In re C.B. ( 2024 )

[Cite as In re C.B., 2024-Ohio-1332.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
HIGHLAND COUNTY
:
IN THE MATTER OF : CASE NO. 23CA17
23CA18
C.B. AND M.B. : 23CA19
23CA20
DEPENDENT CHILDREN. :
DECISION & JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
_______________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Steven H. Eckstein, Washington Court House, Ohio, for Appellant.
Anneka P. Collins, Highland County Prosecuting Attorney, and
Molly Bolek, Highland County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney,
Hillsboro, Ohio, for Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
CIVIL CASE FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT, JUVENILE DIVISION
DATE JOURNALIZED:4-2-24
ABELE, J.
{¶1} This is a consolidated appeal from a Highland County
Common Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, judgment that granted
Highland County Department of Job and Family Services, Children
Services Division, appellee herein, permanent custody of five-
year-old C.B. and two-year-old M.B.
{¶2} Appellants, the children’s biological parents, raise
the following assignment of error:
“THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANT OF PERMANENT
CUSTODY TO THE HIGHLAND COUNTY JOBS AND
FAMILY SERVICES CHILDREN’S DIVISION WAS
AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE.”
{¶3} On May 3, 2021, appellee filed a complaint that
alleged the two children are abused, neglected, “and/or”
dependent children. The complaint alleged that on March 18,
2021, appellee learned that the mother, about to give birth to a
child, had not had any prenatal care and had been in labor for
about one day. The mother indicated that Fayette County had
removed her other children from her custody due to a lack of
running water in the home. The caseworker contacted Fayette
County and learned that the children had been removed due to
methamphetamine use. After the mother gave birth, the newborn’s
cord blood tested positive for methamphetamine.
{¶4} On March 24, 2021, a caseworker visited the family’s
home, but was not able to make contact. This caseworker went to
the home a second time on that date and again could not make
contact.
{¶5} On March 25, 2021, the caseworker asked law
enforcement officers to conduct a welfare check. The officers
reported that they were unable to contact the family.
{¶6} On March 29, 2021, the caseworker and a police officer
visited the home, and this time, they contacted the family. The
mother admitted that she had used methamphetamine with the
father and in the children’s presence. Appellants submitted to
random drug screens and mother’s test returned positive for
methamphetamine, and father’s test returned positive for
methamphetamine, cocaine, and Tramadol. The caseworker
“completed a safety plan with paternal grandmother.”
{¶7} On April 15, 2021, a caseworker visited the family and
conducted another round of drug screens. Appellants tested
positive for methamphetamine and the father also tested positive
for THC.
{¶8} Two weeks later, a caseworker attempted to visit the
paternal grandmother’s home but could not make contact. The
caseworker then visited appellants’ home. At first, no one
answered. The caseworker, however, observed a car in the
driveway that contained car seats. The caseworker then drove to
a location where she could see the home and “law enforcement was
contacted due to concerns that the safety plan was not being
followed.” While waiting, the caseworker observed appellants
“walking out to the car with the children.” Appellants reported
that “they only had the children for a few hours” because the
paternal grandmother had been at a doctor’s appointment.
{¶9} Consequently, the agency requested the court to grant
it emergency temporary custody of the children or enter another
appropriate disposition. Also on May 3, 2021, the agency filed
a motion for emergency temporary custody of the children, which
the trial court granted.
{¶10} On June 15, 2021, the trial court adjudicated the
children dependent and dismissed the abuse and neglect
allegations. The court also placed the children in appellee’s
temporary custody for a one-year period.
{¶11} Nine months later, on April 18, 2022, appellee filed a
permanent-custody motion. Appellee later amended this motion to
request a six-month extension of temporary custody. The trial
court granted appellee’s motion.
{¶12} On October 12, 2022, appellee filed a second
permanent-custody motion. As with the first permanent-custody
motion, appellee also later amended this motion to request an
extension of temporary custody so that appellee could conduct a
home study for a potential placement. The trial court granted
this motion and continued the children in appellee’s temporary
custody.
