bd. of Edn., 113 Ohio
App.3d 305, 310 (1996). Each transfer request is decided on its own particular facts under
the required balancing test. Id. at ¶ 81. Thus, “ ‘[w]hen a transfer of school districts is
proposed, a balancing must take place between many competing factors in order to achieve
the desired result of achieving what is in the best interests of the students concerned.’ ” Id.
at ¶ 51, quoting Garfield Hts. at 323. The weight to be given to those factors “necessarily
depends on the full context of the situation.” Id. at ¶ 84. The hearing officer’s balancing of
the factors should be treated with deference. Id. at ¶ 89.
{¶ 20} In its first assignment of error, Vandalia-Butler SD asserts that the trial court
erred as a matter of law in finding that there is evidence of an educational impact
supporting this transfer. We find this assignment of error meritless.
{¶ 21} In support of this assignment of error, Vandalia-Butler SD first argues that
the trial court erroneously found “that the presence of a developed subdivision to the north
[of the Property] is an ‘educational’ factor supporting the transfer.” (Brief of Appellant at
8-9.) This argument simultaneously mischaracterizes the trial court’s statements relating
to the location of the Property and utterly misstates the standard for considering school
district territory transfer requests.
{¶ 22} First, regarding the trial court’s statements pertaining to the location of the
Property, nowhere in its decision does the trial court declare or even intimate that it found
that the location of the Property, standing alone, to be evidence of educational impact.
Instead, it is clear from the trial court’s decision that it was simply and correctly
acknowledging that both the hearing officer and the State Board properly considered the
location of the Property as part of its balancing of the myriad factors required to be
2 At the time the decision in Bartchy was issued, the 25 questions to be answered by the school districts
implicated in the transfer request were set forth in Ohio Adm.Code 3301-89-02(B).
No. 23AP-474 11
considered when determining the educational impact of the proposed transfer on the
students who would be living at the Property. For example, the trial court noted under
“Facts” that the record showed “[t]he Property is contiguous to the Tipp City school district
and abuts the Deer Cliff Run Subdivision, which is located in the Tipp City district. Tipp
City schools are a shorter travel distance from the Property.” (July 5, 2023 Decision & Jgmt.
Entry Affirming the Dec. 13, 2022 Resolution of the Ohio State Bd. of Edn. & Notice of Final
Appealable Order at 2.) The trial court further set forth the hearing officer’s statement in
his initial report and recommendation “that there was a legitimate concern that the
Property should be in the same school district as the neighboring subdivision.” Id. at 2-3.
Under “Arguments on Appeal,” the trial court further pointed out the hearing officer’s
statement “that the issue was whether Petitioners’ ‘concern for their special needs child’
and the proximity of the Property to the Deer Cliff Run subdivision outweighed [Vandalia-
Butler SD’s] concerns about the transfer.” Id. at 5. Similarly, the trial court noted the
hearing officer’s observation “that the Property could be reached only by traveling through
the Deer Cliff Run subdivision” and that “the schools in Tipp City were closer to the
Property.” Id. Thus, on the face of the trial court’s decision, it is evident the trial court did
not find the location of the Property, standing alone, to be evidence of educational impact.
{¶ 23} Second, regarding Vandalia-Butler SD’s misstatement of the standard for
considering school district territory transfer requests, as previously discussed, “ ‘[w]hen a
transfer of school districts is proposed, a balancing must take place between many
competing factors in order to achieve the desired result of achieving what is in the best
interests of the students concerned.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Bartchy at ¶ 51, quoting Garfield
Hts. at 323. The weight to be given to those factors “necessarily depends on the full context
of the situation.” Id. at ¶ 84. Vandalia-Butler SD’s insistence that there are specific
educational factors or educational impact factors that always must take precedence over
non-educational factors—such as the location of the territory sought to be transferred—is
simply not supportable by the foregoing authorities. Rather, both the Ohio Administrative
Code and the established legal precedent governing the standard for considering school
district territory transfer requests make clear that all of the competing factors must be
considered and balanced, “ ‘with primary consideration given to the present and ultimate
No. 23AP-474 12
good of all the students who are affected by the proposed transfer.’ ” Id. at ¶ 50, quoting
Garfield Hts. at 319.
{¶ 24} Moreover, the consideration of the location of the Property by both the
hearing officer and the State Board was both proper and mandated by the applicable law.
Most notably, amongst the 25 questions set forth in Ohio Adm.Code 3301-89-02(D) to be
utilized by the State Board in considering a transfer of territory request are numbers (14),
(15), and (16), which specifically relate to the location of the territory proposed to be
transferred in relation to both school districts involved. Furthermore, the list of other
factors to be considered, delineated under Ohio Adm.Code 3301-89-03(B), is specifically
noted to be non-exhaustive, to wit: “[o]ther factors that a hearing officer shall consider in
hearing any request for a transfer of territory for school purposes include, but are not
necessarily limited to * * *.” In other words, a hearing officer is free to consider any
additional factors integral to the determination of whether a requested transfer of territory
should be granted. Thus, the hearing officer’s and the State Board’s consideration of the
location of the Property—including its proximity to the Deer Cliff Run subdivision, its
proximity to the schools in Tipp City SD, and the fact that it can only be accessed via the
Deer Cliff Run subdivision—was entirely appropriate.
