State v. Stapleton , 2023 Ohio 3085 ( 2023 )

[Cite as State v. Stapleton, 2023-Ohio-3085.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Appellee : C.A. No. 29736
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2022 CR 01204/2
:
SIR DEWAYNE STAPLETON : (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
: Court)
Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on September 1, 2023
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MICHAEL MILLS, Attorney for Appellant
RICKY L. MURRAY, Attorney for Appellee
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EPLEY, J.
{¶ 1} Sir Dewayne Stapleton was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery
following his no contest plea in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas.
Stapleton appeals from his convictions, claiming that the trial court erred in overruling his
motion to suppress his statements made to law enforcement officers and that his attorney
rendered ineffective assistance in failing to seek a competency evaluation. For the
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following reasons, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On April 22 and 23, 2022, Stapleton and another man were involved in two
aggravated robberies on or near the University of Dayton campus. The Dayton police
soon identified Stapleton as a suspect and began looking for him. Stapleton turned
himself in on April 26, 2022, and he was taken by detectives to the downtown police
station (the Safety Building), where he was interviewed for approximately 50 minutes.
{¶ 3} On May 5, 2022, Stapleton and a co-defendant were indicted on two counts
of aggravated robbery (deadly weapon), felonies of the first degree. Stapleton moved to
suppress the evidence against him, including the statements he made to detectives on
April 26, any eyewitness identifications, and any physical evidence gathered as fruit of
the wrongfully-obtained evidence. He argued that his statements had been obtained in
violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) and
were made involuntarily.
{¶ 4} A suppression hearing on Stapleton’s statements was held on July 12, 2022.
The court heard testimony from Detective Anthony Sawmiller of the Dayton Police
Department, a witness for the State, and Chauntey Washington, a case worker for
Goodwill Easter Seals, who was called by the defense. The pre-interview Miranda
waiver form and a video-recording of the April 26, 2022 interview were admitted into
evidence. A second hearing was scheduled on the additional issues, but it appears that
the hearing did not go forward.
{¶ 5} The trial court overruled the motion to suppress Stapleton’s statements. In
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a ten-page decision, the court concluded that Stapleton’s waiver had been made
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, despite his claim that his lack of education and
his intelligence level had prevented him from understanding his rights or the effect of the
waiver. The court further concluded that Stapleton’s statements had not been made
involuntarily.
{¶ 6} Approximately five months later, Stapleton pled no contest to both
aggravated robbery counts. As part of the plea, he agreed to pay restitution and have
no contact with the victims. After a presentence investigation, the trial court sentenced
him to concurrent sentences totaling three to four and a half years in prison. It also
ordered him to pay restitution of $483.60 and $518.45 to the two victims, jointly and
severally with his co-defendant. The court waived court costs.
{¶ 7} Stapleton appeals from his convictions, raising two assignments of error.
He challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress and his trial attorney’s
failure to seek a competency evaluation for him.
II. Motion to Suppress
{¶ 8} In his first assignment of error, Stapleton claims that he did not knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights on April 26, 2022. “Whether a
statement was made voluntarily and whether an individual knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently waived his or her Miranda rights are distinct issues.” State v. Lovato, 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 25683, 2014-Ohio-2311, ¶ 30; see also, e.g., State v. Eley, 77 Ohio
St.3d 174, 178, 672 N.E.2d 640 (1996). Stapleton does not challenge the trial court’s
conclusion that his statements were made voluntarily.
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{¶ 9} An appeal from a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question
of fact and law. State v. Ojezua, 2016-Ohio-2659, 50 N.E.3d 14, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.). When
considering a motion to suppress, the trial court takes on the role of trier of fact and is in
the best position to resolve factual questions and assess the credibility of witnesses.
State v. Turner, 2015-Ohio-4612, 48 N.E.3d 981, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.). As a result, we must
accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent and credible
evidence. Id. “Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently
determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts satisfy
the applicable legal standard.” Id., quoting State v. Koon, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26296,
2015-Ohio-1326, ¶ 13. The trial court’s application of law to the findings of fact is subject
to a de novo standard of review. State v. Shepherd, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29123,
2021-Ohio-4230, ¶ 10.
A. Evidence Presented at the Suppression Hearing
{¶ 10} Detective Sawmiller’s testimony and the video-recording of the April 26,
2022 interview established the following facts.
{¶ 11} On April 26, 2022, two detectives from the Dayton Police Department
brought Stapleton to the Safety Building in downtown Dayton after Stapleton expressed
a desire to give himself up to the police. Stapleton initially was placed in a holding cell.
{¶ 12} At approximately 3:20 p.m., Detective Sawmiller of the Violent Offender Unit
brought Stapleton into an interview room with a desk and three chairs. Stapleton sat in
the corner beside the desk; Sawmiller sat a few feet away at the desk and led the
interview. Detective Harry Swaggert from the University of Dayton Police Department
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sat by the door and assisted with some questioning.