{¶13} On April 27, 2023, appellee filed a third and final
permanent-custody motion. At the hearing, the mother testified,
as if on cross-examination, that she has not completed a drug
treatment program. She agreed she tested positive on 19 of the
20 drug screens that she submitted throughout the pendency of
the case and she is “worse off now than when” the children
initially were removed from her care.
{¶14} The father likewise testified as if on cross-
examination and stated that he did not complete a drug treatment
program and he tested positive for drugs on 19 of the 20 drug
screens.
{¶15} Visitation monitor Taylor Ball testified that
appellants attended 107 of 111 visits and the visits went well.
Ball explained that the children appeared to be bonded to
appellants.
{¶16} The children’s foster father testified that the
children lived in his home since April 30, 2021. He stated that
he and his wife are interested in adopting the children.
{¶17} Rebecca Souther testified that she has been the
family’s caseworker since the children’s May 2021 removal. She
explained that the case plan required appellants to complete
drug and alcohol assessments, to complete mental health
assessments, and to maintain stable housing and employment.
Souther stated that neither parent completed a drug treatment
program or a mental health assessment.
{¶18} Caseworker Souther agreed that appellants’ visits with
the children have been appropriate. She also reported that the
children are doing well in the foster home and seem to be bonded
to the foster family.
{¶19} Caseworker Souther also stated that mother identified
two potential placements for the children. The first placement
“back[ed] out,” and the second placement did not have the home
study approved.
{¶20} The mother testified again on direct examination and
reported that she (1) currently stays “between hotels and
family,” (2) has been employed as a nursing assistant for 13
years, (3) is enrolled in an online drug treatment program, (4)
continues to test positive for drugs, (5) is enrolled in a
mental health program through the same online provider, and (6)
has not entered an inpatient treatment center due to the
financial costs. The father testified that he did not enter a
treatment program because he cannot “make” himself “do it.”
{¶21} On September 13, 2023, the trial court granted
appellee permanent custody of the two children. The court found
that the children have been in appellee’s temporary custody for
12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period and that
placing the children in appellee’s permanent custody is in their
best interests.
{¶22} With respect to the children’s best interests, the
court found that appellants have maintained appropriate contact
with the children. However, the children are bonded with the
foster family, and the foster parents are willing to adopt both
children. The guardian ad litem also recommended that the court
grant appellee permanent custody of the children. The
caseworker stated that no viable relative placements exist and
that the children are doing well in their current placements.
Also, appellants are unable or unwilling to provide the children
with a legally secure permanent placement. They currently
reside either in hotels or with family members and remain
addicted to drugs and continue to test positive.
{¶23} The trial court explained:
This case presents yet another unfortunate example
of parents being unwilling to make the right choices and
sacrifices to reunify with their children. They have
chosen their respective illegal drug consumption and
unwillingness to provide a stable home for the children
over reunifying with them. Simply visiting is not
enough.
The court did not believe that granting appellants more time
would be in the children’s best interests: “To grant additional
time to the parents for reunification is only delaying what is
in the best interest of the children.” The court did not
believe that appellants’ efforts would be any different if it
granted them more time. Consequently, the court granted
appellee permanent custody of the two children. These appeals
followed.
{¶24} In their combined and sole assignment of error,
appellants assert that the trial court’s decision is against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, they contend
that the trial court could not have formed a firm belief that
placing the children in appellee’s permanent custody is in their
best interests when the mother was unable to quit her job to
enter inpatient drug treatment and was subject to a $350 monthly
child support obligation. Appellants assert that the mother’s
“recovery from drugs was too difficult to manage, she could not
enter inpatient drug treatment as it required her to quit her
job and then she could not pay her child support.”
{¶25} Appellants additionally fault the trial court for
failing to understand “what drug addiction is.” Appellants
charge that “[t]o call it a habit and the parents willingly
using and choosing drugs over their children is not consistent
with any drug addiction theory.” Appellants contend that the
trial court should have denied appellee’s request for permanent
custody and, instead, should have required the agency to file a
new complaint to start a new two-year period to allow them to
continue to work on their case plan.