{¶ 25} Vandalia-Butler SD also contends in support of its first assignment of error
that there is a “lack of evidence supporting the hearing officer’s key conclusion (i.e., that the
Property’s location in relation to the Deer Cliff Run subdivision justifies the transfer)” and
that the trial court “erred as a matter of law in finding that evidence of an ‘educational
impact’ supports the transfer.” (Brief of Appellant at 14-15.) As with its argument relating
to the trial court’s statements pertaining to the location of the Property discussed above,
this contention again mischaracterizes the trial court’s statements on the point and again
misconstrues the standard for considering school district territory transfer requests. We
therefore reject this contention, as well.
{¶ 26} We have already set forth the trial court’s statements regarding the evidence
concerning the Property’s location in relation to the Deer Cliff Run subdivision above and
will not repeat ourselves. We have also already thoroughly discussed the proper standard
for considering school district territory transfer requests, which requires a balancing test of
No. 23AP-474 13
“many competing factors in order to achieve the desired result of achieving what is in the
best interests of the students concerned.” (Citation omitted.) Bartchy at ¶ 51. At its core,
under its first assignment of error, Vandalia-Butler SD is attempting to have this court
reweigh and balance all the factors to be considered. As set forth above, this is not the
standard of review for this court. In short, it was entirely within the purview of the hearing
officer and, ultimately, the State Board to decide “that there was a legitimate concern that
the Property should be in the same school district as the neighboring subdivision” and that
“the transfer achieves the ‘present and ultimate good’ of the students in both districts.”
(July 5, 2023 Decision & Jgmt. Entry Affirming the Dec. 13, 2022 Resolution of the Ohio
State Bd. of Edn. & Notice of Final Appelable Order at 2-3, citing Dec. 29, 2020 Report &
Recommendation.) The trial court correctly deferred to the State Board on these issues.
{¶ 27} Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellant’s first
assignment of error.
{¶ 28} In its second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court abused
its discretion in finding that the State Board’s decision was supported by a preponderance
of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. We disagree.
{¶ 29} In support of this assignment of error, Vandalia-Butler SD first argues that
because there is no evidence showing how or when the Property will be developed, the
hearing officer’s conclusion that the Property should be placed in the same school district
as the Deer Cliff Run subdivision is fundamentally flawed as being based on speculation.
Vandalia-Butler SD points out that even Petitioners conceded at the hearing that the
Property could ultimately be subdivided into its own residential neighborhood. Yet, this
possibility is much more speculative than the evidence relied upon by the hearing officer in
concluding that the Property should be in the same school district as that of the immediately
adjacent Deer Cliff Run subdivision. Specifically, the evidence shows Petitioners have three
elementary school age children, all of whom currently attend school in Tipp City SD. They
purchased the Property with the intention of building a home and a barn on the Property.
They want their children to continue to attend Tipp City SD schools. All this evidence was
undisputed, and the hearing officer was entirely free to believe the testimony of Petitioners
on these points as the factfinder.
No. 23AP-474 14
{¶ 30} Furthermore, after the remand from the first appeal to the Franklin County
Court of Common Pleas, the parties jointly stipulated to three key facts: that the Deer Cliff
Run subdivision directly abuts the north line of the Property and access to the Property;
that the Property is not located within the Deer Cliff Run subdivision; and that the only
public access to the Property is through the Deer Cliff Run subdivision.
{¶ 31} Thus, taken together, the evidence showing the intent of Petitioners to reside
on the Property with their children (which includes both their testimony as well as their
Petition and supporting documents) and the location of the Property in relation to the Deer
Cliff Run subdivision is reliable, probative, and substantial evidence fully supporting the
hearing officer’s conclusion that the Property should be in the same school district as that
of the Deer Cliff Run subdivision. That Vandalia-Butler SD disagrees with this conclusion
does not make it unsupported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.
{¶ 32} Vandalia-Butler SD also argues that there is no evidence, let alone reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence, submitted showing the educational impact that the
requested transfer would have on pupils at the Property, and therefore, this court must look
to secondary considerations. Specifically, Vandalia-Butler SD argues that its evidence of
the loss of annual tax revenue, were the transfer request to be granted, should have been
more fully considered, and indeed, that it should have been dispositive. We reject this
position.
{¶ 33} The record clearly shows that the hearing officer did fully consider the loss
of annual tax revenue to Vandalia-Butler SD should the transfer request be granted. The
hearing officer specified in his findings of fact that “[t]he annual real property tax on the
unimproved property, currently paid to [Vandalia-Butler SD], is $3,236.17.” (Nov. 2, 2022
Hearing Officer’s Supp. Report & Recommendation Following Remand at 5.) The hearing
officer ultimately concluded, however, that “there is little present detriment [to Vandalia-
Butler SD’s tax revenue], only the loss of a small annual tax on the unimproved property.”
Id. at 12. Again, that Vandalia-Butler SD disagrees with the hearing officer’s conclusion
(and, ultimately, that of the State Board) does not make it unsupported by reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence.
No. 23AP-474 15
{¶ 34} In short, by way of its arguments under this second assignment of error, as it
did by way of its first, Vandalia-Butler SD is effectively asking this court to reweigh the
evidence, rebalance the factors, and substitute its judgment for that of the State Board. But
it is for the hearing officer and, ultimately, the State Board, not this court, to weigh these
facts and arguments and determine what will serve the present and ultimate good of the
pupils concerned. See Garfield Hts. at 323. We find no error here, when the hearing officer
acknowledged evidence on both sides of the issues but decided that one party’s evidence
deserved more weight.
{¶ 35} Accordingly, based on our above discussion, we find the trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it found the State Board’s order was supported by reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence. Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 36} Therefore, for all the foregoing reasons, we overrule appellant’s two
assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common
Pleas.
Judgment affirmed.
BOGGS and EDELSTEIN, JJ., concur.
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