{¶ 13} Detective Sawmiller began the interview by asking Stapleton how old he
was. Stapleton indicated that he had just turned 18 years old. When asked if he had
had his rights previously read to him, Stapleton said that he had but did not remember
when, just “a long time ago.” The detective then obtained identifying information from
Stapleton: his name, birthdate, and home address. Sawmiller wrote the information on
a waiver of rights form. Stapleton did not know his Social Security number.
{¶ 14} Stapleton told the detective that he had completed ninth grade and had had
no additional schooling. Detective Sawmiller then asked Stapleton if he understood the
term “learning disabilities.” When Stapleton responded that he did not understand,
Sawmiller asked if he had difficulty reading. Stapleton said that he could read “some”
and understood what he read “half the time.” He nodded affirmatively when Sawmiller
asked if he understood what others read to him.
{¶ 15} Stapleton further indicated that he did not work, that he had eaten that day,
and that he had not taken any drugs.
{¶ 16} Detective Sawmiller began to review the pre-interview Miranda waiver form
with Stapleton. The detective told Stapleton that he would need to initial on the
“hashmarks” to show that he understood what the detective had read to him. When
Stapleton motioned to begin initialing, Sawmiller stopped him and said that he (Sawmiller)
needed to read the statements first. Detective Sawmiller first read that Stapleton was
being interviewed regarding the crime of aggravated robbery. He then read Stapleton’s
first Miranda right. The detective asked Stapleton if he understood, and Stapleton
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nodded affirmatively. Sawmiller had Stapleton initial next to the first right. They
proceeded similarly with the additional four statements of Stapleton’s Miranda rights.
{¶ 17} Detective Sawmiller asked Stapleton to try to read the “waiver of rights”
paragraph on the form. Stapleton shook his head, indicating that he could not. After
confirming that Stapleton had completed ninth grade, the detective read the waiver
paragraph to him. Sawmiller asked if Stapleton understood the word “coercion” and then
explained that he would not trick Stapleton or threaten him to force him to do something
he did not want to do. After Stapleton indicated that he understood, the detective had
him sign the pre-interview form.
{¶ 18} Detective Sawmiller then asked Stapleton if he wanted to talk to them. As
noted by the trial court, Stapleton’s response was unintelligible. The detective explained
to Stapleton that “somebody alleged a crime against you” and that, before the detectives
could talk to him, Stapleton had “to say yes or no.” Stapleton replied, “Yeah.” Sawmiller
clarified, “You want to talk to us?” Stapleton again responded affirmatively.
{¶ 19} For the next 43 minutes or so, Detective Sawmiller and, to a lesser degree,
Detective Swaggert questioned Stapleton about the events surrounding the aggravated
robberies near the University of Dayton. The trial court summarized the interview,
stating:
Det. Sawmiller began questioning Defendant about the events at
issue in the case. Some questions Defendant answered appropriately;
other times, Defendant asked why he was asking him questions; and
sometimes Defendant just stared at Det. Sawmiller in response to the
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questions. Defendant initially seemed hesitant to answer any questions
that would incriminate his co-defendant, but when Det. Sawmiller began
making statements about knowledge already gained from his co-defendant,
Defendant became somewhat more forthcoming with his answers. At one
point, he said “I was just following; he was the leader.” Several times when
the detective would phrase a question, “did you guys…,” Defendant would
clarify “he” did whatever was being asked, referring to his co-defendant,
appearing to distance himself from any criminal acts.
At times, Defendant provided a narrative of events. When he did
this, the response was appropriate and the narrative made sense. At other
times, Defendant would not give any verbal or nonverbal response to the
officers’ questions. The second detective in the room tended to ask
compound questions that were more difficult to answer, and Defendant
often did not respond at all, other than to just look at him. At one point in
the interview, the detectives asked Defendant if he knew the whereabouts
of a female they believe was involved in a separate burglary of a gun.
Defendant said it wouldn’t help his case to tell them anything about her.
Throughout the interview, Defendant occasionally asked questions about
the various topics of discussion. However, Defendant consistently,
throughout the interview, downplayed his role in all of the events at issue.
At no point during the interview did Defendant ask to stop or ask for an
attorney.
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{¶ 20} Chauntey Washington testified at the suppression hearing that she had
worked with Stapleton as a case manager with the Lifeline re-entry program at Goodwill
Easter Seals beginning in January 2022. Washington explained that the program works
with young adults in the judicial system, assisting them with obtaining education and
employment, making referrals for mental health services, and “just helping them stay out
of trouble.” Washington indicated that she met with Stapleton one-on-one once or twice
per week. She had assisted him with obtaining a state identification card and getting
back into school.