A
{¶26} Generally, a reviewing court will not disturb a trial
court’s permanent custody decision unless the decision is
against the manifest weight of the evidence. E.g., In re B.E.,
4th Dist. Highland No. 13CA26, 2014-Ohio-3178, ¶ 27; In re R.S.,
4th Dist. Highland No. 13CA22, 2013-Ohio-5569, ¶ 29; accord In
re Z.C., Slip Op., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 1.
“Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination
of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in
a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than
the other. It indicates clearly to the jury that the
party having the burden of proof will be entitled to
their verdict, if, on weighing the evidence in their
minds, they shall find the greater amount of credible
evidence sustains the issue which is to be established
before them. Weight is not a question of mathematics,
but depends on its effect in inducing belief.’”
Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972
N.E.2d 517, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,
387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1594
(6th Ed.1990).
{¶27} When an appellate court reviews whether a trial
court’s permanent custody decision is against the manifest
weight of the evidence, the court “‘“weighs the evidence and all
reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses
and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence,
the [finder of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a
manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.”’” Eastley at ¶ 20, quoting
Tewarson v. Simon, 141 Ohio App.3d 103, 115, 750 N.E.2d 176 (9th
Dist.2001), quoting Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 678 N.E.2d
541, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485
N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983); accord In re Pittman, 9th Dist.
Summit No. 20894, 2002-Ohio-2208, ¶¶ 23-24. We further observe,
however, that issues relating to the credibility of witnesses
and the weight to be given the evidence are primarily for the
trier of fact. As the court explained in Seasons Coal Co. v.
Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984):
The underlying rationale of giving deference to the
findings of the trial court rests with the knowledge
that the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses
and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice
inflections, and use these observations in weighing the
credibility of the proffered testimony.
{¶28} Moreover, deferring to the trial court on matters of
credibility is “crucial in a child custody case, where there may
be much evident in the parties’ demeanor and attitude that does
not translate to the record well (Emphasis sic).” Davis v.
Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 419, 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997).
Accord In re Christian, 4th Dist. No. 04CA 10, 2004-Ohio-3146, ¶
7.
{¶29} The question that an appellate court must resolve when
reviewing a permanent custody decision under the manifest weight
of the evidence standard is “whether the juvenile court’s
findings * * * were supported by clear and convincing evidence.”
In re K.H., 119 Ohio St.3d 538, 2008-Ohio-4825, 895 N.E.2d 809,
¶ 43. “Clear and convincing evidence” is:
the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the
mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as
to the allegations sought to be established. It is
intermediate, being more than a mere preponderance, but
not to the extent of such certainty as required beyond
a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. It does not
mean clear and unequivocal.
In re Estate of Haynes, 25 Ohio St.3d 101, 103-04, 495 N.E.2d 23(1986). In determining whether a trial court based its decision
upon clear and convincing evidence, “a reviewing court will
examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had
sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of
proof.” State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74, 564 N.E.2d 54(1990); accord In re Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368, 481 N.E.2d
613 (1985), citing Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120
N.E.2d 118 (1954) (“Once the clear and convincing standard has
been met to the satisfaction of the [trial] court, the reviewing
court must examine the record and determine if the trier of fact
had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy this burden of
proof.”); In re Adoption of Lay, 25 Ohio St.3d 41, 42-43, 495
N.E.2d 9 (1986). Cf. In re Adoption of Masa, 23 Ohio St.3d 163,
165, 492 N.E.2d 140 (1986) (whether a fact has been “proven by
clear and convincing evidence in a particular case is a
determination for the [trial] court and will not be disturbed on
appeal unless such determination is against the manifest weight
of the evidence”).
{¶30} Thus, if a children services agency presented
competent and credible evidence upon which the trier of fact
reasonably could have formed a firm belief that permanent
custody is warranted, the court’s decision is not against the
manifest weight of the evidence. In re R.M., 2013-Ohio-3588,
997 N.E.2d 169, ¶ 62 (4th Dist.); In re R.L., 2nd Dist. Greene
Nos. 2012CA32 and Greene Nos. 2012CA33, 2012-Ohio-6049, ¶ 17,
quoting In re A.U., 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 22287, 2008-Ohio-
187, ¶ 9 (“A reviewing court will not overturn a court’s grant
of permanent custody to the state as being contrary to the
manifest weight of the evidence ‘if the record contains
competent, credible evidence by which the court could have
formed a firm belief or conviction that the essential statutory
elements * * * have been established.’ ”).
