In re J.C. , 2023 Ohio 3070 ( 2023 )

[Cite as In re J.C., 2023-Ohio-3070.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
IN RE: J.C. : APPEAL NO. C-220544
TRIAL NO. 22-1680Z
:
: O P I N I O N.
Appeal From: Hamilton County Juvenile Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Appellant Discharged
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: September 1, 2023
Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Judith Anton Lapp,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Joshua A. Thompson, Assistant
Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
KINSLEY, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant J.C. appeals her adjudication for resisting arrest. In two
assignments of error, J.C. challenges whether there was sufficient evidence to support her
adjudication and whether her adjudication was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Following our review of the record, we hold there was insufficient evidence to support J.C.’s
adjudication. Accordingly, the judgment of the juvenile court is reversed, and J.C. is
discharged.
Factual and Procedural Background
{¶2} On May 21, 2022, Officer Kevin Woodruff received a call to investigate potential
problems at a group home. Woodruff made two visits to the group home that day to
investigate two separate issues. During his second visit, he spoke with the group home
supervisor and the alleged victim. Based on these conversations, Woodruff determined he
had probable cause to arrest J.C. for aggravated menacing. When Woodruff and another
officer arrested J.C., she yelled, attempted to kick the officers, and threw herself ont0 the
ground. Further, as the officers physically forced J.C. into a police cruiser, she continued to
threaten the officers and use physical force against them.
{¶3} J.C. was charged with aggravated menacing and resisting arrest. The
complaint alleged that J.C. threatened another juvenile, who was living at the same group
home as J.C., with violence. But at trial, the state voluntarily dismissed the aggravated-
menacing charge.
{¶4} The juvenile court then held a trial on the resisting-arrest charge. Woodruff
was the sole witness. He testified that his conversations with the group home supervisor and
the alleged victim were the basis for his determination that he had probable cause to arrest
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
J.C. But he did not testify as to the details of these conversations or as to any other basis for
why he arrested J.C. J.C. did not cross-examine Woodruff and did not call any witnesses.
{¶5} J.C. moved for an acquittal under Crim.R. 29, arguing there was insufficient
evidence that there was probable cause for a lawful arrest. The magistrate denied the motion
and adjudicated J.C. delinquent for resisting arrest. J.C. filed objections, which the juvenile
court overruled. The juvenile court adopted the magistrate’s findings. At the hearing on the
disposition, the juvenile court held that it no longer had the legal authority to hold J.C. in
detention given that she had reached the age of majority. The juvenile court imposed court
costs as a disposition against J.C., which it remitted due to her indigency.
{¶6} J.C. now appeals.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
{¶7} “The standard of review when determining whether a juvenile court’s
adjudication of delinquency is supported by sufficient evidence is identical to the standard
used in adult criminal cases.” In re R.B., 2021-Ohio-3749, 179 N.E.3d 749, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.).
“The court on review asks whether after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.{¶8} R.C. 2921.33(A) provides, “No person, recklessly or by force, shall resist or
interfere with a lawful arrest of the person or another.” “A lawful arrest is an element of
resisting arrest and the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the arrest
was lawful.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Pitts, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-
220080, 2022-Ohio-4172, ¶ 13. Warrantless arrests made without probable cause are
unlawful. State v. Hughes, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-070755, 2008-Ohio-3966, ¶ 22. As this
court has held, where the record demonstrates that officers had only an articulable suspicion
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity, rather than probable cause, there exists
insufficient evidence to support a charge of resisting arrest. State v. Raines, 124 Ohio App.3d
430, 432, 706 N.E.2d 414 (1st Dist.1997).
{¶9} Under these principles, the prosecution was therefore required to prove that
Woodruff had probable cause to arrest J.C. for aggravated menacing.
{¶10} “[P]robable cause exists when the facts and circumstances are sufficient to
provide a reasonable belief that the accused has committed a crime.” State v. Martin, 170
Ohio St.3d 181, 2022-Ohio-4175, 209 N.E.3d 688, ¶ 17. But “probable cause requires more
than bare suspicion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at ¶ 18. “The circumstances
must demonstrate a fair probability that a crime has been committed.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id. Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to establish probable cause.
State v. Reed, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200104, 2022-Ohio-3986, ¶ 25.
{¶11} The evidence of probable cause to arrest in this case was extremely slim.
Woodruff was clear that he was arresting J.C. for aggravating menacing under R.C.
2903.21(A). That statute prohibits knowingly causing “another to believe that the offender
will cause serious physical harm to the person or property of the other person, the other
person’s unborn, or a member of the other person’s immediate family.” Thus, to demonstrate
that Woodruff had probable cause to believe J.C. committed aggravated menacing, and
therefore to arrest her for that offense, the state had the burden of presenting evidence
creating a reasonable belief that J.C. knowingly caused the alleged victim to believe J.C. would
cause serious physical harm to her.
{¶12} To that end, the state presented nothing but Woodruff’s extremely sparse
testimony. Woodruff stated that he spoke with the group home supervisor and the alleged
aggravated menacing victim, but he gave no details as to what these witnesses said. Not only
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
did Woodruff fail to provide these details, he also did not testify as to any circumstantial
evidence to his belief that J.C. had engaged in aggravated menacing. In fact, the only
testimony he gave as to his decision to arrest was simply that he talked to two people. Absent
more detail, there was no evidence in the record to justify Woodruff’s estimation that probable
cause existed to arrest J.C. for aggravated menacing. And because the state is required to
prove a lawful arrest as an element of resisting arrest, the absence of testimony from
Woodruff as to the basis for arresting J.C. is fatal to the state’s case.