{¶ 21} Washington testified that she “had to explain stuff to [Stapleton] thoroughly”
and would need to complete forms for him because “the comprehension wasn’t all the
way there.” She clarified that even when she explained it, he did not understand.
Washington stated that she had received Stapleton’s educational records, which showed
that he had an individualized educational plan (IEP) and received all failing grades. The
IEP was for “a learning disability, just he wasn’t comprehending.” When asked if
Stapleton understood when she read forms to him, Washington responded, “Some of it,
but not for the most part.”
B. Validity of Stapleton’s Miranda Waiver
{¶ 22} Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, no person
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself or herself. To ensure that this
constitutional right is protected, statements resulting from custodial interrogations are
admissible only after a showing that the procedural safeguards described in Miranda have
been followed. State v. Earnest, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26646, 2015-Ohio-3913, ¶ 21.
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Miranda held that prior to questioning, a suspect “must be warned that he [or she] has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he [or she] does make may be used as evidence
against him [or her], and that he [or she] has a right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed.” In re M.H., 163 Ohio St.3d 93, 2020-Ohio-5485, 168 N.E.3d 439,
¶ 18, quoting Miranda at 444. Custodial interrogation occurs when an officer, by words
or action, seeks information from a suspect that he knows is reasonably likely to be
incriminating. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d
297 (1980); State v. Thompson-Shabazz, 2017-Ohio-7434, 96 N.E.3d 1146, ¶ 17 (2d
Dist.).
{¶ 23} A suspect may effectively waive his or her Miranda rights only if the waiver
is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. State v. Dailey, 53 Ohio St.3d 88, 91,
559 N.E.2d 459 (1990), citing Miranda at 444. The waiver of Miranda rights is valid only
if (1) the waiver was “the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation,
coercion, or deception[,]” and (2) the person had “a full awareness of both the nature of
the right[s] being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon [them].”
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986); State v.
Marejka, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27662, 2018-Ohio-2570, ¶ 14.
{¶ 24} Courts examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a
suspect has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his or her Miranda rights.
State v. Clark, 38 Ohio St.3d 252, 261, 527 N.E.2d 844 (1988); State v. White, 2018-
Ohio-3076, 118 N.E.3d 410, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.). “By definition of ‘totality,’ a court is to look
to all of the evidence to determine a suspect's understanding, which can be implied by
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his conduct and the situation.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Lather, 110 Ohio St.3d 270,
2006-Ohio-4477, 853 N.E.2d 279, ¶ 9. Similar to determining whether the pretrial
statement was involuntary, relevant factors regarding the Miranda waiver may include the
suspect’s background and criminal experience; age, education, and intelligence; the
length, intensity, and frequency of the interrogation; the existence of deprivation,
mistreatment, threat, or inducement; and any other factor deemed by the court to be
relevant. E.g., Lather at ¶ 9; State v. Wesson, 137 Ohio St.3d 309, 2013-Ohio-4575, 999
N.E.2d 557, ¶ 35. When the suspect is a juvenile, the totality of circumstances includes
the capacity to understand the warnings, the nature of the Fifth Amendment rights, and
the consequences of waiving those rights, as well as the access to advice from a parent,
guardian, or custodian. State v. Barker, 149 Ohio St.3d 1, 2016-Ohio-2708, 73 N.E.3d
365, ¶ 24.
{¶ 25} “[D]eficient intelligence is but one factor in the totality of the circumstances
that must be considered in determining the voluntariness of a waiver.” State v. Ford, 158
Ohio St.3d 139, 2019-Ohio-4539, 140 N.E.3d 616, ¶ 190. “A defendant’s mental
condition may be a ‘significant factor in the “voluntariness” calculus. * * * But this fact does
not justify a conclusion that a defendant’s mental condition, by itself and apart from its
relation to official coercion, should ever dispose of the inquiry into constitutional
“voluntariness.” ’ ” State v. Frazier, 115 Ohio St.3d 139, 2007-Ohio-5048, 873 N.E.2d
1263, ¶ 113, quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d
473 (1986).
{¶ 26} No express written or oral waiver of Miranda rights is required. North
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Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979); State v.
Dillon, 2016-Ohio-1561, 63 N.E.3d 712, ¶ 59 (2d Dist). “Instead, waiver can be inferred
where a defendant proceeds to speak after being advised of his rights and indicating an
understanding of them.” Dillon at ¶ 59; see Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 388-
389, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010) (“a suspect who has received and
understood the Miranda warnings, and has not invoked his Miranda rights, waives the
right to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the police”).
{¶ 27} The State bears the burden of proving a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
waiver of Miranda rights. State v. Martin, 151 Ohio St.3d 470, 2017-Ohio-7556, 90
N.E.3d 857, ¶ 100. “Evidence of a written waiver form signed by the accused is strong
proof that the waiver was valid.” State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 425, 683 N.E.2d
1096 (1997).