{¶31} Once a reviewing court finishes its examination, the
judgment may be reversed only if it appears that the fact-
finder, when resolving the conflicts in evidence, “ ‘clearly
lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice
that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’ ”
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20
Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). A
reviewing court should find a trial court’s permanent custody
decision against the manifest weight of the evidence only in the
“ ‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against
the [decision].’ ” Id., quoting Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at 175,
485 N.E.2d 717; accord State v. Lindsey, 87 Ohio St.3d 479, 483,
721 N.E.2d 995 (2000).
B
{¶32} We recognize that “parents’ interest in the care,
custody, and control of their children ‘is perhaps the oldest of
the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e United
States Supreme] Court.’ ” In re B.C., 141 Ohio St.3d 55, 2014-
Ohio-4558, 21 N.E.3d 308, ¶ 19, quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). Indeed, the
right to raise one’s “child is an ‘essential’ and ‘basic’ civil
right.” In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157, 556 N.E.2d 1169(1990); accord In re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48, 679 N.E.2d 680(1997); see Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct.
1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (“natural parents have a fundamental
right to the care and custody of their children”). Thus,
“parents who are ‘suitable’ have a ‘paramount’ right to the
custody of their children.” B.C. at ¶ 19, quoting In re
Perales, 52 Ohio St.2d 89, 97, 369 N.E.2d 1047 (1977), citing
Clark v. Bayer, 32 Ohio St. 299, 310 (1877); Murray, 52 Ohio
St.3d at 157, 556 N.E.2d 1169.
{¶33} A parent’s rights, however, are not absolute. In re
D.A., 113 Ohio St.3d 88, 2007-Ohio-1105, 862 N.E.2d 829, ¶ 11.
Rather, “ ‘it is plain that the natural rights of a parent * * *
are always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child, which
is the polestar or controlling principle to be observed.’ ” In
re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106, 391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979),
quoting In re R.J.C., 300 So.2d 54, 58 (Fla. App. 1974). Thus,
the State may terminate parental rights when a child’s best
interest demands such termination. D.A. at ¶ 11.
{¶34} Before a court may award a children services agency
permanent custody of a child, R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) requires the
court to hold a hearing. The primary purpose of the hearing is
to allow the court to determine whether the child’s best
interests would be served by permanently terminating the
parental relationship and by awarding permanent custody to the
agency. Id. Additionally, when considering whether to grant a
children services agency permanent custody, a trial court should
consider the underlying purposes of R.C. Chapter 2151: “to care
for and protect children, ‘whenever possible, in a family
environment, separating the child from the child’s parents only
when necessary for the child’s welfare or in the interests of
public safety.’ ” In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104,
862 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 29, quoting R.C. 2151.01(A).
C
{¶35} A children services agency may obtain permanent
custody of a child by (1) requesting it in the abuse, neglect or
dependency complaint under R.C. 2151.353, or (2) filing a motion
under R.C. 2151.413 after obtaining temporary custody. In this
case, appellee sought permanent custody by filing a motion under
R.C. 2151.413. When an agency files a permanent custody motion
under R.C. 2151.413, R.C. 2151.414 applies. R.C. 2151.414(A).
{¶36} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) permits a trial court to grant
permanent custody of a child to a children services agency if
the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
child’s best interest would be served by the award of permanent
custody and that one of the following conditions applies:
(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned or has
not been in the temporary custody of one or more public
children services agencies or private child placing
agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive
twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18,
1999, and the child cannot be placed with either of the
child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not
be placed with the child’s parents.
(b) The child is abandoned.
(c) The child is orphaned, and there are no
relatives of the child who are able to take permanent
custody.
(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of
one or more public children services agencies or private
child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a
consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after
March 18, 1999.