{¶13} In its brief, the state attempted to address this gap by relying on the complaint
and arrest report to supplement Woodruff’s bare-bones testimony. But the state conceded at
oral argument that these documents were not introduced at trial and therefore are irrelevant
to the question of whether the state presented sufficient evidence of a lawful arrest. See State
v. Rodano, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104176, 2017-Ohio-1034, ¶ 26; see also State v. Palmer, 1st
Dist. Hamilton No. C-050750, 2006-Ohio-5456, ¶ 15-16.
{¶14} Because probable cause requires more than bare suspicion, Woodruff’s
testimony alone is insufficient to establish there was probable cause to arrest J.C. for
aggravated menacing. See Martin, 170 Ohio St.3d 181, 2022-Ohio-4175, 209 N.E.3d 688, at
¶ 18. Accordingly, given the absence of any proof as to the essential element of a lawful arrest,
J.C.’s adjudication for resisting arrest cannot stand. Her first assignment of error is therefore
sustained.
{¶15} J.C.’s second assignment of error, alleging that her adjudication was against
the manifest weight of the evidence, is made moot by our disposition of her first assignment
of error.
Judgment reversed and appellant discharged.
CROUSE, P.J., concurs. WINKLER, J., dissents.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
WINKLER, J., dissenting,
{¶1} Because the juvenile court dismissed the state’s delinquency case against J.C.
prior to holding a dispositional hearing, and the juvenile court did not impose a disposition
on J.C.’s adjudication, this court lacks jurisdiction over J.C.’s appeal. Therefore, I dissent
from the majority’s opinion reversing J.C.’s adjudication.
{¶2} The state filed two complaints against J.C. alleging that J.C. was a delinquent
child for committing acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the offenses of
aggravated menacing and resisting arrest. On the day of trial, the state dismissed the
aggravated-menacing complaint, but proceeded with its complaint for resisting arrest by
introducing testimony from the arresting officer. The magistrate adjudicated J.C. delinquent
of resisting arrest and continued the case for disposition. Prior to any dispositional hearing,
J.C. filed objections to the magistrate’s adjudication decision. While J.C.’s objections
remained pending, the magistrate entered an order terminating J.C.’s case. At the hearing on
the objections, J.C.’s attorney admitted to the juvenile court judge that the magistrate had
“actually closed the case out.” The juvenile court entered an order adopting the magistrate’s
decision terminating J.C.’s case and remitted court costs. J.C. now appeals to this court.
{¶3} Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(2), provides that courts of appeals
“shall have such jurisdiction as may be provided by law” to review “judgments or final orders.”
It is axiomatic that a delinquency adjudication without a disposition is not a final appealable
order. In re Sekulich, 65 Ohio St.2d 13, 14, 417 N.E.2d 1014 (1981); see R.C. 2505.02.
{¶4} In this case, J.C. filed objections to the magistrate’s decision regarding her
delinquency adjudication prior to any dispositional hearing. J.C. turned 18 shortly after her
adjudication, and even though the juvenile court maintained jurisdiction over J.C.’s
delinquency case under R.C. 2152.02(C)(6), the magistrate nevertheless chose to enter an
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
order terminating J.C.’s case prior to disposition. When a juvenile court dismisses a
delinquency complaint after adjudication without imposing a disposition such dismissal is
the functional equivalent of “an acquittal of the charges.” In re D.R., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos.
100034 and 100035, 2014-Ohio-832, ¶ 13, citing In re N.I., 191 Ohio App.3d 97, 2010-Ohio-
5791, 944 N.E.2d 1214 (8th Dist); see Juv.R. 29(F)(2)(d) (permitting the juvenile court to
dismiss a complaint after adjudication but prior to disposition if it “is in the best interest of
the child and the community.”).
{¶5} The fact that the juvenile court remitted court costs in J.C.’s case does not
equate to a “disposition” on J.C.’s adjudication. See State v. Bennett, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos.
C-140507 and C-140508, 2015-Ohio-3246, ¶ 5-6 (in a criminal case, the trial court’s judgment
entry remitting court costs without any further punishment does not constitute a “sentence”
and therefore no final appealable order exists).
{¶6} Because J.C. never received a disposition after her delinquency adjudication, I
would hold that this court lacks jurisdiction over J.C.’s appeal, and it should be dismissed.
Nevertheless, even if this court had jurisdiction over J.C.’s appeal, as the majority necessarily
determines, I would determine that J.C.’s adjudication for resisting arrest was supported by
sufficient evidence. J.C. argues that the police officer did not have probable cause to arrest
her for aggravated menacing, but the police officer testified that he responded to a call for an
issue at the group home where J.C. lived, and that he spoke to both the supervisor of the group
home and the alleged victim, another female juvenile, before placing J.C. under arrest.
Therefore, the police officer did not act on bare suspicion in arresting J.C.
{¶7} I respectfully dissent.
Please note:
The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
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