{¶ 28} Upon review of the suppression hearing evidence, the trial court did not err
in denying Stapleton’s motion to suppress the statements he made during his police
interview. Stapleton was 18 years old and had some previous experience with the
criminal justice system. Washington confirmed that she began working with Stapleton
when he “got out of juvenile,” and she was in contact with his probation officer. Stapleton
indicated that he had previously been informed of his Miranda rights, albeit a “long time
ago.”
{¶ 29} Before informing Stapleton of his Miranda rights, Detective Sawmiller
inquired about Stapleton’s reading and comprehension abilities. Sawmiller learned from
him that he had a limited ability to read and understand what he read; Washington’s
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testimony reinforced that Stapleton had a significant difficulty reading and completing
forms himself. Stapleton indicated to Detective Sawmiller, however, that he understood
what was read to him. The detective read the pre-interview form to Stapleton in its
entirety, stopping after each right to ask if Stapleton understood it. Stapleton expressed
that he did, and he followed the detective’s instruction to initial on the line beside each
right. The detective also read the waiver of rights paragraph to Stapleton, explaining
what “coercion” meant. Stapleton signed the form and orally expressed that he wanted
to speak with the detectives.
{¶ 30} There was no evidence that Stapleton was coerced into waiving his Miranda
rights, nor that the detectives otherwise engaged in any improper behavior to induce the
waiver. The detectives spoke with Stapleton for approximately an hour (including the
review of the pre-interview form) in a conversational manner.
{¶ 31} Although the record supports a conclusion that Stapleton has learning
disabilities and could not read the pre-interview form, his answers to the detectives’
questions did not indicate that Stapleton had been unable to validly waive his Miranda
rights. The trial court found “most compelling” Stapleton’s conduct throughout the
interview, stating:
While at times Defendant would simply stare at whichever detective asked
him the question, this often happened when his response could potentially
incriminate him or his co-defendant. Defendant was careful on multiple
occasions to distinguish the acts of himself and his co-defendant in
response to the detectives’ questions. He also redirected the detectives
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when their questions assumed a fact that may not have been true.
Occasionally, Defendant even said to the detectives that answering certain
questions (usually about other people) would not help his case in any way.
While Defendant likely does have some cognitive deficits, he did not
exhibit them to the detectives to the extent they would not have believed his
waiver was knowing and intelligent. * * *
We agree with the trial court’s assessment. Although Stapleton may have some
cognitive deficits, the record reflects that Stapleton’s waiver of his Miranda rights was
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
{¶ 32} Stapleton’s first assignment of error is overruled.
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
{¶ 33} In his second assignment of error, Stapleton claims that his trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to seek a competency evaluation. He argues
that an evaluation was necessary to properly challenge the Miranda warnings in this case.
{¶ 34} To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
demonstrate both that (1) trial counsel’s conduct was deficient, and (2) trial counsel’s
deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Lloyd, Ohio Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-
4259, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 15.
{¶ 35} Trial counsel’s performance is deficient if it falls below an objective standard
of reasonableness. Strickland at 687; Lloyd at ¶ 16. The first prong “requires showing
that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’
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guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland at 687; State v. Dennis,
2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29266, 2022-Ohio-2888, ¶ 37. Hindsight is not permitted to
distort the assessment of what was reasonable in light of counsel’s perspective at the
time, and a debatable decision concerning trial strategy cannot form the basis of a finding
of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Cook, 65 Ohio St.3d 516, 524-525, 605
N.E.2d 70 (1992); State v. Fields, 2017-Ohio-400, 84 N.E.3d 193, ¶ 38 (2d Dist.). Trial
counsel is entitled to a strong presumption that his or her conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable assistance. Strickland at 689.
{¶ 36} The second prong requires a showing that the errors were serious enough
to create a reasonable probability that, but for the errors, the outcome of the case would
have been different. Strickland at 694; Lloyd at ¶ 18. “A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.{¶ 37} A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be raised on direct
appeal if it relies on evidence outside the record. E.g., State v. Stanford, 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 29544, 2023-Ohio-1515, ¶ 36; State v. Merrick, 2d Dist. Greene No.
2019-CA-29, 2020-Ohio-3744, ¶ 34.
{¶ 38} Although there was some evidence in the record that Stapleton may have
had cognitive deficits, the record did not contain the results of a mental evaluation.
Consequently, we can only speculate whether a mental evaluation would have supported
Stapleton’s claim that he was unable to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his
Miranda rights. On this record, Stapleton cannot establish that he was prejudiced by his
attorney’s failure to obtain a mental evaluation of him. Rather, his argument necessarily
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relies on information outside of the record. Stapleton’s claim that his trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to obtain an evaluation is not properly raised on
direct appeal.
{¶ 39} Stapleton’s second assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 40} The trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.
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WELBAUM, P.J. and LEWIS, J., concur.