(e) The child or another child in the custody of
the parent or parents from whose custody the child has
been removed has been adjudicated an abused, neglected,
or dependent child on three separate occasions by any
court in this state or another state.
{¶37} Thus, before a trial court may award a children
services agency permanent custody, it must find (1) that one of
the circumstances described in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) applies, and
(2) that awarding the children services agency permanent custody
would further the child’s best interest.
{¶38} In the case at bar, the trial court found that the
children had been in the agency’s temporary custody for more
than 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period, and thus, that
R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) applies. Appellants do not challenge
this finding.
{¶39} R.C. 2151.414(D) directs a trial court to consider
“all relevant factors,” as well as specific factors, to
determine whether a child’s best interest will be served by
granting a children services agency permanent custody. The
listed factors include: (1) the child’s interaction and
interrelationship with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives,
foster parents and out-of-home providers, and any other person
who may significantly affect the child; (2) the child’s wishes,
as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s
guardian ad litem, with due regard for the child’s maturity; (3)
the child’s custodial history; (4) the child’s need for a
legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of
placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody
to the agency; and (5) whether any factors listed under R.C.
2151.414(E)(7) to (11) apply.
{¶40} Courts that are determining whether a grant of
permanent custody to a children services agency will promote a
child’s best interest must consider “all relevant [best
interest] factors,” as well as the “five enumerated statutory
factors.” C.F. at ¶ 57, citing In re Schaefer, 111 Ohio St.3d
498, 2006-Ohio-5513, 857 N.E.2d 532, ¶ 56; accord In re C.G.,
9th Dist. Summit Nos. 24097 and Summit Nos. 24099, 2008-Ohio-
3773, ¶ 28; In re N.W., 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 07AP-590 and
Franklin Nos. 07AP-591, 2008-Ohio-297, ¶ 19. However, none of
the best interest factors are entitled to “greater weight or
heightened significance.” C.F. at ¶ 57. Instead, the trial
court considers the totality of the circumstances when making
its best interest determination. In re K.M.S., 3rd Dist. Marion
Nos. 9-15-37, 9-15-38, and Marion Nos. 9-15-39, 2017-Ohio-142, ¶
24; In re A.C., 9th Dist. Summit No. 27328, 2014-Ohio-4918, ¶
46. In general, “[a] child’s best interest is served by placing
the child in a permanent situation that fosters growth,
stability, and security.” In re C.B.C., 4th Dist. Lawrence Nos.
15CA18 and Lawrence Nos. 15CA19, 2016-Ohio-916, ¶ 66, citing In
re Adoption of Ridenour, 61 Ohio St.3d 319, 324, 574 N.E.2d 1055(1991).
{¶41} In the case sub judice, appellants do not explicitly
challenge the trial court’s findings regarding one of the best
interest factors. Instead, they generally assert that the trial
court could not have “reasonably form[ed] a firm belief that
permanent custody is in the best interest of the children.”
Appellants assert that the trial court placed improper reliance
on their drug addiction and failed to recognize that the mother
could not enter a drug treatment program due to her full-time
employment and her monthly child support obligation.
{¶42} Appellee, however, contends that the record contains
clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s
decision that placing the children in its permanent custody is
in their best interests. We agree with appellee.
Children’s Interactions and Interrelationships
{¶43} The evidence shows that appellants share a bond with
the children and dearly love them. Appellants consistently
visited the children and had telephone contact with them outside
of their supervised visitations.
{¶44} The children are doing well with the foster family and
appear bonded to the family. The foster parents intend to adopt
the children if granted the opportunity.
Children’s Wishes
{¶45} The trial court noted that the children’s guardian ad
litem recommended that the court place the children in
appellee’s temporary custody. C.F. at ¶ 55 (R.C. 2151.414
“unambiguously gives the trial court the choice of considering
the child’s wishes directly from the child or through the
guardian ad litem”); In re S.M., 4th Dist. Highland No. 14CA4,
2014-Ohio- 2961, ¶ 32 (recognizing that R.C. 2151.414 permits
juvenile courts to consider a child’s wishes as child directly
expresses or through the GAL).
Custodial History
{¶46} The children have been in appellee’s temporary custody
since May 3, 2021. As of the date that appellee filed its
permanent custody motion, the children had been in appellee’s
temporary custody for almost two years. Thus, the children have
been in appellee’s temporary custody for 12 or more months of a
consecutive 22-month period.
Legally Secure Permanent Placement
{¶47} “Although the Ohio Revised Code does not define the
term, ‘legally secure permanent placement,’ this court and
others have generally interpreted the phrase to mean a safe,
stable, consistent environment where a child’s needs will be
met.” In re M.B., 4th Dist. Highland No. 15CA19, 2016-Ohio-793,
¶ 56, citing In re Dyal, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 01CA12, 2001 WL
925423, *9 (Aug. 9, 2001) (“legally secure permanent placement”
means a “stable, safe, and nurturing environment”); see also In
re K.M., 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 15AP-64 and 15AP-66, 2015-
Ohio-4682, ¶ 28 (legally secure permanent placement requires
more than a stable home and income, but also requires an
environment that will provide for child’s needs); In re J.H.,
11th Dist. Lake No. 2012-L-126, 2013-Ohio-1293, ¶ 95 (mother was
unable to provide legally secure permanent placement when she
lacked physical and emotional stability and father was unable to
do so when he lacked grasp of parenting concepts); In re J.W.,
171 Ohio App.3d 248, 2007-Ohio-2007, 870 N.E.2d 245, ¶ 34 (10th
Dist.) (Sadler, J., dissenting) (legally secure permanent
placement means “a placement that is stable and consistent”);
Black’s Law Dictionary 1354 (6th Ed. 1990) (defining “secure” to
mean, in part, “not exposed to danger; safe; so strong, stable
or firm as to insure safety”); id. at 1139 (defining “permanent”
to mean, in part, “[c]ontinuing or enduring in the same state,
status, place, or the like without fundamental or marked change,
not subject to fluctuation, or alteration, fixed or intended to
be fixed; lasting; abiding; stable; not temporary or
transient”). Thus, “[a] legally secure permanent placement is
more than a house with four walls. Rather, it generally
encompasses a stable environment where a child will live in
safety with one or more dependable adults who will provide for
the child’s needs.” M.B. at ¶ 56.
{¶48} In the case at bar, the evidence shows that the
children need a legally secure permanent placement and that they
cannot achieve this type of placement without granting appellee
permanent custody. Appellants have not successfully completed a
drug treatment program despite nearly two years of agency
involvement. The father does not believe that he can “make”
himself “do it.” The mother has not taken adequate steps to try
to overcome her drug addiction and admitted that, at the time of
the permanent custody hearing, she was “worse” than she had been
when appellee first removed the children from her care. While
she recently started to engage in an online treatment program,
she continued to test positive for drugs. The trial court
believed that the mother’s past conduct and her six-year history
of abusing drugs are predictors of her future conduct and did
not bode well for the children. See In re West, 4th Dist.
Athens No. 05CA4, 2005-Ohio-2977, ¶ 28, citing In re A.S., 12th
Dist. Butler Nos. CA2004-07-182 and CA2004-08-185, 2004-Ohio-
6323, ¶ 37 (“Past history is often the best predictor of future
conduct. While surely people can change, the facts do not
indicate that [the biological parents] have the motivation or
ability to follow through and do what is necessary to regain
custody of their child.”); In re Vaughn, 4th Dist. Adams No.
00CA692, 2000 WL 33226177, *7 (Dec. 6, 2000) (“To further the
interests of the children, the court must consider any evidence
available to it, including a parent’s pattern of conduct. Some
of the most reliable evidence for the court to consider is the
past history of the children and the parents.”); see also In re
Brown, 60 Ohio App.3d 136, 139, 573 N.E.2d 1217 (1st Dist.1989)
(stating that the mother’s “past parenting history and her
ability to comply with prior reunification plans regarding her
other children were relevant considerations in the juvenile
court’s dispositional determination” to award a children
services agency permanent custody).
{¶49} Thus, during the nearly two years that this case had
been pending, appellants failed to conquer their drug addiction
so as to give appellee assurance that, if the court returned the
children to their custody, they would not continue to abuse
drugs. Appellants have an unfortunate and lengthy history of
substance abuse and did not demonstrate that they would be
capable or willing to try to remain drug-free for their
children’s health, safety, and welfare.
{¶50} Appellants nevertheless assert that the trial court
should have afforded them two more years to try to conquer their
addiction. As we have recognized in the past, however, the
permanent custody statutes do not contemplate leaving children
in custodial limbo for an extended period of time while a parent
attempts to demonstrate that the parent is capable and willing
to provide the children with a legally secure permanent
placement. See R.C. 2151.415(D)(4) (prohibiting court from
granting “an agency more than two extensions of temporary
custody” and from ordering “an existing temporary custody order
to continue beyond two years after the date on which the
complaint was filed or the child was first placed into shelter
care, whichever date is earlier, regardless of whether any
extensions have been previously ordered pursuant to division (D)
of this section”). Additionally, keeping children in limbo is
not in their best interests. In re B.C., 141 Ohio St.3d 55,
2014–Ohio–4558, 21 N.E.3d 308, ¶ 20, quoting Lehman v. Lycoming
Cty. Children’s Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513–514, 102 S.Ct.
3231, 73 L.Ed.2d 928 (1982) (“ ‘There is little that can be as
detrimental to a child’s sound development as uncertainty over
whether he is to remain in his current “home,” under the care of
his parents or foster parents, especially when such uncertainty
is prolonged.’ ”).
{¶51} We recognize that drug addiction is a “powerful and
difficult” force to overcome. In re Ca.S., 4th Dist. Pickaway
No. 21CA10, 2021-Ohio-3874, ¶ 65. “However, we do not believe
that it is in a child’s best interest to continue the child in
custodial limbo — or to return a child to a parent’s care — when
the parent is engaged in a long-term fight against drug
addiction.” Id.{¶52} In sum, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion
that the children cannot be placed in appellants’ custody, and
the children desperately need “stability and security * * * to
become productive and well-adjusted members of the adult
community.” Ridenour, 61 Ohio St.3d at 324. Their best
interests will be “served by placing them in a permanent
situation that fosters growth, stability, and security.” In re
C.B.C., 4th Dist. Lawrence Nos. 15CA18 and 15CA19, 2016-Ohio-
916, ¶ 66, citing Ridenour.
{¶53} The evidence also shows that the children enjoy a
stable placement with the foster family. The foster parents are
interested in adopting the children, and the foster parents are
able and willing to provide the children with the “stability and
security” that they need “to become productive and well-adjusted
members of the adult community.” Ridenour, 61 Ohio St.3d at
324. The trial court could have quite reasonably determined
that placing the children in appellee’s permanent custody would
give them the best opportunity to become productive members of
society. The trial court had no obligation to give appellants
more time to become drug-free or to return the children to their
custody.
As this court often notes:
“* * * [A] child should not have to endure the
inevitable to its great detriment and harm in order to
give the * * * [parent] an opportunity to prove her
suitability. To anticipate the future, however, is at
most, a difficult basis for a judicial determination.
The child’s present condition and environment is the
subject for decision not the expected or anticipated
behavior of unsuitability or unfitness of the * * *
[parent]. * * * The law does not require the court to
experiment with the child’s welfare to see if he will
suffer great detriment or harm.”
In re W.C.J., 4th Dist. Jackson No. 14CA3, 2014-Ohio-5841, ¶ 48,
quoting In re Bishop, 36 Ohio App.3d 123, 126, 521 N.E.2d 838(5th Dist.1987). For all of these reasons, the trial court’s
decision is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶54} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we
overrule appellants’ sole assignment of error and affirm the
trial court’s judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the appeal be affirmed and that appellee
recover of appellants the costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this
appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this
Court directing the Highland County Common Pleas Court, Juvenile
Division, to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that
mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J. & Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion
For the Court
BY:__________________________
Peter B. Abele, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a
final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
commences from the date of filing with the clerk.